THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE CRIMES OF THE NAZI AND SOVIET OCCUPATION REGIMES

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System of Criminal Occupational Policy – the Role of Political and Social Occupational Structures as well as Collaboration with them in 1940-1941

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INTRODUCTION

During the first half of the XX century for the first time in the world's history totalitarian regimes were established in some countries, the regimes, which sought to change the political structure of the world under their political model. The totalitarian Soviet Union managed to occupy the Republic of Lithuania and other Baltic countries in 1940, imposed its power there and started reorganising the lives in those countries with the help of the occupational power mechanism under the Soviet principles. After the Soviet Union annexed Lithuania, it enforced the unified soviet political system in the country. The communist political doctrine did not envisage other political model of the USSR occupied regions than that existed in the Soviet Union[1].

The essential feature of the soviet political system and the totalitarian regime was political dictatorship of the communist party, which monopolised the power, to the society[2]. Seeking to retain illegitimate monopoly of power and to change the life of the society to suit its own principles and goals on the basis of the communist doctrine, the communist party took social and political institutes under its power. Political dictatorship enabled the communist party to create and implement such a political system from above, the nucleus of which was the party, which concentrated undivided and unlimited powers of the government. It also unconditionally imposed its power upon all other elements of political system. The organisation of the party and other subordinate political institutions, the system of public institutions in the first place, embodied the totality of political institutions through which the communist party was expressing its political will, exercised its powers and implemented the policy. The policy of the communist party, which was a deliberate activity, ruled over the processes of the society development and was directed towards the implementation of the interests of the governing communist party. Under the conditions of totalitarian regime the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) practically eliminated all boundaries between the policy and the areas of governing and made all the governance political. The unity of the policy and governance created preconditions during the 4th decade in the Soviet Union to form a special system of bureaucratic administration where the organisation of the party and its apparatus played political and basic administration role. In the totalitarian system the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) (b) sought to penetrate into all the spheres of social life, reorganise them under its doctrine, manage and control. Besides, it expanded the functions of governing and administration system and the sphere of activity, as well as the role of the state's apparatus in implementing the power and policy of the party, regulating and controlling over the life of the society. The organisation of the party and the system of political institutes, in the first place public institutions, controlled the society, practically politicised and nationalised many institutes of social life and means of expression. During the second half of the 4th decade the bureaucracy and governmental system established in the Soviet Union. In such a system the class of

higher bureaucracy - political bureaucracy (nomenclature) was formed on the basis of political ideological fidelity[3]. The political system of the Soviet Union was an alien political and historical phenomenon to the occupied Lithuania, which did not result from the natural historical development of the society and political life of the country. It was imposed on Lithuania from the side by an alien occupant state. It was implemented by forcible and administration methods from above through the occupational political structures. It destroyed the political structure of the Republic of Lithuania, the political institutes of the society of Lithuanian, social and political relations.

Occupational government could not establish the principles of the communist system in Lithuania and function without having established the institutional forms and the action mechanism. The communist party could not implement its policy without applying the means of influence on the society and without having the totality of political institutes though which it was implementing its political ideas, objectives and interests, exercising its power, organising and managing the life of the society to suit the interests and goals of the party. The processes of sovietization of Lithuania, implementation of the power and policy of the communist party was very much dependent on the organisation and functioning of political institutes. Political structures were the main political elements of the occupant state, its powers and occupational policy in Lithuania through which the occupation authorities legalised and expressed themselves, imposed and implemented their powers, performed the functions of the occupant state and government, implemented the policy of the communist party.

The goals of the communist party were to annex and retain Lithuania by force in the Soviet Union under the interests and objectives of the party as well as to change the social political reality of Lithuania, organise and rule over its social processes. The objectives of the party were to destroy the statehood of Lithuania, its national political, economic structure; to destroy the forms of Lithuanian social and spiritual life; to crush the national and political awareness of the Lithuanian nation and suppress its resistance to occupational regime; to physically annihilate the most politically active and the most conscious part of the Lithuanian nation; to implement soviet political system in Lithuania, socialist planned economy, to form uniform social structure of the society, to reform other spheres of social and spiritual life on the communist grounds. The functions of the occupational policy were to express and implement the interest of the ruling communist party; to reorganise the life of the occupied Lithuanian society under the principles of the communist doctrine, to organise and manage the society processes on the communist grounds; to incorporate Lithuania into the Soviet Union and in this way to ensure the stability and uniformity of the soviet social and political system.

The occupational government, which was hostile towards Lithuanian society, could make people obey its will and turn all their life upside down only by using organised violence of the state, political dictatorship and introducing an all-inclusive society control. Therefore, the communists were implementing occupational policy with the help of the state's apparatus and the means of influence of

the state on the society. The system of government and administration of occupied Lithuania was an important political element, which performed the functions of implementation of occupational policy, universal organisation of the occupied society, management, control and repression.

Lithuania was occupied by force and by using military aggression as well as cunning political operations. Lithuania was annexed to the Soviet Union against the law and retained under its power using the state's organised power of violence. All occupational policy in Lithuania was enforced and criminal in its objectives and tasks, content and manner, the means of its implementation, measures as well as the actions of the ones who were carrying out such a policy.

Scientific researches on the implementation of the communist party policy, the establishment of political institutions, which exercised it, and its functioning are an important part of works of political science and historical development of the occupied Lithuanian society. Without realising the enslavement of Lithuania, governance and the mechanism of occupation policy it is impossible to analyse in depth the sovietisation of Lithuania and other processes, which took place in the occupied Lithuania. The establishment of occupation structures and their role in implementing occupation policy during the first period of the Soviet occupation is a part of problems of occupied Lithuanian history, which have been touched upon very little in the historiography of Lithuania and the foreign one. An objective and thorough research of such problems could be realistic only in the works of a compound type, in the light of historical, political science, social and other aspects and using the methods of these spheres. Such questions are difficult or practically impossible to be dealt with in one study. It is difficult to analyse the political system of occupation as historical and political literature gives various definitions of such a policy, its system, they use different terms to define the forms of policy, content and process itself. Policy is defined as relations of political classes; dominance connected to the struggle and application of power; relations connected with gaining of power, retaining and application of power; organisation of public life and governing with the help of the government; the system of norms and principals regulating the life of the society; conscious activity of governing and managing over the processes of social development with the help of national government within the interests and goals of the society or its groups (classes, elite); etc. Contemporary Russian historians and political scientists, who analyse the policy of the communist party under the conditions of totalitarian regime, say that a policy is an activity of a party in organising and ruling over the processes of the society with the help of national government within the interests and goals of the communists[4]. Political structure consists of relations related to the gain, retention and application of power; the activity of public institutions organising and governing the society; the totality of political organisations and norms, which help to realise political ideas, objectives and implement the power. On the institutional level, the political system is the totality of political institutes though which the dictatorship of the communist party is implemented, the society is organised and

governed within the interests and goals of the party, relations with the government are formalised and exercised. Similarly the occupational policy is understood by Lithuanian researches. A term *policy* is quite common in the works of Lithuanian and Russian authors as well as publications in Russian and Lithuanian. The contemporary foreign works and publications in English use three terms to define the form of policy, its content and the process: polity, policy, and politics[5]. Policy is used in investigating the content of the government, its way of operation, the practise of political decision-making.

This study will try to define the structure of occupational political and social structures, the communist party in the first place, and their role in implementing criminal occupational policy during the years of the first soviet occupation. The object of research is the formation of occupational policy system in Lithuania, the role of the elements – political structures – of this system in implementing criminal occupation policy as well as the collaboration of social classes with them. Occupational policy in this work means the activity of the occupational government of incorporating and retaining Lithuania in the Soviet Union by force. It also means putting Lithuania on the communist track and recasting Lithuanian social and political reality to suit the interests and objectives of the communist party, organising and governing the processes of the occupied society. The system of occupational policy has an institutional approach as a totality of political structures, through which the communist party was expressing its political will, exercising the power and implementing its policy.

Political events in the Soviet Union and its occupied regions are explained in a different way in contemporary historical and the literature of social political science. This study agrees with the prevailing opinion that the USSR administration was implementing a closed political system, totalitarian political regime, and bureaucratic type of governance, which manifested in the form of political bureaucracy in Lithuania by force[6]. We are of the opinion that the authorities of CPSU (b) were forming occupation policy and making the most important decisions on the sovietisation of Lithuania. The communist organisation of Lithuania was not practically involved in forming occupational policy. However, it was the most important political structure, which was organising and supervising the implementation of measures. The study agrees with the prevailing opinion in historiography that the communist party implemented occupational policy through the organisation of the party, the subordinate government and administration institutions as well as the class of political bureaucracy (nomenclature). Since the occupational policy was carried out with the help of the government, its measures and administration methods, the institutions of administration were an important element of the party's policy. Public organisations, which were active in occupied Lithuania, were incorporated into the system of occupational policy. However, during the period of the first soviet occupation it played a minor political role.

Survey of Historical Literature and Sources

The historians, who were analysing the history of the USSR and occupied Lithuania, characterised the formation of occupational political structures and their role in implementing occupational policy in Lithuania during the first Soviet occupation in various aspects. However, there are no special professional investigations carried out in this field, which would provide with academic analysis of the implementation of the USSR political system, governing of occupied Lithuania, the role of occupational structures in implementation of occupational policy in Lithuania during the first Soviet occupation. There is a lack of political science investigations in this field. Various representatives of political science theories and historiographic conceptions have noticed that the USSR reshaped the life of the society in all occupied countries as well as in Lithuania to suit the same principles of the communist system. The life was also being controlled under the same model. The works elucidated on the soviet political system, which was being implemented in those regions ("proletariat dictatorship in the form of the soviet rule", "communist dictatorship", "the dictatorship of nomenclature", etc), political regime and the form of governing (totalitarianism, nomenclature totalitarianism, authoritarianism, autocracy, partocracy). Also the model of governing is defined (command administration, nomenclature, bureaucratic system), formation and implementation of the party's policy is discussed in general[7]. It is emphasised that due to political regime and autocracy in the organisation of the party a very small number of highest party executives were forming CPSU (b) policy and participating in a decision-making process. These executives removed all party structures apart from the CPSU (b) political bureau of the communist party from decision-making procedures. When analysing the implementation of the policy, political scientists emphasise that the ruling communist party implemented its policy through the government of the state by its measures. Historians underscore that the communist party implemented its policy through the organisation of the party and other subordinate political institutes, through the system of state institutions in the first place. A couple of conditions gave impetus to limit themselves with the characteristics of the common political system and political regime without analysing the structure and functioning of the political system.

Soviet historians realised the real mechanism of governing of the communist party and could use, though in a limited way, primary historical sources. However, due to undemocratic political system, the Marxist historiographies, which were mandatory to all researches, did not have a possibility to objectively elucidate upon such questions[8]. The conditions were more favourable to foreign researches and they were able to analyse the political system of the communist party in the occupied Lithuania on the basis of historical facts and in an objective way. However, the primary sources, without which the scientific research of history becomes impossible, were inaccessible to them. Therefore it was difficult to define what was the real structure of occupational government, the

real role of political structures in forming and implementing the policy. It is important that the political communist doctrine and practise were not analogous in universal political history. Totalitarian political regimes of the USSR and Germany were compared and conclusions were made about the similar structure of the government and its functioning, however it was difficult to find relevant equivalents to other phenomena related to the governing of the state. The system of the communist party and its policy was hard to understand to foreign researches who lived in a totally different political and cultural environment. In the terminology of political science there even were proper definitions, which could have defined Soviet political reality[9]. Contemporary Russian historiography underscores that the political system of the USSR is hard to analyse and evaluate adequately within the framework and definitions of ordinary historical conceptions, which dominate abroad, and theories of political science.[10].

The obstacles for the thorough analysis of foreign authors was the fact that due to the political interests of the ruling communist party the content of the soviet state and government was deliberately misinterpreted. Various doctrines were made up to conceal political phenomena in the USSR and occupied Lithuania; the terms to mislead the scientific society were broadly used. They caused confusion in concepts and meanings.

It is difficult to analyse the occupation policy system during the first soviet occupation in Lithuania due to the special features of this period. Since the soviet political system in occupied Lithuania was implemented during the processes of bolshevisation and sovietisation, the system of occupational policy was formed gradually. Before the war between Germany and the USSR occupational government could not physically establish the system of occupational policy in such a way so it could work in other territories of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this system could not always be adequately evaluated in the framework of the prevailing historical conceptions and theories of political science.

As there is a shortage of professional historical and political science studies on the system of occupational policy during the first soviet occupation in Lithuania, one has to discuss many works that are not directly related to the analysed topic and where the historical processes and political phenomenon in Lithuania in 1940-1941 are not evaluated adequately very often. However, these works define in some aspect the governing and the role of political structures in implementing the occupational policy.

Soviet Historiography

In general the soviet historiography makes an integral literature group. The Marxist-Leninist historiography model was being implemented on the level of all the Soviet Union[11]. Authors, who wrote about the governing of the USSR and Lithuania, claimed that they were referring to the research

methodology of Marxist historical processes. However, in practise most of the time it manifested in that researches were evaluating political processes under the official doctrine of the communist party, which was politically and ideologically useful to the party. This doctrine was provided and supervised by the elite of the party (nomenclature). Marxist-Leninist historiography was a part of historiography of the Soviet Union ruling class, it was a conception which met their political and ideological interests[12].

Marxist-Leninist historiography claimed that economic relations and the distribution of the society into classes determine political processes. Due to that political relations were analysed mostly from the approach of class interests and relations between them. The 8-9 decade of the 20-century saw the works, which described the Marxist-Leninist conception on the issues of the Soviet State, government and governing of the society[13]. Under the veil of the so-called theory of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and partly Vladimir Lenin on the state, government and governing of the society were imposed and adjusted to suit the interests of the ruling class. They considered these ideas the fundamental postulates of Marxism and an indicator, which could determine whether the ideas of Marxism are observed in general[14]. There were even attempts to attach some conception fragments of foreign political scientists, who managed to find some correspondences in the works of theoreticians of Marxism and bolshevism, into the scheme of traditional Marxism[15].

Theoreticians of Marxism and bolshevism evaluated the state from the social–class approach, therefore they emphasized its class origin, nature and functions. In their opinion, any state (including the socialist one) is a consequence and manifestation of a gap between the government and the society as well as a permanent class conflict, a special suppressing power, which one class applied in order to suppress the oppressed class. The presence of the state shows that the society is divided into opposing classes and the conflicts of these classes are permanent[16]. According to the Marxist approach, the only way to eliminate the gap between the government and the society was by creating a non-class communist society where the state with its mechanism of violence and government would vanish[17]. The statement about vanishing of the state as such as well as the destruction of its mechanism of violence (including bureaucracy) was a fundamental postulate of the political doctrine of Marxism and one of the main tasks of the communist party policy. However, after Bolsheviks seized the power, the Marxist conception of the vanishing of the state and other political institutes did not meet the interests of retention and expansion of the soviet state. Therefore, at the end of the 4th decade of the 20th century Joseph Stalin revised Marxism and said that the institute of a strong state should be retained not only in the socialist but also in the non-class communist society[18]. Bolshevik ideologists transformed the conception of Marxism on vanishing of a state, rehabilitated the idea of the statehood, which was criticised by Marxism and established the provisions for a strong centralised socialist state with its

enormous mechanism of violence and governing (strong administration and bureaucracy which concentrated the power). That helped to ideologically reason the interests of the totalitarian state and dictatorship, to retain and strengthen their organisational role in controlling the processes of the society. Political expansion ideas and traditions of the Russian empire started to be revived. The philosophy of the so-called great Russians and great statesmen about the global liberation mission of the Russian nation and the Russian state were transferred and adjusted to bolshevism as well as the so-called positive ('civilising') significance of Russian imperial colonial policy to the occupied regions[19]. Such a system of approaches was ideologically concealing the aggressive USSR policy towards the neighbouring countries. It also reasoned the aggression of the USSR towards Lithuania and its incorporation into the Soviet Union. Lithuanian historians were repeating statements of the USSR historiography almost word by word that incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union is a historically advanced phenomenon and meets the historical interests of the USSR states and Lithuania as well as strengthens the power of the Soviet state[20].

Soviet historiography emphasized the definition of the tasks and functions of the state. Historians faced some ideological problems in discussing the function of suppressing the state. Lenin did not hide that the state of proletariat dictatorship is "a special force of proletariat to suppress bourgeoisie". He underscored that "the conflict of classes, in the proletarian dictatorship, does not vanish but gain another form", therefore it is important to suppress the resistance against the communist government[21]. Stalin developed such ideas so as they became statements on the strengthening of class conflict in a socialist state and he also underscored that suppression is one of the main functions of the USSR state[22]. However, after 20th meeting of the Soviet Socialist Communist Party (SSCP) in 1956 negatively evaluated Stalin's statement about the strengthening of class conflict and publicly condemned his mass repressions, the soviet historiography tried to write as little as possible on the activity of the state, which was associated with the terror of Bolsheviks. The ideological roots and political reasons of mass terror were concealed, the role it had in implementing totalitarian regime was kept quiet. The repression function of the state was interpreted in the context of class conflict emphasising that it was directed only towards overthrowing exploitative classes. Also, there were attempts to strengthen the political situation of the soviet government (proletariat dictatorship). Mass terror was associated only with Stalin's philosophy, its personal dictate and the so-called violations of socialistic legislation during the years of Stalin's "personal cult"[23].

In the framework of such statements the activity of LSSR repressive structures in suppressing the resistance of the Lithuanian nation towards occupation in 1940-1941 was defined [24]. The occupational regime was trying to conceal the tasks, objectives and nature of the resistance of the Lithuanian nation on political considerations. Therefore, the content of the resistance movement was totally misrepresented. The fight of the Lithuanian nation for the reestablishment of the sovereignty of

the state was identified with the fight of bourgeoisie for political power. Such a position reflected the efforts of the communist party to conceal that the occupational regime in Lithuania did not have a mass support and was based on the organised violence and state mechanism of the USSR. One of such works - the dissertation of lawyer Stanislovaitis (R. Stanislovaitis) should be mentioned[25]. The author took the view of the soviet historiography and interpreted the resistance of the Lithuanian nation in the framework of the class conflict theory. Therefore, he called the activity of the soviet state in suppressing the fight for liberation of the Lithuanian nation "the suppressing function of adversarial activity of overthrown classes and opposing class elements"[26]. In contrast with other soviet authors, Stanislovaitis discussed repressive policy in Lithuania in a broader sense and mentioned such aspects, which were not legal under the norms of the soviet law.

Seeking to ideologically reason their political practise, ideologists of the communist party transformed the conception about the direct governing of the nation and adjusted it to the political dictatorship of communists. Theoreticians of Marxism-Leninism theory claimed that upon the elimination of alienation of people and the government, the state and its functions would gradually vanish in the socialist society. This would happen when the bureaucratic rule would be changed by the direct governing of the nation, which would manifest in a special form of governing. According to Marx an example of such a form of governing is the commune of Paris, according to Lenin – a specific form of Russian proletariat dictatorship - councils[27]. Lenin was preoccupied with councils firstly due to the fact that they neglected the principle of the separation of powers and practically united the forms of governing in one centre of power, which could be easily controlled by communists[28]. Having seized the power, Bolsheviks shaped the idea about the unification of the forms of governing to their ideology. Party structures directed and controlled the activity of councils, duplicated their functions and practically usurped their executive and legislative powers and became unified centres of governing[29]. Councils became formal institutes with the motto – "all power to councils"; this motto was concealing the dictatorship of Bolsheviks. Seeking to conceal that the party was creating a power monopoly and uniting all the forms of power in its structures, Bolshevik ideologists were artificially advocating the principle of separation of powers. Historical literature emphasized two forms of government. It explained that the Bolshevik party had a political power, whereas councils had the power of the state. Under the provisions of the USSR constitution adopted in 1936, the separation of powers into the legislative, executive and judiciary was emphasized. Also, it was written that the socialist parliamentarian form of governing was established in the Soviet Union[30]. The advocates of the so-called socialistic parliamentarianism did not even explained why Stalin "rehabilitated" parliamentarianism out of a sudden, which Marxists considered an unsuccessful form of governing of the socialist state and unacceptable form of governing of bourgeoisie state. Till 1936 all the Bolshevik ideologists were evaluating it negatively, including Stalin himself[31]. Soviet authors tried not to give

away that communists established a pseudo-parliamentarian construction in order to hide the unification of powers in party structures under it and to create an appearance of a legitimate government and democratic form of governing. The advocacy of the so-called soviet parliamentarianism model caused another problem: within its framework it was impossible to explain why the bureaucratic vertical was strengthened in the Soviet Union in the 4th decade, and why the prerogatives of the executive bodies expanded. The fact that ruling and administration institutions in reality were not accountable to "the parliament", did not go together with the parliamentarian form of governing[32]. The Soviet authors did not comment on the fact of strengthening the executive bodies so not to attract the attention to those issues.

The scheme hidden by the motto of the times of Russian revolution "all power to councils" was reflected in works of historians who discussed the implementation of the Soviet political system in Lithuania during the first soviet occupation in some aspects.

Authors who were writing about the events of 1940 in Lithuania claimed that the political, social and economic structure established during the first soviet occupation in Lithuania was different from the one that was in the Soviet Union at the time. Different from the USSR the socialism was only started to be implemented in Lithuania. The transitional period, which matched with the state of proletariat dictatorship under the doctrine of Bolsheviks, was needed in order to form the so-called foundations for socialism. Therefore, the proletariat dictatorship was established in Lithuania[33]. Under the formal argument - the USSR constitutional document of 1940, historians and lawyers claimed that the Soviet rule was established in Lithuania and the system of governing of the state and institutes was transferred from the USSR[34].

Seeking not to ruin the so-called scheme of the soviet parliamentarianism, soviet authors did not analyse the real role of soviet institutes in the mechanism of the state, their competencies and interaction between them. Soviet historiography did not try to explain convincingly how the soviet government was functioning in Lithuania during the first soviet occupation if there were no councils at the time apart from the People's Parliament, which became a temporary Supreme Soviet on 25 August 1940. Having in mind that all the sources of the soviet times unanimously claim that councils were the basis for the soviet state and they were the national form of proletariat dictatorship, then one might ask how the proletariat dictatorship was functioning without its main institute and whether the Soviet rule was in Lithuania at all. It is understandable that due to ideological reasons historians had to explain such a situation somehow and conceal the "vacuum of the soviet bodies of power". The authors, who wrote on the structure of the LSSR administration in-1940 –1941, claimed that before the USSR-Germany war the communists hadn't managed to organise the elections to the councils[35]. They almost repeated word-by-word the resolutions of the communist party on the establishment of the local administration bodies and claimed that the system of temporary transitional type of local bodies of

power was established when the provisional executive committees merged the functions of councils and their committees[36]. However, not a single historian explained in a convincing way why the representatives of the Soviet Union had enough time to organise the elections to the People's Parliament, whereas they did not manage to organise the elections to the Supreme Soviet and local councils in a year. It's obvious that occupation government did not want to establish councils as they could govern the country without them. Such an observation could be illustrated by the fact that Soviet authors did not reveal the role of some substitute for councils – the role of provisional executive committees in the administration of Lithuania; they only emphasized insignificant regulative functions. LSSR historians on ideological reasons tried concealing the fact that the communist party structures were establishing provisional committees, imposed their policy on them, duplicated their functions and controlled the activity. Seeking to hide the dictatorship of the communist party, the soviet historiography was deliberately enforcing the scheme of the soviet government.

Ideological efforts were focussed very much on the misinterpretation of the role of other political institutes in the soviet political system. Under the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism class interests and relations determined political reality, whereas the essence of political government was the dictate of the ruling class over all other society groups. Therefore, communist ideologists claimed that upon seizing the power, the communist party, which is the political vanguard of proletariat and the instrument of proletariat dictatorship, could under communist intentions radically change social political reality, organise and manage society development processes. Its leader Lenin validated the role of the communist party. A famous saying by Lenin "give us a revolutionary organisation and we'll overthrow Russia"[37] expressed his idea that the communist party could seize the power by force, get established there and implement its policy with the help of the communist party even in a country where under Marxism theory there were no preconditions for socialist revolution as well as conditions to establish socialism. Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders realised that only a political organisation of dictatorship and the one which monopolised the power could impose its will to the society and change its life to suit their interests and objectives. Having that in mind Lenin claimed that the communist party is a core of the soviet political system and all authority[38]. The leaders of the communist party never concealed that seizing the party is within their interests. However, they and especially Lenin and Stalin realised that it is impossible to retain the power monopoly only with the help of the party and the organised violence of the state. One has to have a political support in the society as well as in some classes of the society. Seeking to obtain social legitimacy, communists tried to create an image of the party, which could be appealing to the society. They emphasized that it was the ruling working class, which had the power in the soviet state and not the communist party. The party was defined as a political power, which represented the interests of the society and controlled its development and was a fundamental element of the soviet political system, which governed all the other political institutes[39].

The party was deliberately singled out from the system of the state apparatus. Stalin emphasized, "the party is the core of power. However, it is not and cannot be identified as a national power"[40]. Soviet historiography categorically neglected the conclusions of foreign historians and political scientists that the communist party monopolised the national power[41].

The concept of the party government prevailed in all the soviet historiography under which the political mechanism of the communist party was established. Under it the party was "representing" the political interests of some social classes (at first – the proletariat, the working class, later – the interests of all the soviet nation), formed its political programme, implemented its policy by political methods through party structures and the communists in the mechanism of the state. Such a system concealed the real mechanism of political decision-making and their implementation with the help of the national power. On ideological grounds it did not have a strong element of the political system (party dictatorship at the same time) – the apparatus of the state through which the policy is implemented, the processes of the society are organised and governed. Therefore, historians concealed that the policy of the party was formed by the authority of the party, which focussed on the political interests of the party and the ruling class (nomenclature) and not the ones of the development of the society. Also, the facts that the party implemented its policy through the organisation of the party national institutions accountable to it and though the class of political bureaucracy with administrative methods were also kept quiet. All the activity of the communist party was interpreted on the basis of such a scheme of "political governing", its policy in Lithuania during the first soviet occupation.

Due to ideological reasons the soviet historiography misinterpreted the relations of the communist party with other political institutes, many internal social and political processes in the party were concealed as well as the dictate of the party structures to the state institutions and society organisations. The works tried not to comment on the fact that the party structures were duplicating the functions of governing and administrative institutions, directed and controlled their activity. It did not mention the fact that after expansion of the party apparatus, the united party-national apparatus was formed. Soviet historiography kept quiet the process of bureaucratisation, the subordination of party masses to the apparatus, the formation of the ruling political bureaucracy class. The literature did not analyse the establishment and the functioning of the system of selection of the state officials, their appointment and the system of their control – nomenclature. Any hints that nomenclature became a privileged and ruling social class tried not to be mentioned. The works apologetically discussed the policy of the personnel change in the communist party, the tasks and principles of the personnel policy were discussed inadequately (especially during the time of Stalin's regime), the reasons, objectives and intentions for personnel clean-up campaign. Social and political processes in the communist party were approached ideologically, in the framework of understanding of the so-called social unanimity of the communist party, monolithic political ideal and organisational unanimity. Seeking to conceal the

internal fight for political power as well as to hide the essence of political disagreements, soviet historians were explaining that party discussions reflected the efforts of the party to retain its ideological and organisational unanimity (the so-called ideological purity and organisational monolithic structure)[42]. The regulation of the communist party social structure was interpreted in a similar way. They explained that the party was changing the terms of admission and used the mass party clean-up campaigns in order to retain the proletariat structure of the party[43]. Seeking to preserve the ideological myth that the communist party was a political vanguard of the proletariat class, its social composition was falsified and the fact that it became the organisation of political bureaucracy in the 4th decade was concealed as well[44]. Efforts were made in order to conceal the inner life forms of the centralised, dictator-like and autocratic party, principles of organisation and activity. Historians kept quiet about the fact that the communist party transferred these principles into the organisation of the state and established the governmental system on the basis of them.

Due to ideological reasons the soviet historiography kept quiet about a lot of issues connected with political regime and government. Seeking to avoid analogies to totalitarian regimes in other countries, the literature did not discuss political phenomena, which corresponded with any of the features[45]. Seeking to retain the image and illusions of the structure of the federation state due to the so-called union subjects – the sovereignty of the soviet republics, the historiography misinterpreted the structure of the USSR state apparatus, especially the principles of formation of the union and republic institutions and interaction between them. Historians concealed the fact that Lithuanian SSR and other soviet republics did not have a sovereign state and their administrations did not have the features of the government[46]. The mechanism of the Soviet Union governmental institutes controlled the LSSR administration and their activity control was hidden, including the so-called the system of second persons (second secretaries of party structures, deputy directors of administration institutions).

Under the conceptions and ideological schemes mentioned above, historians of Lithuanian SSR discussed the concrete processes of the implementation of soviet policy system in Lithuania, governing of Lithuania and the processes of LSSR administration formation during the first soviet occupation. The historiography of LSSR did not establish original conceptions on these issues. As a rule, it absorbed the popular evaluations of the Soviet Union literature, very often even without considering whether they corresponded to the historical situation of Lithuania.

Seeking to ideologically conceal the occupation of Lithuania and its annexation under the Marxist –Leninist doctrine and explain the events in Lithuania in 1940–1941, the ideologists of the communist party directed historians to form such a historical conception which would persuade that Lithuanian occupation, annexation and sovietisation processes were determined by the historical development of Lithuanian society, class conflict and class struggle for power. The foundations of such a conception were laid in 1941 by the representative of CPSS (b) CC (central committee) and

USSR LCP former USSR high representative in Lithuania Nikolaj Pozdniakov and LCP (b) CC secretary Antanas Snieckus (Sniečkus)[47]. They were the first to try and interpret political processes in Lithuania under the Marxism-Leninism revolutionary doctrine. Under the influence of their statements at first the soviet literature wrote about the establishment of the soviet rule in Lithuania in 1940, later – about its reestablishment indicating that this government was established during the so-called socialist revolution in 1918–1919 and then it was suppressed. During the 6th decade LSSR historiography started formulating the so-called socialist revolutionary conception in 1940 in Lithuania[48]. However, soviet historians could not explain many processes in the framework of the Marxist–Leninist revolutionary doctrine. It was especially difficult to explain why the soviet government started radically changing the political system only after the formal annexation of Lithuania. Seeking to explain the facts contradictory to the revolutionary scheme and conceal the mechanism of annexation, it was claimed that the revolution took place in two stages[49]. This conception did not get established in the Soviet historiography since even the USSR historians understood that it is speculative even under the Marxism criteria.

Political events in Lithuania and Hungary in the middle of the 6th decade, the expansion of the USSR in Asia and Africa forced communist ideologists to conceal more convincingly their expansion and occupational policy. Therefore the 20th CPSU meeting in 1956 declared that it "developed" Lenin's idea that different countries could transfer to socialism in various ways, they also formulated statements that such a transition is possible in a peaceful parliamentary way[50]. Such statements enabled communists to call any occupation, annexation, coup d'etat the transition of the state into socialism. Under the influence of such a scheme, LSSR historiography published statements about the features of socialist revolution in Lithuania emphasising that it was peaceful[51]. The outline of the LCP history, 3rd volume, lays out the so-called conception of a peaceful socialist revolution under which the so-called revolution started on 14-15 June 1940 when Lithuania was occupied and it was carried out in a peaceful way. The resolutions of the People's Parliament on 21 July 1940 established the victory of the socialist revolution and re-established the suppressed Soviet rule; "the government of the working class" was established during the "revolution process" which lasted more than a month (from 14 June to 21 July 1940); "the political system of the proletariat dictatorship, its national form" was formed in the "process of revolutionary reforms" and was introduced without any violence, with the help of peaceful revolutionary measures[52]. It was stated that a peaceful development of revolution created preconditions to eliminate in a constitutional way the high officials of the Republic of Lithuania from the central and local governmental institutions. Soviet writers underscored that all the political and social rearrangements were organised by the Lithuanian Communist Party and the People's Government represented by it. In such a way falsifying the history, the occupation and annexation were concealed. However, such an interpretation of events proved that Lithuania was

annexed gradually manipulating the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and using the puppet government of Justas Paleckis.

Observing the so-called socialist revolutionary scheme, historians of LSSR wrote quite a few works discussing from ideological position of the communist party on the issues of governance of Lithuania, the formation of administration of LSSR, structure and composition during the first soviet occupation. Butkute-Rameliene (Butkutė-Ramelienė), A. Cirtautas, K. Domasevicius (Domaševičius), S. Juoniene (Juonienė) and other authors discussed the implementation of the soviet political system in a general way, as well as the formation of administration, its structure and compositional changes[53]. Soviet historians wrote quite a lot on the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party in forming administration and making it subordinate to the communist control. Atamukas[54] discussed the communist role in this sphere. The communist policy in changing the composition of administration was discussed by many historians, however Atamukas made a special focus on it. Paleckis and Augus touched upon some aspects of national composition in administration[55].

The historiography of LSSR wrote quite a lot on the composition of the most important political structure – the Lithuanian communist party[56]. The major focus here was on elucidation of the social composition, as it was a very important indicator in defining the character of the party, its social basis and social interests represented. Since the social change of the LCP composition in 1940–1941 was contradicting to the statements of the party ideologists about the proletariat character of the party, historians tried to hide it by manipulating the statistics of the social composition of the communists. The fact that during the first soviet occupation the LCP (b) became a bureaucratic organisation was tried to be concealed most of all. In order to establish the image of the Lithuanian communist party and prove that it represents the interest of the Lithuanian nation, the relatively small number of non-Lithuanians there was deliberately kept quiet as well.

Soviet historians discussed in a general sense the role and the activity of LSSR administration institutions in the process of Lithuanian sovietization. The role of administration in the system of the party's policy was discussed; its role in reshaping the life of the Lithuanian society under the soviet model was also elucidated. The structure of LSSR administration was touched upon very passively, not focussing on the issues of its composition and functioning. Soviet historians did not analyse the structural changes of administration structure and the interaction of its links.

Soviet historiography deliberately falsified and put ideological emphasis on historical and political processes; therefore it is not valuable in discussing the governing of Lithuania, LSSR administration structure and composition during the first soviet occupation. However, the works of soviet historians provide with quite a lot of factual information, which helps in analysing historical processes.

The soviet historiography did not influence other historiography paradigms and historical conceptions. Contemporary Russian historiography rejects many conceptions of soviet historians[57]. However, Marxism and its methodology based on the interpretation of historical processes have responses in some academic classes of the society, especially in foreign countries[58]. Therefore, the survey of historical conceptions by soviet authors and scientific criticism remains topical for historians, sociologists, and humanitarian scientists.

Historiography of Western Countries

Marxism and its Russian variations - political doctrine of bolshevism and its practise, the political system of the Soviet union and the countries it occupied was analysed in foreign historiography on the basis of various historical conceptions and theories of political science. Quite a few studies were written by Anglo-Saxon political scientists, historians, the so-called sovietologists. These studies were devoted to the political processes in the USSR and the regions annexed to it. In one way or another the political system of the USSR, the control of the regions annexed to it, relations of the local administration with the government of the USSR were discussed almost by all authors who analysed the universal and modern history of the USSR, the doctrine of the communist movement and practise[59].

Zbignev Brzezinski (Bžezinskis) characterised political doctrine and practise of the communism, the structure of the USSR, political system, its model of governing the occupied regions[60]. He discussed general features of the communist system, its manifestation in the so-called socialist countries, compared the structure and relations between the USSR, the puppet governments and political structures in these countries, as well as discussed the mechanism of its political dictate in the annexed countries. Brzezinski's statements and conclusions help a lot in trying to understand the mechanism of the communist party policy and the model of LSSR governing.

N. Wert (N. Vertas) wrote a study "History of the Soviet State. 1900–1991", where he characterised the annexation of Lithuania and the first political changes in LSSR[61]. The author analysed the foundations of the soviet political system, the structure of the government, its functioning. He discussed some aspects of relations between the USSR government and the administrations of the republics. The author characterised the soviet bureaucratic system of the government and its role in the mechanism of the communist party and its policy. The researcher analysed the shift of the soviet bureaucratic composition, the process of formation of the higher bureaucracy (nomenclature) and its transition into the ruling class of the society.

In analysing the system of the communist party policy, the works of R. A. Bauer, A. Inkeles, L. Schapir and other authors are important[62]. These researches analysed the political system of the USSR and its totalitarian political regime, the mechanism of the state and the organisation of the

government, the structure and functioning of governmental system. They characterised the relations of the soviet republics with the USSR government, not singling out Lithuania. The authors focussed on the disclosure of the party's interaction with the elements of the ruling system.

The situation of the soviet republics, Lithuania among them, their political institutes and the role in the soviet political system, relations of administration institutions of republics with the central government was analysed by those researches, who were investigating political phenomena in the USSR in the light of national relations. R. A. Bauer, J. Hazard, J. Houh and other authors characterised the model of governing in soviet republics, discussed the relations of the USSR government with the administrations of the republics, focussed on some differences of their interests[63]. The articles of Latvian historian immigrant Augustinas Idzelis analyse the interaction of interests between the government of the USSR and the political structures of the annexed regions, the so-called institutional nationalism.[64].

Foreign political scientists and historians focussed on defining the national doctrine and practise of the communist party[65]. They discussed the ideology of the communist expansion, which reflected the ideas of Russian messiahnism and chauvinism, the stereotypes of Russian imperial thinking and the vision of the creation of global communist system. The researches focussed on the fact that the communist party tried to ideologically reason and hide the expansion of the USSR, create the impression of legitimacy of occupational regimes. Foreign authors characterised the national policy of the communist party.

Foreign historiography investigated the repressions of totalitarian political regime against political, social groups and against the society, they also analysed the suppression of the liberation movement of the enslaved countries[66]. Researches defined the ideological elements, tasks and objectives of repression policy, analysed various aspects of communist terror (political, social, ideological, psychological). Authors unfolded the role of political and repression structures in ideological reasoning, organisation and implementation of repression policy. Their conclusions help to analyse the repression policy of occupational government in Lithuania, evaluate the role of LSSR political and repression structures in organisation and implementation the suppression of the resistance movement towards occupation in Lithuania, ideological cover-up, and annihilation of the Lithuanian nation.

Foreign historiography concentrated on analysing the situation and role of bureaucracy in the political system of the USSR, elucidating the separation and stratification of bureaucracy. M. Djilas and the works of other researches analyse the development of bureaucracy, the way the higher class of bureaucracy became the ruling class of the society and its establishment in power[67]. Under the influence of Djilas work term *new class* was established for some time in literature to define the class of the soviet society.

Foreign historiography contributed with many valuable generalisations on the soviet political system and totalitarian political regime, organisation of the government and the system of governing, its structure and functioning. They help to analyse historical processes in Lithuania encourage discussing them in a broader perspective in the context of political processes in the Soviet Union.

Russian historiography

The works of Russian immigrants and contemporary Russian historiography, which analyse the political history of the USSR, should be mentioned together with the studies of foreign political scientists and historians.

A. Avtorchanov characterised political processes in the Soviet Union, which were related to the totalitarian regime and the power mechanism of the communist party[68]. Conclusions on the subordination of the state institutions to the communist party structures as well as the mechanism of the party dictate to the system of administration are important for the analysis of the USSR administration structure.

In his soviet study M. Voslenskij characterised in general the USSR political system and described the structure of the communist party government. According to the historian, some statements of the author are debatable, especially his thoughts on the structure of the soviet state and the system of the communist party policy. The work focuses on the definition of ideological political faithfulness to the communist party. The author makes a distinction between the features of bureaucracy under the party structures and the higher bureaucracy, which controls them, its formation, development, and the way it became the ruling class of the soviet society[69]. Under the influence of his work the term nomenclature started to be used to name the ruling soviet class of the society at first only in scientific publications and later in academic works. This definition changed the term, which had been used before - the new class, which was offered by the researcher of the communist ruling class Djilas. The thoughts of Voslenskij on the composition of the soviet republic ("half colonies") administration institutions are important for investigation the administration of annexed Lithuania. He claimed that mostly local, however having cosmopolitan self-awareness and very often open pro-Russian bureaucrats worked there. The researcher noted that representatives of the Soviet Union ('metropolis'), mainly Russian nomenclature were holding high positions in the administration institutions of the republics. This Russian bureaucracy was not numerous, however it was politically the most influential class of the local administration, which had real leverages of power, management and administration[70].

The works of Voslenskij and Djilas influenced the contemporary historiography. Many researches referred to their conclusions on the ruling class, used their definitions and terms. The term nomenclature was established to define the ruling class of the soviet society. Since it wasn't precise

from the sociological and political science point of view, there was a tendency to expand the content of the term "nomenclature". The term nomenclature, which is defined as the list of positions and the people who hold the positions provided by this list, was used to define the highest class of the soviet bureaucracy; the system of selecting, appointing and controlling the activity of the highest state officials; the element of the party policy and government mechanism; "party governing system", even "the system of governing the state". From sociological and political science and investigations of bureaucracy point of view it is wrong to identify nomenclature with the mechanism of the party government and policy, the soviet bureaucratic system of government and the class of bureaucracy. This term should be used in order to define the ruling class of the soviet society – a part of the higher bureaucracy (the bureaucracy appointed on the basis of ideological political faithfulness of the party, accountable to its structures and controlled by them).

The conceptions of contemporary Russian historiography started to develop during the years of Michail Gorbachev reforms [71]. There are a lot of published works in Russia that are analysed referring to archive documents, foreign and local historiography, the development and political relations of the USSR and regions annexed to it. This work introduces the conception of the USSR political processes, which in some aspects is close to foreign historiography; in other aspects it repeats the schemes of the former soviet historiography.

The study of authors of the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Science "Russian History. XX century" touches upon the contemporary Russian historiography conception on the issues of the USSR political history. The investigation emphasises that the contemporary Russian historiography is not yet capable to define precisely soviet political system, political regime and the model of bureaucratic governing [72]. Many political processes are described in the same way as in foreign historiography, however following the ideological principles they categorically disagreed with the opinion that the totalitarian regime was introduced in the Soviet Union under the rule of Stalin [73]. Under the same principles they tried not to analyse in more detail and evaluate critically the foreign and national policy of the communist party, not to comment on those phenomena that were ascribed to communist crimes by foreign researches [74]. The monograph discusses in depth the questions related to the policy of the party and mechanism of the government as well as the system of government in the state, the formation and development of the ruling class of the society (nomenclature). However, the study, misinterprets the relations between the USSR government and administrations of the republics, the dictate of the USSR government to administrations of the republics. Also their activity control mechanism was kept quiet. The occupation and annexation of the Baltic States is discussed apologetically. The annexation of Lithuania and other states is characterised in a very general way and vague definitions are given. The usage of such terms as annexation and occupation is avoided. Only three things were mentioned: the fact that the USSR forced the Baltic States to establish pro-soviet

governments, also that these governments declared the soviet rule and lastly, that the Supreme Soviet of the USSR legitimised "the acceptance" of the occupied states to the USSR[75]. The authors tried to convince that Lithuania was incorporated supposedly upon the will of its society in accordance to all legal procedures. The statement of one of the authors of the study M. Gorin "before the war the soviet government regained all the territories of Russia which were lost due to a severe crisis of 1917–1920 (apart from Finland and Poland)"[76] proves that the apologetic manifestations of the USSR expansion policy are still alive in the contemporary Russian historiography.

The course book for Russian universities "The Modern history of the country. XX century" discusses the political system of the USSR and political regime, the mechanism of the communist party policy and the government[77]. The authors characterised the features of totalitarian regime during the rule of Stalin (the all-inclusive organisation of the state and its control, the monopoly of the party power, the unification of forms of power in party structures, etc). However, as it is common in Russian historiography, the authors avoided to call it totalitarian. The course book widely elucidates on the structure of the governing and administration system of the USSR, its role in implementing the policy of the party and government. Also, the bureaucratic form of governing and the evolution of the soviet bureaucracy are characterised. However, the study does not analyse the relations between the USSR government and administration of the republics in greater detail. Lithuanian occupation, annexation and formation of LSSR administration were discussed in a very concise way[78]. Like many other Russian historians, the authors of the study tried to persuade that Lithuania was incorporated in to the Soviet Union voluntarily and under the initiative of its society, legitimately and without using any force. Therefore, the investigation does not mention the fact that the government of the USSR established LSSR administration, enforced its policy there and controlled its activity. In general, due to political and ideological reasons, the authors of the study tried not to mention the aspects of relations between the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania as well as the government of the USSR and the administration of LSSR, which disclosed the expansion policy of the USSR and the dictate of its government to Lithuanian administration institutions.

Quite a few Russian historians analysed the policy mechanism of the communist party, the role of the USSR government and administrative sector in the political system, its organisation, functioning and the role in the government and policy mechanism of the party as well as the development and formation of the ruling bureaucratic class.

The book by A. Sokolov "The course of the Soviet history. 1917–1940" introduces to the society development conception of the Soviet Union, which is very similar to the one introduced in "Russian History. XX century" (Sokolov was one of the co-authors). However, it is different from it in some aspects and conceptions of other contemporary Russian historians. Sokolov underscored that it is very difficult to define the soviet political system and governance of the state in the framework of one

historical conception or the theory of political science as controversial tendencies manifested in the political life of the USSR[79]. Analysing the nature and governmental relation with the society and the political regime, the author emphasized that it is difficult to explain certain political phenomena in the framework of totalitarianism and the so-called underdeveloped totalitarian models[80]. Sokolov defined the system of bureaucratic rule and administration, the role of bureaucracy in politics and governance of the state, elucidated upon the formation, development and compositional changes of the ruling class of bureaucracy. The researcher analysed in a broader sense the organisation of bureaucracy, especially its centralised hierarchical structure, the functioning of the bureaucratic system as well as disclosed the fact that the institutions of republics, regions, and their administration-territorial units were totally dependent on the soviet government and governing institutions. Sokolov did not deliberately analyse the structure of governing the LSSR and its administration. He only touched upon the occupation of Lithuania and other Baltic countries emphasising that the transitional period from capitalism to socialism was declared in all annexed states and that the unified soviet system started to be implemented[81].

A. Makarin in his study "Bureaucracy in the system of political government" analysed the system of organisation of the USSR governance and administration and its role in politics[82]. Referring to contemporary theories of political science and sociology as well as the conceptions of bureaucracy research, he analysed the situation of bureaucracy and its role in the soviet political system, as well as in the mechanism of the communist party policy and government. The author broadly characterised the soviet bureaucratic model of governing ("political bureaucracy") and the fact that the soviet political system and totalitarian political regime determined it. Seeking to radically change the life of the society under the communist doctrine, to organise and control society processes and to retain the monopoly of its power within its interests and objectives, the communist party established an all-inclusive organisation of the society and control, which was performed by the expanded bureaucratic system. Makarin discussed the influence of Asian and European bureaucratic system on the soviet system of governing. He noted that the USSR system of government developed on the basis of centralised and despotic tradition of governance of the Russian Empire and matched the features of Asian system. However, in parallel communists absorbed and adapted within their interests and objectives European rationalisation ideas on the governing of the society, individualistic culture of Western bureaucracy, some elements of functioning and organisation of this bureaucracy[83]. The study analyses the development and formation of the ruling class concisely but in more depth than the works of Djilas and M. Voslenskij. Makarin noticed that when the party monopolised the power and united the forms of power, the spheres of policy and government were practically united. The unanimity of policy and government created preconditions for the party to increase the political role of the higher bureaucracy (political bureaucracy in a proper sense, according to Volsenskij – nomenclature), which

was under the power of the party and controlled by it. The researcher discussed the features of this class of bureaucracy, compared the principles of political and professional bureaucratic activity, internal relations and culture. He also reviewed different factors, which determined the fact that the soviet bureaucracy became established in the society as well as the fact that its part became the ruling class of the society. The term *political bureaucracy*, which is used by Makarin and other researches of bureaucracy, defines more precise than a word nomenclature, the soviet system of governing. According to Makarin, the ruling class of the society consisted of higher bureaucracy, which was appointed on the basis of ideological political faithfulness; its functions were political and administrative. According to the author, the soviet system of government was based on the unification of policies and spheres of government, the decisive role of policy and politicians in governance. The conclusions of the researcher are useful in analysing the structure and functioning of the LSSR administration, in defining its role in the system of soviet policy, the policy of the party and the mechanism of governing, in analysing the formation of the soviet bureaucracy class in Lithuania.

Lebedeva discussed the mechanism of Lithuanian annexation, the role of political structures of the Soviet Union in annexing Lithuania, implementation of soviet political system and formation of its administration there[84]. The author disclosed the fact that before the formal incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union CPSU (b) CC made political decisions on the annexation of Lithuania and the change of political system[85]. The author showed how under some resolutions of the CPSU (b) authorities the soviet political system was implemented in Lithuania, the local administration was formed and its officials appointed[86]. Lebedeva's article is one of the few studies of Russian historiography where the governing of LSSR is analysed objectively and referring to archive sources.

Contemporary Russian historiography is varied. There, among modern conceptions, conclusions close to foreign historiography, objective surveys of historical process one can find the stereotypes of the soviet historiography, the manifestations of imperial ideology in deliberately misinterpreting the past to suit the political and ideological interests of contemporary Russian state. Most controversial are the studies of those historians where the political regime is discussed as well as the relations of the USSR government with the society of the annexed countries. There are attempts to justify the occupation of Lithuania and other Baltic countries and to hide its occupation and annexation under the myth of the so-called voluntary Lithuanian incorporation into the USSR. It is claimed that the government of the USSR was legitimate and based on the powers of Lithuanian society misinterpreting the circumstances of incorporation of Lithuania. Lithuanian annexation and governing is usually discussed in general in Russian historiography, without any details on LSSR administration structure, composition and relations with the USSR institutes of government. Russian literature of political science discussed more precisely than the works of historians the totalitarian political regime

in the Soviet Union, the mechanism of the communist party policy and government, the features of bureaucratic system of governing[87].

Russian historians analysed historical processes, which in one way or another manifested in occupied Lithuania. Therefore, this historiography is valuable in analysing the governing mechanism of the communist party, governance of Lithuania, structure and functioning of the LSSR administration.

Historical literature of Lithuanians abroad

Many Lithuanians abroad, who analysed annexation and occupation of Lithuania, in one or another aspect discussed the soviet political system, governing of Lithuania, the structure and the role of the USSR in the sovietisation process of Lithuania.

Kipras Bielinis, Juozas Brazaitis, Albertas Gerutis, Juozas Jakstas (Jakštas), Bronius J. Kazlas, Domas Krivickas, Benediktas Maciuika (Mačiuika), Kazys Pakstas (Pakštas), Juozas Prunskis, Vytautas St. Vardys and other authors characterised the political doctrine of the communist party, the political system and the model of ruling imposed on Lithuania as well as the mechanism of governing and the communist party policy[88].

R. J. Misiunas (Misiūnas) and Reinas Taagepera discussed the soviet political system and the model of governing in Lithuania, they also indicated that the government of the USSR was dictating to the administration of LSSR[89]. Gerutis, Bronius Nemickas, Pranas Viktoras Raulinaitis evaluated the formation of the People's Government and LSSR administration in accordance to the constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and international law[90]. Brazaitis-Ambrazevicius (Ambrazevičius), Krivickas, Prunskis and other authors discussed the role of LSSR administration in implementing occupational policy, its structure and the change in its composition, the process of clean-up of officials of the Republic of Lithuania from administration institutions (the so-called personnel clean-up)[91]. It was established that there were quite a lot of people working in the institutions of the LSSR and Lithuanian communist party who were not Lithuanian nationals[92].

Lithuanians abroad focussed on characterising the repression policy of the occupational government. Backis, Bielinis, Gerutis and other authors indicated that the communist party was carrying out expansion, Russification, assimilation and annihilation (genocide) policy towards Lithuanians and other annexed nations[93]. Damusis, Pajaujis-Javis, Pelekis (Pelėkis) and other researches discussed the activity of occupational regime structures in implementing this policy in Lithuania and noted that the communist party and repression departments played the most important role here[94].

Since primary sources were inaccessible to Lithuanians abroad, their works contained factual mistakes, and debatable statements at the same time. The works of Lithuanians abroad would usually judge about the composition of LSSR administration on the basis of memories of contemporaries and on the examples of LSSR administration institutions in Kaunas and communists of Kaunas. Therefore,

the ethnic composition of institutional workers and communists was not evaluated precisely, there were some debatable statements on the political orientation of some Lithuanian ethnic minorities[95]. When the unrepresentative situation in Kaunas was identified as the situation of Lithuania, one could have noticed such statements that during the first soviet occupation the majority of communists were Jews and had a big influence in the party and administration institutions, especially in repression departments. Saulius Suziedelis (Sužiedelis) evaluated more objectively the role of Jews in the party and administration) referring to works of Lithuanian historians [96].

The historiography conception of Lithuanians abroad on the issues of Lithuanian political history is close to the conception of other historians and political scientists of Western countries on political processes in the USSR and regions annexed to it. The statements of Lithuanian authors abroad on the political system implemented in Lithuania, governing of Lithuania, administration structure and composition of LSSR during the first soviet occupation are valuable in analysing historical processes in Lithuania in 1940–1941.

Contemporary Historiography of the Republic of Lithuania

Contemporary Historiography of the Republic of Lithuania referring to archive documents, memoirs and historical literature analyses various aspects of political system imposed on Lithuania, governing of Lithuania, administration structure and composition of LSSR, interaction of occupational political structures and their role in implementing communist policy in Lithuania during the first soviet occupation and later.

In 1989 Mykolas Rőmeris, the professor of national (constitutional) law of the Republic of Lithuania, work "Survey and Constitutional Evaluation of Historical Sovietisation of Lithuania", which was written in 1944, was published. There Lithuanian occupation, annexation are evaluated from the legal point of view, the soviet political system imposed on Lithuania as well as the role of the main political structure – Lithuanian communist party – in implementing the power and policy of CPSU (b) are discussed[97]. Rőmeris' study greatly influenced contemporary Lithuanian historiography as well as the one of Lithuanians abroad. Many authors analysed political processes in Lithuania referring to legal evaluation of Lithuania's occupation, annexation and sovietisation of Rőmeris[98].

Lithuanian lawyers analysed Lithuanian annexation and occupation from the point of view of the law of the Republic of Lithuania and international law, they evaluated the content and consequences of the People's Parliament declarations, the status of Lithuanian SSR and processes in the country itself. Important is the statement of Zalimas' that from the approach of the international law Lithuania never was a legitimate part of the Soviet Union and that LSSR structure established by occupational government was a puppet structure of the USSR which occupied Lithuania[99]. Mindaugas Maksimaitis and Stasys Vansevicius (Vansevičius) discussed from historical and legal approach the legalisation of Lithuanian annexation and formation of LSSR, characterised soviet political and

economic system transferred to Lithuania, the structure of LSSR administration and some aspects of its composition in their monograph "History of Lithuanian State and Law"[100].

Vytautas Kancevicius (Kancevičius) and Liudas Truska discussed the mechanism of Lithuanian annexation and its role in the formation of occupational regime administration, and disclosed some features of functioning of occupational regime in Lithuania in the summer of 1940[101]. Analysing the processes of the destruction of Lithuania's statehood and sovietisation of annexed Lithuania Truska in his work "Lithuania in 1938-1953" discussed the implementation of the soviet political system and formation of the mechanism of governing of Lithuania[102]. He indicated that due to unitary structure of the USSR and centralised governing in Lithuania the system of administration institutions was established on the basis of the Soviet Union model.

J. Matusevicius (Matusevičius) in his doctoral dissertation analysed occupational political regime in Lithuania in 1940–1941[103]. The historian characterised occupational political system, the governing of Lithuania, as well as the role of the LSSR administration in sovietisation process of Lithuania, elucidated on the structure of administration sector, the status of its links and interaction[104]. The thesis broadly discusses the policy of the personnel in the communist party, the compositional change of LSSR administration, formation of the soviet bureaucracy and its highest class – nomenclature[105]. Since it was difficult for the author to discuss all political processes related to the mechanism of the communist party policy, occupational government and its functioning, some of them were touched upon only in a general way. From the historical point of view the implementation of totalitarian regime in Lithuania was discussed very little as well as the role of LSSR political structures in implementation occupational government and policy.

There are works of contemporary historiography, which in one way or another discuss specific questions of the communist policy in Lithuania and ruling during the first occupation of Lithuania. Stanislovas Buchaveckas, Vanda Kasauskiene (Kašauskienė), Bronius Puzinavicius (Puzinavičius), Henrikas Sadzius (Šadžius), Gediminas Vaskela and other researches discussed the role of LSSR administration links in the process of sovietisation of Lithuania[106]. They noticed that the communist party established and retained its dictatorship and implemented its policy in Lithuania with the help of its structures and administration institutions.

Antanaitis, Kasauskiene and other authors disclosed the decisive political role of the communist party in the process of sovietisation and administration of the life of occupied Lithuania[107]. Truska discussed the role of LSSR administration institutions in the process of sovietisation of Lithuania, their subordination and interaction[108]. He stressed that LCP (b) CC bureau was the highest institution of the LSSR, which was dealing with all more important matters in the region, dictated to other administration institutions and controlled them[109].

The formation of repression apparatus of occupational regime and its role in the mechanism of the LSSR government and party policy was elucidated by Arvydas Anusauskas (Anušauskas), Eugenijus Grunskis, Inga Petraviciute (Petravičiūtė), Henrikas Sadzius (Šadžius) and other authors[110]. The researches came to a conclusion that Lithuania was retained in the USSR by force and governed by the organised power of violence of the USSR, by repressions and mass terror. Anusauskas and Grunskis analysed in detail the repression policy in Lithuania, the role of the repression apparatus and other political structures in organising and carrying out the genocide of the Lithuanian nation[111]. Lawyer Zita Slicyte (Šličytė) evaluated from the legal approach the criminal policy of the communist party in Lithuania and the role of LSSR institutions in it, discussed in more general way the USSR criminal activity carried out in Lithuania – the crime of genocide[112]. Anusauskas, Grunskis, Slicyte statements on the role of LSSR administration structures in organisation of totalitarian regime and criminal occupational policy are valuable in analysing the governing of Lithuania and implementation of the communist party policy in Lithuania.

Some studies of contemporary historiography discuss the change in the composition of LSSR administration, internal relations of the soviet bureaucracy during the first soviet occupation of Lithuania. Truska discussed the personnel policy of the communist party, its role in this sphere, elucidated on some issues of the soviet bureaucracy formation [113]. He noted that the representatives of the USSR political bureaucracy, who were appointed head deputies of LSSR institutions and occupied other high positions in LSSR hierarchy of bureaucracy, practically directed and controlled their activity[114]. The researcher noted that the so-called system of second persons was a means of activity control of Lithuanian Government, local administration and Russification of administration apparatus.

Solomonas Atamukas discussed in general the formation of LSSR administration and the change of its composition during the first soviet occupation, characterised the role in implementing the policy of the communist party[115]. He emphasized that the government of the USSR did not trust politically local communists and administrators, therefore they dictated LSSR administration, controlled its activity and did not let them independently form their organisation and composition.

Truska, Atamukas and other authors characterised some specific compositional changes of the soviet bureaucracy[116]. Historians noted that during the first soviet occupation the communist party did not manage to form the politically and ideologically uniform bureaucracy, which would be faithful to communists. In the summer and autumn of 1940 the personnel of the governing link were changed very quickly. During the so-called clean-up campaign many politically disloyal persons to the occupational government were dismissed. However, in the spring of 1941 many former officials of the Republic of Lithuania worked in LSSR administration institutions. They adjusted to the occupational regime, however they were not ideologically faithful to communists. According to the researches, such a situation was due to the fact that too little communists were at the time in Lithuania and other

persons faithful to them who were able to carry out their work in a professional way. Historians noted that due to the fact that the communist party was changing the officials of the Republic of Lithuania to the officials who are faithful to the occupational regime, a new ethnic composition of bureaucracy was formed: the number of Russian and Jew officials increased. Atamukas, Truska and other writers noted that the soviet Russian bureaucracy started politically dominating in LSSR administration. Atamukas emphasized that after communists employed Jewish people in institutions national antagonism between them and officials of other nationalities became a problem.

Antanaitis did not analyse the formation of the ruling class of the soviet society - nomenclature[117]. He characterised the features of this class, some internal processes, relations with the USSR bureaucracy and other classes of LSSR society. The statements of the researcher on nomenclature are important in analysing the formation of this class, its role in the policy of the communist party and governing of Lithuania during the first soviet occupation.

Analysing the development and internal relation of LSSR bureaucracy Vytautas Tininas' studies are important[118]. In the biographies of the highest-ranking officials of LSSR administration he revealed the bureaucratic aspect which hadn't been discussed before – the relations and positions of various LSSR administration institutions, bureaucracy groups and their leaders on the issues of sovietisation and government of Lithuania[119]. Discussing the relations of LCP (b) secretary of the central committee Antanas Snieckus (Sniečkus) with other leaders of the USSR and LSSR, Tininis showed how personal, group and institutional interests of the bureaucracy overlapped. Tininis statements are important in analysing the interaction of LSSR administration structures, their role in the policy of the communist party and governing of Lithuania.

Contemporary Lithuanian historiography focuses a lot on the composition of the major political structure - Lithuanian communist party. Historian Anusauskas was one of the first to have doubts about the data of the soviet historiography on the composition of LCP. Referring to secret service police data of the Republic of Lithuania, he announced the figures on the number of communists, their ethnic composition in Kaunas[120]. Truska referring to analogous sources indicated the number of the number of the illegal communist party in Lithuania and its ethnical composition[121]. Similar data on the composition of LCP was announced by Nijole Maslauskiene (Nijolė Maslauskienė)[122]. Atamukas, Maslauskiene and Truska discussed some changes in the composition of Lithuanian communist party during the first soviet occupation[123]. He and other authors described in general the role of communists of different ethnical background during the first soviet occupation.

Lithuanian historiography and historical publications evaluated very differently the role of Jewish communists and officials in the party and administration. Contemporary Lithuanian historians tried to analyse the problem in more depth[124]. Atamukas noted that the communist party enabled Jews to be employed in administration institutions[125]. Truska and Atamukas published some facts on the

Jewish communists who worked in administration institutions. According to them, a small number of Jewish communists and Jews, who worked in institutions, proves that the occupational regime did not protect the Jews and they played a minor role in the party and administration. Truska and Atamukas underscored that the statements of some authors on the big role of Jews in the communist party and administration are based on ideology and are not substantial. The opinion of some of the researches on the role of Jews in the party and administration is based on quantitative indicators: the number of Jews in the structures of the party and administration. No doubt that quantitative features are important in seeking to establish the position of a specific group in social or political organisation. However, they are not the criteria in evaluating the influence of this group in the bureaucratic organisation, the mechanism of the party and its policy. Political and administrational influence and role are defined on the basis of its political and administrative powers not on the basis of the size of the group.

Since the occupational regime tried to find public support in Lithuania and to create there its political backing, the historiography analysed the relations of the institutes of the occupational government with the occupied society of Lithuania as well as the attempts of the communist party to involve the Lithuanian society into the implementation of its policy. Valentinas Brandisauskas (Brandišauskas) and Truska emphasized that the Lithuanian nation did not recognise the occupation and annexation of Lithuania and was resisting to the occupational regime and its policy[126]. Together historians noted that the society adjusted to the regime. The communist party managed to involve some classes of the society and organisations into the implementation of its policy. Bagusauskas elucidated the activity of the communist youth organisation of Lithuania in idealising and politicising the life of the young and incorporating it into the political measures of the communist party[127].

Contemporary Lithuanian historiography offers valuable statements and generalisations on the governance of Lithuania, the mechanism of the communist party, the formation of LSSR administration, its organisation, composition and role. Historians emphasized that the USSR government was implementing the unified centralised bureaucratic system of administration and governing in Lithuania and other annexed regions. They stated that the structure of LSSR administration matched the structure of the USSR State apparatus. Historiography elucidated on the dictate of the USSR government to the administration of LSSR, discussed aspects of relations between the USSR political bureaucracy, which were determined by the mechanism of governing of Lithuania.

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The contemporary Lithuanian historiography analysed in various aspects the political model of the Soviet Union and the countries annexed to it, the soviet political system, which was transferred to Lithuania, the formation of LSSR administration, its structure and the change in its composition during the first soviet occupation. These investigations help to adequately understand and scientifically analyse historical processes and political events in Lithuania 1940–1941. However, very few

investigations have been devoted to analyse the political system of the communist party, the role of LSSR administration under the doctrine of the communist party changing the social and political reality of Lithuania within its interests and objectives, organising, governing and regulating the life of its society.

Primary Sources and Memoirs

The documents of LSSR political and administration structures filed in the Lithuanian archives are direct sources for investigation on occupational political system, governance of Lithuania, and the role of administration institutions in politics and governing during the first soviet occupation.

The formation of the LSSR administration, its structure and composition, the activity of political institutes in implementing the policy of the communist party in Lithuania during the first soviet occupation is reflected in the documents of LSSR administration institutions filed in the Lithuanian central national archive (LCNA).

The funds of LSSR Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (fund R-758), Council of National commissioners (f. R-754), People's Commissariats (labour – f. R-42, agriculture R-111, justice – f. R-121, finance – f. R-164, domestic affairs – f. R-756, national security – f. R-759, education – f. R-762, state control – f. R-763, communal economy – f. R-768, health care – f. R-769, social care – f. R-770, local industry – f. R-771, food industry – f. R-773, trade – f. R-772, meat and food industry – f. R-774, the representative of the council of the USSR relations of the People's commissariat and the LSSR relations – f. R-1017 and other) store the documents of 1940-1941 of the People's Parliament, LSSR Supreme Soviet, Council of National Commissioners and People's Commissariats, provisional executive committees. These are the organisational-regulative, informative and the documents of other type of these institutions, which show the tasks, functions, competencies of their activities, disclose their role in implementing the USSR power and the policy of the communist party. Almost all the document funds of administration institutions keep the documents of the USSR government and governing institutions, which reflect the vertical bureaucratic relations (firstly, the centralised hierarchical structure and hierarchical subordination to the USSR institutions). They show that the political institutes of the USSR made all the more important decisions on the organisation of LSSR administration sector, its functioning and composition, imposed their dictate to the local administration, regulated and controlled its activity.

LSSR documents of administration institutions poorly discuss about their relation with the communist party. Therefore, one could have a different understanding and think that the institutions were not politically subordinated to communists and were not under the rule of the party structures. The documents of the personnel departments of administration institutions do not disclose all the

circumstances of change in bureaucratic composition. The document funds of the Council of National Commissioners and commissariats do not have exhaustive data on the social and political change of employees, results of change of unreliable officials to the occupational regime of the Republic of Lithuania to communists or officials faithful to them (the so-called personnel clear-up campaign). The lists of the commissariat workers are not comprehensive and precise and sometimes – misleading. It is likely that seeking to protect the former workers of communist institutions of the Republic of Lithuania from terror, the information about them was twisted and kept quiet (the social status, political activity, the place where they worked before June 1940, etc). Under these lists it is difficult to establish how many officials of the Republic of Lithuania were dismissed from administrative work soon after the occupation of Lithuania and how many were dismissed later. Despite that, these documents are important and informative sources, which help to investigate the structure and composition of LSSR administration, the role of administrative sector in the governing of Lithuania and implementation of the communist party policy.

The documents of the Lithuanian communist party of 1940-1941, which are filled in the Lithuanian special archive (LSA) are important sources for analysing the occupational policy system, the role of the party and LSSR administration institutions, the structure and the composition of administration. The most informative are the documents of LCP (b) central committee (fund 1771). These are the organisational-regulative, informative and other documents of the structural units of the central committee, which disclose the policy mechanism of the occupational government and the communist party. Public statements and other documents of LCP (b) and leaders of the Lithuanian communist party show the efforts of communists to hide the annexation and occupation of Lithuania, to reason the legitimacy of the USSR government and its institutes. The documents reflect upon the party relations with other administration structures. They show how the bodies of the communist party subordinated administration institutions to their dictate and control, duplicated their functions and practically appropriated their prerogatives. The documents of the personnel department of the LCP (b) central committee and other documents widely reflect upon the change in the composition of workers, the formation of nomenclature – the highest class of the soviet bureaucracy.

While investigating the organisation of LSSR administration, internal relations and interaction of bureaucracy with the structures of the communist party, other sources are important as well. Firstly, these are the memoirs of persons who took part in political events of the time. The memoirs of former members of the People's Parliament, the People's Government and the Council of the National Commissioners, LSSR administration officials Liudas Dovydenas (Dovydėnas), Ernestas Galvanauskas, Antanas Garmus, Jurgis Glusauskas (Glušauskas), Vincas Kreve-Mickevicius (Krėvės-Mickevičius) and others tell about the occupation and annexation of Lithuania. Also, they elucidate on the formation and activity of LSSR administration, the dictate of LSSR representatives to the local

administration[128]. The memoirs contain information on the relations of the soviet bureaucracy. Firstly, these are the relations between the local officials and the ones who came from the USSR, the officials of the Republic of Lithuania who remained to work in the institutions and the communists or their supporters employed after the occupation, and these relations were poorly reflected in direct historical sources[129].

Referring to historical sources it is possible to analyse the implementation of the soviet political system in Lithuania, governance of Lithuania. It is also possible to establish the formation and the activity of the communist party policy system, the organisation of LSSR administration and the role it played in implementing the occupational policy, to reveal the change in composition of bureaucracy during the first soviet occupation.

1.The Destruction and Deformation of Lithuanian State Institutions in Occupied Lithuania on 15 June – 23 July 1940

The occupation of Lithuania in June 1940 was determined by the totality of different circumstances, especially by historical-geopolitical processes in Eastern and central Europe. That mostly depended on the development of mutual relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, their discontent with Versailles peace system and its revision as well as the implementation of expansion (territory expansion) policy[130]. The Soviet Union reasoned its expansion policy on the idea to establish the global communist system, to retain the power and expand aggressively under the military strategic doctrine [131].

On 23 August 1939 Germany and the USSR signed a non-aggression pact and a secret protocol on the division of the spheres of influence in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, under which Lithuanians were assigned to the German sphere of influence. Having occupied Poland, on 28 September Germany again divided anew the spheres of influence with the Soviet Union. This time the Republic of Lithuania was assigned to the Soviet Union. A part of Lithuania still remained in Germany's hands, however it was sold for 7.5 million dollars to the Soviet Union under the secret protocol. The interests of Germany and the USSR and their secret agreements on the distribution of spheres of influence (the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov pact) determined the further development of events and the destiny of Lithuania[132].

At the end of May 1940 the USSR started implementing aggression against Lithuania and other Baltic countries. In order to cover up the occupation of Lithuania and to mislead the opinion of the world, the Soviet Union used military occupation action and the means of cunning political combinations to instigate the Governmental crisis of the Republic of Lithuania, to eliminate the Government and to replace it with the puppet government[133]. The military variant of Lithuania's accession was not abandoned[134].

On 14 June the USSR delivered an ultimatum to the government of Lithuania and on 15 June the army of the USSR crossed the Lithuanian border. The USSR violated the fundamental norms and principles of the international law, international responsibilities to Lithuania and the international community, the treaty of the Soviet Russia and the Republic of Lithuania among them, the USSR – the Republic of Lithuania non-aggression treaty of 1936 and the USSR – the Republic of Lithuania treaty on mutual support of 1939[135]. Violating the pledges of international agreements, the Soviet Union implemented the aggression action against the Republic of Lithuania, occupied it and imposed its will there by military power. Lithuania was under the rule of another country[136]. The occupation of the Soviet Union terminated the natural historical development in Lithuania. Historical events in the region were dependent on the outside factors – the political will of the government of the Soviet Union[137].

Establishment of Puppet Structures in Occupied Lithuania in June 1940

As the international circumstances were unfavourable to Lithuania and the bigger country occupied it, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania accepted the USSR ultimatum on 15 June. Only Lithuanian President Antanas Smetona and Defence Minister Kazys Musteikis proposed to take military actions and oppose the aggression, however the majority of government members were not in favour of this proposal[138]. The Government of Lithuania accepted the will of the USSR.

President Smetona accepted the resignation of Antanas Merkys Council of Ministers, and delegated Merkys to be an acting minister before the new Government was formed. Also, under the act of 15 June Smetona appointed General Stasys Rastikis (Raštikis) Prime Minister and delegated him to establish a new cabinet[139]. Since the candidacy of Rastikis did not answer the demands of the government of the Soviet Union, it demanded Lithuania to co-ordinate the composition of a new cabinet with the representative of the USSR government[140]. The Government of the Soviet Union authorised Valdimir Dekanozov the deputy of the National Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and sent him to Lithuania.

As soon as Dekanozov arrived to Kaunas on 15 June he started co-ordinating the activities implementing the USSR occupational policy[141]. Together with the USSR plenipotentiary in Lithuania Pozdniakov established a work group from the officials of the embassy, the leaders of the USSR army units deployed in Lithuania, the members of secretariat of the communist party central committee, the brigade of Domestic affairs people's commissariat (NKVD). Practically that was the political structure of occupational regime, which politically dictated to the constitutional institutes of the Republic of Lithuania[142].

Seeking to form the impression of legitimacy of occupational regime, the Soviet Union was seeking to fake the legitimate change of the regime. Therefore, it tried to show that the political changes in the country are based on the constitution and implemented by Lithuanian political

powers[143]. Therefore, they wanted take advantage of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania of 1938 and the institution of the President that had wide powers under this Constitution.

The occupants faced difficulties when President Smetona resigned on 15 June refusing to legitimate the actions of the USSR, which were destroying the independence of the Republic of Lithuania. Under the article 71 of the constitution he appointed Merkys acting president and together with the defence Minister Kazys Musteikis crossed the German border[144]. Under the proceeding provided by the Constitution the Prime Minister, who was acting President, had some powers of the President, however, he was not entitled to all the powers of the President and did not govern the country. He could not appoint a new Prime Minister and delegate him to form a new cabinet[145]. Realising that the government of the USSR sought to make Smetona come back to Kaunas and make him legalise the change of the Government. Therefore the government of Merkys, probably under the pressure of Dekanozov, tried to persuade Smetona to come back to Lithuania. Failing to do that the members of the government decided to consider the departure of Smetona his resignation on 19 June [146]. That was an obvious violation of the constitutional norms of the Republic of Lithuania, as the Constitution did not grant the Government the right to dismiss the President. Also, the acting Prime Minister under the Article 71 of the constitution could not take over all the powers of the President under Article 72. Despite that the duties of the President seemingly under the Article 72 of the Constitution were delegated to Merkys who was acting President[147].

Acting President Merkys declared the period of defence of Lithuania on 16 June and dismissed the Defence Minister Musteikis and delegated his powers to the commander of the army Vincas Vitkauskas[148]. On the same day Domestic Affairs Minister Kazys Skucas (Skučas) and the director of the State security Augustinas Povilaitis were detained and put to prison. Merkys accepted the demand of Foreign affairs national commissioner Viaceslav Molotov to co-ordinate the composition of the new government favourable to the USSR with the USSR high representative in Lithuania Dekanozov. On 16 June the government issued a declaration where it urged the society not to interfere into political events and be as calm as possible[149]. This declaration revealed the position of the government of the Republic of Lithuania not to resist to the military aggression of the USSR.

Having accepted the power of the USSR the government of Lithuania led by Merkys started co-ordinating its actions with the representatives. On 16 June Dekanozov and Merkys discussed the composition of a new cabinet. Dekanozov rejected all the candidacies proposed by Merkys to the post of Prime Minister and started forming a new cabinet himself[150]. The USSR sought to form an easily manipulated cabinet, which would be right-winged, however not communist. Therefore the USSR advocates, who were known, culture people of Lithuania with democratic views, however politically inexperienced and trusting were chosen to it. Seeking to mislead the society, the members of the Lithuanian communist party had deliberately no access to the government[151]. The leaders of

communist international and the structure of Dekanozov asked communists to keep quiet and not to demand anything and do not interfere in the political wangles of the USSR[152].

The cabinet was formed very quickly "at the speed of Bolshevik stachanovscina"[153]. The candidacies to the members and leaders of the cabinet were appointed by the USSR representative in Lithuania Pozdniakov under the embassy list of Lithuanian political and social leaders[154]. He was well aware about the political life of Lithuania, he personally new the representatives of various political leaders, the leaders of society and culture, he was well aware about their characteristic features. The candidacies to ministers were chosen from the left winged people. Some of them were chosen from the people of the *Lithuanian Society for the Culture of the USSR Regions* (the Chairman of the society Kreve-Mickevicius, Vice Chairman - journalist Paleckis, active members – writers Liudas Gira, Antanas Venclova and others), some people were known to the USSR embassy better than others. When deciding on the government and leaders of ministries, the USSR representatives sometimes listened to the opinion of some LCP members: at first only to the LCP central committee secretary Icikas Smuelis (Šmuelis) Meskupas, later to Michalina Meskauskiene (Meškauskienė), the LCP central committee secretary Snieckus (Sniečkus) who was released form prison and others[155]. They chose the persons who had no experience in political activity and no understanding in political matters, probably expecting that they would not grasp quickly on their political machinations, and when they do it, they could not retreat as they would be involved there[156]. Some persons were chosen because of their relations with NKVD residency (for example, with the acting minister (till 19 June) of Agriculture and domestic affairs Matas Mickis). The representatives of the USSR government did not propose the finance minister and allowed Paleckis and Merkys choose him themselves. As one could see from the list of candidates to high positions in administration, which was compiled by the USSR embassy in Kaunas, LCP CC secretary Meskupas and Genrikas Zimanas tried to nominate for this post engineer Chaim Alperavicius (Alperavicius), who was close to communists. However Dekanozov and Pozdniakov did not approve of this. Merkys and Paleckis decided to leave the former minister of finance Galvanauskas. On 16 June he was delegated to the government under the meeting of populists and Christian democrats[157].

Dekanozov and Pozdniakov tried to make it seem that the Soviet Union would retain the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania and would not interfere into its internal affairs and would let the government act independently.   However, the procedure of forming the new cabinet ruined these illusions and showed that the representatives of the USSR were forming a puppet structure of occupational regime. Dekanozov group chose and appointed the members of the government at their own discretion, and did not respect the will of Lithuanian political powers. Paleckis had to announce to the candidates the decision of the USSR representatives and persuade them to become ministers, whereas Merkys had to legitimate the appointment of the puppet government. As we could see from

the memoirs of our contemporaries, the ministers were appointed under the scheme which was characteristic to dictator regimes. The candidates were asked to come to Paleckis and were informed that "the people" nominated hem to these posts as ministers, not considering their doubts whether they are able to perform administrative functions[158]. By the way, not a single candidate categorically rejected the offer to become a minister or vice-minister and was involved into political machinations of the occupants.

On 17 June 1940 Dekanozov gave instructions to Merkys on the composition of the government[159]. On the same day Merkys appointed Paleckis Prime Minister and signed an act on the approval of the so-called People's Government[160]. The cabinet consisted of 7 members: Prime Minister Justas Paleckis, Deputy of Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister and Acting Education Minister Vincas Kreve-Mickevicius, Defence Minister and Commander of the Army General Vincas Vitkauskas, the Minister of Justice Povilas Pakarklis, the Minister of Finance and Acting Domestic Affairs Minister Matas Mickis, Health Care Minister Leonas Koganas. Finance Minister Galvanauskas and Acting Defence Minister Vitkauskas were left in the puppet government from Merkys government. Merkys resigned on the same day and Paleckis replaced him[161].

The next day Paleckis made a speech, the content of which was co-ordinated with the structure of Dekanozov and the secretariat of the Lithuanian Communist Party central committee[162], seeking to calm the society. It was assured that the government would retain the constitutional order of the republic of Lithuania and the sovereign government and would exercise independent policy. Seeking to mislead and attract the citizens the ideas that were popular among some classes of the society were declared[163]. Such statements could create an illusion, that the government is going to independently exercise political reforms.

Seeking to misinform the global society on its political objectives in Lithuania, the Soviet Union disseminated a communiqué on 20 June. It explained that the USSR brought its army into Lithuania in order to ensure the implementation of the mutual assistance agreement between the USSR and Lithuania[164].

Some Lithuanian political powers and foreign countries recognised Paleckis government. The Lithuanian society did not disclose the treachery of occupants till the resolutions of the People's Parliament, did not understand their political plans and the role of the government in implementing them. Therefore, some political powers of Lithuania declared that they trust in the puppet institution[165].

The government of Paleckis was a temporary political institution practically – the structure of occupational regime in Lithuania. It was established by the USSR government under the same principles, under which it formed the governments of other occupied Baltic States[166]. Puppet governments of the occupied Baltic States were established not by the national constitutional institutes

or political powers of these countries but by the political structures of occupational regime – the representatives appointed by the USSR groups: in Lithuania - Dekanozov, Latvia – Andrej Vysinskis (Vyšinskis) and Aleksej Zdanov (Ždanovo) in Estonia. They were delegated by the USSR to establish puppet administration institutions. The members of the government were chosen under the criteria, which the communists applied to the political structures of the so-called transitional period. The main indicators here were political faithfulness of these people to the USSR and its political system, obedience to its government and the representation group of the USSR. Paleckis cabinet members, similarly like the members of Johannes Vares in Estonia and August Kirchenstein in Latvia, liked the Soviet Union, were left-winged, however, the majority did not belong to the communist party. The majority of them was politically naïve, had no political experience and was easily manipulated on sordid political motives. Qualifications, competencies, administration skills and experience, which are usually a necessity for bureaucracy in a normal environment, this time, played no role. Apart from Galvanauskas and partly Vitkauskas other members of the Lithuanian Government had no appropriate qualifications for the job.

The puppet government did not represent the Lithuanian nation and Lithuanian society, it did not express the interests of social and political classes. The fact that some members of the government were left-winged political leaders created an impression that all the government is representing these political streams and are responsible for the implementation of their programmes. However, Lithuanian political parties did not form the government and did not grant it the responsibilities to implement its policy. The cabinet did not have a separate political program, clearly formulated political ideas and the projects of rearranging the social life. The promises declared in Paleckis' speech were a set of left-winged populist thoughts, intended to mislead the society. It was clear from the very beginning that the representatives of the USSR would not allow the government to exercise any independent policy. This government had its responsibilities from another country. Its power was dependent on the power of the USSR government. Therefore, the puppet government had only those powers, which were established by the USSR representatives. Without the permission from Dekanozov structure, it could not make any decisions[167].

The government was a structure of political regime in Lithuania, which was implementing political will of the USSR. Its goal was to implement the political plans of the USSR in annexing Lithuania. It was to govern the occupied country and change its social life – implement the USSR policy under the control of the USSR representatives[168]. Dekanozov and its people were directing and controlling over the cabinet from the very beginning. Despite that some ministers hoped that the USSR government would let the government of Lithuania act independently. It was believed that the dictate of Dekanozov is temporary and carries some personal and not political character. Having no political experience the ministers did not even realise that the dictator-like behaviour of Dekanozov reflected

not only his character but also the principle of functioning of dictatorial occupational government. Only Galvanauskas, who had political experience, had no illusions that the government would be allowed to act independently. He was the first to realise that the USSR representatives are manipulating the government to suit their political interests[169].

The puppet government was politically not homogeneous, its members were imagining the further political development of Lithuania in a very different way. Ministers and high officials who supported Kreve-Mickevicius and Galvanauskas had hopes that it is possible to retain partial Lithuanian sovereignty and the powers of the sovereign government[170]. The politicians who were supporting communists kept the LCP (b) political platform, obeyed Dekanozov and were acting under his instructions. The political orientation and activity of the puppet government practically did not depend on the position of Ministers. The political will of the USSR and the decisions of its representatives determined the activity of the puppet government.

The occupation of Lithuania did not formally change the composition of the communist party: it still was violating the law. However, the occupation gave hope to communists that with the help of the Soviet Union they could start governing the country[171]. Due to the annexation mechanism the representatives of the USSR were keeping the communist party further away from the legislature of occupied Lithuania and did not let them out from the underground to develop their activity. On 16 June 1940 during the meeting of the secretariat of LCP central committee the leaders of the party were angry that there is not a single communist in Paleckis cabinet and the party does not exercise powers in the Ministry of Interior[172]. The leaders of LCP were probably persuaded that communists have to act under the traditional bolshevism scheme of political institutes – to introduce an immediate control of communists in the institutions of Lithuania and to take high positions into their hands. They politically did not like many candidacies of the ministers, especially Galvanauskas. However Meskupas, who communicated directly with the USSR representatives made them understand that the communists could not set any conditions, they had to obey the will of the USSR representatives. However, the communists decided to get the post of the Minister of Interior. It was within the interests of the USSR government to put the Ministry of Interior under its and local communist control as it had to ensure a smooth annexation process. In essence from the very first days of occupation this ministry had to exercise the repression functions of the USSR. In order to do that, this power structure of the Republic of Lithuania had to be quickly transformed into the repression structure of occupational regime. As soon as Snieckus was released from prison, he together with Meskupas visited the USSR embassy in Kaunas on 18 June[173]. It was agreed that communist Mecislovas Gedvilas would become the Minister of Interior, Snieckus – the director of the Security department, the local communist group would be directed to the security department. LCP CC secretariat appointed Snieckus and Gedvilas to these positions on 19 June and sent the group of communists who were just released from prison to the

department of security[174]. The process of bolshevisation of the ministry started – there were attempts to make it subordinate to the dictate and control of the party.

After the representatives of the foreign countries and the Lithuanian society accepted the government of Paleckis, the USSR representatives started changing its composition and replacing old employees with new communist ministers and other people who supported communists[175]. On 18 June Paleckis appointed Antanas Venclova Minister of Education, on 19 June Gedvilas - Minister of Interior, on 24 June Liudas Adomauskas – State Inspector, on 27 June communist Mykolas Juncas – Kucinskas (Junčas-Kučinskas) - Minister of a new Labour Ministry (when he got ill Motiejus Sumauskas (Šumauskas) substituted him and was appointed Chairman of the Labour Palace 19 June), on 1 July Stasys Pupeikis – Communication Minister, communist Karolis Didziulis (Didžiulis)-Grosmanas – representative of the government for the city of Vilnius and its region with the rights of the minister[176]. After Paleckis on 5 July dismissed Galvanauskas and appointed supporter of communists Juozas Vaisnoras (Vaišnoras) acting Finance Minister, there was a majority of communists in the cabinet[177].

In July acting President Paleckis and the ministers realised the USSR political plans in Lithuania. During the meeting of Kreve-Mickevicius with Molotov on 1 July it was clear that soon the USSR would incorporate Lithuania[178]. The members of the government, apart from Galvanauskas who left the office, resigned themselves to such a perspective. The so-called People's Government started helping the USSR Government in annexing Lithuania.

The Dismantling of the State and Political System of the Republic of Lithuania in June-July 1940

After the formation of the so-called People's Government, the constitutional system in Lithuania officially did not change. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted in 1938, remained valid. However, in practice, Lithuania's status and its government did change. After the occupation, the Republic of Lithuania lost its sovereignty. Political powers, representing the interests of certain layers of the Lithuanian society, which had their political programmes and could implement their policy with the help of the government, were removed from power. They were replaced by a group of foreign country representatives, and this group was not allowed to take any political decisions independently. The most important constitutional institutions of the Republic of Lithuania- President and Government were by force established by a foreign country. The Government was politically empowered not by the Lithuanian sovereign, but by foreign country representatives; it obeyed them and carried out their political will. State institutions of the Republic of Lithuania lost their power- the main function of authorities, which were sovereign, independent of a foreign country and accountable

only to the citizens of Lithuania. This indicated that the Republic of Lithuania lost its independence and sovereign government[179].

After the Soviet Union authorities imposed their political power on Lithuania, they started changing its political system, first, the principles of the government's relations with the public, also the principles of political institution organization, functioning and reciprocity. The USSR carried out the changes gradually, manipulating the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and making use of the Lithuanian governing and administrative system. Until Lithuania's annexation became official, the name of the Republic of Lithuania was left unchanged, the Constitution and other legal acts remained formally valid, and the organization of the governing and administrative system of the Republic of Lithuania stayed the same. The representatives of the USSR used those sections of the State Machinery, mainly of the executive, which they could easily change and subordinate to the implementation of the occupation policy without causing the public's suspicion. After the so-called People's Government started reorganization, the tasks of institution activity and socio-political content of their functions were changed. Due to their political interests, the representatives of the USSR started changing the set-up of high-rank bureaucracy.

On June 25, on demand of the representatives of the USSR, the Council of Ministers cancelled the Concordat between the Vatican and the Republic of Lithuania, signed on September 27, 1927[180]. On July 12, the Government transmitted the gold of the Republic of Lithuania, which was being stored abroad, to the USSR's Central Bank (Gosbank)[181].

On June 22, by order of the USSR authorities, Justas Paleckis signed the act revoking the period of state defence and introducing the period of strengthened state protection in whole Lithuania, with the exception of the cities and counties of Vilnius, Trakai and Švenčionėliai, and on July 19, he introduced it also in these cities and districts[182]. The Law on Strengthened State Protection granted great powers to Minister of the Interior. By means of this law, civil rights were restricted and political institutions of the Republic of Lithuania were rapidly started to be abrogated[183].

Some resolutions discriminating against certain layers of society were passed. On July 17, on proposal of Antanas Venclova, Minister of Education, the Council of Ministers decided to deprive ten people of the pensions for distinguished people. These included Kazys Ladyga, Vladas Mironas, Ignas Musteikis and Mykolas Krupavicius (Krupavičius)[184]. On July 30, the Government assigned to the National Audit Office of the Republic of Lithuania to recover from the former members of the Cabinet bonuses on their salaries and holidays[185]. On the same day, the Council of Ministers passed the Law on Sequestration of Premises[186]. This resolution violated the citizens' right to property, laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. On July 29, the Council of Ministers repealed the word of address "Mr."[187]

Lithuanian political organizations were banned and other civil institutions were started to be destroyed. On June 19, by the decree of Mecys Gedvilas, Minister of the Interior, the Lithuanian Nationalist (Tautininkai) Union and the Organization of Young Lithuanians were closed, and on June 27, also all political, public, cultural and religious organizations and student corporations[188]. On July 18, the Council of Ministers closed the Lithuanian Scouts Association and Lithuanian Riflemen's Union[189]. The ban on Lithuanian public associations put an end to one of the most important elements of a democratic political system.

In an attempt to introduce the Soviet occupation control over the mass media, on June 18, the Government strengthened control of information and newspapers. By the June 18 order of Gedvilas, Minister of the Interior, from July 7, all the newspapers and magazines were closed, except for the official "Lietuvos Aidas" (on July 12, renamed to the "Darbo Lietuva", later the "Tarybu Lietuva") and several other communist newspapers,[190] supporting the occupation regime. With the ban on the freedom of the press, the Lithuanian public was cut off from information, which was not controlled by the occupation regime. This paved the way for spreading the USSR propaganda and beginning the campaign for ideological justification of the occupation regime.

The ban on all, except for the communist, press, political and other public organizations and the restriction on the right to organize meetings and gatherings meant that people's political rights were taken away and, in fact, freedom of the press, speech and association was abolished. The occupation authorities started controlling and changing in their own interests the political life of the Lithuanian public. The representatives of the USSR openly started patronizing the political powers, which had helped them to introduce the occupation regime, to get them involved in the occupation policy mechanism and form from them the occupation regime political support. People, punished mainly for communist activity, were amnestied and released. By the June 25 order of Gedvilas, Minister of the Interior, the Lithuanian Communist Party was legalized and on June 28- also the Communist Youth Union of Lithuania[191]. On June 26, Minister of the Interior allowed communists to publish their newspaper the "Tiesa". The representatives of the USSR widely started to incorporate the LCP into their political measures[192]. With the legalization of the Lithuanian Communist Party and ban on other political parties, a single party political system was created in Lithuania. By widely involving local communists in the occupation policy, the foundations of the communist party policy mechanism were laid down.

Important steps were also taken to destroy the state organization of the Republic of Lithuania and approximate the Lithuanian administrative organization to that of the USSR: the constitutional institutions of the Republic of Lithuania were destroyed and new institutions were established according to the model of the USSR. By the June 27 act, from July 1, Paleckis dissolved Parliament (the Seimas) - one of the most important constitutional institutions[193] of the Republic of Lithuania. On

July 26, the Council of Ministers dissolved the State Council[194]. According to the model of the USSR, in June, the Ministries of Health and Labour were established, on July 25- the Ministry of Industry and on July 29- the Ministry of Trade[195]. Seeking to destroy the structures of power of the Republic of Lithuania and establish in their place the structures analogical to those of the Soviet Union, on June 26, the People's militia[196] were started to be created. On July 2, the Council of Ministers passed the Law on Reorganization of the Army[197]. The following day, by the act of Paleckis, the army was renamed into the Lithuanian People's Army and, according to the model of the USSR the post of political leaders[198] was introduced in it.

The distribution of the USSR troops in Lithuania enabled the invaders to create the occupation regime organization in Lithuania. It was concentrated in one political centre – Dekanozov group, which dictated to all Lithuanian political structures and used them to implement the will of invaders. It subordinated the People's Government and other political institutions and became top of the hierarchy, being the highest authority of the occupation regime in Lithuania. The Dekanozov group had the real government levers in Lithuania: the subordinate state apparatus (the Government and other institutions) and organized force of compulsion, made up of the USSR troops distributed in Lithuania as well as the repression apparatus,[199] being quickly developed by emissaries of the NKVD.

The Dekanozov group was the centre of the occupation regime in Lithuania, imposing on Lithuanian institutions the occupation regime decisions related to life changes of the Lithuanian public according to the interests of the USSR authorities and supervising their implementation[200]. According to the formal law, Dekanozov's spoken directives were not legal acts; however, in politics they had validity of a political norm. These were the occupation authorities' instructions for Lithuanian institutions on what laws and resolutions should be passed, and what measures should be implemented. The People's Government could not take decisions that were not in line with Dekanozov's directives and could not change them. The Government could not refuse to carry out the occupation authorities' instructions because it was accountable to the Dekanozov group. The latter made direct orders to the Government and ministries and monitored how they implemented the directives. In fact, it took away Lithuanian institutions' independence, restricted their powers, narrowed their competence and usurped part of prerogatives.

The occupation authorities changed the place and role of the institutions of the President and Government in the Lithuanian governing system. The institution of the President lost its political meaning and was transformed into a symbolic institution, which was needed to conform to the scheme of a presidential republic and which legalized the USSR authorities' decisions. It had a very insignificant role in the bureaucratic vertical of power. Contemporaries recall that Paleckis, the acting President, did not have political power and did not play any significant role in governing the country[201]. Members of the Government and heads of other Lithuanian institutions co-coordinated all

the important decisions not with him, but with the representatives of the USSR. For practical considerations of governing the occupied country, the occupation authorities retained the Government's prerogatives; however, they changed its political role. The People's Government became an institution, the main function of which was the organization of the implementation and monitoring of the execution of the occupation authorities' decisions. The structures of the LCP, at that time, were not incorporated into the Lithuanian governing system.

Until Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR, the occupation authorities created the impression that Lithuania retained the distribution and subordination of institutions, characteristic of a presidential republic. However, the Dekanozov group's political dictatorship over Lithuanian institutions undermined this illusion. New relations of institution subordination and bureaucratic hierarchy were being created. On top of the new bureaucratic pyramid, there was the apparatus of Dekanozov, who was the authorized agent of the USSR Government, and lower there were Lithuanian political institutions that were all subordinate to Dekanozov.

After Lithuania's occupation, the communist party political mechanism was started to be created in Lithuania. Heads of the CPSV (b) determined the communist party policy aims, tasks and means of their implementation in occupied Lithuania; they also took all the most important political decisions, concerning the change of Lithuania's socio-political reality, to fit their interests and aims. This policy was carried out through the Lithuanian political institutions[202] subordinate to the Dekanozov group. The Dekanozov group was the most important instrument in implementing the occupation policy. It held a political dictatorship over Lithuanian institutions involved in the governing and administrative system; it also directed and coordinated their activity implementing the occupation policy. The Lithuanian communist organization carried out the CPSU (b) policy and from the first day of occupation acted in accordance with Dekanozov's directives[203]. The Dekanozov group incorporated the communist organization into the occupation regime mechanism and turned it into its element[204].

Lithuania's annexation, and the implementation of other political tasks of the occupation regime, largely depended on the functioning of the occupation regime and communist party political mechanism. It was politically vital for the occupation regime to make this mechanism work for Soviet interests. To achieve this, the tasks and principles of activity of the Lithuanian governing and administrative apparatus needed to be changed. For the interests of annexation, until Lithuania's incorporation the representatives of the USSR did not change legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania, which established the aims of the state apparatus, the tasks of its institution activity, their functions, competence and principles of activity. At the same time, after the occupation the state apparatus could not perform its main function- to exercise power and decide on political issues. On announcing the political programme of the People's Government, the tasks of Ministries and other institutions, as well

as the political content of their functions, in fact, were changed. They started implementing reforms of the People's Government. As the latter was carrying out the political will of the representatives of the USSR, it actually meant that Lithuanian institutions were implementing the occupation policy, i.e. were changing different spheres of life according to the instructions and interests of the occupation authorities[205]. The occupation regime did away with the essential principles of functioning of the governing system of the Republic of Lithuania- constitutionalism and lawfulness. Although, formally the activity of institutions and officials in occupied Lithuania was in line with the legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania and the competence established therein; in practice, they acted unlawfully, based on authorizations and competence granted to them by the representatives of the USSR.

From the memoirs of members of the People's Government, Vincas Kreve- Mickevicius (Krėvė- Mickevičius), in particular, it is clear that Lithuanian bureaucrats noticed that the representatives of the USSR started changing some tasks and organization principles of the Lithuanian state apparatus[206]. They were especially worried about Dekanozov's dictatorship over Lithuanian institutions. Following the bureaucratic hierarchy, Lithuanian bureaucrats kept to the subordination of institutions and administrators that was common in the Republic of Lithuania, and they were not willing to change this tradition to suit Dekanozov's wishes and interests of his group. Some members of the People's Government tried persuading Pozdniakov not to allow Dekanozov to dictate to heads of Lithuanian institutions. For political reasons, Pozdniakov tried to make heads of Lithuanian institutions believe that Lithuania will retain its sovereignty and its respective governing organization. That is why he tried to persuade them that Dekanozov's dictatorship was temporal and had a personal rather than political nature. Without political awareness and experience, the above-mentioned members of the Government did not realize that Dekanozov's behaviour not only reflected his character but also expressed the principle of functioning of the dictatorial occupation regime. In the end, the majority of members of the People's Government and other officials accepted the political dictatorship of invaders, and the fact that they had started changing the organization of the Lithuanian governing system. Most likely, they saw no possibilities of changing the attitude of the representatives of the USSR.

It was politically important for the .Dekanozov group that Lithuanian institutions and their staff wholly and unconditionally obeyed its instructions and did not attempt to sabotage them, postponing the implementation of political decisions or using other methods of opposing the will of politicians, commonly known to bureaucrats. In the eyes of the public, the bureaucracy was the expression of legal supremacy, which is why, for ideological purposes, it was very important for the occupation authorities to create an impression that the governing system and bureaucracy of occupied Lithuania represented lawful authority. The representatives of the USSR wanted Lithuanian bureaucracy to acknowledge the Government created by invaders, and confirm it and its lawfulness by their activity.

There were different ways of making bureaucracy obey instructions of the representatives of the USSR. Until Lithuania's incorporation, the occupation authorities gave priority to political dictatorship and administrative measures. Administrative measures suited best for the purposes of the occupation authorities that implemented their policy through the bureaucratic system, making use of the Lithuanian bureaucratic vertical and internal discipline of administration. To achieve this, a layer of high- rank bureaucracy, politically loyal to the occupation regime, needed to be created that would act as a kind of intermediary between the occupation authorities and the rest of bureaucracy, politically disloyal to the invaders. It had to concentrate in its hands the levers of administration in Lithuania and hierarchically subordinate to it the remaining bureaucrats making them obey the occupation authorities' instructions. In pursuit of these goals, the representatives of the USSR started replacing Lithuanian officials with administrators who were loyal to the communist cause.

The replacement of officials of the Republic of Lithuania with administrators loyal to the invaders in June – July 1940

The process of replacing the officials of the Republic of Lithuania with administrators loyal to the invaders started on the first day of occupation and lasted for the whole period of the first Soviet occupation. The creation of the People's Government was the first step taken by the Soviet regime in this sphere. The content, speed and scope of this process depended on many factors in both Lithuania and the Soviet Union. It was determined by the annexation mechanism and the policy of Lithuania's sovietisation (the transposition of the Soviet political system and the formation of the Soviet bureaucracy, in particular) also by the mechanism of the communist party authority and policy in occupied Lithuania. The organizers of this process kept to some principles of the communist party cadre policy, however, at the same time, they took into account Lithuania's annexation mechanism and practical considerations of governing the occupied country.

The replacement of Lithuanian bureaucrats largely depended on the occupation authorities' political confidence in local communists and the whole of the local administration, on Lithuanian communists' readiness to take over the administration of the country, especially, on whether they had people who were suitable for administrative work. For various reasons, heads of the CPSV (b) had no political confidence for either communists of Russian nationality ("nationals") or local administration in general, and did not have political confidence in the Lithuanian Communist Party, which had just emerged from the underground. Only after the Lithuanian communist organization was incorporated into the CPSV (b) did the invaders allow local communists to take over the country's administration. Even then, they kept the most important levers for governing Lithuania in their own hands because they still lacked political confidence in the Lithuanian administration.

For practical interests of governing the occupied country, the occupation authorities did not attempt to replace all the Lithuanian bureaucracy at a time because massive dismissal of qualified administrators would have inevitably disorganized the governing system. Until the People's Parliament elections farce, the representatives of the USSR tried to hide their intentions regarding Lithuania's annexation and sovietisation, mislead the public and create the illusion that Lithuania retained its sovereignty, constitutional order, and that it was still governed by local authorities. That is why the representatives of the USSR were not interested in massive replacement of Lithuanian officials with local communists and administrators coming from the USSR (except for the apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior). The important fact was that the occupation regime lacked citizens of Lithuania who would be politically loyal and suitable for administrative work. The occupation authorities tried to recruit loyal administrators mainly from the circle of local communists. However, members of the LCP were mostly uneducated, illiterate and politically unqualified people; they did not have the necessary competence and administrative skills. Besides, there were not enough of local communists to occupy all the important posts. In June 1940, almost 1600 communists emerged from the underground or were released from prisons and the total number of officials involved in the governing and administrative system of the Republic of Lithuania amounted to approximately 25- 30 thousand people[207]. For these reasons, the Dekanozov group could not restrict itself only to local communists and had to look for suitable, politically loyal administrators among other layers of society, supporting the occupation regime and communist system.

Until the announcement of the People's Parliament elections, only the officials of the Ministry of the Interior had been massively replaced, as this institution was quickly reorganized into the repressive structure[208] of the occupation regime. Attempting to paralyze the power and activity of the courts, executive officials of district courts and prosecution offices that were at the command of the Ministry of Justice were started to be removed. In other governing institutions, only heads and other high- rank officials, who politically opposed the occupation regime, were removed. The Dekanozov group only coordinated the process of replacing high- rank Lithuanian officials with reliable administrators selected from the occupation authorities; it was directly organized by the workers of the USSR embassy together with members of the LCP CK- Antanas Sneckus (Snečkus) and Icik Meskupas. After Sneckus was elected head of Security Department, from the end of June, Meskupas and member of the LCP CK Secretariat, later head of the LCP CK cadre section Chaimas Aizenas took over the selection of high- rank officials[209]. As Ziman testified, Meskupas played a very significant role in selecting people for the apparatuses of the People's Government and ministries[210].

The Dekanozov group took decisions on what heads of institutions should be removed from office immediately for political or social reasons, and what officials could temporary be left at work until suitable candidates for replacement would be found. It compiled lists of potential candidates for

high- rank posts and collected information on them. Following the USSR model, members of the group, workers of the USSR NKVD, checked the candidates using their own sources. The selected people had to arrive at the USSR embassy for an interview with members of the group[211]. During such interviews the Secretary of the USSR embassy, Fiodor Molockov (Moločkov), workers of the embassy, Luniakov, Semionov and others asked about the candidates' political views, their opinion of the USSR system and their possible reaction to Lithuania's annexation. Based on information received from the NKVD, opinions of the members of the LCP and other people and impressions from the interview, the embassy workers prepared a short characteristic of the candidate and their conclusions. These included the evaluation of the candidates' political views and degree of their loyalty to the occupation regime, also the forecasts on how their views and behaviour might change after Lithuania's annexation and start of sovietisation. It is clear from these characterizations that candidates were presented and supported by the committee of the LCP centre (it was then written that the candidates were recommended by the LCP CK), leaders of the party and party activists (mostly Meskupas, Snieckus, Leiba Sausas (Šausas), Ziman, Meskauskiene (Meškauskienė), some Ministers (Povilas Pakarklis, Venclova)[212]. People that often visited the USSR embassy in Kaunas in the 1940's and participated in its projects were also asked to give opinions about the candidates. A lot of information on almost all the candidates to high- rank posts was provided by communists who closely cooperated with the USSR embassy and had its trust; also by Lithuanian citizens who worked for the embassy.

For instance, after interviewing and collecting opinions about Juozas Ziugzda (Žiugžda), headmaster of Kaunas Gymnasium, a worker of the USSR embassy stated the following: 'Ziugzda is afraid that Lithuania will lose its independence. He is also full of doubts concerning international status and creation of kolkhozes. He is a Bourgeois. He has a confusing methodology of small bourgeoisie. He is liberal and is now afraid of his origin and belonging to social democrats. He has no particular skills. To use him, one must expose him to close scrutiny. These are the recommendations of Mieskauskiene, his former student. She also recalled that he materially helped MOPR. Cvirka wrote a negative reference. According to him Ziugzda joined the Lithuanian Nationalist Union due to large family'[213]. In view of this characteristic, he was not chosen for the post of Minister of Education, but he was appointed Deputy Minister of Education to Venclova.

Here is what a worker of the USSR embassy wrote about the writer Liudas Gira, candidate to the post of managing Director of the Ministry of Education: 'Often visited the embassy and informed about Lithuanian political life. The information he provided was not always important and verified. […] In the years 1919- [19] 20 he was Head of Vilnius Intelligence Office, however his skills as intelligence officer are doubtful. […] According to Ziman G[ira] was "a complex phenomenon" […] Sausas expressed his doubts in G[ira] motivating his opinion with Gira's past. However, he finally

agreed that Gira should be used to educate the masses'[214]. The final positive conclusion determined Ludas' Gira assignation to the prospective post.

Alperavicius (Alperavičius), the potential candidate to the post of Vice Minister of Finance, at the time technical Director of the electric elements factory "Helios", was described by a worker of the USSR embassy as folllows: "Alperovic, a Jew, […] Ziman's opinion: A[lperavicius] - a non-party Bolshevik. Ziman thinks A[lperavicius] should be assigned Vice Minister of Finance because then we will know everything that Galvanauskas does with the Jewish capital, which A[lperavicius] knows well. Opinion of comrade Molockov: has known A[lperavicius] for almost two years, impression is good. In March this year A[lperavicius] visited the embassy with the information about closing the newspapers (was with Sausas), later together with Ziman asked to give engineers an opportunity to help the RKKA[215] military construction in Lithuania"[216]. When the representatives of the USSR expressed their doubts whether it was purposeful to assign Alperavicius vice Minister of Finance, Meskupas and Ziman provided additional information and supported his candidature. A worker of the USSR embassy reported: 'Alperavic […] had relations with communists (Ziman, Maimin, Sneider. Formally, he is not member of (communist) party. Considers himself to be communist by ideology. […] Recommendation of Ziman. Good opinions of Sneider, [Meskupas]. Has to be used in the Ministry of Finance[217]. Meskupas and Ziman's attempts to assign Alperavicius to some high post proved successful. Although the Dekanozov group did not put him in charge of the occupied country's finances, on July 26, he was assigned Minister of the new Ministry of Industry[218]. Similar characteristics were prepared for Auditor General Adomauskas, Head of State Land Commission Alfonsas Zukauskas (Žukauskas), Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pijus Glovackas, vice Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture Meskauskiene (Meškauskienė) and other people who were candidates to high- rank posts.

From the characteristics of the candidates to high- rank posts, it is clearly seen that, at that time, the most important thing for the occupation authorities was the indicator of political loyalty to the occupation regime and communist system. Similarly as when forming Paleckis Government, the Dekanozov group paid a lot of attention to candidates' personal characteristics, first, obedience and susceptibility to manipulation. The representatives of the USSR gave priority to people who had no strong will power or political courage, who were obedient and easily manipulated. Candidates' belonging to political parties and their social origin, at that time, were not essential criteria in choosing people for high- rank posts. For instance, people who were not members of the communist party, participated in political organizations that opposed communists (e.g. Meskauskiene, Ziugzda and others) even worked in the structures of power (e.g. Gira), originated from the so-called bourgeoisie or belonged to this layer of society were envisaged as heads of institutions. The Dekanozov group did not keep to the usual CPSV (b) criteria of selecting the cadres, mainly the criteria of party or social

belonging. These were the cases when it had to take into account the status of Lithuania, which was occupied but still not annexed, the interest of the occupation authorities to misinform the public until Lithuania's incorporation, hiding the plans of Lithuania's annexation and sovietisation, when it could not find other candidates who would be more suitable to occupy high-rank posts.

When selecting people to high-rank posts, a certain role was attributed to their personal relations with members of the puppet Government and leaders of the LCP. In the USSR nomenclature system, it was common to have relations based not only on political but also personal loyalty to leaders of the party and administration. For that reason, the occupation authorities appreciated personal recommendations and thought them to be a certain guarantee that appointed officials would be loyal to their patrons and would not risk their own or their patrons' position. The Dekanozov group, above all, paid attention to the opinion of communists that were members of the People's Government. For instance, Minister of the Interior Gedvilas for some time belonged to the Lithuanian Peasants' Union, at one time was member of the board of the Lithuanian Youth Union centre together with Justas Paleckis, Valerijonas Knyva and Juozas Vaisnoras (Vaišnoras)[219]. Owing to that, Knyva first became Director of the Municipalities Department of the Ministry of the Interior and in a few months was assigned national commissioner for the LSSR municipal economy[220]. Acquaintance with Gedvilas, Paleckis and Aleksandras Guzevicius (Guzevičius), a communist and Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, helped Vaisnoras become vice Minister of Finance and after Galvanauskas, Minister of Finance, was removed from office, take up his post[221].

The Dekanozov group assigned selecting heads of institutions subordinate to Lithuanian Ministries to the Secretariat of the LCP CK. Meskupas and Aizenas did the work. For instance, Meskupas suggested the majority of county governors and Aizenas agreed upon their candidacies with Minister Gedvilas by phone. Members of the LCP CK Secretariat who had trust of the representatives of the USSR gradually gained more and more rights. At the beginning, they only distributed communists into different institutions. Later, after they had answered the expectations of the representatives of the USSR, they started dealing with other issues concerning people envisaged to higher posts[222]. A small group of communists was formed which took over from the Dekanozov group some issues related to cadres.

After selecting people loyal to the invaders, heads of Lithuanian institutions were replaced. In June- July, on the basis of Paleckis' acts, Government's resolutions and Ministers' orders, the following officials were dismissed: head of President's Office, Auditor General, Secretaries General of the Ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Education, Directors of Ministries' Departments, President of the Lithuanian Bank, Chairman of the Chamber of Labour, Director of the "Elta", editor of the "Lietuvos Aidas" and others[223]. By order of Minister of Justice Pakarklis, judges and prosecutors were started to be eliminated, by order of

Minister Gedvilas- heads and workers of Ministries, heads of security districts, heads of police forces and counties; also heads of regions, cities burgomasters and workers of municipalities. Until the middle of July, heads of Departments of the Ministry of the Interior, 40 heads of districts, security districts and police offices, 175 heads of regions, 25 members of district boards, municipality workers, 13 assistants of burgomasters and other officials were dismissed, 83 workers of Security Department were arrested or left the country. The total number amounted to not less than 380 civil servants[224]. To speed up the process, a method of dismissing officials under the veil of reorganization of institutions and establishment was widely applied. In June- July, the Council of Ministers several times changed the staff of the President's Office of the Republic of Lithuania, Cabinet Council, Ministries of Defence, the Interior, Finance, State Control, Health and Social Security, Labour and Education[225]. Under the veil of calling off the present staff and establishing new posts, high- and middle- level officials were dismissed not only because of the posts they occupied but also for political reasons; and only people loyal to the invaders were appointed instead. However, there were cases when members of the People's Government appointed people to work in their institutions on their own initiative without discussing the candidates with the Dekanozovas group. They chose those people on their own, based on their general social activity and personal acquaintance. This was usually the practice of communists, who had best opportunities to employ new people. For instance, Gedvilas, Minister of the Interior, invited his good acquaintance Jurgis Glusauskas (Glušauskas) from Telšiai and, first, made him his secretary, in a week, appointed him head of the county of Kaunas, and in a month, recommended him to the post of the LSSR national commissioner for social welfare[226].

After selecting and assigning people as heads of Lithuanian governing and administrative institutions on the basis of their political loyalty to the occupation regime, the representatives of the USSR started preparing the ground for replacing middle- and low- level officials disloyal to the occupation regime by communists and other supporters of the regime.

Under the veil of the idea of democratisation, the controlled mass media and communist propaganda encouraged to subvert the bureaucratic system and do away with the right wing officials who represented it. The communist press formed the image of Lithuanian civil servants being spies and enemies of the people. On June 18, the LCP CK made a statement in which it demanded that the state apparatus be cleaned from "spies, agents provocateurs and villains"[227]. This was the first official directive of the LCP to start eliminating officials of the Republic of Lithuania on a mass scale. On June 29, at a communist meeting Meskauskiene demanded that the state apparatus and the army be immediately cleaned of "People's enemies"; they should be arrested and their property confiscated[228]. The slogan reflected the Stalinist tendency of Bolshevik ideology attitudes and paralleled with the atmosphere of terror in the Soviet Union[229]. Some members of the People's Government eagerly accepted the idea of People's enemies. Paleckis added local colour to it: he urged to eliminate from

institutions officials of the so-called plutocratic regime- all kinds of plutocrats[230]. Meskauskiene's statement was the expression of the official position of the LCP, which wanted to change the make-up of the Lithuanian officialdom and extend the scale of this process as quickly as possible. The communist propaganda suggested an idea that the Lithuanian officialdom should be one hundred per cent replaced by people loyal to the occupation regime, which, for ideological and psychological reasons, found its supporters among extreme communists. It was stated that not only high- rank officials were "reactionary" and "political hirelings". The same held true about the rest of officials, who were "humbugs" allegedly adapting themselves to any authorities; they were potential enemies of the People and, therefore, could not be left in official posts but had to be "swept out" from all the state institutions[231]. This opinion was a schematic reflection of Bolsheviks' standpoint that after seizing power, communists had to dismantle the state apparatus of a bourgeois state and completely replace its officialdom with new administrators. Under the veil of Bolsheviks' statement that a state can be governed by any representative of the People, it was urged to replace professional Lithuanian officialdom with people who were uneducated, unprofessional and without administrative work skills but who originated from "the People" and were loyal to them. In fact, it was decided to immediately form according to political criteria new officialdom that would be loyal to the occupation regime. Extreme communists in Lithuania oriented themselves to the Stalinist principles of cadre policy and practice of the so-called massive clean-up campaigns (dismissal of people disloyal to the communist party, politically or socially unfit, and their replacement with people loyal to the communists) common in the Soviet Union. Even those communists who were assigned heads of institutions approved of this decision without paying regard to the fact that it could disorganize the work in their institutions[232]. This attitude of Lithuanian extreme communists was not in line with the Dekanozov group's position on the pace of replacement of Lithuanian officialdom. Against the odds, the representatives of the USSR allowed to spread the radical slogans of the communists because they did not contain forthright instigation to replace all officials only with communists. Populist declarations about democratization of the Government and demands to involve People's representatives in the state apparatus created the impression that the People's Government was in favour of democratic changes and the communist party only demanded to implement those democratic changes as soon as possible.

In the summer of 1940, Dekanozov oriented the LCP to select communists who would gradually replace the officialdom of the Republic of Lithuania. To maintain the proper work of Ministries and institutions, high-rank officials were dismissed only after communists or other people, politically loyal to the occupation regime, had been chosen to replace them. As work in public institutions was important and prestigious for communists, only people who had a good record of accomplishment in the party were sent to it. It was only natural that these were mainly people belonging to the former underground communist party and communist youth apparatus: members of

the Secretariat, instructors and heads of state prisoners' collectives. To organize such a group quickly, almost all communists, young communists and state prisoners,[233] released from prisons, at hand of party leaders or banded together in Kaunas were entered in the list. The practice was also determined by other circumstances, mainly, the fact that all the central Lithuanian administrative institutions were concentrated in Kaunas, therefore, it was easy for the invaders to select people to them from the local communists and people well known to the USSR embassy in Kaunas. In addition, the representatives of the USSR eyes turned to the communists from Kaunas and communists released from prisons because they were leaders of the communist party and organizations that functioned under its influence and they were all active members of the communist movement. Some of them, for a short time, lived in the Soviet Union, studied at Western Ethnic Minorities Communist University or International Lenin School, where communists were being prepared for party work. They seemed politically most loyal to the invaders, more educated, proactive, strongly opposing Lithuanian state, and its officialdom. These people formed quite a large, socially and nationally varied reserve of communists, politically loyal to the occupation regime, though poorly educated and unqualified, who were to replace middle-level officials.

Evidently, some problems arose when sending people from the party apparatus to work in the administrative institutions. According to the Bolshevik tradition, the party apparatus formed the elite layer of communists who had no rivals in taking all the most important political and administrative posts. Therefore, the majority of party leaders expected to get high posts. However, in the summer of 1940, the party leadership used the party apparatus, mainly, to form and strengthen party organization. The majority of party organizers, predominantly, members of the Secretariat, instructors, secretaries of territorial organizations, were left to organize the work of the party and only some of them were assigned Ministers and other administrators. The communists, especially members of the Kaunas organization, got the impression that the representatives of the USSR kept the distinguished communists out from administrative work[234]. The truth was that, for the reasons of Lithuania's annexation, the occupation authorities avoided engaging in state institutions communists who were well known to the public. However, a more important fact was that it was politically vital for the invaders not to weaken the set-up of the LCP when sending communists to administrative posts. After Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR and introduction of the Soviet political system, the structures of the LCP were to become the most important element of the communist party power and policy mechanism.

The number of communists, eager to take up official posts, was much higher than the number of posts available at the time. As very few of them were content with their previous activity, at the end of June and the beginning of July, a great many of communists and their supporters, mainly residents of Kaunas[235], overflowed the Secretariat of the LCP CK in Kaunas demanding "good" posts in central

governing institutions. The situation was similar in the province. The LCP district committees turned into "jobcentres"[236], where communists and nonparty people, on a mass scale, went to demand employment. Owing to the party's efforts of enlarging its membership, in July, the LCP counted 3629 members[237]. Communists now could offer twice the number of people than at the end of June. As the Dekanozovas group in July was not eager to give more posts to communists and there were no vacancies for them in the institutions, they started to demand a quicker dismissal of Lithuanian officials. Personal wishes of communists to get employment in administrative institutions coincided with political interests of the occupation authorities and Lithuanian communist organization to make Lithuanian administration Bolshevist.

Until the middle of July, almost 300 communists[238] were employed in the Lithuanian governing and administrative institutions. Another 105 communists selected by Snieckus and Meskupas were sent to Security Department[239]. Communist administrators made up a relatively small part of Lithuanian bureaucracy. However, they were high in the bureaucratic hierarchy; they made up politically most influential layer of administrators. Communist influence surpassed their number and they played a very significant role in the Lithuanian governing and administrative sector. Due to the common political interests and objectives, communist administrators identified themselves with the occupation authorities. In the eyes of the public, this layer reasonably embodied the occupation regime.

After replacement of high-rank officials of the Republic of Lithuania with administrators selected according to their political loyalty to the occupation authorities, a layer of bureaucracy, loyal to the occupation regime, was formed. These people organized institutional work and directed it towards the implementation of the occupation policy according to the instructions of the occupation authorities. Such officials, hierarchically, subordinated to themselves the rest of officials and, by administrative measures, subjected them to obeying the guidelines of the representatives of the USSR. Administrators selected according to political loyalty to the occupation authorities and employed in institutions made up a layer of bureaucracy that belonged to the occupation regime and the communists identified themselves with it. After the representatives of the USSR used Lithuanian governing and administrative institutions to implement the occupation policy, part of Lithuanian bureaucracy was involved in its implementation and started allying with the occupation authorities.

The beginning of terror against the Lithuanian officialdom

After Lithuania's occupation, the majority of officials of the Republic of Lithuania remained in their posts and implemented the instructions of the new Government. Only a small part of them, protesting against the occupation, left their jobs or, wanting to escape communist terror, fled the country. For instance, Minister of Finance Galvanauskas resigned and moved abroad. On July 5, he was dismissed from office for not endorsing the elections of People's Parliament[240]. According to

Gedvilas, he became 'right hand of Kreve-Mickevicius, expressed his doubts to him and scared that Lithuania and its culture are on their deathbed'[241]. On July 1, after a talk with Molotovas, Kreve-Mickevicius wanted to resign from the post of Prime Minister; however, Paleckis did not accept his resignation. Not wanting to participate in the activity of the People's Government any longer, Kreve-Mickevicius went on holiday and Gedvilas took his place[242]. After realizing that Lithuania lost its independence, even Paleckis and communist Gedvilas grieved[243]. Nevertheless, all of them remained in their posts and further implemented the instructions of Dekanozov and Gedvilas even organized arrests. This obedience ensured personal safety for some time. However, this did not help other politicians, high-rank officials, rank-and-file civil servants and representatives of political movements and politically active layers of society escape the terror of the occupation regime.

In an attempt to eliminate from the Lithuanian public life politically most conscious and active political groups, which opposed the occupation regime, on the eve of the elections to People's Parliament, to intimidate the public and suppress their resistance, the Dekanozov group together with heads of the USSR NKVD started repressions against the representatives of Lithuanian political movements, civil servants and other layers of society. In June- July, former Prime Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania Augustinas Voldemaras, Antanas Merkys and Leonas Bistras, as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs Juozas Urbsys (Urbšys) were arrested. On July 10- 17, shortly before the elections to Parliament, 504 Lithuanian political and public characters and civil servants were arrested[244]. The arrests of Lithuanian politicians and officials went on also after July 17. They were organized and carried out by communists, workers of Security Department, and lead by Snieckus. Paleckis himself sanctioned the arrest and exile from Lithuania on July16 of Merkys and Urbsys[245].

Arrests and deportations of Lithuanian citizens to the remote areas of the USSR were illegal and criminal actions of the occupation authorities and their puppet institutions, which violated Lithuanian and international legal norms[246]. The first arrests of heads of institutions and civil servants of the Republic of Lithuania shocked and intimidated the Lithuanian officialdom and other layers of society. Repressions made the officialdom disloyal to the occupation regime unresisting to the USSR authorities and impelled part of it adapt to the regime. However, the majority of Lithuanian officials remained loyal to the Republic of Lithuania. The occupation authorities certainly realized that only then could they make Lithuanian officialdom and other layers of society adapt themselves to the regime when Lithuanian statehood would be destroyed and resistance of the People of Lithuania to the occupation would be broken.

Legitimising the Annexation of Lithuania

Seeking to create an illusion that annexation was a legal process stemming from Lithuania's own accord, occupational authorities organised sham elections to the national parliament (the Seimas). The Dekanozov group deliberated on the plan for the coming elections on July 1st[247]. Dekanozov

called for holding elections within 10 days at the latest[248]. Vladas Niunka, member of the LCP CC (Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee) and Pakarklis, Minister of Justice were to promptly draft a new law on elections by modifying the Lithuanian Seimas Law on Elections of 1936. Ostensibly consistent with principles of fair voting and democratic representation, the new law was to supply communists with powerful instruments of control over the election process. Dekanozov group and the LCP CC secretariat adopted the new Law on Elections and formed the Electoral Commission within several days [249].

The new Law on Elections included some provisions from the USSR Constitution[250]. They stipulated rigorous nomination of parliament candidates. Nomination in fact was only possible through county proletariat meetings organised by Constituency Electoral Commissions. An essential requirement for the number of candidates per constituency was not to exceed the number of representatives to be elected therein. Voting was compulsory[251]. The ostensibly democratic nomination of candidates through electoral initiative actually allowed unhindered imposition of communists' will on the electorate. As the Central Electoral Committee explained on July 8, the right to hold meetings and nominate candidates in Lithuania was limited to legally operating organisations. Gerdvilas, Minister of Internal Affairs, had dissolved all political parties and organisations of the republic. The only remaining parties were the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP), the Lithuanian Communist Youth Organisation, largely influenced by LCP, the People's Support (ex MOPR, International Organisation for Aid to Revolutionary Fighters), and the communist-controlled trade unions[252]. Law did not require preparation of voter lists, thus conditions were favourable for falsification of election results. Voting was rendered compulsory by adopting provisions for obligatory marking of the voters' passports. This was done to increase the rates of participation and to ensure the election results could be considered declarative of the will of the people.

With a purpose to further mislead the society and to enable the occupying state to exercise control over the sham elections to attain its desired goals, the Dekanozov group selected members to the Central Electoral Committee in advance. Thus, LCP CC member Niunka was appointed Chairman of the Committee, Kestutis Domasevicius (son to Andrius Domasevicius, a figure of standing who represented the Lithuanian social democrats) was appointed Vice Chairman; Andrius Bulota, communists Valerija Narvydaite and Jonas Kvietkauskas became Committee Members[253].

On July 5, the Council of Ministers adopted the Law on Elections proposed by the Seimas and appointed the Electoral Committee[254]. On the following day, Paleckis announced the make-up of the Central Electoral Committee and the date of parliamentary elections, July 14[255]. On July 6, the Committee sent instructions concerning the elections organisation procedures to local Electoral Committees in the constituencies[256]. A mere three -day period was set for nominating the candidates.

The USSR representatives authorised the Lithuanian Communist Party to organise the election campaign. Local communists were evidently earning more trust. Together with Dekanozov, the LCP CC prepared an unchallenged 79-candidate list, *The Lithuanian Labour Union Election Bloc*, to stand for election to the 79 seats available in the People's Parliament[257]. Candidates were recruited, not democratically nominated. They were not representative of the electorate. The principles of fair democratic elections were violated. The candidate list included 38 communists, accounting for a near half of the future members of the People's Parliament. High proportion of communists was necessary to ensure legitimisation of Lithuania's annexation in the Parliament. To mislead the society, the list also included 41 non-party-bound non -communist candidates. In reality, this was nothing short of sham, providing cover for communist government domination. Most of the candidates were forcibly nominated; others were not even notified about their nomination and learned about it from the *Election Bloc* list published in the press[258]. Ironically enough, the list of candidates for Ukmerge constituency included a wrongly spelt candidate name (Jonas Abakonis instead of A. Bakonis) and voters were obliged to vote for a person who did not even exist[259].

The candidates to the People's Parliament were deliberately selected to demonstrate that people from the working class essentially dominated the Parliament. Nearly even proportions of middle class representatives, including workers, farmers, and the leftist intelligentsia, were delegated. In order to appease the general public, the Dekanozov group endeavoured to promote the national spirit in the Parliament, in the sense that the People's Parliament was to be mostly composed of Lithuanians. Stringent measures were applied to ensure the least numbers of candidates representing national minorities. The candidate list only included 4 Jews (5.06 % of the future MPs), 3 Poles (3.79 %), 2 Byelorussians (2,53 %), 1 Russian, and 1 Latvian representative (2.53 %). An overwhelming majority of the candidates were Lithuanians (86.07 %)[260].

In social and political terms, the so-called *Election Bloc* was a heterogeneous, amorphous formation, which failed to represent the interests of any social stratum or social group. Except for communists, none of the candidates could boast of a comprehensible political platform, or substantial relevant experience. The list did not include any figures of rank, capable of seeing through the role assigned to the parliament and skilful enough to hinder the occupying power from misusing the Lithuanian Parliament to attain its own ends. As Member of Parliament, none could succeed in preventing annexation from being legalised. The *Election Bloc* members were carefully previously selected by the Dekanozov group to allow a communist majority in the Parliament. Thus, communists were the only consolidated formation in the Parliament, and they were more than ready to implement the orders of the USSR authorities.

The *Lithuanian Labour Union* election programme, prepared by Niunka, Aizenas and Liudas Gira under close supervision of Dekanozov and the LCP CC secretariat, was announced on July 6[261].

The programme consisted of sixteen points specifying universally popular democratic and social ideas and promises to ensure enforcement of democratic rights and freedoms, to provide social insurance and healthcare to larger strata of society, to aid industrial workers and public service personnel, etc.[262] The programme did not underestimate the fact that majority of the voters were peasants and farmers. Therefore, it included statements that farmers would be exempt from paying debts and tax arrays; it generously offered land to the ones who had little or no land at all, and included other similar promises. In order to appeal to lower rank public personnel and other sections of society, who were largely dissatisfied with the financial status of superior public service officials, the programme promised to lower salaries to high officials and to do away with their salary supplements[263]. Seeking to render annexation of Lithuania free from possible complications, the programme was carefully designed to avoid any reference to incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR and included no mention of any changes whatsoever to Lithuania's political system.

The election campaign was in practice nothing short of sham election aimed to conceal the fact that the People's Parliament members were appointed by the USSR authorities. The campaign was conducted smoothly in Lithuania, following the example set by the election campaign in the USSR. Voter meetings, nomination of candidates, establishment of the Electoral Commissions and their operations were brought under local communist control. Most of the election activists were communists, too[264]. Communists, mostly based in Kaunas, also prevailed among the organisers, electioneerers and technical staff of the Central Electoral Committee. Some communists and their allies performing technical tasks even caused trouble for members of the Committee[265]. The Central Electoral Committee, compliant with orders from Dekanozov, was especially puzzled when activists of the electoral campaign coming from national, mostly Jewish, minorities, became more numerous and more active than Lithuanian activists. This collided with the myth enforced by communist propaganda and emphasising that Lithuanian nation itself was responsible for its social and political development.

However, serious political reasons lay beneath the strained relations between the communist and non-communist members of the Committee. Most probably, some members of the Committee were aware of the planned annexation of Lithuania, and of the role the Parliament was to play in the process. Therefore, they tried to delay the technical and organisational work during the elections and otherwise obstruct election of the People's Parliament. Once efforts to delay elections failed, attempts to set more stringent voting requirements were made to at least partially pre-empt possible election fraud[266]. For instance, it was proposed to demand committees in each constituency to present accurate voter lists so that exact voting results could be documented. At the same time, however, communists under Dekanozov and their allies were encouraging the Central Electoral Committee to renounce ordinary organisational procedures related to elections, and in particular to give up the preparation of

voter lists and provision of ballots complying with the established norms. This preconditioned election fraud.

Clearly, there was a need to intimidate the society and to dismiss all political forces that could be suspected of encouraging citizens to boycott the elections or otherwise influence the electorate and election results to the disadvantage of the occupying power. This would further complicate the legalisation of annexation. Therefore, the Dekanozov group and the USSR NKVD authorities issued an order to the State Security Department under Snieckus to carry out on the eve of elections the first series of mass arrests of Lithuania's political and public figures.

A portion of the society participated in the elections on July 14. The turnout, however, was low[267]. Consequently, on July 14 Paleckis extended the period of voting by one more day due to ostensibly unfavourable weather conditions[268]. Historian Truska established that 85% of voters took part in the elections. The *Lithuanian Labour Union Election Bloc* received 55% of votes. A major part of the candidates failed to reach the 50 % threshold[269]. According to the researcher, the Central Electoral Committee engaged in electoral fraud by concealing the number of votes the candidates actually received and by increasing the official number of active voters by 10%.[270] As mentioned above, even a non-existent person was "elected" to the parliament in Ukmerge constituency. Announcing that this particular member of the People's Parliament failed to arrive at a Parliament meeting circumvented the affair[271]. In the final analysis, the affair "proved beneficial", as noted Niunka, Chairman to the Committee[272]. In fact, after incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR, Paleckis was to be appointed Chairman to the future provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR. However, Paleckis had not even been nominated candidate to the People's Parliament, as he was an Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania at the time of elections. In order to solve this problem, the election results in Ukmerge constituency were annulled, additional elections were organised on August 22, and Paleckis assumed office in the People's Parliament[273].

Under soviet occupation, the people of Lithuania could not declare their will in free and democratic elections. The elections were undemocratic and no alternatives with respect to the choice of candidates were offered. The elections were organised and controlled by representatives of another country. In real terms, this was nothing but sham election that replicated the pattern of elections held in the Soviet Union and was aimed to legalise the People's Parliament, a body completely reliant on and formed by another country in order to legalise the annexation of Lithuania.

Dekanozov, Visinskis and Zdanovas, the USSR High Representatives in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia respectively, deliberated the formal side of annexation of the three Baltic countries in Tallinn on July 17[274]. All three states were annexed at the same time in, and in compliance with the same pattern.

In order to feign that Lithuania was enthusiastically demanding its incorporation into the USSR, communists organised starting from July 18 a series of public demonstrations, calling for incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union[275].

The first session of the People's Parliament was on July 21 and the last one took place on July 23[276]. The Dekanozov group was behind all decisions of the Parliament[277]. The People's Parliament members were forced to accept the will of the USSR to renounce Lithuania's independence and the constitutional political system[278]. The very first day as MPs, communists forced declarations on the People's Parliament aimed at changing the political system of Lithuania and integrating the country into the USSR. These declarations were adopted without changing a word therein, and without any MP displaying enough courage to object. Even votes were not cast on the issue[279].

The first declaration stipulated the introduction of a soviet regime in Lithuania, and proclaimed the country to be a Soviet Socialist Republic. The second declaration was a "request" to integrate the Lithuanian SSR into the Soviet Union [280]. On July 22, the People's Parliament adopted a declaration proclaiming land to be the property of the state. Based on this declaration, Parliament established a 30 ha per farm limit, and excessive land was proclaimed to belong to the state land fund, to be used for distributing land to those who had little or no land[281]. On July 23, the People's Parliament announced nationalisation of banks and the large-scale industry[282]. These decisions collided with the system of government of the Republic of Lithuania; they were in breach of the political and economic system enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, and in violation of human and private property rights. These decisions were directed against the interests of the state, the society and the people. The declaration of the People's Parliament were printed in gilded letters on special paper, as though in an attempt to emphasise their importance to the aggressor and its allies[283].

To completely suspend the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and to legitimise the annexation of the Lithuanian SSR, on July 23 the People's Parliament appointed a committee of 11 members to prepare the Constitution of the LSSR (the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic) and formed a delegation to be sent to Moscow[284]. On August 3, the USSR Supreme Soviet meeting simultaneously incorporated the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs into the Soviet Union[285]. This was done in a hasty manner and in breach of the Constitution of the USSR. As a formally federal state, the Soviet Union needed to sign union agreements with its sovereign states. The occupied Baltic States were incorporated into the USSR without any attempt at feigning their signing any such agreement[286]. After the People's Parliament declared the Lithuanian SSR, promulgated declarations on the change of the state regime and incorporated the LSSR into the Soviet Union, Dekanozov left Lithuania [287] and Pozdniakov was appointed to Dekanozov' post.

The declarations of the People's Parliament shocked both Lithuania and the world community. Foreign diplomatic representatives of the Republic of Lithuania prepared protests against the

falsification of Lithuanian people's will and submitted them to governments of the countries where they were accredited. They also sent protest letters to Kaunas[288]. Influential foreign states and the world society also expressed protest against the annexation of Lithuania by the USSR[289]. It was evident to the society of Lithuania and societies of other countries in the world that Lithuania was annexed illegally and that an international crime was committed against the country.

Two years later, on August 30, 1942 eight members of the People's Parliament, including Kreve-Mickevicius, met in Kaunas to adopt a resolution expressing protest against the occupation and annexation of Lithuania, and against falsification of the will of the people of Lithuania by the People's Parliament[290]. They emphasised that the members of the People's Parliament could not and did not express the will of the nation.

People's Parliament decisions were unconstitutional under the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and in terms of international law[291]. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania did not impart on the Parliament any legal authority to decide the fate of the state, or to deliberate and adopt decisions conflicting with the national interests and the will of the people. Sovereignty did not reside in Parliament. During elections to the People's Parliament, the Lithuanian nation did not declare its will to change the Lithuanian national self-determination, to suspend the sovereignty of the state and to change the political system of the Republic of Lithuania. When they went to the polls, the citizens did not vote for converting the Republic of Lithuania into LSSR and for its incorporation into the Soviet Union. *The Lithuanian Labour Union* programme did not include any statements about changing the status of the state and its political system either. Sovereignty resided with the Lithuanian people, who did not express the will that communists in the People's Parliament talked about. The undemocratically elected People's Parliament did not represent the nation. It usurped the sovereignty of the state and its people, and falsified the will of the nation. As Rőmeris noted, in terms of constitutional law the People's Parliament conducted a constitutional coup, which was a logical but unconstitutional aftermath of the occupation and annexation of Lithuania[292]. Before July 21, the CPSU(b) pursued occupational policy in Lithuania. It manipulated the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, used it as cover, yet still abided with the Constitution. July 21–23 proved to be the end of this process. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania was violated and preconditions were created for its complete abrogation[293].

Declarations of the People's Parliament were forced on the Parliament by another state; they were illegal, unlawful, and directed against Lithuania's national interests. The ostensible expression of the will of the people via People's Parliament, which was in practice obtained by force, delusion and other illegal methods, was null and void[294]. In terms of international law, Lithuania did not become a legal part of the USSR. The Republic of Lithuania continued to exist as a subject of international law.

The LSSR, formed by an occupying force on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, was a puppet regime, a territorial – administrative unit of the USSR[295].

2. Implementation of the Soviet Political System in Lithuanian SSR during the Period from August to September 1940

After the declaration of Lithuanian SSR and its incorporation into the Soviet Union, Lithuania was forcibly integrated into the social and political life of the USSR. The characteristic features of the USSR political system were authoritarian rule, dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party, totalitarian regime and isolationist society model. Out of ideological considerations and propaganda related needs, the Constitution of the USSR declared the union a to be federal state and promulgated equal rights and sovereignty of union republics, subjects of the union. However, in reality, Bolsheviks imposed a centralised system of government in order to retain territories of the former Russian imperium and unify them by creating a single communist state. A substitute for the Russian imperium, the Soviet Union was in practice a Communist imperium[296]. In real terms, the USSR was a centrally governed state. The subject republics had no sovereignty, and no powers to make independent political decisions. The governing Communist party largely narrowed the rights and competences of the republics, and exercised control over national institutions[297]. In 1936, the USSR Constitution limited the competences of the republics to an even higher degree, rendering their sovereignty mere fiction. In terms of political decision-making and implementation of decisions as well as in terms of the competence and functions of local authorities, the union republics became purely territorial units of a unitary state. Ostensibly sovereign, the authorities of the republics were in practice part of the USSR governing apparatus[298]. Governing authorities of LSSR, as those of other union republics, exercised no sovereign powers. They operated within the limits set by Government of the USSR and were hierarchically subordinate to USSR government institutions. Due to centralised form of government, the Soviet Union imposed on all union republics a single political system, a centralised bureaucratic mode of government, and a centralised governing apparatus[299]. For Lithuania, incorporation into the USSR meant forceful imposition of Bolshevik ideology, culture, lifestyle and values, and introduction of a social, economic and political system that was completely alien to Lithuania.

Political processes in the annexed Lithuania, and in the Soviet Union as a whole, largely depended on the "general line" of the governing CPSU(b)[300]. In all the annexed Baltic States, a so-called transitional period was announced. In communist jargon, this meant a period of transition from capitalism to socialism, i.e. sovietization of the incorporated countries[301]. The Communist Party sought to incorporate Lithuania into the Soviet Union by imposing the centrally planned economy, the soviet political system, the socialist culture, the communist ideology, and the policy aimed at assimilation of Lithuanians with other nations within the Union. Sovietization of all spheres of life

conformed to the same pattern in all the incorporated countries[302]. As eminent political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski noted, irrespective of historical circumstances accompanying the incorporation of separate countries into the communist system, irrespective of their socio-economic and political situation, in all incorporated countries the imposition of the centralised political and socio-economic model followed the same pattern. The main features of the imposed model were totalitarian regime and dictatorship of the communist party[303].

Political decisions on sovietization of Lithuania were made by the supreme CPSU(b) leadership. The administrative government of LSSR was unable to exert influence on the CP leadership. Neither were the people of Lithuania. However, the CPSU(b) strategy targeted at sovietization of Lithuania did depend on certain local factors, especially in terms of the speed and forms of imposition of the socialist political and socio-economic system. These factors included local conditions for introducing the communist system, public resistance to the occupying regime and sovietization, the process of establishment and operation in Lithuania of local CP leadership, and its policies.

In political terms, the most important objectives of the CPSU(b) were the implementation of a socialist political system, totalitarian regime and dictatorship of the communist party in Soviet Lithuania.

In August, with the view of achieving these goals, the CPSU(b) leadership adopted decisions leading to the abolition of Lithuania's social and political system, imposition of the soviet political system, and formation of the LSSR administrative government. On August 14, CPSU (b) CC and the USSR LCT adopted a ruling "Regarding the Building Principles of the State and Economy in Lithuanian SSR, Latvian SSR and Estonian SSR". In compliance with this ruling, Governments of the republics were to convene in August 20–25 for sessions of respective Parliaments - the People's Parliaments (Seimas) in Lithuania and Latvia and Duma in Estonia[304]. These bodies were to adopt the USSR constitutions tailored to each republic, respectively, and to endorse new Governments, whose members were to be previously harmonised with the CPSU (b) CC Politburo. The ruling provided guidelines for restructuring Baltic economies and bringing them in line with the soviet practices and ideology. It was agreed to temporarily preserve external borders of the three Baltic States with Byelorussian SSR and Russian SSR. On August 22, CPSU(b) CC Politburo drew up an agenda for an extraordinary session of the Lithuanian People's Parliament. Dekanozov provided Politburo with the Draft Constitution of LSSR based on the USSR Constitution. It had been prepared by the People's Parliament committee under close supervision of Pozdniakov. The Politburo issued consent to the draft and conferred its ratification on the People's Parliament[305]. These decisions of CPSU(b) authorities paved the way for transforming Lithuania into a soviet state. By unilaterally deciding on all critically important issues pertaining to Lithuania's development, the CPSU(b) leadership

demonstrated that the formal LSSR administration enjoyed neither real authority nor competences, nor could it make any independent political decisions. CPSU (b) CC Politburo rulings proved that in LSSR power *de facto* belonged to the CPSU (b) leadership. The latter wantonly framed policies directed against the will of the people and the public interests of Lithuania, and adopted all important political decisions with a view of bringing the Lithuanian political system and public life in compliance with the communist doctrine, communist party interests and goals. This practice explicitly demonstrated the principles of CPSU (b) governance and policy-making.

Constitutional Endorsement of the USSR Political System in LSSR

In line with the orders of the USSR government, the LSSR People's Parliament convened for its first extraordinary session on August 24–25. During the session, the decisions of the USSR authorities on the introduction of the soviet political system in Lithuania were legalised[306]. On August 24, the People's Parliament promulgated the Constitution of the LSSR (the fundamental law of the country), where the fundamentals of the Soviet political and socio-economic system were enshrined[307]. It was a replica of the USSR Constitution of 1936 tailored to the local conditions in the LSSR. The main provisions of the LSSR Constitution echoed the stipulations of the USSR Constitution.

For ideological purposes, the CPSU (b) sought to honour federal composition of the USSR and to create an illusion that the LSSR acceded the Soviet Union on its own will. Therefore, Article 13 of the LSSR Constitution announced that Lithuanian SSR voluntarily joined other soviet republics to form a union state, i.e. the Soviet Union[308]. It stressed that the Soviet Union, i.e. its heads of government were only granted the rights proclaimed in Article 14 of the USSR Constitution. With respect to all remaining rights, the LSSR was entitled to "exercise its powers independently and to preserve all its sovereign rights". Article 15 of the LSSR Constitution guaranteed the LSSR with a right to secede the USSR. Article 19 stipulated a wide scope of responsibilities, including legislation, resting with the LSSR governing structures. Article 25 provided for promulgation of the LSSR laws in Lithuanian and Russian language. Articles 116 and 117 established the flag and the coat of arms of the LSSR. Article 118 announced Vilnius to be the capital of Lithuania[309].

Statements announcing Lithuania's voluntary accession to the Soviet Union, sovereignty of the LSSR and delegation of its sovereign powers to the USSR authorities failed to reflect reality. The Lithuanian statehood was abolished without the consent of the Lithuanian people, by use of force, treachery and other unlawful methods. The LSSR was created by the occupational government, not by the Lithuanian people. The Lithuanian people did not vest powers in the occupational government and did not authorise it to delegate any rights to the USSR. Under Article 16 of LSSR Constitution, the laws and Constitution of the Soviet Union became supreme and obligatory in LSSR. The USSR Constitution of 1936 was peremptory in all union republics. It established their constitutional system of government, political system, institutional functions and competences. The USSR Constitution

extended the mandate of the federal institutions and nullified sovereignty of the union republics[310]. As mentioned above, the declaration of sovereignty of LSSR bore absolutely no resemblance to political reality. Due to the fact USSR was a unitary state characterised by centralised government and practically unlimited prerogatives of the union's political institutes, LSSR administration did not exercise sovereign powers, it could not make any important political decisions and independently decide on matters of state importance[311]. The right to secede the union was fictitious, deliberately unsupported by any practical secession mechanisms or procedures. Secession of any republic would contradict the communist political doctrine, the Communist Party political programme and its desire to retain authority over the whole territory of the former Russian imperium. The CPSU (b) responded with measures of terror to all steps toward freedom undertaken by any of the subjugated nations. It held the union republics within the Union by force and pre-empted any attempts at secession[312].

Some features of the LSSR Constitution distinguished it from the USSR Constitution of 1936. The CPSU (b) made allowances for the obvious differences between Lithuania and the USSR in terms of socio-economic and political situation. Neither a socialist political and socio-economic system nor a socialist society existed in Lithuania. Under the Communist doctrine, socialism had already existed in the Soviet Union, and Lithuania had not even adopted the fundamentals of socialism. The authorities of the USSR could not therefore declare that a functioning socialist system was in operation in Lithuania already. Therefore, the LSSR Constitution stipulated that the aim of the Communist Party policy was to create a socialist society in Lithuania[313]. Due to these reasons, the economic system defined in the LSSR Constitution differed from the one defined in the USSR Constitution. LSSR Constitution recognised the existence in Lithuania of a socialist, capitalist and small-scale trade system[314]. Since Lithuania had no collective farms and cooperative unions were the basis of collective property, the LSSR Constitution collective property definition differed from the respective definition in the USSR Constitution. The LSSR Constitution included only vague references to the structure of the society. For ideological purposes, the document refrained from explicitly declaring that communists intended to change the social system of the country.

The constitutional definition of Lithuanian SSR and its political system also differed from respective provisions in the USSR Constitution. The Constitution of the USSR proclaimed that, having essentially attained socialism, the USSR proletarian dictatorship had further developed to form a people's dictatorship. Socialism did not exist in Lithuania yet. Therefore, the LSSR Constitution proclaimed Lithuania to be in a transitional period from capitalism to socialism and announced the country to be a state in transition governed by transitional government. According to the principles of the communist doctrine, a state in transition from capitalism to socialism is a proletarian dictatorship characterised by political system of dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, article 2 of the LSSR Constitution proclaimed that the building blocks of the LSSR political system were councils

comprised of working class representatives, which came into being "after having overthrown the capitalist and bourgeoisie rule and having introduced the dictatorship of the proletariat". Articles 1 and 3 of the Constitution announced that LSSR was a "socialist state of workers and peasants" with all powers vested in the urban and rural proletariat, represented by its delegates in the Councils[315]. Thus, the definitions of the LSSR government and its political system were internally incongruent. They even conflicted with some statements of the Bolshevik political doctrine. Finally, they did not reflect reality. These statements could only be qualified as ideological, aimed at legalising the occupational government and feigning a state governed by its people. By the introduction of the people's government and proletarian dictatorship in Lithuania, communists concealed their own dictatorial power and the occupation and annexation of Lithuania. Statements about the people's government represented the efforts of the occupational regime to create an appearance of legitimacy.

Other aspects of the LSSR political system conformed to the Soviet Union's political model. For ideological purposes, the LSSR Constitution refrained from explicit reference to the Communist Party dictatorship and the *de facto* subordination of administrative institutions to the party structures[316]. The Constitution deliberately failed to attribute the Communist Party to the administrative sector (i.e. to the "institutions of state government and control"). Instead, the Party, along with other public organisations was referred to in Article 98 of the Chapter on Civil Rights and Duties[317]. The Constitution endorsed political domination of the CPSU(b) over all political structures in the LSSR. Under the USSR Constitution, the CPSU (b) was "precursor of the proletariat in its fight for the enforcement and expansion of the socialist model, and the supreme executive power in all, both public and state proletarian organisations"[318]. Notably, the Constitution did not say anything about the Lithuanian Communist Party, which functioned at the time as a formally independent organisation.

The Constitution established the form of government and the political system of the LSSR[319]. In order to create an illusion of a representative democracy and republican form of government in LSSR, power was declared to be vested in the Councils, to which the people elected representatives. The Constitution announced that Councils were ostensibly elected via public, equal (one person-one vote) and direct elections by secret ballot. This provision failed to reflect political reality, since power in the Soviet Union was monopolised by the Communist Party, and councils of working people's deputies did not exercise real power. Elections to the councils were fictitious, in practice the Communist Party candidates were appointed to the seats[320]. Article 113 of the Constitution partially mirrored the procedures of establishing Councils. Under Article 113, the right to nominate candidates to Councils was restricted to CP and other communist - controlled proletarian organisations[321].

The LSSR Constitution also defined the LSSR administrative system. Constitutionally, power was vested in LSSR institutions, and the principle of separation of powers was enshrined. Institutions were divided into supreme and local executive and administrative bodies[322]. Under the Constitution,

the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR was the supreme executive and legislative body of the state (cf. Articles 20 and 23 of the LSSR Constitution). The LSSR Council of National Commissioners was the supreme executive and judicial body (cf. Article 39), the People's Councils were state executive bodies in the counties, cities, regions, towns, and constituencies (cf. Article 52), and executive committees elected by People's Councils were local executive and judicial bodies (cf. Article 56)[323]. Article 45 of the LSSR Constitution stipulated the composition of the Council of National Commissioners. It provided for the establishment of 13 People's Commissariats, including Commissariats of: Local Industry, Food Supply, Finance, Agriculture, Trade, Interior, Justice, Healthcare, Education, Communal Economy, Social Security, Labour, and State Control. It also established the institution of LSSR People's Commissariat Representatives and LSSR State Planning Committee[324]. There were two kinds of Commissariats: All-Union Commissariats and Union Commissariats (cf. Art. 48). Food Supply, Agriculture, Finance, Trade, Interior, Justice, Healthcare and State Control Commissariats were All – Union Commissariats. Local Industry, Education, Labour, Communal Economy and Social Security Commissariats belonged to the second category[325]. This classification reflected centralised territorial and branch government principles applicable in the Soviet Union.

As to administrative institutions, their outward and internal hierarchy and patterns of cooperation formally corresponded to the pattern established for the Union Commissariats. Under Article 40 of the LSSR Constitution, the Council of National Commissioners (the Government) was responsible and accountable to the LSSR Supreme Soviet (the "Parliament"), and to its Presidium in between the meetings of the Supreme Soviet[326]. All commissariats were also formally subordinate to the Council of National Commissioners. The LSSR Constitution deliberately refrained from defining the role of the Communist Party in the administration. Officially, the party had no constitutional right neither to dominate over administrative institutions, nor to duplicate or usurp their institutional functions.

The constitutional administrative structure of LSSR bore no relation to reality in terms of interaction of its separate elements and the implementation of the principle of subordination, as well as in terms of competences and functions of the structural elements of the administration. Due to the USSR federal and centralised government, the LSSR was institutionally powerless. The LSSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium did not exercise independent legislative powers. They only helped to feign sovereignty of the Lithuanian SSR. In terms of competences, these institutions only applied the USSR government decisions in Lithuania. Officially, the LSSR Supreme Soviet was not responsible to any other institution. However, in practice, it was subordinate to the USSR government institutions, and its activities and operations were determined by the Communist Party dictatorship. The executive power was consolidated in the USSR; other state powers were under its control. Due to

centralised government and plural subordination (to state institutions in the USSR and to the Communist Party), neither the Council of National Commissioners nor the Commissariats exercised any executive powers. Nor were they able to perform government functions. They only performed administrative functions, organised and controlled implementation of the USSR government decisions[327]. The Commissariats and the LSSR Council of National Commissioners were in practice responsible to the Communist Party and the USSR institutions, not to the LSSR Supreme Soviet. The People's Councils, defined in the LSSR Constitution as the building blocks of the LSSR political system and as local government bodies, were not established during the first period of soviet occupation. According to the principles of Bolshevism and to the constitutionally defined political system of LSSR, the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet government were unthinkable without Councils. In practice, the absence of such did not affect the functioning of the occupational authorities. In the Soviet political system, Councils were a merely formal political body; they only had to sham a legitimate and democratic government. They performed administrative functions and were subordinate to the Council of National Commissioners and to the CP structures. The Communist Party was emphatically excluded from the definition of the administrative system in LSSR. In practice, the party exercised direct control over other administrative institutions, duplicated a part of their functions and controlled their activities and operations. The Central Committee Bureau of the Lithuanian Communist Party was in practice the supreme executive institution in the LSSR.

The LSSR Constitution reflected some priorities of the CPSU(b) social policy. Articles 90 and 93 declared the rights of LSSR citizens to leisure, work, retirement pensions and allowances, and to compulsory public secondary education free of charge, effectuated in native language[328].

The concept of civil rights stipulated in the LSSR Constitution collided with the concept of human rights. This concept demonstrated how isolated and restricted the soviet society was. It attested to the fact that the Union was a totalitarian state. Finally, it enforced the dictatorship of the governing leaders over every person and over the society as a whole. The Constitution declared the USSR state and government interests to have precedence over human rights and freedoms. On the one hand, it gave an exclusive status to persons belonging to the government- protected social classes and sharing the government's political views. On the other hand, it discriminated against people from other classes and those holding other views. The Constitution did not declare the fundamental human rights. To sham a façade of a democratic regime, it only stipulated citizens' rights and freedoms that agreed with the interests of the Communist Party and did not endanger its stability in the government[329]. The Constitution did not provide people with the right of free choice and the right to change their lifestyle and their place of residence. Under the influence of the principles of the communist policy, the constitution restricted the human right to property. Via Article 103, an unlawful category of the so-called *enemy of the people* was established. This violated human rights and human dignity. Persons

who encroached the socialist property were called enemies of the people. The society could not use the declared freedoms of speech, press, assembly and the right to create public organisations, since according to Articles 97 and 98 of the Constitution, only CP and organisations under its control could function legally, only communist press and ideology could be spread. The totalitarian regime, and especially stringent control and repression of public life made inapplicable the provisions of Art. 96, 99 and 100 on freedom of conscience, inviolability of persons and apartments, and secrecy of written communication. The political reality practically made human right to life, personal security, and freedom of conscience null and void. It also abolished political rights and freedoms.

Articles 102–105 of the LSSR Constitution set out the obligations of the citizens, promoted by the communist government and the totalitarian state[330]. In breach of the norms of international law, the people of the occupied state were obligated to serve in the occupational army. They were to abide by the laws of the occupying state (the Soviet Union) and its territorial unit, the LSSR. Article 105 distorted the concept of the national loyalty and enforced the interpretation of patriotism based on the category of class. In line with communist ideology, national loyalty was equalled to loyalty to the communist sate and the communist government. Patriotism primarily meant loyalty to the socialist state (the Soviet Union) and to LSSR, its territorial unit.

The LSSR Constitution, and especially the state political system defined therein, was in many respects inconsistent with reality. The Constitution was a nominal and unfeasible legal document aimed to feign the ideas of statehood, democracy and republican form of government, and to maintain a façade of a democratic state and a democratic government[331]. However, the Constitution was not a mere collection of declarative statements. It mirrored the change of the country's status. The Constitution abolished the social and political system of the Republic of Lithuania. It officially established the soviet political system in Lithuania and defined its foundations. By promulgating the Constitution, the government of the USSR legitimised itself and its institutions in line with the soviet law. The Constitution provided the foundation for the introduction of LSSR administrative structures into the soviet political system, defined the role of the LSSR administration in the USSR state apparatus and established the structure of the LSSR administration.

By declaring that LSSR had sovereign powers, the USSR tried to imitate a legitimate, sovereign and democratic state, and thus mislead both Lithuanians and the global community. However, in due course, the constitutional statements about the "independent exercise of executive powers, and sovereign rights" acquired practical significance in LSSR. The Constitution became a viable argument for some institutions and their heads in trying to obtain real power.

The Constitution and all legal provisions of the Soviet Union were forced on Lithuania. They were unlawful, because Lithuania was occupied and annexed by force. The USSR forced Lithuania to implement and abide with Soviet laws and the LSSR Constitution. The promulgation of the LSSR

Constitution laid down the foundations for the establishment of the USSR governing apparatus in Lithuania. Preconditions were created for establishing on the part of the LSSR a local administrative sector that would operate in practice as part of the USSR governing apparatus.

Establishment of the Main LSSR Administrative Institutions and Appointment of their Heads in August - September 1940

Having proclaimed the LSSR Constitution, the USSR authorities ruined the political system of Lithuania completely, and abolished the system of state institutions. Instead of these institutions, new administrative sector was formed. Due to the characteristics of the USSR state structure and its centralised government, the LSSR administration institutions became a part of the USSR political system. The LSSR Constitution defined the tasks of administrative institutions, their formal competences and functions. The LSSR authorities had to implement the decisions of the USSR government and the policies of the Communist Party, to control various local sectors in accordance with the aims and guidelines established by the CP and the USSR administrative institutions.

After Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR, an apparatus for Pozdniakov was established. Pozdniakov was commissioned by the CPSU(b) CC and the USSR Council of National Commissioners. The objective of this apparatus was to specify and tailor the sovietization-related political decisions of the CPSU(b) to local conditions in Lithuania and to oversee the implementation of these decisions[332]. The apparatus exercised political pressure on the LSSR authorities and controlled their operations[333]. In practice, Pozdniakov exercised supreme power in Lithuania, and enjoyed vast authority conferred on him by the USSR authorities[334].

In August, Pozdniakov' apparatus and the LCP leadership started establishing the main LSSR authorities and appointing their heads[335]. The supreme officials of LSSR administration were selected in compliance with the main principles of the Communist Party personnel (cadre) policy. The main criteria for selection of candidates were loyalty to the Communist Party, unconditional and zealous implementation of CP policies and decisions made by the USSR governing institutions. Social origin and status were also important criteria. While implementing the soviet political system and introducing the CP dictatorship in Lithuania, communists were especially concentrated on selecting CP – faithful administrative personnel. Therefore, CP membership was among the most important criteria. The highest posts were given to those who were CP members, members of CP-influenced organisations, or to people politically related to the CP.

A crucial CP personnel (cadre) policy principle was selection of staff on social grounds (social origin and status). Representatives from the top of the social ladder, and sometimes even middle class representatives were deliberately denied placement in governing posts. In particular, those who possessed private property, originated from, or belonged to the bourgeoisie were discriminated against. Appointing candidates from the lower classes of society to governing posts was widespread. For

ideological purposes, in order to imitate the "people's rule" and emphasise the proletarian origins of the executive authorities, promotion of the so-called working people was widely advertised by communists. Candidate selection procedures did not require proof of any adequate qualifications, administrative capacities nor experience of work in administrative structures. Efforts were made to select persons intelligent enough to understand and rigorously implement directives. For propaganda-related purposes communists sought to create an image of a Lithuanian government and to show, that Lithuania was ruled by locals, mostly Lithuanians. Therefore, they strived to mostly appoint Lithuanians to governing posts. For ideological purposes, communists sought to demonstrate that a variety of social classes is represented in the country's administration. Therefore, they strived to create an image socially, party-wise and nation- wise inhomogeneous administrative apparatus.

Candidates to the Presidium of the provisional Supreme Soviet of LSSR, the Supreme Court and the Council of National Commissioners were selected on the above criteria. Paleckis, Acting President of the state, helped the USSR authorities in the process of annexation of Lithuania and proved politically loyal to the USSR. On July 17, he even joined the CP. This was taken into consideration as he was appointed Chairman of the provisional Presidium of Supreme Soviet of LSSR. The deputy chairmen were Domas Rocius, CP member since 1920, former Secretary to the LCP Committee in the County of Telsiai; and Didziulis, the People's Government Representative in Vilnius City and Region, CP member since 1919. Kreve-Mickevicius expressed disapproval of the annexation and sovietization of Lithuania. He thus lost the trust of the USSR authorities, which dismissed him from the leadership[336]. Gedvilas, former Minister of the Interior in the People's Government, CP member since 1934, was appointed Chairman of the Council of National Commissioners. Stasys Brasiskis, LCP member in 1918–1919, and Pijus Glovackas, former Foreign Vice Minister in the People's Government (documented as Glovackis), LCP member in 1920–1928, were appointed deputy chairpersons. Glovackas was also appointed Chairman to the State Planning Committee. A major part of the former People's Government ministers and deputy ministers, loyal to the CP, were appointed to perform the functions of National Commissioners. Mykolas Juncas–Kucinskas, CP member since 1919, was appointed National Commissioner for Labour. Juozas Vaisnoras, initially not party member (he joined LCP(b) in 1940), became Commissar for Finance. Liudas Adomauskas, initially not party member (he joined CPSU(b) in 1941) was appointed Commissar for State Control, Matas Mickis (non party member) Commissar for Agriculture, Povilas Pakarklis (non party member) Commissar for Justice, Antanas Venclova (non party member) Commissar for Education, Aleksandras Gudaitis–Guzevicius, former Vice Minister of the Interior, LCP member since 1927, was appointed National Commissioner for the Interior. Valerijonas Knyva, former head of the Department of Municipalities under the Ministry of Interior, not party member, was appointed National Commissioner of Communal Economy. National Commissioner for Trade was former Labour Unionist Marijonas Gregorauskas.

Jonas Laurinaitis, non-party member, was appointed National Commissioner for Food Supply. Non party member Jurgis Glusauskas was appointed to the post of National Commissioner for the future new Social Security Commissariat. Koganas and Alperavicius were dismissed from their positions as ministers[337]. The National Commissioner for Healthcare was former Social Democrat Vytautas Girdzijauskas. Unquiet about the spread of negative opinions in the society as to different social criteria applied to administrative officers of Lithuanian origin, as compared to the people originating from other nationalities, the USSR representatives substituted Alperavicius, originating from a Jewish industrialists' family and formerly working as Minister for Trade, by a Lithuanian worker[338]. A worker from Kaunas Motiejus Sumauskas, LCP member since 1924, former Chairman to the Chamber of Labour was appointed National Commissioner for Local Trade.

Out of sixteen National Commissioners, four were members of the Communist Party (Gedvilas, Gudaitis–Guzevicius, Juncas–Kucinskas and Sumauskas); two had formerly belonged to the LCP, but were forced out of it or left it themselves due to various reasons (Brasiskis and Glovackas). Two members who were going to join the party were accepted as members in due course (Adomauskas and Vaisnoras). Communists were going to re-establish Brasiskis and Glovackis as party members and accept several more National Commissioners on easy terms. This allowed communists to have eight seats in the Council of National Commissioners, which accounted exactly for a half of the Council. Other National Commissioners shared communist views, although did not formally belong to PC. Although communists did not account for the majority in the Council, yet politically they dominated the Council. The LSSR provisional Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Supreme Court members were selected by applying similar criteria.

In keeping with the rules of the USSR - established system (nomenclature), the candidates had to be approved by the CP structures. On August 22, the CPSU(b) CC Politburo deliberated and approved the candidates for posts of the Chairman of Presidium of the LSSR Supreme Soviet, its deputy – chairs, and the Chairman of the LSSR Council of National Commissioners[339]. On August 24, the LCP CC plenum deliberated on all administrative leadership[340]. Candidates' personal cases were filed in the LCP CC and managed by the communists who came to work in Kaunas from Moscow, and who formerly worked in the personnel department of the Communist International Executive Committee.

The procedures for selecting heads and members of administration allowed communists to establish control and dominate over institutional authorities from the very start. The top administrative authorities were responsible to the party structures whereby they were selected and approved. Their placement in the administration was completely dependent on political trust of the CP. This preconditioned their both political and hierarchical subordination to the Party leadership.

The list of LSSR administration authorities, selected by Communists and approved by the CPSU(b) leadership, was submitted to the LSSR People's Parliament for approval. The People's Parliament extraordinary session on August 25 established the Seimas to be the provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR and conferred upon it all the constitutional rights of the Supreme Soviet, to be exercised until the standing Supreme Soviet was elected. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was delegated to announce the date of elections[341]. During the period of the first Soviet occupation, such elections were neither announced nor organised. Thus, the provisional Supreme Soviet continued to operate on the rights of a standing Supreme Soviet[342].

During the first meeting of the Provisional Supreme Soviet on August 25, the administrative institutions of the LSSR were established and their heads were appointed[343]. Communist Boleslovas Baranauskas was appointed chairman to the Provisional Supreme Soviet, non – party member Liudas Dovydenas and communist Marija Kutraite were appointed deputy chairmen[344]. Replicating the system established in the USSR, the Chairman and deputy chairmen to the provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR were selected in a way to emphatically "represent" three social classes: workers, peasants and the intelligentsia. These persons were to embody the slogans of Bolshevic propaganda about "all working people's government" representing all layers of the "working people" and about political unity of these layers. They were meant to demonstrate the importance of the role of the CP in social life of the country. In order to emphasise gender equality, one female communist was deliberately selected. She was a person complying with the typical woman created by Bolshevik propaganda.

The Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet had 15 members[345]. Its chair was Paleckis, deputy – chairs were Didziulis and Rocius. Former Minister of Communications Stasys Pupeikis (LCP member since 1928) was appointed secretary to the Soviet, and its members were Birute Abdulskaite (LCP member since 1933), Juozas Banaitis (LCP member since 1933), Antanas Bauza (LCP member since 1932), Petras Cvirka (joined LCP in 1940), Pranas Eidukaitis, Michalina Meskauskiene (LCP member since 1935), Jan Paskevic (Janas Paskevicius), Pranas Petrauskas (LCP member since 1924), Snieckus (LCP member since 1920, CC secretary since 1936), Jankelis Vinickis (LCP member since 1927) and Romanas Zebenka. Thirteen members of Presidium were communists and only two did not belong to any party. In terms of nationality, 13 members were Lithuanian, one Pole and one Jew. In terms of social class, 8 were peasants, 6 representatives of the intelligentsia and 1 worker. Communists constituted a majority in the Presidium.

The only Commission in the Supreme Soviet, the Budget Commission, was composed on similar principles. The Commission had no real impact on budget, since the budget was drawn up by the USSR governing institutions. In order to ensure problem-free approval of the budget, the Party leadership appointed Commission members who were completely incompetent in budget planning, implementation and finance management, yet loyal to the communist regime. Thus, Party control over

this sphere of operations of the Commission was ensured. Chair to the Commission was Juozas Banaitis, its members were Icikas Demba (LCP member since 1932), Romualdas Juknevicius, Ignas Lauce (LCP member since 1932) and Petronele Milanciute[346].

Without any previous discussion, the Provisional Supreme Soviet announced Gedvilas Chairman to the Council of National Commissioners on August 25, and approved the composition of the Council of National Commissioners on August 26[347]. As mentioned above, deputy chairs were Brasiskis and Glovackas. Glovackas also worked as Chairman to the State Plan Commission. Sumauskas was approved for his placement as Commissar for Local Industry, Laurinaitis as Commissar for Food Industry, Vaisnoras for Finance, Mickis for Agriculture, Gregorauskas for Trade, Gudaitis-Guzevicius as Commissar for the Interior, Pakarklis for Justice, Girdzijauskas for Healthcare, Venclova for Education, for Communal Economy, Glusauskas for Social Security, Juncas-Kucinskas for Labour, and Adomauskas for State Control[348].

The Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR appointed members to the Supreme Court. Jurgis Blieka was appointed Chairman, Edmundas Medzius (LCP member since 1936) and Pranas Zibertas (LCP member since 1919) were appointed deputy-chairmen. The following persons were appointed members of the Supreme Court: Berelis Latvis-Fridmanas (LCP member since 1932), Petras Kiskis, Eugenijus Meskauskas, Stase Vaineikiene, Jokubas Zimanas[349]. The majority of the 9 Supreme Court members were lawyers, three were communists, and others shared CP views.

After the LSSR People's Parliament and the Provisional Supreme Soviet ruled on key principles of creating the LSSR administrative system, administrative institutions were formed. Their objective was to administer the country in stringent compliance with CP directives and decisions of the USSR governing institutions, and to regulate the public life in Lithuania in compliance with the CP political interests and goals.

The CP structural bodies were critical elements in the mechanism of government and party policy- making within the Soviet political system. They performed a crucial role within the USSR governing and administrative system. The sovietization policy implementation in Lithuania was largely dependent on the party make-up and activities. The Lithuanian Communist Party was entitled to become a major support for the occupational regime in Lithuania, the cornerstone of the country's social political system, the crucial element in the mechanism of party government and policy-making and the nucleus of the administrative authorities. With these goals in mind, the CPSU(b) modified the LCP status and role within the political system of the country. On October 8, the CPSU(b) CC Politburo incorporated the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Communist Parties into the CPSU(b)[350]. The Lithuanian CP(b) became CPSU(b) territorial unit exercising the rights of a local organisation. In accordance with the statute approved in the 18th CPSU(b) Congress, local party organisations could not make any independent decisions on political, organisational, personnel – related and other affairs.

They were subordinate to and completely dependent on the CPSU(b) leadership. Via party directives, through representatives in the Lithuanian CP(b) and through the USSR-established system (nomenclature), the CPSU(b) CC Politburo and the Organizational Bureau dominated and controlled LCP activities, established its structure and posts, selected people to work for the executive bodies within the Party, and allocated funds from the CPSU(b) and the USSR state budget. The CPSU(b) leadership had all possible means of control over the LCP and used the party to implement its rule and policies. The LCP(b) became the most crucial instrument for implementing the CP rule and policies in the LSSR.

After the Lithuanian CP was incorporated into the CPSU(b), the CPSU(b) leadership started establishing LCP executive bodies in Lithuania. On September 21, the CPSU(b) CC Politburo established the LCP(b) CC Bureau[351]. The following people were appointed members to the bureau: First Secretary Snieckus, Second Secretary Meskupas, Third Secretary Kazys Preiksas, ordinary members: Chairman to Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of LSSR Paleckis, LCC chairman Gedvilas, National Commissioner for the Interior Guzevicius, head of the LCP(b) CC Organizational Instructors' Department Daniilas Supikovas. The Bureau meetings were attended not only by officially appointed members, but also by Pozdniakov. Formally, he was not member to the Bureau; however, his opinion was of critical importance. The CPSU(b) leadership granted the LCP(b) CC Bureau the status of the supreme institution within the soviet political system in Lithuania. The role of the Bureau in the administration of LSSR was of crucial importance. As heads of the most important LSSR administrative institutions were appointed members of the Bureau, political and administrative (executive) spheres and functions were united in one political body. The Bureau acquired the right to duplicate the functions of other administrative institutions. In practice, the LCP(b) CC Bureau became a unified political and administrative centre, the supreme national administrative institution. This preconditioned the subjugation of the remaining LSSR administrative bodies to the party rule[352].

The establishment of the LSSR provisional Supreme Soviet, the Council of National Commissioners, the Supreme Court and the LCP(b) CC Bureau meant that the critically important elements for implementing the communist party and occupational regime policies in LSSR were created. These bodies were a fundamental part of the USSR government in Lithuania. They enabled the USSR authorities to establish other administrative institutions in Lithuania and to form the LSSR administrative sector.

3. Occupational Political System and Soviet Administrative Reform in Lithuania in 1940 – 1941

After Lithuania was incorporated into the Soviet Union, the USSR authorities commenced the implementation of the soviet political system and totalitarian regime in the country. The mechanism of

the soviet political system and party policy-making was introduced to Lithuania. In order to enhance the implementation of the occupational policies, the CP established its own political system in Lithuania. As the CPSU(b) policy was implemented by the USSR leadership via CP structural bodies and through the governing and administrative structures, the LCP bodies and the LSSR administrative apparatus were the main instruments of implementation of the occupational policy in Lithuania.

The USSR political system was forced on Lithuania, it was implemented by force and employing a top-down approach. It was alien to the Lithuanian society and illegitimate. Similar to any other illegitimate aggressor with hidden intentions to occupy a certain territory, the USSR sought to earn legitimacy in Lithuania. Therefore, from the very first days of occupation it strived to acquire overall public recognition and support form at least a part of society. It strived to demonstrate, that the newly and forcibly established government and state institutions are indispensable, legal and legitimate. The USSR authorities employed various methods to justify their actions by ideology, soviet legal norms, political expediency, and political tradition. They were trying to create an illusion of legitimacy of the government and state institutions in Lithuania and to feign closeness of these institutions to the society.

To create an illusion of legitimacy, the USSR authorities strived to justify their actions and legitimise their institutional system imposed on Lithuania. Initially, legal provisions of the Republic of Lithuania were employed to that end. Later, after Lithuania's incorporation, the USSR legal provisions and formal LSSR constitutional principles were employed to earn legitimacy. The LSSR administrative bodies were formally established in accordance with the procedures established by the LSSR Constitution. Although in practice establishment of administrative institutions in LSSR was based on decisions of the USSR authorities, yet officially, their establishment was based on LSSR laws, rulings of the provisional Supreme Soviet and rulings of the Council of National Commissioners. It was emphasised that the new system was ostensibly constitutional, introduced in the name of the state and on Lithuania's free will. One more way to emphasise legitimacy of the new order was to support it by the system of bureaucracy, portrayed as a legal and reasonable system. The administrative sector was to serve as the embodiment of the lawfulness and reasonableness of the occupational authority[353]. The CP purported to create an illusion that the administrative system in the LSSR was based on democratic principles[354]. Communists imitated the existence in the annexed Lithuania of a representative government elected through elections. The LSSR was proclaimed to have a sovereign government, and institutions that perform functions characteristic of the respective government branches. The LSSR administration was divided into three sections, which historically resembled the principle of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial. This created an illusion of a functional constitutional order, and a separation of powers between the executive and the policy –making branch. To legalise the position of the CP in the administration, the

provision in the LSSR Constitution on party's crucial role in the state and public life was employed. Based on this provision, the dominance of the CP over administrative bodies was legitimised.

A special role in legitimising Soviet government in Lithuania, in legalising the CP dictatorship, and in masking the totalitarian regime by sham implementation of democratic principles was attributed to the administration of LSSR. This increased the significance of the LSSR administrative sector for the Lithuanian political sphere in terms of party power structures and political apparatus.

In order to hold Lithuania within the Union by force, the USSR authorities established a mechanism aimed at suppressing all public resistance to occupation and at bringing the society under the rule of the occupational authorities. This mechanism was in fact based on a power structure made up of a repressive apparatus and other administrative structures exercising power over society.

In order to bring Lithuanian public life in line with the soviet ideology requirements, the CP sought to establish systems enabling management and control over the society of Lithuania. Political practice based on comprehensive party control principles established a bureaucratic mode of government, since the party and state apparatus had to regulate and control all spheres of public life. The LCP(b) structural bodies and the LSSR administrative institutions had to span all spheres of life in Lithuania, leaving no room to phenomena and processes unsanctioned by the occupational authorities and not subject to their control. In practice, the effectiveness of domination over Lithuania was crucially dependent on the functioning of the party and administration, on whether they were developed enough to cover all spheres of social life, and whether all their constituent branches operated consistently and smoothly.

To implement a soviet political system, the CP first abolished the local civil society institutions and organisations in Lithuania. Solely organisations, whose activities were regulated by the USSR and controlled by the CP, were allowed to operate. The organisations that had previously operated in the LSSR were nationalised, politicised and became bureaucratic in character. The CP structural bodies politically dominated and exercised control over the organisations and administrative institutions regulated and directly supervised their activities.

The CPSU(b) implemented its power and policies through branches of the soviet political system, primarily through party structures and subdivisions of the USSR state apparatus in Lithuania. This allowed the party to maximise its administrative and governing capacities and ensure the implementation of party policies. The LCP(b) assisted CPSU(b) by managing and controlling the implementation of the party policy and by tailoring CP decisions to local conditions. The LSSR administration, compliant with the orders of CP and USSR leadership, managed and implemented measures aimed at sovietization of Lithuania. The LSSR administration was gaining more importance for sovietization of the country, as the implementation of party policies was increasingly dependent on the administrative sector. The latter could effectively function and perform its political and

administrative role only provided it had a constant, centralised and stringent hierarchy, ensuring strict and immediate abidance by all the political decisions. Therefore, the CP established a rigid hierarchy within the government and the LSSR administrative bodies. In order to implement party policies via various administrative structures, the LCP(b) was expanding by establishing bodies that politically dominated Lithuania's institutions, directed and controlled their activities.

Establishing the structures of the Lithuanian Communist Party during the Period from October 1940 to February 1941

The status and role of the LCP substantially changed after the USSR political system was introduced in Lithuania. Initially, LCP was a small party, having neither great political importance nor substantial impact over the public life of the country. After Lithuania was occupied, the LCP became an element of the mechanism of the occupational regime. After the country was incorporated into the USSR, the Lithuanian CP developed into a critical element of the social political system, instrumental to the implementation of the communist rule and policies in Lithuania.

Article 98 of the LSSR Constitution, proclaiming the CPSU(b) to be of crucial importance within the soviet state and public life endorsed CP dictatorship and the Party's dominant position in the LSSR political system, government administration, and the policy-making apparatus. CP underpinned its dictatorship and control over all political structures and state institutions by the argument that the Party is the nucleus of all state and public institutions. In line with ideological arguments, the party was proclaimed the vanguard of the Lithuanian proletariat ("sovereign power" was vested with the proletariat), the sole legal political power, representing public interests, the initiator and supervisor of all processes within the society.

Implementation of the occupational policy and effectiveness of CP rule was crucially dependent on the make-up of the party, its operations and relations with other political formations. With a view to introduce radical changes in Lithuania's public life, the LCP(b) tried to cover all spheres of public life, to control them through CP bodies, CP-subordinate administrative institutions and public organisations. Therefore, LCP was expanding speedily to cover both vertically and horizontally all spheres of public life and control all institutions. Communists Party aspired control over all branches of administration in order to implement the sovietization policy. For all-inclusive CP control over public life to become reality, administrative institutions had to be subjugated to party rule, and a party apparatus with substantial authority and power needed to execute ultimate institutional control had to be established. In order to subjugate all public organisations and implement its policies through them, the party sought to introduce its political dictatorship and control over all public organisations.

A uniform and centralised structure meant that all the territorial sub-units CPSU(b) were controlled by centralised, dictatorial and autocratic party hierarchy. Most of these principles of

centrally exercised control dated back to the period of illegal operation of the Bolshevik Party. The centralisation and concentration of power in the hands dictator Stalin, leader of the party and the state, preconditioned the development of a centralised hierarchical structure of the party and the establishment of autocratic rule. The party power was vested in the party leader and in the party apparatus, whose members were appointed and well- paid professionals, providing support and assistance to the party leader and his entourage. Formally, according to the CPSU(b) statute, Party collegial governing and operative bodies were elected by Party members. However, in practice the election was a mere formality, since the governing and executive bodies were appointed by the leaders of the Party, Party formations and their subordinate Party apparatus. The aim was to form an exclusive bureaucratic ring of Party officials, independent from the party at large, responsible to and supportive of the people who appointed them. This allowed forming patronymic hierarchy relations. The party bureaucrats were dependent, responsible and accountable to the people who appointed them. The executive bodies (Bureaus), appointed by Party leaders and bureaucrats, usurped the functions of bodies elected by the party members and having to perform collegial governing functions. The executive bodies were dependent, hierarchically subordinate and responsible to higher party institutions, not the party rank-and-file members. The party had a constant, centralised and strictly hierarchical vertical axis of power. It allowed ensuring subordination of lower party structures to the higher ones. The concentration of power in the highest echelons of party government meant that policy-making depended on the Party leader and a group of supportive oligarchs and bureaucrats. The party at large and the party backbenchers in particular had no influence on party decision-making process. The centralisation of power meant that all directives of the party leadership were binding to all the remaining party structures. The hierarchy within the Party meant that decisions of the Party leadership were implemented unconditionally, accurately and immediately. The stringent party discipline meant that lower party structures and rank-and-file communists had no possibilities of changing the will of the Party leadership or refusing its implementation.

After LCP was incorporated into the CPSU(b), the LCP structure and functions were reformed in accordance with the CPSU(b) statute. With a purpose of expanding the party and creating new party structures, the LCP(b) leadership deliberated on the make-up of the future party structures and the party apparatus.

In October 1940, the LCP(b) CC Bureau reformed the party organisation of Vilnius Region into two branch organisations: Vilnius City party and Vilnius County party. In November, a party branch in Svencioneliai County was established, and in December a party association in Svencionys County was created. The LCP(b) CC Bureau approved the committee members to councils of said organisations[355]. In October, LCP(b) CC established party committees in City and County branches, decided on the composition of 24 committees and submitted the committee members' list for approval

to the CPSU(b) CC[356]. Based on this listing, 111 members to 3 City and 21 County Committees were approved, including 17 First Secretaries, 12 Second Secretaries and 6 Secretaries. Later, Svencionys and Svencioneliai committee members were approved. During a period from October 1940 to January 1941, the LCP(b) CC Bureau approved candidates to become First and the Second Secretaries of City and County Committees[357]. The following is a list of persons who were appointed First Secretaries in respective City Committees: Antanas Petrauskas in Kaunas City Committee, substituted by Juozas Grigalavicius in 1941; Alteris Kleineris in Siauliai, Povilas Baltruska in Vilnius City Committee. As to County Committees, Tomas Tamulevicius was appointed to County Committee in Alytus, Petras Paunksnis in Birzai, Vladislavas Petraitis in Kaunas, Silvestras Zolneris in Kedainiai, Petras Kuncinas in Kretinga, Karlas Petrikas (substituted by Kazimieras Masenis in 1941) in Marijampole, Mecislovas Viciulis (substituted by Alfonsas Kondratas in 1941) in Mazeikiai, Kazys Petrauskas (substituted by Jonas Kuncinas in 1941) in Panevezys, Stasys Filipavicius in Raseiniai, Stasys Sklerius in Rokiskis, Juozas Skaisgirys in Seinai, later substituted by Michailas Kuncinas, Pranas Oleka in Sakiai, Jonas Ziprys in Siauliai, Sergejus Sosinas (Sergej Sosin) in Svencioneliai, Aleksandras Abramovas in Svencionys, Kazys Mozuras in Taurage (substituted by Domas Pundzius in 1941), Valerijonas Mockus in Telsiai (substituted by Antanas Bauza in 1941), Michail Afonin in Trakai, Vladas Vildziunas in Ukmerge (substituted by Jonas Juodagalvis in 1941), Juozas Gruodis in Utena (substituted by Vilhelmas Maciunas in 1941), Agota Geleziunaite in Vilkaviskis, Nikita Fedorenko in Vilnius County Committee, Michail Kovsov in Zarasai. Jankelis Vinickis was appointed Second Secretary to Vilnius City Committee. In Siauliai City Committee, first Petras Kareckis, later Ivan Solovjov was appointed to the same Second Secretary post. Following are the candidates approved as Second Secretaries in the remaining County Committees: Aleksandr Kabanov in Birzai, Vladimir Sibalko in Kaunas, Michail Golubev in Kedainiai, Michail Sorokin in Kretinga, substituted by Kasjan Bobrov in 1941, Ivan Frolov in Mazeikiai, Michail Sorokin in Panevezys, Anatolij Kazakov in Rokiskis, Jonas Ziprys in Sakiai, Pranas Jonusas in Taurage, later substituted by Vladimiras Sustovas, Boris Mironov in Telsiai, Samuilas Sadevicius in Trakai, Vladimiras Girko in Seinai, Vasilij Zaicev in Sakiai, Antonas Smolicius in Svencioneliai, Fiodor Pivunov in Svencionys, Semion Glamzin in Ukmerge, Pavel Lobanov in Utena, Marijonas Miceika in Vilnius, Fiodor Pivunov in Vilkaviskis, Valerijonas Mockus in Zarasai.

The territorial party branch committees were formed to include representatives of local administrative structures. Forcibly, Chairmen of Provisional Executive Committees and heads or deputy –heads of NKVD departments were made party committee members. Selection of committee members was also based on Stalin's Party Personnel Policy principles and the main criteria for party leader selection. Party leaders were expected to be CP members, completely and unfailingly loyal to the CP and its leadership, qualified and possessing organizational capabilities. They were expected to

have a good understanding of the party general line to ensure its complete, immediate and smooth implementation. Prospective party leaders on all levels, and especially Committee Secretaries were expected to demonstrate obedience to Party leadership, dogmatic thinking, party discipline and ability to work under command administration[358]. For ideological purposes, the LCP(b) leadership wanted to create a most attractive image of the Party Committees in the eyes of the public. The party wanted to show its ability to bridge the gap between various interests through fair representation of various nationalities, genders, and local society, especially its lower layers. Local workers, peasants and public officers were recruited as members of the Committees, and while selecting committee chairs; preference was given to communists of Lithuanian origin or communist representatives of a national majority of the particular area. To have at least one female representative within each Committee was a more difficult goal to attain.

In the opinion of the LCP(b) leadership, some committees and committee apparatus structures failed to comply with the requirement of fair representation by admitting too few Lithuanians, workers, and other desirable members to the committees. Therefore, in order to improve the image of such committees, the LCP(b) Central Committee delegated additional Lithuanians or other desirable representatives selected by the CC apparatus from the communists residing in other areas. Thus, in order to improve the public image of the Svencioneliai County Committee, the LCP(b) CC Bureau ordered the Staff Department of the CC to select 10 communists and send them to Svencioneliai[359].

Party leaders, Chairmen of Provisional Executive Committees and heads of NKVD departments were appointed LCP(b) territorial branch committee members. Thus, their functions were duplicated, and favourable conditions were created to bring local administrative institutions under party control. Via party territorial Committees, authorities of three main local administrative bodies (the party, provisional executive committees and NKVD) were consolidated. A homogenous administrative structure was formed, where the main political and administrative role belonged to the party leadership. This stimulated party committees to duplicate the functions of other administrative institutions, and to overtake their prerogative rights. On the other hand, this created preconditions for the incorporation of the local administrative institutions into the party political mechanism. Subjugation of local administrative institutions facilitated the implementation of the occupational policy. The party committees were becoming a unified political and administrative body.

Striving to enforce the party hold over administrative institutions, the CP PPO (Primary Party Organisation) network was expanding. PPOs were to be established in all administrative institutions and subordinate institutions in the LSSR, to allow internal control of their operations. The PPO apparatus was formed; staff secretaries were selected and appointed. On December 8 the LCP(b) CC Bureau established the office of the PPO secretary within the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of the Interior and within its Board in Vilnius[360]. In January 1941, a staff party organiser position was

established in all People's Commissariats[361]. Communists were selected and appointed to organise PPOs within the commissariats and through them exercise internal control over the commissariats.

Establishment of Governing LCP(b) Structures during the Fifth Congress of LCP(b)

In order to introduce structural changes designed to bring LCP in line with the CPSU(b) statute, local party associations' final electoral meeting campaign and the Fifth Congress of the LCP(b) were organised. During the campaign, a standing centralised and hierarchical party structure was to be completely established, and the candidates to governing and executive party bodies were to be elected and approved. The elections of the candidates were only formal. The purpose of these elections was to sham an internal party democracy and staff rotation on the one hand, and to cover the fact that committee members and heads were previously selected and appointed by the Party leadership and the Party apparatus, on the other. Election procedure could also be used to ostensibly "legally" substitute the candidates who proved to be disobedient, unsuitable to the party or to its leadership. The party leadership and the CP apparatus strived to form a closed and exclusive group of executive bureaucrats, independent from the party backbenchers, responsible to and supportive of the leaders and the party apparatus.

The campaign was in conformity with the plan drawn up by the LCP(b) leadership under strict supervision of the LCP(b) CC. In December, the LCP(b) CC Bureau approved the plan of measures for reorganisation of local party organisations and the committee election plan[362]. The City and County Committees of the CP were ordered to bring the party structure in line with the CPSU(b) statute. This included reforming the illegally operating groups into primary organisations, establishing Region, County and City organisations, unless previously established, and forming their governing bodies. The party branches were established on the territorial – industrial principle (i.e. there were party organisations established in all territorial units of the country and in all workplaces). By December 30, the primary and region branches were to be completely established. In accordance with a previously established schedule, conferences of County branches were to be held on September 15 – 25, 1941. In early February, the Fifth Congress of the LCP(b) was to convene. Primary Party Organisations (PPO) to be approved by the City of the County Committee were to be established in all institutions, companies and villages having over three communists. In regions, where the number of communists exceeded 20, five-member Region Committees were to be established. The candidate secretaries and party organisers for Region Committees were to be approved by the LCP(b) CC apparatus and submitted to the LCP(b) CC Bureau for approval. Especially stringent regulations were enforced on the procedures for holding County Conferences and for selecting Committee members during these Conferences. Such conferences were to comply with the agenda established by the LCP(b) CC Bureau and the rules approved by the Organisational Instructors' Department. In order to ensure party and LCP(b) CC control over the local party associations, LCP(b) CC assigned supervisors to every

association. The supervisors were to organise and manage the County Conferences. The number of County Committee members was limited. For instance, in Kaunas, Vilnius and Siauliai, local party organisations were allowed to elect committees comprised of 19 to 27 members and 5 to 9 candidates. Bureaus were to have 2 secretaries and from 7 to 9 members. City and County Committees were ordered to ensure the party bodies are managed on all levels by "certified Bolsheviks, dedicated to the Party of Lenin and Stalin", able to "defend the communist cause till the end"[363].

After the final electoral meeting campaign was finished, the party structure was brought in line with the CPSU(b) structure and its managing personnel was selected. The party leadership and bureaucrats appointed the executive bodies (committees and bureaus) that took over the functions of collegial authorities elected by party members. Instead of being subordinate to all party members, the committees and bureaus were hierarchically subordinate to, responsible to and completely reliant on the party leadership. The make-up of the County and Region Committees was subject to little change. LCP(b) lacked reserves of governing personnel and people with organisational capacities. Therefore, staff fluctuation model, characteristic of the CPSU(b), was not immediately applicable in Lithuania. Barely several secretaries were exchanged between committees of the local party associations. The personnel of the Committees remained the same. The Party leadership was generally satisfied with the make-up of committees established by the LCP(b) CC in autumn of 1940. There were merely several cases where due to political reasons secretaries or other committee members needed to be dismissed, since they either turned out to be secret agents of the Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania or the Police, or their biographies included discrediting facts which made them unwanted in the CP. Thus, for instance, Secretary to the County Committee in Mazeikiai Mecislovas Viciulis was dismissed and excluded from the party as "unworthy of political trust" due to his links with a relative who cooperated with the Police of the Republic of Lithuania. The CP qualified Viciulis' relative as an "agent provocateur"[364]. The make-up of some committees suffered minor changes due to natural circumstances, as their members were transferred to other posts. As previously mentioned, persons holding high posts in the national administrative structures were forcibly appointed to the party committees. After new heads were appointed to provisional executive committees and other institutions, the makeup of party committees changed as well.

Since the beginning of 1941, new first secretaries were appointed to the LCP(b) in Kaunas City and in Counties of Marijampole, Mazeikiai, Panevezys, Seinai, Taurage, Telsiai and Ukmerge. Some secretaries where promoted, transferred to other Party of administrative structures, or changed office due to other reasons. For instance, Petrauskas, Secretary to the Committee in Kaunas City resigned, since he was unable to manage his duties under the influence of rival communist groupings in the city and could not cope with their pressure. Grigalavicius, former instructor in the LCP(b) CC Organisational Instructors' Department and former secretary to LCP(b) in Rokiskis County, was

appointed to the post. Although Petrauskas lacked organisational capabilities and probably other indispensable features as well, still, thanks to his personal links with the party leadership, in particular with Snieckus, Meskupas, Maiminas and Aizenas, he was promoted to the post of LCP(b) CC secretary for Food Supply in March. Since 1941, second secretaries to the committees, particularly those coming from the USSR, were also changing frequently. In most cases, these people were searching for improved living and working conditions, as they were often unsatisfied about the places to which they were appointed by the party leadership. Also important were subjective criteria, such as personal relations between the first and the second secretary, the ability of the second secretary to adjust to other committee members and to the local administrative staff, and to NKVD staff in particular. Not all the first secretaries were willing to demonstrate immediate obedience to the newly appointed second secretaries. The NKVD personnel coming from the USSR considered themselves the ultimate representatives of the USSR and were not always willing to obey the commands of the second secretaries. The LCP(b) CC apparatus would generally take into consideration the wishes of first and second secretaries and would transfer them to other Counties. Due to such fluctuation of staff, the make-up of the committees was changing, but this did not affect the essence of their activities.

During the final electoral meeting campaign of the LCP(b), the committee apparatus structure was legitimised, and heads of the subdivisions (departments) of the committees were appointed. The make-up of committee apparatus was subject to little change, remaining the same as proposed by the LCP(b) CC in autumn 1940. The committee apparatus structure was similar to, yet not so widely extended as the LCP (b) CC. The county committees employed fewer personnel than the Central Committee.

In order to bring the selection of the superior party leadership in line with the CPSU(b) statute, a party Congress was convened. Complying with the statute, the LCP(b) CC Bureau established a commission to help organise the Fifth Congress and to serve the delegates' needs, approved the agenda for the Congress and the rules for delegate representation[365]. The communists of the Red Army of the USSR, deployed on Lithuanian territory, and the NKVD army communists were not formally included into the LCP (b) listings and did not belong to any of the Party's local associations. Despite of this, they were to delegate their representatives to the LCP (b) Congress. The election of delegates was to demonstrate the ostensible internal democracy in the Party, and the wide possibilities for communist representation within the make-up of party leadership. In practice, the Party apparatus carefully selected the party leadership, its electorate, and the delegates to the congress in advance via backstage deals and agreements. Delegates to the Fifth LCP (b) Congress were selected by heads of the party committees, and approved by the LCP (b) CC apparatus. Every party organisation was forced to delegate leaders of administrative structures, staff of party apparatus, officers of the USSR army deployed in Lithuania, and other persons selected in advance by the LCP(b) Central Committee and

barely even known to the locals. Thus, for example, Vilnius City LCP branch was ordered to "elect" Pozdniakov, Preiksas, and Supikovas. Siauliai City branch, in turn, was obliged to delegate Meskupas, Alytus County delegated Guzevicius, Panevezys County sent Gedvilas, and Vilnius County delegated Paleckis.[366] The list of delegates from the most numerous and influential Kaunas City LCP association was prepared by the LCP(b) CC apparatus and approved by the party leadership[367]. Thus, Kaunas communists were forced to delegate Snieckus, National Commissioners Sumauskas and Glusauskas, LSSR Military Commissar Fiodoras Bogdanovas, Chairman to the trade unions' Central Organisational Bureau Juozas Stimburis, and other persons. Out of 63 of Kaunas City LCP delegates enjoying the right to vote, as many as 20 were commanders of the USSR Army deployed in Lithuania, and 6 were executives of the NKVD. Since such procedures were employed for delegating representatives to the Congress, odd incongruities also occurred. For instance, the local party association in Alytus County ostensibly delegated Butkus, a communist who knew nothing about his being delegated; Kaunas City Committee informed Elena Krasauskiene she was delegated to the Congress, but forgot to notify her about the date and time of the Congress.[368] The Mandate Commission only started searching for the missing candidates after the Congress began.

The Fifth LCP (b) Congress was held on 5–9 February 1941. There were 279 delegates enjoying the right to vote and 65 delegates with a right of advise[369]. In terms of nationality, there were 135 Lithuanians, 120 Russians, 42 Jews, 21 Byelorussians, 15 Ukrainians, and 11 people of other nationalities. Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian communists coming from the USSR dominated the Congress, and Lithuanians only accounted for a minority. 176 delegates occupied high posts within the Party and administrative structures and belonged to the higher soviet bureaucracy. 119 delegates were USSR Army officers and members of NKVD staff. Representatives of party and administrative structures, including repressive structures, and the armed forces of the USSR dominated and controlled the Congress. Other delegates had no impact for the Congress. This was essentially a meeting of communists representing bureaucratic and power structures.

In line with common practice of the CPSU(b), the members to supreme bodies of the CP were selected by a small group of communist leaders via backstage dealings and in keeping with the rules for party nomenclature formation. The soviet political system model demanded the LCP(b) CC to become a homogenous political centre of the annexed Lithuania. This implied it had to unite the leaders of the local CP, administrative institutions and the commanders of the USSR army deployed on the Lithuanian territory. Therefore, the heads of all the most important political and power structures became members to the LCP CC. To ensure domination of the party nomenclature, the supreme LSSR bureaucracy officials accounted for two thirds of the CC. All candidates were selected based on the following principles: CP's political trust, obedience to the supreme party structures, i.e. the CPSU (b) CC and LCP (b) CC Bureau, and faithfulness to party leaders, starting with Stalin and

finishing with Snieckus. The requirements to abide with the party discipline and obey the party leaders were crucially important in order to make LCP CC completely dependent on the party leadership, to ensure its smooth and unconditional approval of all the CP decisions, and in order to sustain authoritarian rule within the party.

For the purposes of propaganda, the LCP (b) CC was required to demonstrate an ostensibly wide representation of communists from a variety of social classes. Therefore, its members included forcibly delegated female representatives, workers from the industrial, educational and other institutions and companies, representing a variety of age groups. There was a problem of how to render the make-up of the party leadership ostensibly proletarian. According to the Bolshevik traditions, CC needed to include at least several workers and peasants to feign the proletarian origin of the party leadership. However, all active party members, who in terms of social status and origin were workers and peasants, were promoted to higher posts after Lithuania was incorporated into the USSR, and became party officials or LSSR administrators. The solution was found by drawing on the CPSU(b) practice applied in party statistics for defining the status of party members. Thus, the status of workers and peasants was "granted" to party white-collar workers originating from blue-collar workers and peasants. This is how the necessary social status of workers was secured to the LCP(b) CC secretary Preiksas, heads of CC Departments Aizenas, Ciblys, Didziulis, Jakovlevas, Pepole's Commissar Sumauskas, Head of Railroad Board Vasilijus Lochmatovas and others representatives of party and administrative offices. Out of all the supreme administrators, merely Paleckis, Gedvilas and several deputy - commissars were officially referred to as public officers. Traditionally, the origin and social status of Snieckus usually was not mentioned[370]. Manipulation of the party statistics allowed to create an ostensibly proletarian Central Committee.

Candidates to CC were selected in a closed party nomenclature meeting. This was held in secret. The delegates and the party at large never knew the party leadership and party apparatus made secret final decisions about the composition of the Central Committee. After the Congress, when Aleksandras Kozlovas (Aleksandr Kozlov), editor of a Vilnius newspaper "Novaja Zyzn" (*the New Life*) told the communists about the secret meeting, he received a reprimand from Snieckus for leaking the news[371]. The CP leadership wanted to sustain the illusion entertained by the party rank-and-file that the CP adhered to provisions of the CPSU(b) statute.

The procedure of forming the LCP(b) Central Committee ensured the regime with an appropriate selection of CC candidates; however, it could not guarantee the Congress delegates would automatically approve them. Therefore, delegates to the Congress needed to be manageable and flexible, ensuring unconditional acceptance of the backstage decisions made by the Party leadership. Nomination of unforeseen candidates, or refusal to approve any of the previously selected candidates unacceptable to a group of the delegates was to be pre-empted. In the final analysis, this meant that

obedience of party members to the party apparatus and party leadership was crucial to ensure the party could function as a monolithic body, totally obedient to the party leadership and easy to manipulate. During the Congress, due to various reasons a part of the delegates did not support the choice of candidates made by the LCP(b) CC leadership and thus complicated the procedures of approval of some CC members.

Activists of the formerly illegal LCP attempted to make use of the procedure of candidate nomination and to nominate some underground communists to CC, including Vinickis and Chodosaite. The leftist delegates contested the nomination of former Labour Unionists Paleckis and Vaisnoras[372]. In spite of the assurances by Supikovas, who claimed that the National Commissioner for Finance Vaisnoras was "implementing the right party line", leftist radicals achieved his exclusion from the list of CC members submitted for voting. Yet another candidate, Zimanas, editor of the "Tiesa" newspaper remained in the list largely due to the LCP(b) CC Secretary for Propaganda Preiksas, although it was clear that a major part of the delegates, in particular Lithuanians and people of other nationalities coming from the USSR, were against leaving his name in the list of candidates.

Forty-seven members and sixteen candidates were elected to the LCP(b) CC. Eleven persons were elected members of the Revision Commission[373]. Only Zimanas was not elected CC member (out of the total 263, 137 voted against him). This was a major drawback for the LCP(b). It proved that the LCP(b) CC leadership and apparatus failed to manage the delegates and to force them to cast votes for a person preselected by the leadership, yet unpopular with the party backbenchers. However, the fact that neither Zimanas nor Vaisnoras became the LCP(b) CC members did not produce negative consequences for the these persons, since their position in the party and in the administration solely depended on the USSR authorities and LCP(b) leadership's political trust, not on the party backbenchers. Zimanas retained party's political trust, and Vaisnoras' position within the administration weakened largely due to his insufficient diligence in ensuring management of the Commissariat staff.

Out of the 63 LCP(b) CC members and candidates, 35 were party leaders, 13 heads of administration, 4 leaders of public organisations (including the Communist Youth, trade unions and other), 10 were military commanders of the USSR army deployed in Lithuania, 1 was editor of a communist newspaper. Contrary to the Communist propaganda, emphasising that the CC was representative of the proletariat, CC was in fact dominated by representatives of political bureaucracy and power structures. The nomenclature (white-collar) staff accounted for 84 % of the LCP(b) CC members. In terms of its establishment procedures, make-up and subordination pattern, the LCP(b) CC was a nomenclatorial body. The status of CC members within the Committee depended on their posts and on the political trust earned with the party leadership. Abuse of trust or change of post in the administration could mean the loss of the CC member status. Formally, CC was the supreme collegial

leadership body of the party. In practice, subordinate to the LCP(b) CC Bureau, CC was obliged to approve the decisions made by the CPSU(b) leadership and the LCP(b) CC Bureau. The real powers with respect to party management were vested in the LCP(b) CC Bureau.

On February 9, the First Plenum of the LCP(b) CC appointed leaders of the Lithuanian CP, who were previously selected by LCP(b) CC via backstage deliberation and approved by the CPSU(b) leadership[374]. The regime demonstrated its trust in a major part the LCP(b) leaders by leaving them in the same posts. Snieckus remained the First Secretary of the LCP(b) CK, Meksupas remained Second Secretary, and Preiksas remained Secretary for Propaganda. A new figure, Nikolajus Gridinas, Secretary of Staff, became part of CC secretaries' grouping. His task was to gradually take over from Pozdniakov the functions of the supreme supervisor of LCP(b) and other administrative structures in the LSSR. Gridinas was delegated to coordinate the implementation of the CPSU(b) staff policy. The CPSU(b) leadership were unsatisfied with activities of the Lithuanian communists within the sphere of personnel selection, therefore, local communists were dismissed from implementation of the party personnel policy. Communists coming from the USSR, Gridin in particular, regulated all the main staff related affairs.

The 18th Conference of the CPSU(b) decided to establish several secretaries for Industry in the local party associations in republics, autonomous regions, provinces and cities. The main task of these secretaries was to control the main industry branches of the mentioned territorial units. The conference also established the office of secretary for transport. On March 7 – 8, the LCP(b) CC Second Plenum appointed two more LCP(b) CC secretaries[375]. Ciblys, former Head of the Department of Industry and Transport, was appointed LCP(b) CC Secretary for Industry, and Petrauskas, former First Secretary in Kaunas City Committee became CC Secretary for Food Supply. As the LCP(b) leadership could not come up with an appropriate local communist to oversee the transport sector, they were obliged to ask the CPSU(b) CC for sending an appropriate person[376]. The CPSU(b) CC suggested Aleksandras Zubovas (Aleksandr Zubov) and the LCP(b) CC Bureau approved him as the LCP(b) CC Secretary for Transport on April 23 [377].

The LCP(b) CC First Plenum established the supreme executive body of the party, the Bureau. The following is a list of Bureau members: Snieckus, Meskupas, Gridinas, and Preiksas, LCP(b) CC Secretaries; Grigalavicius, Secretary to Committee in Kaunas City association, which was the most important and influential LCP unit; Supikovas, Head of the Organisational Instructors' Department of the LCP(b) CC; Paleckis, Gedvilas, Guzevicius and Gladkovas, leaders of LSSR central administrative structures and repressive institutions; and Vasilijus Morozovas (Vasilij Morozov), representing the USSR army deployed in Lithuania. Pozdniakov, the CPSU(b) CC representative, was not formally member of the Bureau, however, as previously, he attended the Bureau meetings and together with Gridinas supervised the Bureau activities. The Plenum approved with minor modifications the list of

previously operating heads of LCP(b) CC departments, including Supikovas as head of the Organisational Instructors' Department, Didziulis of the Department of Agriculture, Ciblys of the Department of Industry and Transport, and Zdanavicius of the Department of Education. Piotras Jakovlevas (Petr Jakovlev) from the USSR was appointed as new Head of the Military Department, and Maiminas, former deputy head of the Industry and Transport Department was appointed Head of the Trade Department. Editors for communist publications were also approved. Zimanas was approved as editor for "Tiesa" (*The Truth*), Sochatas for "Emes", Meskauskiene for the "Valstieciu Laikrastis" (*The Peasants' Newspaper*), and Dilmanas for "Truzenik" (*The Laborer*).

The LCP(b) CC Bureau was a critically important instrument of party policy implementation. It tailored to local conditions the CPSU(b) leadership's political decisions aimed at bringing the public life in Lithuania along the lines of soviet principles; planned and supervised the measures for party policy implementation. The Bureau adopted crucial rulings on establishment of administrative institutions and on institutional reform. Its role was decisive for selecting and changing the institutional personnel and for organising their work. The Bureau salved issues related to changing the make-up of administrative bodies and appointment of their authorities. It also deliberated on the crucial issues related to activities of public organisations, including their role in implementation of the party policy, and appointed the heads of these organisations. The LCP(b) CC Bureau incorporated all the major LSSR administrative institutions into a single LSSR administrative body. The Bureau was an embodiment of the integration of the CP and the administrative structures. The LCP(b) CC Bureau was the supreme institution within the LSSR administration, which brought all other administrative bodies under its control. The Bureau members were central body of the local bureaucracy, and *de facto* the Government of the LSSR. Formally, the Bureau was a collegial governing body, where voting salved all issues and all members had equal rights. Yet in practice, the status and influence of the Bureau members differed from the formally declared. The Bureau was governed by four persons: Pozdniakov, Gridinas, Snieckus and Meskupas. Its other members were either supporting the factual Bureau leaders or trying to form separate fractions. Thus, for example, Paleckis and Gedvilas sometimes attempted at giving a more moderate opinion than other members of the Bureau gave. Preiksas also joined them sometimes, when issues of culture of the soviet Lithuania were at the core of the debate[378]. However, their thinking never went beyond the CPSU(b) policy framework.

Formation of the LCP (b) CC Apparatus

The Central Committee and its apparatus, the supreme party structure, played an important role within the organisation and the political mechanism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) was a party body that made political decisions concerning the organisation of and changes in public life[379]. The CPSU (b) CC apparatus specified and organised the

implementation of the party's political decisions, engaged in direct dictate to all political institutions as well as constituent parts of the state apparatus and controlled the implementation of party decisions. The Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party was also an important party structure that debated the issues concerning the implementation of party policy in Lithuania and adopted respective decisions. The LCP (b) CC apparatus directly organised the implementation of the decisions by the LCP (b) CC and its Bureau, controlled the activities of the LSSR administrative and political structures while implementing the party policy and organising their work in the soviet framework. Every part of the LCP (b) CC apparatus was established for the purposes of the organisation and implementation of specific political, ideological, organisational and other party activities as well as the implementation of the CPSU (b) policy in certain areas. Within the LCP (b) Central Committee, structural units (divisions and sectors) were established. Those units had a task to supervise certain spheres of public life, provide instructions to respective administrative institutions, and control their activities.

In October 1940, the Organisational-Instructors' Division and Divisions for Staff, Activism and Propaganda, Schools, Agriculture, Industry and Transport were established, the Special and Financial-Economy sectors were formed. The Organisational – Instructors' Division was set up for the purpose to develop party's organisational activities and carry out the overall supervision of the LSSR administrative institutions and public organisations. It directly supervised the work of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR and provisional executive committees and controlled their activities while implementing party political measures. In addition, it controlled the activities of other administrative agencies, primarily of the Council of National Commissioners, even though formally the Secretaries of the LCP (b) CC were the ones charged with that supervision. The Organisational – Instructors' Division organised reforms related to the introduction of the soviet political system and party dictate and controlled the implementation of the party policy in that field. The task of the Staff Division was to deal with all the issues of the selection, appointment and control of activities of party functionaries and LSSR executives. That was one of the most important and influential structures in the party which, while manipulating staff policy and nomenclature system of the party, controlled the work of the entire party and administrative structures. The Division for Activism and Propaganda was established in order to reorganise people's spiritual life following the communist ideology. It was engaging in the direct dictate to institutions that were responsible for the administration of the spheres related to spiritual life and values, controlled their activities and supervised the work of virtually all educational, cultural and art establishments and organisations and means of mass information. The Schools' Division was set up in order to implement education policy of the party as well as to control how LSSR institutions and educational establishments were reorganising education system according

to communist ideology. The Division directly dictated to the People's Commissariat for Education, controlled the activities of that Commissariat and its subordinate units. The LCP (b) CC branch divisions (Agricultural, Industry and Transport, later on also Trade) were established in order to implement communist economic policy. They regulated and controlled the activities of branch commissariats of the LSSR and supervised industrial, transport, construction and agricultural institutions and organisations under their control.

In October 1940, the LCP (b) CC Bureau was appointing Heads of Divisions. Karolis Didžiulis (member of the LCP since 1919) was appointed Head of the Division for Agriculture, Šmerelis Maiminas (in LCP since 1922) - Head of the Division for Industry and Transport, Petras Jodelis was selected as Head of the Division for Schools, Chaimas Aizenas (in LCP since 1927) - Head of the Staff Division.[380] In a month's time, Michailas Čiblys (member of the CPSU (b) since 1924) was appointed Head of the Division for Industry and Transport, and Maiminas was downgraded to the position of Deputy Head of the Industry and Transport Division[381]. In December, Jonas Zdanavičius (member of the LCP since 1932)[382] was selected as Head of the Division for Schools. Division Deputy Heads were also selected. Communist Vladimir Kurojedov from the SSSR was appointed Deputy Head of the Division for Activism and Propaganda, and Juozas Grigalavičius – Deputy Head of the Organisational – Instructors' Division[383]. On 12 December 1941, Aizenas was downgraded to the position of Deputy Head of the Staff Division of the LCP (b) CC[384].

Furthermore, subdivisions (sectors) of the LCP (b) CC Divisions were formed and their leaders were appointed. A Byelorussian Vladimir Tarasevič was appointed Head of the Sector of Party Statistics and the Uniform Party Card Sector of the Organisational – Instructors' Division. He arrived from Byelorussian SSR and was employed following the references by Šupikov. Kazimiera Ozarskaja, formerly an employee of the Staff Division of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, responsible for staff matters of the illegal LCP, was appointed Head of the Staff Record Sector of the Staff Division. Antanas Skardis was installed as Head of the Party Staff Sector, Juozas Daškauskas - as Head of the Soviet Staff Sector, Alfonsas Kudla - Head of the Industry Staff Sector. Vasilij Dolotov from Russia was appointed Head of the Special Sector. Marija Chodosaitė was selected as Head of the Political Activism Sector of the Division for Propaganda and Activism, a Russian Aleksandr Ogarkov from the SSSR was selected Head of the Party Propaganda Sector. Jonas Besparaitis[385] was appointed Head of the Financial and Economy Sector.

In October, the formation of the apparatus of the LCP (b) divisions and sectors began, and instructors and other responsible party functionaries were appointed. For example, in December – March 1941,

the LCP(b) CC Bureau named the instructors of the Division for Propaganda and Activism Jonas Jurevičius, and Tichon Košelev, Dmitrij Laptuchov, Konstantin Svistunov from the SSSR; instructor for the Staff Division from SSSR Grigorij Melnikov; instructors of the Organisational – Instructors' Division Jonas Mikulevičius, Leonas Kučinskas, Georgij Jacko from the SSSR; instructor of the Division for Industry Dveira Berzakaitė, Chief Accountant of the Financial and Economy Sector Moisej Bergman etc[386]. The same procedure applied to the selection of other division instructors and responsible staff. After the formation of the LCP (b) apparatus began the establishment of a party structure engaging in direct dictate to the LSSR administrative bodies, controlling how they implemented the party policy and worked within the soviet framework.

Secretaries of the LCP (b) were the highest-ranking party leaders and officials of the LSSR administration. The sphere of their activities coincided with that of the communist party policy. The Secretaries had to ensure the enforcement of CPSU (b) policy, party dictate, and control in all the spheres of public life falling within their scope of responsibility. The Secretaries were directing and controlling the regulatory structures within the fields under their responsibility. Secretaries of the LCP (b) CC strongly influenced institutions or organisations under their control, and that influence often equalled or even exceeded the degree of influence enjoyed by chiefs of such institutions. The Secretaries' spheres of competence were divided following the scheme set forth by the CPSU (b) authorities. First Secretary Antanas Sniečkus supervised the processes of the sovietisation of the LSSR and introduction of the soviet political system, and was responsible for political party dictate to the entire LSSR administration. The "peculiarity" of the governing body of the LCP (b) was the absence of an appointed secretary for agriculture. According to a "non-public" agreement, the implementation of agrarian policy in Lithuania was Sniečkus' privilege. Second Secretary Meskupas governed organisational issues of the party, coordinated the activities of party structures, and controlled the operation of the party policy mechanism, in the first place - political dictate of the party and control over the administration and public organisations. The Secretary for Staff Gridin dealt with all staff issues. He supervised the employment of communists in administrative institutions, changes within the administration and the formation of the soviet bureaucracy, with its highest unit – the nomenclature. Following the tradition of the CPSU (b), staff issues constituted the most important sphere of the party's work, as it ensured the functioning of the party policy mechanism, party dictate and control over all political structures and public organisations. Since the times of Stalin's rule, due to the bureaucratic government of the Soviet Union, the common practice had been that the party and the state was governed by the one man who had the grip on staff issues. Therefore, the secretary for staff issues was one of the foremost figures in the party and state hierarchy. In the republics occupied by the SSSR, such a man was also the one to implement central power dictate and control local

administration. Following the Bolshevik tradition, the Secretary for Propaganda Preikšas was regarded as party ideologist. It is obvious that the CPSU (b) authorities did not grant the Lithuanian Communist Organisation the right to interpret communist ideology at their own discretion. The LCP (b) was only allowed to promote communist ideology, and, very rarely, apply ("adapt") certain communist doctrines to local conditions. The main functions assigned to the propaganda sector included the organisation and control of Bolshevik ideology implantation in the public, politisation and ideologisation of people, most of all in respect to spiritual values, as well as the introduction and development of ideological control over the public. Industrial sectors were to supervise economic reforms by the CPSU (b), control the introduction and functioning of economy plan in Lithuania. Most attention was paid to the co-ordination and control of the implementation of economy plans, and the supervision of structures administering economy and economic entities. Along with the supervision of public life, Secretaries of the CC also controlled the activities of specific LSSR administrative bodies and public organisations[387]. For example, Sniečkus was supervising the Provisional Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, the Council of National Commissioners, the State Planning Commission and 5 People's Commissariats (for Internal Affairs, Security, State Control, Agriculture and the Proxy Board of the SSSR People's Commissariat for Purveyance); Meskupas was responsible for the State Bank, People's Commissariats for Finance and Trade, Boards of Communication, Fluvial Navigation and Railways, Central Organisational Bureau of Trade Unions and the Consumers' Co-operation; Preikšas was accountable for the People's Commissariat for Education, Boards of Art, Cinemafication and Radiofication, the Glavlit, the National Publishing House and the TASS agency. Gridin supervised the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's Office, People's Commissariats for Justice and Labour, Šupikov was responsible for the People's Commissariat for Health Protection, Comsomol Central Committee and, together with Sniečkus, co-ordinated work of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Čiblys supervised the Industrial Co-operation, Road Board and 5 People's Commissariats (for Local Industry, Food Industry, Meat and Dairy Industry, Forests and Municipal Economy); Jakovlev was responsible for the Physical Education and Sports Committee, Hydro-meteorological Service, Association for the Support of Aviation and Chemical Defence (OSOAVIACHIM); Aizenas supervised the People's Commissariat for Social Provision and State Insurance Institutions. Having distributed the spheres of party policy implementation and respective institutions, the secretaries and heads of leading divisions of the LCP (b) CC shared out the areas of influence. That gave rise to the practice that no relevant matter concerning party policy implementation in a given sphere as well as the responsible institution could be debated or decided on without having been discussed and co-ordinated with an appropriate secretary or head of a division.

Routinely, CC Secretaries were personally responsible for the implementation of party policy in the sphere under their supervision. Attribution of personal responsibility for the implementation of political decisions to the leaders was one of the most significant instruments of the CPSU (b) political mechanism and bureaucratic management of the SSSR. It made party functionaries and executives implement party decisions unconditionally and diligently, employing any means necessary. Bearing in mind the fact that under the totalitarian rule political bureaucrats faced the risk of repressions for possible deviations from given directions or for disobedience, party Secretaries had a vital interest in ensuring right and smooth implementation of the CPSU (b) political will.

Heads of the LCP (b) Central Committee divisions were not only party functionaries, but also administrators of a respective sphere under the responsibility of the division. They organised the activities of their division and made efforts to attain direct control over the work of the institutions under a given division's responsibility. Real powers of division heads, as well as divisions on the whole, highly depended on the influence degree enjoyed by a LCP (b) CC Secretary controlling their work. Each Secretary sought that their subordinate divisions should be stricter in controlling an entrusted sphere and promoted the involvement of divisions in all the issues arising within that sphere as well as its overall supervision. For example, Preikšas initiated strict control by the People's Commissariat for Education as of the summer of 1940[388]. He arranged that all important orders and circulars of the People's Commissariat for Education should be co-ordinated with him and the LCP (b) CC Division for Schools. Divisions for Schools and Propaganda and Activism were especially critical in assessing ideological purposefulness of the decisions and orders issued by the People's Commissariat for Education. Analogously, in autumn 1940, Head of Division for Industry and Transport Čiblys introduced an order to co-ordinate with him resolutions of the Council of National Commissioners and respective People's Commissariats concerning the issues of nationalisation and sovietisation of industry, trade and transport, administration of those spheres, selection of staff etc., and requested reports on the work of commissariats and activities of enterprises operating within the field of their responsibility (including plan implementation) and etc[389]. In the party hierarchy, heads of the LCP (b) CC divisions were formally in a position lower than National Commissioners. Yet due to the party's political dictate to administrative institutions and its political mechanism, they played a more important political role, had higher positions and enjoyed more powers. In fact, National Commissioners were subordinate to heads of CC divisions, and quite often even to regular instructors of the divisions.

Initially, instructors of LCP (b) CC divisions and sectors as well as other responsible officials of the apparatus were just servicing the executives of the LCP (b) CC. They collected and submitted to party leaders the information on the implementation of party policy in a given sphere, the reorganisation of

that sphere on the soviet basis, activities of administrative bodies and their subordinate institutions, enterprises or organisations, prepared various documents and, in rare cases, even drafted resolutions of the LCP (b) CC Bureau. As the scope of the LCP (b) CC apparatus dictate and control over the administration expanded, the functions attributed to the instructors were changing as well. Subsequently they found themselves in a position to supervise specific institutions or organisations directly, and were aiming to become directors thereof. Instructors were directly interfering with all the matters of importance in an institution, from drafting the provisions of People's Commissariats and commissioners' orders on various issues to staffing of commissariats and their subordinate institutions. The LCP (b) CC adopted the CPSU (b) practice to submit all regulations prepared by National Commissioners to instructors for analysis and, later on, co-ordination with heads of divisions. That was mostly characteristic of divisions discharging ideological functions (Propaganda and Activism, Schools). Such a procedure contributed to the strengthening of the party's political dictate to the administration, restricting of the competence of administrative institutions as well as limiting the possibilities to take independent decisions on institutional activities. As the LCP (b) CC apparatus was increasingly penetrating public life, the dictate to and the control of institutions was expanding, party structures were increasingly interfering with internal matters of institutions, which eventually resulted in the overlapping of activities.

Expansion of the LCP (b) Structures and the Party Apparatus in the Spring of 1941

After the 5th Congress of the LCP (b), the territorial structure of the LCP (b) was undergoing change mostly due to natural reasons. After the establishment of administrative units –districts– in the largest cities following the SSSR model, respective party organisations were set up. Vilnius city party organisation was divided into 4, and that of Kaunas – into 3 district organisations. In April, the LCP (b) CC Bureau endorsed the composition of Lenin and Stalin District Committees of Kaunas City[390]. For instance, Vaclovas Supranas was installed as the First Secretary of Lenin District Committee, and the position of the Second Secretary was initially held by Michail Koregin, Deputy Head of the Provisional Executive Committee of Kaunas City, who was replaced by Večeslav Goriunov in May. Aleksandr Kuriatnikov, party co-ordinator in a military factory, Stepan Dobromudrov, party co-ordinator of the Nemunas navigation, Pines, army regiment commissioner, and party instructor Chana Geršonavičiūtė were selected as members of the Committee. Stasys Šeškevičius was appointed as First Secretary of the October District Committee, whereas Nachman Gordon, Head of the Organisational – Instructor's Division, Solomonas Atamukas, Head of the Staff Division, Jonas Karduševičius, Head of the Propaganda and Activism Division, Susalin, army brigade commissioner and official of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs Adomas Godliauskas became members of the Committee.

In spring 1941, the network of primary institutions expanded giving rise to new communist organisations. For example, after the reorganisation of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs into two commissariats, the primary party organisation was restructured respectively. A new party organisation for State Security People's Commissariat was established, and in May, the LCP (b) CC Bureau approved Godliauskas as its Secretary[391].

In spring 1941, seeking to embrace all public life spheres and respective administrative institutions, the Communist Party was rapidly enlarging its apparatus and increasing the number of employees. Following the example set by the CPSU (b), the LCP (b) Central Committee reorganised the Division for Industry and Transport into two separate divisions for Industry and Transport, and set up new divisions for Food Industry and Military Affairs[392]. Michail Perov from SSSR was appointed Head of the Transport Division. The structure of existing divisions was developed and new sectors were established. The widening of the structure of the apparatus naturally resulted in the increase of employee numbers.

Lower party structures, replicating the system of the LCP (b) CC and the functions of its structural divisions, underwent analogous processes. Following the example of the LCP (b) CC, it was decided to introduce the Post for Staff Secretary in all city committees, whereas all city and county committees were supposed to establish Staff Divisions[393]. Based on the LCP (b) CC structure, city and county committees established Military and Industry-Transport Divisions and planned the number of staff thereof[394].

As the CPSU (b) introduced the position for Committee Secretary for Industry in party organisations of industrial cities in spring 1941, the same procedure was carried out in Lithuania. On the 7th and 8th of March, the LCP (b) CC Bureau appointed Antanas Petravičius as Secretary for Industry for Kaunas City, and Aleksas Kazlauskas – for Šiauliai City[395]. Since communists were short of suitable candidates, the LCP (b) CC Bureau requested the CPSU (b) CC to send a communist to take up the vacant position as Secretary for Industry of Vilnius City Committee.

The party bureaucracy formed along with the expansion of the party apparatus. It constituted a part of the new soviet bureaucracy occupying a significant position in the SSSR government hierarchy and, judging by its influence, was the most powerful bureaucratic group. Differently from the administrative (the so-called national), technocratic (the so called economic) and other ideologically heterogeneous bureaucratic groups under development, party bureaucracy was unanimous both politically and ideologically. It was united by common goals of flawless implementation of party policy and strengthening of political party dictate to the public. The party bureaucracy was dominated by underground LCP activists, united in long-standing common anti-State activities and informal

relations that were actually more important than official relations of hierarchic subordination. That group made up the core of the new soviet bureaucracy, as it was the source for candidates to occupy executive posts in the LSSR administration. The party bureaucracy was the elite group that often disregarded authorities outside its framework. Due to their exceptional situation, even communists occupying low positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy could afford to disobey high-ranking executives provided the latter were not party members.

Enlargement of the LSSR Administrative Sector in September 1940 – June 1941

The occupation government had two options to form and develop the LSSR administrative sector: either totally destroy the institutional framework of the Republic of Lithuania and make a fresh start by building the new one, or transform of the bureaucratic organisation of the Republic of Lithuania into a soviet one. In the first case, the occupation government would have inevitably disorganised the management of Lithuania, since in was impossible to set up a completely new administrative apparatus so fast and change the entire Lithuanian civil service into the soviet bureaucracy. Yet, without bureaucratic organisation, the communist party would not have been able to implement its policy in Lithuania. In such a case, the policy of Lithuania's sovietisation would have had to be postponed until the establishment of the necessary mechanism. Due to political reasons and practical interests, the SSSR authorities did not deem it necessary to abolish the bureaucratic framework of the former Republic of Lithuania. The reorganisation of the government system of the Republic of Lithuania into the soviet one created preconditions for gradual replacement of Lithuanian management organisation and civil servants by the LSSR government system and the soviet bureaucracy in given transition time, avoiding the disorganisation of the country's management. Such a design complied with political, ideological and practical interests of the Communist Party. It served as a smokescreen to disguise occupational goals, helped to conjure up an image of the legitimacy and government continuity of the occupation authorities and its institutions. Communists were able to make immediate use of Lithuanian institutions while implementing their policy by changing the management and introducing own dictate and control. In practice, the majority of Lithuanian institutions could have been preserved and transformed into the soviet ones by changing their goals, functions, competence and subordination schemes. The same could have been applied to the gradual replacement of bureaucratic staff. The Communist Party was able to rapidly replace high-ranking Lithuanian bureaucrats by politically reliable executives and therefore form the soviet bureaucracy layer that would organise institutional activities and direct the implementation of party policy. That created possibilities to retain qualified but disloyal civil servants, subdue them to politically reliable communist managers and make them follow communists' orders. Since communists had but few people suitable for administrative work and needed time to select and train appropriate candidates, that was the only possible way to replace the

bureaucratic staff while avoiding disorganisation of the LSSR administrative framework and preventing administrative chaos. That was the way to co-ordinate communists' interests to create a bureaucracy that would be loyal to occupants, obedient and disciplined, yet professional and efficient. The transformation of Lithuanian institutions into the soviet ones created preconditions for gradual, but sufficiently fast creation of the mechanism of the occupation government and communist party policy by using local bureaucratic organisation and avoiding management disorganisation in the annexed country. Thus the LSSR administrative sector was created by abolishing only those political institutions of the Republic of Lithuania that were not in line with the framework of the soviet political system and totalitarian regime; by reorganising and adapting to the LSSR political system those institutions that could be used by the communist party for its own policy and adjusted to their own mechanism, by establishing new elements of the SSSR apparatus that were functioning in the Soviet Union but were formerly absent in Lithuania. Many of the institutions of the Republic of Lithuania were incorporated into the LSSR administrative apparatus under changed names and with different objectives and political functions. To describe the process of the formation of the LSSR apparatus, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium Paleckis said, "The peculiarity of the formation of our political apparatus was the fact that we inherited the old Lithuanian state apparatus, which had positive as well as negative aspects. The positive side was that after having legally switched from the bourgeoisie to the soviet regime, we could employ the existing apparatus and its staff we did not have to build the system from scratch. We have changed the management of the state apparatus and could introduce structural reforms by adjusting it to different objectives. Yet along with the old apparatus, we took over its shortfalls, its distance from the masses, the people's interests, the new life, as well as its former civil servants who misunderstand its goals. .."[396] Similar evaluation of the situation was also presented by the Chairman of the LSSR Council of National Commissioners Gedvilas, First Secretary of the CC Sniečkus and other high-ranking authorities[397]. In truth, communists noticed that, due to such a way of the formation of the administrative sector, the party experienced quite a few political and ideological problems, much more serious than those mentioned by Paleckis. Because of the party's routine working principles and professional standards, as well as a number of disloyal individuals within the bureaucratic hierarchy and among civil servants, the LCP (b) structures faced difficulties in subduing administrative bodies to its dictate and integrating them in the party policy mechanism[398]. Nevertheless, party leaders clearly understood that there had been no other way for a fast formation of the administrative sector capable of the implementation of the policy of Lithuania's sovietisation.

The main civic society and state institutions of Lithuania were eliminated in summer 1940. Occupation authorities dismissed all non-communist political parties and organisations, the Seimas of the Republic

of Lithuania, the State Council etc. In the autumn, communists rapidly abolished the institutions they could not adapt to the soviet political system and incorporate into the party mechanism as well as the SSSR management and administration system.

The SSSR authorities were seeking to create a semblance that local political powers were replacing Lithuanian political system and administrative organisation, and due to that reason, the soviet executives did not demonstrate their role in that process and were disguising the fact that Lithuanian institutions had been abolished upon the decisions of the CPSU (b) and other SSSR institutions. The process of the liquidation of the institutions of the Republic of Lithuania seemingly by the will of the LSSR management and on behalf of its institutions was supposed to maintain the semblance of the LSSR sovereignty and local administration.

On the 26th of July, the LSSR Council of Ministers dismissed the State Council[399]. On the 2nd of August, the Government Proxy Institution for Vilnius City and Region was eliminated, on the 7th of August, the Commission for Klaipėda Affairs was abolished, and on the 9th of August, the Transferring Commission was dismissed[400]. Lithuanian judicial bodies that could not have been used for the purposes of the regime were abolished. On the 26th of September, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners abolished the Chief Tribunal and the Court of Appeals[401]. On the 9th of January 1941, mortgage institutions were eliminated, and their property was transferred to provisional executive committees[402].

The Constitution of the LSSR legalised the privileges of the Union authorities to govern, organise, and manage public life. The scope of their competence embraced the spheres of foreign affairs, defence, finance and credit, transport and communication, etc. Therefore, those Lithuanian institutions the competence and functions of which were taken over by central authorities of the SSSR were abolished.

According to the constitutional competence of the LSSR and the scheme of its administrative institutions, its administration was not permitted to deal with any defence and foreign issues. Consequently, departments responsible for these issues were eliminated. Along with the liquidation of the Army of the Republic of Lithuania, the Ministry of Defence was also abolished. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was eliminated on the 9th of August, and the next day an announcement was made proclaiming the suspension of the activities of all Lithuanian representations and consulates abroad[403]. By violation of the rights of the Republic of Lithuania as a subject of international law, the Soviet Union appropriated movable and immovable property of the representations and consulates. The staff of the representations of the Republic of Lithuania was ordered to return to the annexed Lithuania. In early September, foreign representations in Kaunas were closed. Since foreign trade in the Soviet Union was conducted on the basis of state monopoly and was within the SSSR competence, on the 24th

of August the Departments of Customs and Foreign Trade the under the Ministry of Finance of the LSSR were abolished[404]. All customs offices operating in the Republic of Lithuania and property thereof were taken over by the Chief Customs Board of the SSSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

The formation of the system of central institutions of the LSSR administration progressed according to the scheme uniform to the entire Soviet Union. In respect of official competence and subordination, institutions were divided into separate links within the LSSR administrative sector and made responsible for dealing with the issues under the LSSR competence. They were subordinate to the LSSR Council of National Commissioners as well as the SSSR authorities operating on the exterritorial principle. The latter enjoyed the privilege to administer the spheres within the SSSR competence.

Having nationalised banks and credit institutions and integrated them into the uniform soviet finance and credit system, the SSSR took over their administration. On the 3d of October, the CPSU (b) Central Committee and the SSSR Council of National Commissioners adopted a resolution on the establishment of the bank offices of the SSSR in the Lithuanian SSR. Following that resolution, the Lithuanian Bank was reorganised into the Lithuanian Republic Office of the SSSR State Bank[405]. The LCP (b) CC appointed Aleksandras Drobnys as Governor of the Office on 20-21 December[406]. Vasilij Ušakov from SSSR was appointed his Deputy[407]. The LSSR Communal Bank, subordinate to the SSSR Central Communal Bank, was composed from the nationalised International, Economy and Vilnius City banks[408]. On 23 November, the SSSR Council of National Commissioners appointed Jackus Sondeckis as Governor of the bank and Jurgis Grabauskas as his Deputy, to be joined by Andrej Jeršov later on. Lithuanian Republic Office of the SSSR Agricultural Bank was established, taking over the nationalised Agricultural and Cooperation Banks[409]. On 29 November, the LSSR Councils of National Commissioners appointed Bronius Bieliukas as Governor of the bank, and on 2 April 1941, the LCP (b) CC Bureau approved the candidate. Fiodor Kovryga from the SSSR as his deputy[410]. On 16 January 1941, the Commerce Bank was replaced by Lithuanian Republic Office of the SSSR Industry Bank[411]. Initially, communists appointed a non-party candidate Alfas Lukaitis and later on – communist Samuil Movšovič as its Governor[4412]. Banks of the LSSR were transformed into territorial and structural units of the SSSR.

In the Soviet Union, administration of transport and communication spheres was attributed to the competence of Union executive bodies. Having integrated Lithuanian transport and communication enterprises into a uniform and centralised SSSR transport and communication system, their administration was reorganised as well. On 27 August, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners

abolished the Ministry of Transport and Communication[413]. The SSSR People's Commissariat for Transport took over Lithuanian railroads, workshops of locomotives and carriage repairs, and the SSSR People's Commissariat for Communication gained control over telephone and telegraph lines. The Republic Railroad Board was set up to deal with railroad transport. After the nationalisation of private transport enterprises, marine steamboats were taken over by the SSSR Navy People's Commissariat, and fluvial fleet – by the SSSR Fluvial Navigation People's Commissariat[414]. To control fluvial navigation, the LSSR State Fluvial Navigation - a structural unit of the SSSR People's Commissariat for Fluvial Navigation –- was established. The LSSR administration was solely entrusted with the control of auto transport issues.

As the SSSR People's Commissariat for Purveyance established its unit in Lithuania, in December 1940, the LCP (b) CC Bureau set up Lithuanian Proxy Board of the SSSR People's Commissariat for Purveyance, approved its structure and staffing, and appointed Bronislavas Leonas- Pušinis as its Proxy[415]. In two months' time, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners drafted acts analogous to decisions of the Communist Party and the SSSR authorities[416]. As on 23 January 1941 Leonas-Pušinis was appointed as National commissioner for Agriculture, Kazys Banys became his successor as Proxy of the SSSR People's Commissariat for Purveyance[417]. On 13 February 1941, the Council of National Commissioners issued a resolution adopting analogous decision and appointing Kazys Banys as Proxy[418]. A Communist Nikolaj Volf from SSSR was appointed his Deputy[419].

Due to centralised rule, many of the SSSR People's Commissariats were making efforts to set up own territorial units and Lithuanian institutions under their control that would be operating independently from the LSSR administration as an extraterritorial structure, directly subordinate to the SSSR management institutions. With such aims, People's Commissariats of the SSSR were establishing their proxy councils and various institutional units. For example, the SSSR People's Commissariat for Industry established a Lithuanian unit of their office "Sojuzutil" – the national office of the LSSR "Sojuzlit". On 17 December, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners transferred to the office nationalised points for the collection of scrap iron, waste paper and other secondary materials[420]. Similarly, following the decision of the SSSR People's Commissariat for Purveyance to establish a Lithuania sub-unit of all-union enterprise "Central Grain Purveyance" ("Centrozagotzerno"), on 12 February 1941 the LSSR Council for National Commissioners set up a national office and its 40 preparatory points and bases throughout Lithuania[421]. Lithuanian office of "Centrozagotzerno took over grain elevators, formerly belonging to the Consumers' Cooperation Union, the Union of Cooperatives "Linas" (Flax)[422].

The formation of territorial units of the SSSR executive institutions was finalised in spring 1941. They were operating on extraterritorial principle. The LSSR Council of National Commissioners had little control over their activities. In truth, it was only the LCP (b) CC Bureau that could supervise them by means of political and administrative impact.

The authorities of the Soviet Union were making efforts to conjure up a semblance that it was representing republics, the so-called subjects of the Union,- therefore it was setting up their representations in Moscow. Those were formal structures that did not play any political and administrative role. On 25 October, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners established the Representation of the Lithuanian SSR under the SSSR Council of National Commissioners [423]. The LCP (b) CC Bureau appointed a communist Povilas Rotomskis as permanent representative of the LSSR under the SSSR Council of National Commissioners, and the Council of National Commissioners endorsed that decision[424].

According to the administrative model of the SSSR and the scheme of bureaucratic organisation, institutions for administering specific spheres of life emerged in the Lithuanian SSSR.

In order to create an apparatus for ideological indoctrination and control of the public, the authorities of the SSSR were setting up administrative institutions for the regulation of the work of the press and mass means of information. On 5 September, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners reorganised the Division for the Press and Associations of the Ministry of the Interior into the Chief Board of Literature and Publishing Houses under the LSSR CNC[425]. On 11 September, the LCP (b) CC Bureau established the Chief Literature Board under the LSSR CNC ("Glavlit")[426]. The Board was supposed to control the contents of publications, prevent the activities of political opposition and block ideas undermining communist approach and ideology. The Glavlit was a body of communist censorship targeted at preventing any criticism in respect of the communist system, administration and policy, ban the publicity and dissipation of ideas promoting Lithuanian national resistance to the occupation and communist regime. It was an important body of ideological control of the public and an element of the SSSR repressive and ideological apparatus.

In order to regulate the activities of means of mass information, on 21 October the LCP (b) CC Bureau decided to establish the Committee for Radiofication and Radiophony[427]. The LSSR Council of National Commissioners issued a resolution legalising that decision and reorganised the National Radiophone into the Committee for Radiofication and Radiophony under the LSSR CNC[428]. The Bureau appointed Juozapas Banaitis as chairman of the committee, and a communist Emanuelis Cirinskas as his deputy. The task of the committee was to discharge functions of ideological

indoctrination and control of the public. It was a body of the SSSR national and communist ideological apparatus.

The SSSR authorities were establishing institutions designed to sovietise the spiritual aspect of public life. On 30 December, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners established the Board of Art Affairs under the LSSR CNC and appointed Petras Juodelis its director[429]. In three months' time, the LCP (b) CC Bureau endorsed that decision[430]. Since the functions of the Board of Art Affairs were based on the same rights as were enjoyed by People's Commissariats, on 3 April the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet legalised its status within the supreme administration of the LSSR by issuing a special order, and on 14 April appointed Mrs. Meškauskienė Head of the Board[431]. The Board was supposed to sovietise the spiritual aspect of public life and, following communist ideology and their interests, organise, regulate and control the activities of art establishments, creative organisations and art groups, and supervise creative work. In order to organise, regulate and control the work of cinematic establishments and distribution of film production, on 25 October the State Cinemafication Board was established[432]. Aleksandr Prokonov from the SSSR was appointed Head of the Board. On the same day, a state national office "Glavkinoprokat" was established. It was subordinate to the Cinematography Affairs Committee under the SSSR CNC and was authorised to rent cinema films in Lithuania on monopoly rights. The SSSR introduced national monopoly on cinema production and ensured that only films approved by the authorities were shown in Lithuania.

Following the nationalisation of sports and physical exercise organisations and associations, the administrative apparatus for the organisation and regulation of the respective activities was established. On 26 September, the LCP (b) CC Bureau adopted a decision setting up Physical Exercise and Sports Commission under the LSSR CNC, appointed Aleksej Šiman its chairman and Vincas Petronis - as his deputy[433]. On 7 December, the Council of National Commissioners endorsed the decision of the Bureau and formed the Republic Committee on Physical Exercise and Sports[434]. Šimanas was appointed Head of the Committee, and Petronis with Šlioma Kapeliušnik from SSSR were appointed as his Deputies. In March, the Deputies were dismissed and replaced by Ivan Čiudimov[435].

The system of economic administration in the Soviet Union was notably developed. Due to overall nationalisation of industry, concentration of state property in government and administrative structures, a gigantic and multi-stage apparatus of economic administration was formed. Its aim was to plan, administer and regulate all economic processes in a centralised manner. The wish was to introduce an universal centralised system of economy planning, distribution and accounting, control

the activities of economic entities and all the links within the production process. Analogous administration system and respective bureaucratic organisation was transferred into Lithuania.

In order to introduce centralised economy accounting, a special structure - the Central People's Economy Accounting Board, which was subordinate to the SSSR State Plan Commission, was established. On 17 December, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners formed the National Board of Economy Accounting[436]. It was supposed to introduce uniform centralised economy accounting and accountability, and control how institutions and organisations were implementing it as of 1 January 1941.

In all counties the Board had its territorial units and economy accounting inspectorates. Domas Micuta was appointed as acting Head of the National Board of Economy Accounting. Institutions organizing, regulating and controlling the activities of nationalized energy and fuel enterprises were restructured according to the framework of the SSSR economy administration bodies. On 10 October, the LSSR Energy Board under the People's Commissariat for Communal Economy was formed[437]. On 14 April 1941, the LCP (b) CC Bureau and the LSSR CNC reorganised the Board into the Governing Energy Board under the LSSR CNC[438]. The Board took over nationalised electricity enterprises, their transporting and distributing networks that had not been taken over by SSSR People's Commissariats. On 16 October 1940, the Governing Fuel Board under the LSSR CNC was established[439]. Jurgis Vidmantas was appointed acting Head of the Board, and Vasilij Nesvit from the SSSR was selected as his Deputy[440]. The Fuel Board was charged with the administration of the State Peat Trust and all of its subordinate enterprises that formerly belonged to the People's Commissariat for Local Industry, and the new Coal Office was set up[441].

Following the nationalization of vehicles and auto transport enterprises, there was established a structure to administer them. On 3 October, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners established the State Trust of Vehicle Repairs, Communication and Transport under the People's Commissariat of Communal Economy. Five nationalised auto transport enterprises and all bus stations were transmitted to the Trust. On 14 April 1941, the Trust was reorganized into the Board of Auto Transport under the LSSR CNC[442]. The Board was entrusted with organisation and regulation of passenger and freight transport enterprises, transport repairs and inspection bases and production workshops.

In practice, the rights enjoyed by all the Boards founded under the LSSR Council of National Commissioners were equal to those of People's Commissariats. Prior to reorganisation, they had often been functioning as structural units of People's Commissariats. As they were reorganised into

independent institutions, the LSSR administrative sector expanded and was divided into smaller administrative structures. Consequently, the scope of their operation and functions narrowed. The SSSR authorities fostered a hope that after the expansion and division of the administrative sector, institutions would be able to fully penetrate spheres under their control and reorganise them on the soviet basis. According to communists, the development of the bureaucratic organisation and reduction of their constituent parts was supposed to contribute to efficient administration and sovietisation of the occupied country.

Small institutions with arrow sphere of responsibility were set up within the administrative framework. On 6 January 1941, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners established the LSSR Hydrometeorology Service[443]. On 24 April, the LSSR CNC established the Office for Production of Blanks that was supposed to provide LSSR institutions with accounting documentation forms complying with blank forms used in the Soviet Union[444]. Following the decision of the SSSR Council of National Commissioners, the General Court of Standards, Measures, Scales and Assay, formerly within the framework of the LSSR People's Commissariat for Finance, was reorganised. The Proxy Board of the SSSR Committee of Standards and Measure Devices under the LSSR CNC and the Assay Court under the LSSR People's Commissariat for Finance were established[445]. Viktoras Budzys was appointed as Proxy for the SSSR Standards and Measure Devices Committee under the LSSR CNC. Based on the 19 April 1941 decision of the SSSR Council of National Commissioners, the Lithuanian Geology Division of the Geology Affairs Committee under the SSSR CNC was organised in the framework of the Geology Group Base of the LSSR People's Commissariat for Local Industry [446].

The structure of the LSSR central institutions was completed in winter 1941. The newly formed administrative sector embraced all main aspects of life in Lithuania and had the possibility to reorganise them on the soviet basis. Yet that was not the end of the process of the formation of the administration. The ongoing structural reforms directed towards division and expansion of the LSSR administrative sector were mostly due to organisational changes within the SSSR administrative apparatus. However, unlike before, the fact that the LSSR administration was following the SSSR trend of maximum bureaucracy expansion influenced the process as well.

Under the conditions of totalitarian rule in the Soviet Union, especially during the pre-war period, the organisational role of the state as well as its dictate to and control of all the spheres of life was growing. Due to that reason, bureaucratic system was rapidly gaining grounds. The number of the SSSR People's Commissariats rose from 18 to 40, which resulted in larger numbers of subordinate institutions and their staff[447]. The growth of government and administrative system was also induced by the bureaucracy itself. In order to implement political and corporate interests, primarily to strengthen the ruling and governing position in the state and the society, the SSSR bureaucracy was

expanding its organisation and strengthening its role in public life. The transfer of totalitarian rule model into Lithuania gave rise to the tendency of the growth and maximum expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus. Administrative authorities began to enlarge institutions and increase the number of staff.

After the division of the SSSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs into two commissariats, the LSSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs was reorganised as well. The LCP (b) CC Bureau on 6 March 1941 reorganised the commissariat into the Commissariat of Internal Affairs and Commissariat of the State Security[448]. Aleksandras Guzevičius was appointed National commissioner for Internal Affairs, and Piotr Glavkov – Commissioner of the State Security. Consequently, the Presidium of the LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet issued a similar order on 8 March[449].

The trend of enlarging the bureaucratic organisation was mostly prevalent in the sphere of economic management. The sector of local industry and agriculture administration was divided into small units. On 12 February 1941, the LCP (b) CC Bureau decided to organise two new People's Commissariats: one for Forest Industry, and the other - for Meat and Dairy[450]. The Council of National Commissioners was entrusted with transferring forestry objects formerly possessed by the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to the People's Commissariat of Forest Industry, and enterprises formerly under the supervision of the People's Commissariat of Local Industry – to People's Commissariat of Meat and Dairy Industry. The Bureau appointed a communist Elija Bilevičius as Head of the People's Commissariat for Food Industry, and former National Commissioner for Food Industry Jonas Laurinaitis – Head of the People's Commissariat for Meat and Dairy Industry; former Commissioner for Social Provision Jurgis Glušauskas was appointed as National commissioner for Forest Industry[451]. Based on the decision of the Communist Party, the LSSR Council of National Commissioners drafted resolutions concerning the establishment of new People's Commissariats and submitted them to the Provisional Supreme Soviet for endorsement[452]. The Presidium of the LSSR Provisional Supreme Council on 14 February and 24 March issued respective orders, and the Council of National Commissioners adopted analogous decision on 22 February[453].

On 2 April 1941, the SSSR Council of National Commissioners established the People's Commissariat for Soviet Grain and Cattle Farms that was supposed to manage state-owned land, regulate, organise and control the work of the soviet farms in Lithuania. Accordingly, on 22 April, the LSSR People's Commissariat of Soviet Grain and Cattle Farms, subsequently named the People's Commissariat for Soviet Farms, was established[454]. The LCP (b) CC Bureau appointed Vytautas Vazalinskas as National commissioner, and a former deputy commissioner for agriculture from the SSSR Ivan Žitkov, as his deputy[455]. The LSSR Council of National Commissioners issued analogous resolutions[456].

Due to the establishment of new People's Commissariats, committees and boards under the Council of National Commissioners, the LSSR administrative structure became different from the one set forth in its constitution.

In order to eliminate this irregularity and legalise the status of new institutions within the LSSR administration, the LCP (C) CC Bureau instructed Paleckis to amend the LSSR Constitution, and on 9 April it adopted the Draft Law Amending Articles of the Constitution [457]. The 2nd Session of the Provisional Supreme Soviet on 12 April 1941 adopted amendments to the LSSR Constitution[458]. The list of People's Commissariats was extended by adding new People's Commissariats and Committees. On the eve of the war between the SSSR and Germany, in the LSSR there were 18 People's Commissariats, 8 boards and committees under the LSSR CNC and 5 proxy bodies of the SSSR People's Commissariats, all in all – 31 central administrative institutions of Union-national and national subordination. The LSSR administration was capable of penetrating all main spheres of life in Lithuania.

The structure of the LSSR central administrative institutions and their internal arrangement was adjusted to the Soviet Union and duplicated its thriving bureaucratic apparatus. It was too sizeable to fit for Lithuanian SSR conditions and not flexible enough. Along with the increasing division of administrative institutions and their functions and establishment of new structural units, the administrative sector grew larger and larger, causing the growth of the number of staff and expenses necessary to maintain the apparatus. The communists hoped that the division of administrative units and narrowing of their functions would increase their performance efficiency making them able to embrace and strengthen the regulation and control of a narrow field under their command. Yet quite an opposite trend emerged. As there were no accurate definitions of competence and subordination of administrative structures, they started overlapping each other's functions and competing for top positions in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Executives of the LSSR came to realise that they had built a gigantic bureaucratic apparatus, the constituent units of which did not understand their mission and did not know what type of administrative work they were supposed to do and to whom and for what they were accountable[459]. For example, National commissioner for Food and Industry Bilevičius complained that even he did not know which administrative institutions were under his subordination and what field they was accountable for. The LCP (b) CC Secretary Michailas Čiblys said that certain administrative structures, especially units of branch People's Commissariats, were doing nothing but "producing blank papers". Gedvilas noted that the administrative sector was a mess and people "were simply lost in the institutional jungle"[460]. Top executives of the LSSR realised that in contrast to their expectations, the expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus burdened the administration of the country and gave rise to a number of bureaucratic pathologies.

Bureaucratic authorities, the Council of National Commissioners in the first place, understood that the development of the LSSR bureaucratic organisation following the SSSR example caused administrative mess and bureaucratic pathologies and was threatening to prevent the administration from implementing the party policy of Lithuania's sovietisation[461]. Due to that reason, they were trying to find a way to form and maintain a stable, optimal and efficient administrative structure while avoiding destructive organisational changes. They chose to employ a characteristic bureaucratic method to postpone decision making and implementing under the veil of complicated and long procedure of considering and co-ordinating draft resolutions. The LSSR Council of National Commissioners was consciously delaying decisions on the endorsement or amendment of the structure of People's Commissariats, postponing the adoption of its operating regulations and staff lists. The LCP (b) CC authorities understood and were in favour of such tactics, since it was in their own interest to establish what it thought to be the optimal bureaucratic organisation able to ensure efficient implementation of party decisions. Yet not all LSSR executives perceived true reasons behind the delay. For example, National commissioner for Food Industry Bilevičius complained that due to red tape the Council of National Commissioners was delaying the endorsement of the structure of his commissariat. The LCP (b) CC Secretary Sniečkus did not corroborate his idea to "do away with the red tape" and supported Gedvilas' position to postpone decision taking. He explained to the communists that "it is better to keep them [draft resolutions concerning structural issues] in the Council of National Commissioners than have them endorsed by the Chairman of the Council of National Commissioners without clearly understanding them. Comrade Gedvilas is completely right. We had been receiving various visitors proposing numerous drafts documents and, because of our lack of experience, we signed quite a few of such drafts, so now we have to make revisions of what we had signed and decided on"[462]. Even though the postponement of the decisions concerning the structure of central administrative institutions enabled the LSSR authorities to procrastinate the implementation of certain decisions of the SSSR, it was nevertheless impossible to change them. Due to centralised rule and the political mechanism of the Communist Party, the LSSR administration had to obey resolutions of the CPSU and instructions of SSSR political structures, and adjust to the unified ruling scheme of the Soviet Union.

Mechanical and locally unadjusted transfer of the SSSR bureaucratic organisation scheme to Lithuania reflected the centralised ruling system of the Soviet Union and was in line with the bureaucratic control model inherent in totalitarian rule. Expanded and intricate, the bureaucratic apparatus helped the Communist Party to retain its dictate and implement its policy. During the first soviet occupation, such bureaucratic system was just in the initial implementation stage in Lithuania, so it took some time until the authorities of the LSSR realised their role within the soviet political system, especially in the

mechanism of party policy. Even party structures did not understand the essence of bureaucratic absolutism while sovietising Lithuania. Executives of the LSSR were seeking to demonstrate to the occupation authorities that they were capable of carrying out the instructions of the communist party, and therefore they were motivated to ensure efficient administration of Lithuania. They wanted to have a small administrative sector with a clear, simple and stable structure and strictly defined competence of its constituent parts maintaining stable subordination relations. Executives of the LCP (b) endeavoured to form an administration able to supervise and control all of its links and spheres of activity. The enlargement of the administrative sector caused its growth and intricate structure; therefore many communists were no longer able to find their way and lost control. Sniečkus stated that, due to the cumbersome structure of certain central administrative institutions and disproportionate staffing, even party leaders and the administration were no longer able to clarify their activities[463]. Under such conditions, communists could not hope to succeed in controlling the administration. Čiblys noted that the expansion of the administrative sector and division of its structure "made things go wrong". He expressed the anxiety of the LCP (b) authorities that such a clumsy, complicated and non-flexible bureaucratic apparatus would not be able to ensure efficient administration of the country and implement party policy of Lithuania's sovietisation[464].

Formation of Local Administrative Structures of the LSSR

In order to create a uniform local administration system in the Soviet Union, the communist party initiated the establishment of local administrative bodies. According to the LSSR Constitution and the 3 August 1940 Resolution of the SSSR Supreme Soviet, Lithuania was to organise the elections to local councils of workpeople's deputies. However, communists did not hurry with the election.

Within the SSSR political system, the councils were conjuring up an image of democratic and lawful government and possibilities of supposedly broad representation of the society in the administration. Yet in real political life they did not enjoy many powers and did not play any significant role in the administration of the state. In the Soviet Union, party committees and their subordinate council executive committees were acting as local authority institutions. Therefore the SSSR authorities were able to rule the annexed Lithuania without establishing local councils. The objectives of country administration required only local regulatory structures – executive committees, formally subordinate to the LSSR Council of National Commissioners, but in fact controlled by local bodies of the Communist Party. The LCP (b) authorities did not take the initiative of establishing local councils. They explained that there was no purpose to organise the election as long as there was no administrative-territorial division of the Lithuanian SSSR and counties were not reorganised into districts according to the example of the SSSR[465]. Obviously, the fact that the communists had an

interest in delaying the elections to local councils for as long as possible when, until first positive outcomes of sovietisation would emerge, was also important. Those were the reasons why the Communist Party did not establish local councils but started the formation of local regulatory bodies – provisional executive committees.

Provisional executive committees were established following the decision of the SSSR authorities. The committees were formed by the communist party. The LSSR central administrative institutions legalised party resolutions and, following the soviet legal standards, endorsed the formation of committees and defined their status in the LSSR administration. On 17 October, the LCP (b) CC Bureau instructed the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet to form provisional executive committees that would discharge the functions of council executive committees until the election took place[466]. Provisional executive committees were supposed to replace former local government institutions of the Republic of Lithuania. Communists intended to abolish the positions of burgomasters, county governors and region principles, transferring their functions to chairmen of city, county, region and area executive committees. The LCP (b) CC Bureau endorsed the list of provisional executive committees to be formed in 3 cities and 15 counties and officially approved their members. For example, Aleksejus Šimonas was made Chairman of the Kaunas City Provisional Executive Committee, Juozas Šermušenko and Stasys Babalevicius were installed as his Deputies, and among the appointed members of the Kaunas City Provisional Executive Committee there were First Secretary of the LCP (b) city committee Antanas Petrauskas, Second Secretary Nikita Paraščenko, Deputy National commissioner of Internal Affairs Balys Baranauskas, city military commissioner Kozinov, Head of Health Protection Division of the City Provisional Committee, former city burgomaster Antanas Garmus and committee member Matilda Domeikienė. Ivan Garin from the SSSR was appointed Deputy Chairman of Vilnius City Provisional Committee, and among the members of the committee there were First Secretary of the LCP (b) City Committee Povilas Baltruška, the NKVD Division Deputy Head David Bykov and Jonas Drutas. Among the appointed members of the Vilnius County Provisional Executive Committee there were Chairman of the Committee Vilhelmas Dudelis, First Secretary of the LCP (b) County Committee Nikita Fedorenko, the NKVD Division Head Jonas Vildžiūnas and Viktor Berg. Members of the Kėdainiai County Provisional Executive Committee were the Chairman Aleksandras Urbanas, his Deputy Ilja Gamus, and secretary of the LCP (b) County Committee Silvestr Žolner, the NKVD Division Head Justas Rugienis and Head of Agriculture Division Vytautas Sakalauskas. Altogether 93 candidates were selected and approved as members of 18 provisional committees. The LCP (b) CC Bureau instructed the Council of National Commissioners to reorganise local bodies of People's Commissariats into structural units of provisional executive

committees (divisions or inspectorates). Communist party structures, together with the approved members of the provisional committees, were ordered to form provisional regional committees.

The CPSU (b) CC Political Bureau on 10 – 19 November adopted a resolution on the establishment of local administrative bodies in the annexed countries[467]. The set procedure of the formation of executive committees, their staffing and approval was analogous to that of the Soviet Union. Formally provisional committees were to be established according to the resolutions of the LSSR administrative structures: provisional city and county executive committees of national supervision were set up following the orders of the LSSR Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet, and the remaining part was established by the decisions of county provisional executive committees. In line with the nomenclature rules, candidates to become chairmen of county committees were to be approved by the CPSU (b) Central Committee, and the composition of lower-ranking provisional executive committees was to be approved by the LCP (b) Central Committee.

According to the decision of the CPSU (b) authorities, on 12 November the LCP (b) CC Bureau adopted the Draft Order of the Provisional SS Presidium on the establishment of local administrative bodies[468]. That order abolished the Law on Municipalities, formally still in force at that time. It was determined that the Council of National Commissioners was to select staff members of county and city provisional executive committees, whereas county provisional executive committees were to approve the composition of regional, town and area committees. Due to ideological reasons, while forming local administration there was no mention of the LCP (b) dictate. The composition scheme of local administrative bodies was defined. Executive committees of counties and cities were to consist of 5-9 people: chairman, deputy chairman, secretary and 2 to 6 committee members, whereas committees of regions and towns consisted of a chairman, deputy chairman and a secretary. By issuing the 12 November order, the Presidium of the Provisional SS of the LSSR adopted a party directive[469]. The Council of National Commissioners established the specific structure of provisional executive committees and endorsed their staffing[470]. 626 staff members were designated for 22 county provisional committees, whereas the number of staff in the Švenčionys Committee, formerly under the subordination of the Byelorussian SSR, was left unaltered.

In practice, committees were formed by communist party structures. They were selecting committee members and submitting the committee composition to the Council of National Commissioners, while the latter was forwarding it to the LSSR Provisional SS for approval. For example, in November the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR approved chairmen of provisional executive committees of cities and counties, and in February 1941 – members of city and county the provisional executive committees[471]. The LCP (b) CC considered and approved all candidate members of the

committee. Such procedure of the formation of provisional executive committees and their composition ensured communistic dictate to the local administration and created opportunities to control its activities from the very beginning.

Concrete candidates to city and county provisional executive committees were selected by the LCP (b) CC Organisational-Instructors' and Staff Divisions upon the proposal of a respective party committee, whereas party county committees formed regional and area committees selecting staff from the ranks of communist party members and persons loyal to the political regime. The foremost criterion for the selection of candidates to committee members was their position in the local administration. However, the principles of the communist party staff policy were also observed. Party-membership, political loyalty to the communist party and the regime were the basic criteria of candidate selection. Following the SSSR example, members of county provisional executive committees were persons occupying executive positions in the most important local administrative structures: chairmen of the executive committees and their deputies, first or second secretaries of communist party committees (sometimes even both), heads of the NKVD divisions together with several members, and, as a rule, heads of branch agriculture divisions of provisional executive committees. Occasionally city burgomasters or county governors appointed in summer 1940, after Lithuania's occupation, were included in the committee. In order to ensure the dictate of the communist party to the provisional committees, communists were always granted executive posts and formed the majority. Due to that fact, many committee chairmen and their deputies were party members. To introduce control of the SSSR authority representatives over local administrative institutions, the communist party appointed communists arriving from the Soviet Union as committee deputy chairmen. Since in the autumn 1940 there was still a shortage of such persons, local people were appointed as provisional deputies. The communist party had a plan to gradually replace them with the SSSR representatives and have administrators from the Soviet Union employed in all committees.

The administrative division of the LSSR provided for the establishment of 4 national and 32 city executive committees of county subordination, 23 county, 267 regional and 2866 area committees, totalling 3192 executive committees[472]. They were formed during the period from October to December 1940. At the same time structural units of the committees, i.e. divisions, were under formation. According to the SSSR example, general and branch divisions (those of local industry, agriculture, trade, roads, labour, finance, communal economy, health protection, social welfare, and the plan commission that was functioning as a division) were established within the committees. Within city provisional executive committees the general division, divisions of local industry, trade, labour, finance, communal economy, health protection, social welfare, education, civil metrication and the plan commission functioning as a division were established. There were no divisions in regional

committees. The apparatus of city and region committees of provisional executive committees of county subordination was not large, and area committees did not have one at all. The vast majority of people were employed in city and county committees of national subordination (on average from 25 to 40 persons). General divisions were supposed to deal with office-work, finances and economy matters; they were subordinate to the administration of a committee. Branch divisions were charged with the implementation of resolutions of the LCP (b) structures and respective People's Commissariats on the local level. They were subordinate to respective People's Commissariats. By May 1941 chairmen, deputies and members of 173 city and county provisional executive committees as well as all heads of agriculture and finance divisions and part of other division heads had been officially appointed[473]. Since there was no record of the staff of provisional executive committees, the central administrative structures of the SSSR did not possess accurate information about the composition of committee units and the number of committee employees. According to the data of the LCP (b) CC Staff and Organisational – Instructors' Division, in the 5th Party Congress on 5 February 1941 the LCP (b) CC Secretary Sniečkus informed that in provisional executive committees there were 8 833 executive and responsible employees, and together with those working in committee divisions the number of responsible staff members amounted to 10 000[474].

The LSSR local administrative structures were formed by the initiative of the SSSR authorities, following their instructions and according to the set procedure, disregarding even the norms set forth in the LSSR Constitution. Provisional executive committees were authorised by the CPSU (b) and its territorial organization – the LCP (b) authorities. They were not representing the Lithuanian society. The Communist Party appointed only own staff as their employees. Since the very beginning, local administrative institutions were subdued to respective party structures- divisions of the LCP (b) Central Committee, city and county committees and their apparatuses. The activities of provisional executive committees were directly supervised by the Organisation – Instructors' Divisions of the LCP (b) Central, city and county committees. According to the example of the SSSR, within the authorities of provisional executive committees there were executives of the most important administrative structures (party, administrative regulatory and repression bodies). Overlapping of functions created preconditions to merge party and administrative structures and their apparatuses on the local administration level, to approximate political and administrative functions, political and administrative spheres and actually eliminated the dividing line between them.

The establishment of provisional executive committees gave rise to the bureaucracy of the LSSR local administrative structures. Local administrators who had been selected according to political criteria and appointed on the basis of political trust prevailed in that bureaucracy. They were accountable primarily to the communist party structures, and only after that – to the administrative institutions

under the formal supervision of which they were. Local administrators made up a part of the soviet bureaucracy that was included in the nomenclature and related to the party bureaucracy by hierarchical subordination[475].

Representation of LSSR administration in the SSSR political structures

In the Soviet Union, the SSSR Supreme Soviet was a formal institution representing state rule, but not enjoying real powers. Its function was to imitate the legitimacy of the rule and political regime, federal structure of the SSSR and parliamentary government, to support the founding stones of the Bolshevik political doctrine and ideology – the existence of the idea of the soviet rule. In reality, that institution had only one function – to make the decisions of the structure of the Communist Party, primarily the ones of the LCP (b) Political Bureau, official and to shape them into laws that would be binding to all SSSR administrative territorial formations including the republics, as well as all the public institutions. In the process of the indoctrination of the soviet society, the Supreme Soviet played an important ideological role. It was supposed to embody the Bolshevik propaganda myths about the "national" nature of the state and its rule, the legitimacy of the government, the equality of the soviet republics and the SSSR nations, representation of the society and the SSSR nations.

The election to the SSSR Supreme Soviet in the annexed Baltic States was supposed to conjure up a semblance that the SSSR government represented the annexed countries through the Supreme Soviet, and that its policy was formulated taking regard of their interests. Attempts were made to create an impression that the LSSR representatives in the SSSR Supreme Soviet were supposedly influencing its decisions and taking part in the formation of the SSSR policy. The election to the SSSR Supreme Soviet in the annexed countries had a practical goal. The representatives of the LSSR in the SSSR Supreme Soviet formed a link in the government of the annexed countries and served as means of manipulation for the CPSU (b) political mechanism. The so-called LSSR representatives in the SSSR Supreme Soviet were an important instrument for the enforcement of the CPSU (b) policy and party executives' control over the Lithuanian SSR administration. Due to the above ideological and practical interests, the SSSR administration was concerned to select people who could adequately play their role of "representation" of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic within the SSSR administration.

The Soviet Union imitated the procedure of a democratic election because of ideological reasons. Yet in reality, the authority figures were installed by the way of recruiting. The ruling communist party selected people from various groups who were supposed to imitate the representation of those groups. They were typical puppet figures entirely dependent on the communist party. On their own discretion, the structures of the CPSU (b) used to impose one or another candidate on voters, transfer that candidate from one constituency to another, change him with somebody else with no reason at all, etc.

Among the candidates, there was a group of people who had been selected according to their position in the party and state hierarchy, belonged to the political bureaucracy and represented its interests. That group of nomenclature executives controlled the SSSR Supreme Soviet from the inside and ensured communist party dictate over it. The election was progressing in line with the scheme set up by the communist party. The communists proclaimed the election, appointed the electoral committees and controlled their activities. They imitated the procedure of nomination and registering of the candidates, organised the election campaign and voting. The election was non-alternative: there was only one candidate per one position, and rivalling candidatures were banned. The results of the election were predetermined according to the organisers' requirements. Under the totalitarian rule, the society was not given the possibility to express their will in the election.

The same scheme applied to the organization of the election in the Lithuanian SSR. The CPSU (b) Political Bureau proclaimed election to the SSSR Supreme Soviet on 12 January 1941. The election in the Lithuanian SSR was organised and controlled by the LCP (b) structures, primarily by the LCP (b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division. Upon its proposal, on 10 – 11 November 1940 the LCP (b) CC Bureau set up a 13-member LSSR Electoral Committee for the election to the National Council of the SSSR Supreme Soviet[476]. Chairman of the Central Organisational Bureau of the LSSR Trade Unions Juozas Stimburys was appointed Chairman of the Committee, and Head of the LCP (b) CC Agriculture Division Karolis Didžiulis was designated his deputy. Officially, 10 committee members represented trade unions, and the other 3 represented the Communist Party, the Comsomol and the SSSR army troops deployed in Lithuania. The Bureau endorsed a directive letter for the party structures concerning the organization of the election. City and county committees of the party were instructed to set up constituency electoral committees and inform the LCP (b) CC Bureau about their composition; to set up area committees and approve them in the meetings of county committees. It was highlighted that the members of electoral committees must be selected from the most active members of the party "who had contributed to the strengthening of the Soviet Union and proved their loyalty to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin party". In order to respect gender equality, it was required that women should make up no less than 30 % of the committee members. A similar procedure was applied to the selection of candidate deputies. The LCP (b) CC Bureau demanded party structures to select candidates who would be loyal to the regime and the communist dictate, and highlighted "by all means to prevent the nomination of candidates alien and hostile to the party and the people". In order to ensure smooth nomination of persons chosen by the communists, party committees were ordered to select institutions, enterprises or organizations that would stage the nomination of the candidates, appoint concrete persons and distribute their roles in such a staging etc. Concrete instructions on how to prevent people from possible nomination of alternative candidates and non-party representatives

were issued. The LCP (b) structures were also supposed to choose a set of people for campaigning and propaganda, agents of the deputy who would promote the communist candidates. Party committees were instructed to supervise all organisational and technical preparation matters: to control the composition of voters' lists, printing of bulletins, campaigning material etc.

The Presidium of the LSSR Supreme Soviet endorsed the composition of the LSSR Electoral Committee, formed 10 constituencies for the election to the SSSR SS Union Council and 25 to the National Council[477].

Candidates proposed by the structures of the Communist Party were discussed in the LCP (b) CC Organisational – Instructors' and Staff Divisions. Following the traditions of staged elections in the SSSR, the election held in the Lithuanian SSR had to be non-alternative. The plan was to nominate just as many candidates as there were positions, i.e. one candidate for each constituency. 10 people were nominated to the Union Council, mostly those selected because of their high positions. The nominees were the leaders of the LSSR in the CPSU (b) as well as the SSSR CNC Proxy Pozdiakov, First Secretary of the LCP (b) CC Sniečkus, Second Secretary of the Party CC Meskupas, Chairman of the Council of National Commissioners Gedvilas, National commissioner for Internal Affairs Guzevičius, Chief of the 11th SSSR Army Ivan Morozov, Chairman of the LSSR Trade Unions Central Organisational Bureau Juozas Stimburys. Due to propaganda reasons, three persons embodying the working class, peasantry and the principle of gender equality were included in the nomenclature group: a worker from Šiauliai Kazys Milius, a peasant from the Zarasai county Antanas Cibulskis and a peasant Sofija Nakaitė. 8 candidates were communists. There were 25 persons selected to the National Council, from whom 9 were chiefs of the administration: Chairman of the Presidium of the LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet Paleckis, National commissioner for Education Venclova, Secretary for Propaganda of the LCP (b) CC Kazys Preikšas, Head of the LCP (b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division Danil Šupikov, Secretary of the LCP (b) Vilnius City Committee Povilas Baltruška, Secretary of the LCP (b) Vilkaviškis County Committee Elena Geležiūnaitė, member of the LCP (b) County Committee Ignas Jonušas, Chief of the 29th Territorial Regiment of the SSSR Army Vincas Vitkauskas, Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Youth Central Committee Feliksas Bieliauskas. Due to propaganda reasons, 4 workers, 7 peasants and 5 intellectuals (a professor Krėvė-Mickevičius, a writer Salomėja Neris, teachers Kazimiera Trečiokienė and Liuda Tomkytė, a doctor and professor Vladas Kuzma) were nominated as candidates. Among the candidates, there were 23 Lithuanians, 1 Pole and 1 Byelorussian; 9 women. The LCP (b) CC Bureau endorsed the candidates on 16 November and submitted the list to the CPSU (b) Central Committee[478].

During the process of candidate selection, there occurred several disturbing incidents. For example, after the inspection of the police archives of the former Republic of Lithuania it transpired that a candidate to the SSSR SS National Council Rapolas Gedminas had been a police official, and the candidate to SSSR SS Union Council Kazys Milius had been involved with security structures. The LCP (b) CC Bureau had to request the CPSU (b) CC to delete those persons from the candidates' list[479]. They were replaced by the Deputy Chairman of the Šiauliai City Provisional Executive committee communist Petras Kareckas and the Secretary of the LCP (b) Raseiniai County Committee Stasys Filipavičius.

Following the SSSR example, from the candidates selected by the communists the so-called "communist and non-party member block" was formed in order to demonstrate the supposedly broad public representation. However, in the reality it did not represent even those social groups that favoured the regime and did not presented any concrete needs of those groups to the SSSR government. As mentioned above, representatives of the latter were included in the deputy list on the compulsory basis and according to the set quotas. The block members did not have their own election programme and were campaigning for the CPSU (b) policy. The CPSU (b) policy and the objectives of Lithuania's sovietisation and introduction of the soviet political system were promoted in the electoral press published on behalf of the Communist Party or the block[480]. In the political point of view, the block was representing the regime and the Communist Party, whereas in the social aspect it was representing the political bureaucracy (the nomenclature).

On 11 November and 3 January 1941, the LCP (b) CC organised meetings of the secretaries of city and county committees, where Head of the LCP (b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division Šupikov presented detailed instructions on how to smoothly stage up the election and achieve the desired results. On 17 December, the LCP (b) CC Bureau organised discussion between the Committees of Kaunas and Šiauliai cities and Vilkaviškis and Šiauliai counties in order to discuss how party structures were organising the election campaign[481]. The communists grew anxious as public dissatisfaction with the regime increased, and the idea of boycotting the election was gaining grounds. As the communists were reluctant to let the election collapse, they ordered the communist structures to attract people by various promises and other ideological impact means, and to persuade them cast their votes. For example, there was a recommendation to explain to the people in easy language that their welfare had deteriorated not because of the communist policy but due to the "temporary difficulties caused by the construction of the soviet system." Taking account of the fact that the majority of voters were churchgoers, the communist party encouraged its campaigners to refrain from atheistic statements and try to avoid hurting their feelings. The Communist Party did not trust the means of ideological manipulation and was preparing to resort to measures of coercion and threats,

characteristic of the totalitarian regime. The communist structures were instructed to "be determined in strengthening the Bolshevik vigilance in respect to hostile class elements." The LCP (b) CC Bureau endorsed the address of the LCP (b) CC Bureau to the voters on 9 January 1941. The text thereof was drafted by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Provisional SS Paleckis and the National commissioner for Internal Affairs Guzevičius after having received the party executives' instructions.[482]

The election campaign was proceeding according to the communist scheme. It was managed by the LCP (b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division – the actual headquarters of the election stage up. The Division was dubbing the functions of the LSSR Electoral Committee: it formed electoral committees, directed and controlled their activities, supervised the election process, calculated the votes. Analogously, the communist party structures controlled the work of county and area electoral committees. For example, the LCP (b) Trakai County Committee selected the members of the electoral campaign, instructed them how to organise the voting and achieve the desired results, and controlled their performance[483]. As it transpired that several persons disloyal to the party had found their way into the voting committees, the Trakai County Committee issued instructions to follow their every step. Residents, scared by the repressive policies of the SSSR government, participated in the staged election. Yet the overall participation of the voters was scarce. A part of the society boycotted the election. That was reflected even in the official information presented by the communist election headquarters. According to the data of the LCP (b) CC Organisation – Instructors' Division, on 12 January by 8 p. m. approximately 76.6 % of all listed residents had come to vote[484]. The voters were least active in the Telšiai constituency, where Gedvilas and Preikšas were nominated candidates. Only 46.5 % of voters had cast their vote. The election was not running smoothly in the Kretinga, Marijampolė, Mažeikiai, Tauragė, Seinai and other constituencies where the candidates nominated were Krėvė-Mickevičius, Izabelė Laukaitytė, Paleckis, Venclova, general Vitkauskas and others. According to the data of the LCP (b) CC submitted to the CPSU (b) Central Committee, people voted mostly against Meskupas (10 000 votes against), Kareckas (over 8 000), Gedvilas (over 7 000), Nakaitė (almost 7 000), Paleckis (over 6 000), Morozovas (nearly 6 000), Sniečkus (nearly 5 000), Guzevičius (nearly 5000) etc.[485]. According to the official data of the LSSR Election Committee, 91.3 % of voters participated in the election, of which 95.5 % voted in favour of the communist candidates[486]. Under the conditions of occupation and the totalitarian regime, the public did not have any possibilities to express their will in a non-democratic election. People's will was forged just as in the election to the People's Seimas (parliament) in July 1940.

After the fake election a group of people emerged, which represented the LSSR administration in the Soviet Union and imitated the representation of the Lithuanian SSR in the SSSR Government.

In the Soviet Union, the real power rested with the CPSU (b) Central Committee and its Bureau. The CPSU (b) was a body of collective administration that was supposed to demonstrate the supposed principles of collective formation of the party policy and administration of the party, the state and the public. In order to conjure up a semblance of the broad representation of the CPSU (b) territorial organizations in the party administration and their participation in the party policy formation, leaders of the territorial organizations of the party were appointed to the CPSU (b) CC on compulsory basis. That was also a way to strengthen the supervision of party organizations of countries, regions and the Union Republics. The fact of the nomination of a concrete head of a territorial organization to the CPSU (b) CC was presented as the proof of the CPSU (b) political administrations' trust in the nominee and positive evaluation of his activities while implementing the CPSU (b) policy. For any leader of a party organization, the appointment as member of the CPSU (b) CC or nomination as candidate meant the promotion to the top ranks of the political bureaucracy and closeness to circle of the highest political executives of the SSSR, which enabled him to rise above other local party functionaries and administrators and increase their political influence in the local administration and the SSSR political structures. Informal relations established within the CPSU (b) CC provided the members with an opportunity not only to strengthen their personal status in the nomenclature, but also to gain practical benefits for the territory under their administration, e.g. to receive more funds. However, along with bringing honour and granting higher political influence, the CPSU (b) CC membership entailed great risk to displease Stalin, the leader of the CPSU (b) or be drawn into a certain political group that later on might possibly loose in the struggle between the groups. Under the totalitarian government, not a single member of the CPSU (b) CC could feel safe about his status and survival within the organisation; he could be easily and at any time removed from that body, be proclaimed as internal opponent (accused of right or left wing deviation, nationalism or localism) and repressed. For those willing to remain in the CPSU (b) Central Committee, the possession of excellent political understanding and high resourcefulness was a vital necessity.

In the 18th Conference of the CPSU (b) on 15-20 February 1941, the First Secretary of the LCP (b) CC Sniečkus was nominated as candidate member of the CPSU (b) CC[487]. Thus, the administration of the CPSU (b) demonstrated political trust in him and, what is more, acknowledged that the LCP (b) was implementing the policy of the CPSU (b) in the right way. Sniečkus became a representative of the LCP (b) and the administration of the LSSR in one of the most important political institutions of the Soviet Union. In the governmental structures of the SSSR, he embodied the LSSR bureaucracy.

The Role of the LSSR Administrative Institutions in Respect of the Occupation Policy

The authorities of the CPSU (b) were responsible for shaping the occupation policy and adopting the most important political decisions concerning Lithuania's sovietisation. Even though the Lithuanian Communist Organization and the LSSR administrative institutions had in fact been eliminated from the process of occupation policy development and the decision-making, there existed political structures that directed and controlled the enforcement of the decisions and political measures. The LSSR political structures usually adopted resolutions concerning the implementation of decisions made by the CPSU (b) CC Political Bureau, the SSSR Council of National Commissioners or other SSSR authorities as well as the enforcement of political measures of the communist party. For example, as the CPSU (b) CC on 10 November 1940 adopted a resolution on the establishment of the LSSR local administrative institutions, the LCP (b) CC Bureau and the Presidium of the LSSR SS resolved to set up provisional executive committees[488]. The CPSU (b) administration did not even authorize the LSSR administration to deal with the issues in the scope of the competence of the LSSR institutions, as provided in the constitutions of the SSSR and LSSR constitutions, such as legal and education matters.

Due to centralized government and the SSSR political dictate to the LSSR political structures, the latter were in reality subordinate to respective institutions of the SSSR, which governed, regulated and controlled the work of the Lithuanian administration and interfered with the activities of many institutions. Political structures of the SSSR constantly inspected the work of the LSSR institutions and their leaders. For example, in March 1941 the SSSR College of the People's Commissariat for Justice demanded National Commissioners for Justice of the Soviet Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to account for their work[489]. Since the National Commissioners for Justice had been delaying to introduce the soviet legal system, the College decided that such work was not in conformity with the political interests of the SSSR. The LCP (b) Central Committee Bureau had to follow the resolution of the College and evaluate the performance of the People's Commissariat for Justice and its Commissioner Pakarklys[490].

The government of the SSSR transferred to Lithuania the model of political dictate, command over the local administration and control of its activities, which was uniform to all the Soviet Republics. The activities of the LSSR administration were supervised by the SSSR representatives: Pozdiakov, a Proxy of the CPSU (b) CC and the SSSR CNC (in 1941, as he left Lithuania, his functions were taken over by the LCP (b) CC Secretary for Staff Nikolaj Gridin) and his apparatus, as well as persons who had been sent from the SSSR to Lithuania and employed in the Communist Party and administrative structures[491]. Within the bureaucratic hierarchy, those persons occupied high positions, frequently as deputy heads of political and administrative structures. In reality, though, they played the leading role, and often were actual administrators of institutional activities. The same system was operating within

the Communist Party Organization. Local communists were supervised by the CPSU (b) Proxy Pozdiakov, the LCP (b) CC Secretary for Staff Nikolaj Gridin and persons who had been sent from the SSSR to Lithuania and appointed as second secretaries, division heads or their deputies as well as other responsible officials. Those "grey eminences" served as a political dictate and instrument of the communist party and the occupation government to the LSSR administration and helped to control its activities.

Political dictate of the CPSU (b) authorities to party and administrative structures, centralized government and hierarchical subordination of the LSSR institutions to the bodies of the SSSR, their dictate to and control of the Lithuanian institutions, supervision by the "grey eminences" of the SSSR and other measures were the instruments of the communist party and the occupation government, employed to dictate to the LSSR administration and control its activities. Such measures helped the communist party to subdue the LSSR administrative structures to smoothly and accurately implement its political decisions.

The objectives of the CPSU (b) policy in Lithuania and the strategy, tactics and measures of its implementation were the key factors determining the role of the LSSR institutions within the policy implementation process. The communist party imposed its policy through party structures, subordinate administrative institutions and via the hierarchic relations of the political bureaucracy. The government monopoly allowed the party to employ all of its resources (political and legal standards, repression means, ideological impact etc.) as well as all of its means (political, administrative) for the policy implementation. The LCP (b) structures and the LSSR administrative institutions were an important tool for the implementation of the occupation policy. They organised the enforcement of the political decisions of the party, controlled their implementation, organised and administered a given sphere under their supervision within the limits of their competence and following instructions from the party.

The LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet was an institution designed for the adaptation of the SSSR laws to the Lithuanian conditions. The Presidium of the Provisional SS was the institution that, based on resolutions issued by the structures of the SSSR, the LSSR and the communist party, legislated respective acts, shaping them into the soviet legal standards. The LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet and its Presidium were passing laws and orders that were merely duplicating all significant resolutions of the LCP (b) and the LSSR concerning the sovietisation of Lithuania, the formation of its administration, the appointment of institution leaders etc. The LSSR Council of National Commissioners was responsible for adjusting to local conditions and specifying party political decisions and resolutions of the SSSR authorities, organising and controlling the implementation of

the political measures of the CPSU (b). Following the decisions by the SSSR government and the administrative institutions as well as the LCP (b), it was adopting resolutions concerning the introduction of the soviet political government and the sovietisation of public life. It had limited decision rights and possibilities to act, and yet it enjoyed sufficient administrative rights. Provisional executive committees were the local executive and governing bodies that implemented the resolutions of the communist party and the central administrative institutions, and was in charge of economic, social, and other issued of local importance.

The Lithuanian Communist Party implemented the CPSU (b) policy in Lithuania by exercising its political and administrative privileges and employing measures of impact directed towards the LSSR administration and the public. It adapted to the Lithuanian conditions the CPSU (b) political decisions concerning the reorganization of the country's life in the soviet framework, provided to party structures and administrative institutions defined objectives and measures for the implementation of political decisions. The LCP (b) CC Bureau, being the most important political and administrative structure, engaged in political dictate to administrative institutions and controlled activities thereof.

The LCP (b) CC Bureau was continuously evaluating how the LSSR administrative institutions implement the measures of party policy while sovietising Lithuania, administered the sphere under their supervision, and organise their work. According to the rules of procedure of the apparatus, a given division of the LCP (b) CC used to inspect the work of an administrative institution and submit their conclusions (reports or draft resolutions of the Bureau meeting), following which the LCP (b) CC Bureau was supposed to pass a decision concerning the performance of the institution and its leaders. For example, in April 1941 the LCP (b) CC Staff Division inspected how the People's Commissariat for Finance was replacing staff and recommended that the LCP (b) CC Bureau penalized the chiefs of the Commissariat for the delay of staff cleansing. The LCP (b) CC Bureau dismissed Deputy National Commissioner Zaleckis, warned National Commissioner Vaišnoras and instructed Secretary of the LCP (b) CC Meskupas to inspect the overall performance of the People's Commissariat. Vaišnoras was instructed to "clean" radically the People's Commissariat from servants unacceptable to the communists and account to the LCP (b) Central Committee for staff cleansing and other activities[492]. In fact, summary punishment was sanctioned for Vaišnoras. Shortly afterwards he was dismissed from his position and replaced by a communist Bronislovas Markūnas[493]. Because of the failure to implement plans, the LCP (b) CC Bureau dismissed Govorovkij, Head of the Highway Board ("Ušosdor") of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs [494]. Such evaluation of administrative institutions and their leaders indicated that the communist party possessed effective leverage to dictate to administrative institutions and control their leaders' performance. The mechanism of the party control over the administration was functioning within all party structures: in the LCP (b) CC Bureau,

city, county and region committees, as well as primary organisations. Even the organisational staff of the party regularly discussed the performance of administrative institutions and their leaders. That widespread practice gave rise to a characteristic bureaucratic tendency: the lower ranking the structure was, the more power it had and ignored other institutions. Certain party committees attempted imposing their autocracy. Institutional and leader performance evaluation within party committees was becoming increasingly uncivilised. For example, Second Secretary of the LCP (b) Kaunas City Committee Paraščenka became accustomed to threaten communist institution chiefs or heads of structural units to expel them from the party for inadequate implementation of directives. He insistently urged such administrators: "if you have not implemented a party task, leave your party membership card on the table." In the provinces the communists got into habit of threatening "to count one's ribs", "arrest," "imprison" or do away with inefficient administrators in some other way[495]. In order to control administrative institutions, some of the party structures chose to employ any means. Sniečkus, Paleckis and Gedvilas had noticed that, because of the above reasons, tensions between the party and administrative structures emerged[496].

The Bureau of the Council of National Commissioners As Control Leverage of the LSSR Administrative

In May 1941, the Bureau of the Council of National Commissioners was formed. It controlled the enforcement of the decisions of the CPSU (b) authorities, the SSSR government and administrative institutions and the execution of the LCP (b) resolutions. On 21 May 1941, the LCP (b) CC Bureau appointed Gedvilas and his Deputies Šumauskas, Mikėnas, Vaišnoras, Chairman of the State Planning Committee Glovackis and Second Secretary of the LCP (b) CC Meskupas as members of the CNC Bureau[497]. After the establishment of the Bureau of the Council of National Commissioners and appointment of the LCP (b) CC Secretary as its member, the LCP (b) administration strengthened its control over the Council of National Commissioners.

Following the example of the SSSR, in all the LSSR People's Commissariats there appeared colleges the task of which was to ensure party control over the administration and serve as a body of the so-called collective government. The college was also supposed to detail the execution of the decisions.

Communist Command Over the Staff of Administrative Institutions

Following the principles of the communist staff policy, the LCP pooled all the important issues of staff policy in hand: it endorsed the staffing and colleges of central administrative institutions, selected and appointed executives of all levels and politically controlled their activities. For example, on 8

December 1940 the LCP (b) CC Bureau established special divisions in all the LSSR administrative institutions, on 9 January 1940 appointed chairmen of all provisional executive committees, and on 7 and 21 May nominated Head and Deputy Heads of the LSSR Commissariat for State Security[498]. In autumn 1940, the LCP (b) CC nomenclature was transferred from the SSSR to Lithuania as a governing system for the selection, appointment and supervision of executive staff.

The Composition of the Lithuanian Communist Party in June – September 1940

On the eve of the occupation of Lithuania, the Lithuanian communist party had 1261 members. In respect of the social composition, 48 % were workers, 24 % – peasants, 24 % – traders and artisans, 4 % – servants. Women accounted for 10 %, and men – 90 % of the communists. There were 54.48 % of Lithuanians, 30.61 % of Jews, 14.27 % of Russians and 0.63 % of other nationality members. The majority of communists (81.89 %) were experienced in underground activities that took place prior to 1939. In general, the number of underground LCP members amounted to some 1600 communists, including those at large and in prison. To make a comparison, in June 1940 in Latvia there were 968, and in Estonia – 150 members of the communist party[499].[500]

On 25 June 1940, after the legalization of the Lithuanian communist organisation, it was undergoing internal organisational and ideological reforms in respect of the occupation policy objectives. The LCP needed a rapidly expanding party to provide resources for the selection of communists for administrative work. It was supposed to be replenished by socially, politically and ideologically suitable people who would unconditionally follow the line of the CPSU (b) policy. Therefore it considered the regulation of its composition and the control of internal changes as very important.

At the end of June – beginning of July 1940, Dekanozov's group and the LCP leaders had practically no control over the growth of the party and its compositional changes. The CPSU (b) was primarily concerned about the annexation of Lithuania, so it did not attach much importance to the ongoing processes within the LCP until the emergence of negative trends. As it came out of the underground, the LCP was seeking to swell its ranks, pool communists for administrative work and demonstrate to the untrusting and sceptical SSSR representatives how large a party it was.

In June 1940, the LCP city and county committees listed former members of the underground LCP and those willing to join. The admission to the party, resumed in July, was carried out under accelerated procedure and simplified conditions until August (upon presentation of at least one reference, experience was not required)[501]. In many city and county organisations it went out of control, and

members were enlisted without any social, political and ideological selection and without observing the individual admission principle[502]. Due to such uncontrolled influx, in June and July the number of the LCP members boosted almost three times - from 1261 on the eve of the occupation to 3629 at the end of July[503]. Prior to the campaign of issuing party membership cards in October 1940, the LCP had as many as 5365 communists[504]. From June to October 1940, the Lithuanian Communist Party grew 4.25 times.

Due to the political situation, career seeking and the desire to survive under the occupation regime, people from various social backgrounds and nationalities were joining the communist party. The majority consciously chose to cooperate with the occupation government or adapt to it, while others were joining the LCP as circumstances forced them to do so. In July 1940, even the Lithuanian State Ministers Povilas Pakarklis, Moisejus Koganas, Matas Mickis, and the Lithuanian Army Chief Povilas Vitkauskas, together with other persons not even likely to admire the communist views were submitting their membership applications[505]. In July 1940, the LCP CC Secretariat admitted all of them to the party.

After the LCP's expansion, its composition was changed. The number of experienced underground communists rose from 81.8 % in June 1940 to 19 % in October. Among those joining the party there were quite a few persons coming from the poor background and many non-Lithuanian nationals, especially Jews. Due to that reason, the number of communists with non-working class background and Jewish nationals in the LCP increased. In July 1940, the number of artisans and traders increased from 24 % in June to 25 % in July, whereas the amount of Jewish communists rose from 30.6 % in June to 36 % in July. Within the organisation of Kaunas city, the number of Jewish communists grew from 70.88 % in June to 76 % in July. Such a trend caused anxiety among the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the LCP, as it was undermining the communist myth that the party was primarily a representative of the working class, and was threatening to make the LCP a non-Lithuanian organisation in the eyes of the public. Another trend, seen by the communists as a negative one, emerged – the party was joined by former members of parties and organisations of the Republic of Lithuania, who were ideologically and politically disloyal to the communists. In September 1940, within city and county committees of the LCP there were 63 former members of the National Union, 188 former members of the Riflemen's Union, 143 former members of the Peasants' Populist Party and the Social Democratic Party, 56 members of Jewish political organisations (4 members of Bund, 18 – of Poalei Cion, 26 coming from the Zionist Union, 8 from Beitar)[506], and 3 persons who called themselves trockists[507]. In order to prevent the development of such trends, in July individual admission to party members was resumed, and in August the CPSU (b) CC ordered to tighten the admission conditions by introducing the requirement for former experience and two obligatory references by communists[508]. After the

introduction of the new order, the pace of the LCP growth instantly reduced and in October the number of artisans and traders in the party diminished to 10 %, and Jews – to 16.24 %[509]. As increasingly more communists were assigned to administrative work, in August the number of communist civil servants began to grow: in October communist administrators amounted to 15 % of the party members. By the end of September 1940, some 300 communists had been employed as senior central administration officers in the institutions in Kaunas, out of whom 3 in the LSSR Supreme Soviet (all of Lithuanian nationality), 4 in the Council of National Commissioners(1 Lithuanian, 3 Russians), 4 in the Commissariat for Justice (1 Lithuanian, 3 Russians), 10 in the Prosecutor's Office (6 Lithuanians, 1 Jew, 3 Russians), 87 in the Commissariat for Internal Affairs[510], 15 in the Militia (4 Lithuanians, 2 Jews, 9 Russians), 5 in the Commissariat for Finance (1 Lithuanian, 1 Jew, 3 Russians), 10 in the Commissariat for Local Industry (4 Lithuanians, 4 Jews, 2 Russians), 6 in the Food Commissariat (2 Lithuanians, 4 Jews), 5 in the Commissariat for Agriculture (5 Lithuanians), 4 in the Trade Commissariat (1 Lithuanian, 2 Jews, 1 Russian), 21 in the Communication Board (2 Lithuanians, 1 Jew, 18 Russians), 4 in the Auto Transport Trust (2 Lithuanians, 1 Jew, 1 Russian), 6 in the Board of the Nemunas Navigation (1 Lithuanian, 5 Russians), etc. 28.5 % of the communists assigned to administrative work were Lithuanians, 31.3 % - Jewish, and 40.2 % were of Russian nationality. The majority of Russians were originally from the SSSR.

By the beginning of October 1940, in the LCP there were 5365 communists[511]. According to their social status, 50 % were workers, 24 % – peasants, 15 % servants, 10 % – artisans, traders and businessmen. Women accounted for 14 %, men – 86 %. Lithuanians amounted to 68.49 %, Jews – 16.24 %, Russians – 11.97 %, individuals of other nationalities – 3.3 %. 1593 communists were former members of the underground communist party. In the LCP, there were at least 450 persons formerly active in the political organisations of the Republic of Lithuania.

The new procedure of admission to the LCP introduced in August 1940 did not result in substantial changes within the LCP composition or removal of groups that were socially, politically and ideologically unacceptable to the Bolsheviks. In the eyes of Bolsheviks arriving to Lithuania from the SSSR, the LCP was "ultimately polluted" by individuals hostile and disloyal to the Bolsheviks[512]. The authorities of the CPSU (b) came to realise that the only way to cleanse that "ultimately polluted" organisation was by launching a planned and organised mass cleansing campaign, analogous to those executed by the CPSU (b) in the 20ies and 30ies. Such a model for changing the LCP composition was employed in October 1940, after the LCP had officially joined the CPSU (b).

Social and Political Cleansing of the Lithuanian Communists

On 8 October 1940, the CPSU (b) CC Political Bureau admitted Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian communist parties to join as republic organisations[513]. Pozdniakov, the Proxy of the CPSU (b) CC and the SSSR CNC was appointed to lead the reforms of the Lithuanian communist organisation according to the CPSU (b) example and supervise its activities. On 15 November 1940, the campaign for issuing CPSU (b) membership cards to the Lithuanian communists was launched, and by its goals and scope it equalled the campaign of the selection of Lithuanian communists to the CPSU (b) in respect of social, political and ideological criteria as well as elimination (so-called cleansing) of unacceptable communists in order to introduce substantial changes in the composition of the Lithuanian communists and approximate it to the CPSU (b). Even though the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1939 abolished regular mass campaigns of party cleansing as means of party composition regulation, it was nevertheless resorted to in autumn 1940 within the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian communist organisations and was implemented in a planned and organised manner, under the supervision of the authorities of the CPSU (b).

The cleansing of the LCP (b) began in October 1940 and continued until 15 May 1941, but in fact it was finalised in December 1940[514]. On the 7th and 29th of April and the 2nd of June 1941, the LCP (b) CC processed 105 communists' appeals concerning the non-issuance of party membership cards according to the directives from the CPSU (b) and the instructions by the LCP (b) CC on the basis thereof. They defined the campaign and the rules for inspecting the communists' application data and examination of their files. The cleansing process was co-ordinated by the LCP (b) Central Committee, and it was directly organised and implemented by the LCP (b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division (headed by Daniil Šupikov). Organisational Divisions of city and county committees were carrying out cleansing in local organisations. During the period of the Lithuanian communist organisation cleansing, the admission of new members was suspended. In October - November 1940 the data about communists was checked, in October individual cases for the issuance of membership cards were considered. According to the set procedure, the admission to the CPSU (b) and the issuance of membership cards was to be approved by city and county committees of the communist party, and the final decision rested with the LCP (b) CC Bureau, in the meetings of which Pozdniakov, Šupikov, Sniečkus, Meskupas, Preikšas and Aleksandras Guzevičius took part.

Already during the examination of the communist's applications and autobiographies, it transpired that a great deal of data had been forged. In order to facilitate the accession to the LCP (b) or prevent their expulsion, communists engaged in mass concealment of their non-proletarian background and occupation. Cases when businessmen, traders and artisans appeared to have falsely called themselves workers were especially numerous in Kaunas.

By 15 May 1941, the LCP (b) CC had examined 4372 cases submitted by city and county committees for approval. 2793 persons were recognised as communists, 1129 were expelled from the LCP (b), and 450 cases were continued. 1407 persons voluntarily left the party upon realising that they would never advance in the party due to social, political and other reasons. There is no doubt that among them there were citizens resentful about the occupation regime and the work of the puppet party. Based on the results of the examination of the communist's appeals concerning party membership, in the LCP (b) CC Bureau, by 2 June 1941, 2813 persons had been recognised as communists (52.43 % of all communist members of the party as in October 1940), out of whom 1390 were former members of the illegal LCP, whereas 1109 persons were expelled from the party (20.67 %), out of whom 300 were former underground communists and 82 persons had associated themselves with it[515]. Judging by quantitative indicators, the cleansing process of Lithuanian communist was more radical than in Estonia or Latvia, where 85.5 – 86.8 % were granted the membership in the CPSU (b), and only 11-12 % of communists were expelled[516].

The aim of the cleansing campaign was to expel from the Lithuanian communist party the so-called "class enemies" – bourgeois and petty bourgeois groups (businessmen, traders, artisans, civil servants of the Republic of Lithuania). Social cleansing was also a good way to check whether the leaders of the LCP (b) were observing the principle of social purity of the Bolshevik party and whether they were not putting up with the groups socially hostile to the communists. 95 farmers (4 estate owners and 91 large farm owners categorised as "kulaks"), 97 traders, 40 businessmen, 80 artisans and 6 petty traders, the so-called profiteers, were expelled from the LCP (b), accounting for the total of 318 people (28.16 % of all the 1129 persons expelled from the party)[517]. Among the expelled farmers there were 84 Lithuanians, 9 Russians, 1 Jew and 1 Byelorussian; among traders – 10 Lithuanians, 2 Russians, 85 Jews; among businessmen – 7 Lithuanians and 33 Jews. All the expelled artisans were Jewish. However, this information does not reflect the overall scale of the social party cleansing, because, as the cleansing was launched, non-workers began fleeing the communist party on their own initiative, trying to avoid risk and realising that there was no possible way for them to remain in the party due to social reasons.

The objectives of the introduction of the political system of the SSSR and the establishment of the communist party dictate determined the fact that only persons with Marxist approach, communist ideology and loyal to the occupation regime were retained in the LCP (b) organisation. Therefore, the views of the communists as well as their political orientation, activities and political-ideological reliability were important selection criteria. Because of inappropriate views, 18 churchgoers were

expelled, and 501 communists were expelled due to political reasons[518]. Among the latter there were 129 members of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, 66 members of the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, 21 members of the "Jaunoji Lietuva" (The Young Lithuania) organisation, 41 members of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, 29 members of the Lithuanian Peasants' Populist Party, 2 Russian socialist revolutionaries (Essers) and 1 member of the Aušrininkai ("The Dawnists") movement, 50 members of Jewish political organisations (out of whom 6 were former members of the Bund and 21 - former members of the General Zionists Party), 40 Lithuanian volunteers and soldiers of the Kerensky and Kolčak armies, 11 deserters of the Russian Red Army, 58 individuals accused of anti-soviet campaigning as well as other politically unreliable persons and 53 "politically passive" people.

The communist rule was designed to undermine the preconditions for internal opposition, to eliminate the tradition of independent thinking and freedom of activities, and to turn the Lithuanian communist party into a monolithic, centralised and disciplined organisation that would be unconditionally obedient to the CPSU (b). Members of the underground LCP were under close scrutiny – it was supervised whether they followed the official party policy line and what they had been doing during the underground period. 103 persons were removed from the party, out of whom 10 were participating in the LCP faction activities, 79 left the party on their own will and 4 were expelled in the 30ies due to various reasons. Since among the communists there were Lithuanian intelligence agents, the CPSU (b) demanded to remove them as well. In order to preserve their party membership and be safe from repressions, persons who had formerly co-operated with the Lithuanian police or intelligence services were trying to conceal that. Yet according to the intelligence archives, 67 police collaborators and 80 undercover agents were exposed and subsequently expelled from the party[519].

As the underground LCP had not kept the record of the admission of new members and did not issue party membership cards, people willing to join the party could claim that they had been in the underground. Communists regarded such persons as impostors and distanced themselves from such individuals. 82 persons claiming to have been in the underground organisation were expelled from the party. On the other hand, the leaders of the LCP (b), in order to increase the importance of the undercover LCP, made efforts to retain as many people as possible in the party, so they directed local organisations to try to "prove" that those persons were genuine members of the party. In such a way, even 50 persons "replenished" the ranks of the undercover LCP, actually joining the party in summer 1940[520].

In order to improve the image of the LCP (b), communists with criminal record and anti-moral behaviour were banned from joining the party. The same restriction applied to persons seeking party

membership with the purpose to find a job in administrative institutions or be promoted. 23 people who had been sentenced in the Republic of Lithuania for various crimes and 6 smugglers operating at the Lithuanian – Latvian and Lithuanian – Polish border were expelled from the party, as well as some 10 people accused of "career-seeking" and "selfishness", whereas 48 communists had to leave the party on the grounds of alcohol abuse, hooliganism and immoral behaviour[521].

The cleansing of the LCP (b) was not related to nationality or specially targeted at certain communists of Lithuanian nationality. Due to various reasons, 772 Lithuanians (68.37 % of all the expelled), 125 Russians (11.07 %), 222 Jews (19.66 %) and 10 individuals holding other nationalities (0.88 %) were expelled from the LCP (b)[522]. In total, 55 % of the listed Lithuanian communists, 49 % of Jews, and 18 % of Russians were expelled or left the party on voluntary grounds. Lithuanians and Russians were mostly expelled due to political reasons, whereas Jewish people were removed on social and ideological grounds due to their background, status and Zionist Party membership.

The cleansing of the communist party was not a special tool of rusification, however from an objective point of view, along with the introduction of the CPSU (b) staff and nomenclature system it did contribute to the russification of the LCP. The widespread practice of various privileges applied to the Russian communists during the rule of the LCP (b) as well as the communists' migration from the SSSR to Lithuania increased the number of Russian communists and strengthened their position within the party.

Because of the cleansing of the Lithuanian communist party, more than half of all communists who were members of the party in October 1940 received the CPSU (b) membership cards or candidate cards, and one fifth were removed because occupants thought them unreliable. The majority of people were removed because of inappropriate social background, status and occupation (25.16 % of all the expelled) and due to political reasons (44.37 %).

The results of the cleansing of the LCP (b) indicated that the CPSU (b) actually managed to reach the set objectives: a socially and ideologically homogenous communist organization was formed. Since obedient people had been selected as party members, the likelihood of internal opposition was eliminated. The members of that monolith, centralized and disciplined organization constituted a party mass that was uneducated, without civilized political experience, obedient and easily manageable, easy to be directed towards the enforcement of the political goals of the CPSU (b) and the occupation regime. The LCP (b) turned into a Stalin-type party.

According to official statistical accounts submitted by the LCP (b) Central Committee to Moscow, on 1 January 1941 in Lithuania there were 2486 (with the exception of the Švenčionys and Švenčionėliai county organizations of the LCP (b) which were formed in autumn 1940), and, including the latter, 2653 communists[523]. Women accounted for as little as 14.84 % of all the communists, and almost one third of them were from Kaunas. The party was prevailed by those coming from a working-class and peasantry background: almost a half – 48.1 %- were from a working-class background, 28.9 % – those with peasants' background, and 22.9 % were former civil servants. However, judging by their occupation, more than a half (56.8 %) of the communists were employed as civil servants in the party and the soviet institutions, whereas only 17.1 % were employed as workers, 18.2 % – as peasants, 3.1 % – as artisans. Out of the 1412 civil servants, 184 were employed in national, 364 – in city, 762 - in county, 202 – in the regional soviet institutions and almost a half of them (589 persons) were institution leaders. Such a situation emerged in summer 1940 and lasted until June 1941. It was predetermined by the employment of communists in administrative institutions and the party policy aiming to replace former civil servants of the Republic of Lithuania with communists. The Lithuanian communist organization was gradually turning into a soviet bureaucratic party. That trend was mostly obvious in the LSSR administrative centre – Kaunas – where more than two thirds (76.59 %) of communists were employed in administrative institutions, out of whom 156 (41.5 % of Kaunas communists) – as leaders of various institutions.

Quite a few communists were amassed in repressive structures: as many as 485 members of the party (19.5 % of all communists) were employed in system of the LSSR Commissariat for Internal Affairs, out of whom 82 worked in Kaunas. Yet that was only a part of communists employed in that system; apart from them, there were no fewer than 270 communists delegated from the SSSR, yet not registered in the LCP (b) record[524]. Including the latter, in the system of the LSSR Internal Affairs Commissariat there were 755 communists.

Since the LCP (b) statistical accounts have no record of the communists from the SSSR as well as the communists of the SSSR troops deployed in Lithuania and not included in the LCP (b) record by the spring of 1941, they do not reveal a comprehensive picture as to the distribution of communists in administrative institutions.

The LCP (b) was an organization of relatively young and middle-aged people: 46.2 % of communists were up to 30 years of age, 40.2 % were aged 31-40, 11.4 % were 41-50 year-olds, 1.8 % – from 51 years and more.

Perhaps it is but natural that people with poor education were mostly susceptible to the Bolshevik doctrine. It is clearly demonstrated by the composition of the communist party. Among the 2627 communists (with the exception of the Švenčionėliai county), only 42 persons (1.6 % of all the communists) had higher education, 28 (1.06 %) – incomplete higher education, 119 (4.5) – secondary education, 160 (6.1 %) – incomplete secondary education, 1352 –primary education (51.46 %); 909 communists had basic literacy skills, but did not have any education (34.6 %), and 17 communists (0.64 %) were illiterate. It is obvious that the Lithuanian communist organisation was prevailed by people without any education, who made up to 86.7 % of all communists[525]. Due to the mass influx into the LCP (b) in the summer of 1940 and the cleansing of communists in the party, the number of underground communists in the party decreased, whereas the ranks of those who had joined the party after the occupation of Lithuania swelled. Nevertheless, the leaders of the LCP (b) were attempting to preserve as many members of the underground LCP as possible, even by registering fake party membership, therefore former underground members constituted the majority. 1309 local communists and those having arrived from the SSSR had been party members prior to June 1940, out of whom 1245 were members of the underground LCP[526].

After the cleansing of the communist party, the national composition of the organisation was significantly changed. Due to the removal of half of the Lithuanian communists, their number decreased to 63.45 %. Because of the social cleansing of the communists, the numbers of Jews halved, and in January 1941 they accounted for 16.25 % of all the communists. Jews in Kaunas made up 47.87 % of the city's communists. Due to the widespread application of exceptions to Russians during the cleansing process, the influx of communists from the SSSR and because of the joining of the communists from the Švenčionys and Švenčionėliai counties, the number of Russian communists increased by 6 % (up to 16.06 %) and Byelorussians - almost three times (up to 2.66 %).

As of autumn 1940, communists sent from the SSSR to Lithuania for administrative work and those demobilized from the occupation army significantly contributed to the growth of the LCP (b). According to the data of the LCP (b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division, by 3 January 1941 no fewer than 497 communist had arrived to Lithuania from the SSSR, excluding the communists of the SSSR army deployed in Lithuania, about whom there is no generalized record[527]. As many as 54.3 % of them worked in the LSSR NKVD system.

Within the Lithuanian communist organization there were 249 persons (more than 5 % of all the communists), formerly active in the parties and political organizations of the Republic of Lithuania[528]. 58 communists used to belong to various parties: there were 17 former members of the Peasant

Populist Party, 11 – of the Social Democratic Party, 8 Socialist Revolutionaries, 1 former member of the Polish Socialist Party and 1-of the USA Socialist Party "Lithuanian Company", 20 former members of Jewish parties (out of whom 8 were former members of Poalei Cion, and 12 – of General Zionist Party –). Among the 116 members of political organizations there were 53 members of the Lithuanian Youth Union, 14 – of the "Young Lithuania" movement, 8 were former members of "Pavasaris" (the Spring), 7 – of "Žiežirba" (the Sparkle), 4 belonged to "Varpas" (the Bell), 2 – to "Ateitis" (the Future), 1 – to "Aušra" (the Dawn), 3 – to other Lithuanian, and 24 – other Zionist youth organisations.

No strict selection criteria were applied to the leaders of the Lithuanian communist party during the cleansing, therefore many of the leaders with non-working background, formerly active in non-communist organizations, avoided the cleansing. For example, some 40 % secretaries of city and county committees were civil servants, and even 12 % of first secretaries were formerly active members of the Riflemen's Union, and the same amount of communist chiefs belonged to Zionist organisations[529].

Following the staffing policy of the CPSU (b), communists from the SSSR were appointed second secretaries. Two thirds of second secretaries of committees were from the SSSR, and only one third – local communists. Lithuanians made up 42.5 %, Russians – 32 %, and Jews – 6.38 % of first and second secretaries. The composition scheme of other employees of city and county committees was similar to the composition of all Lithuanian communists in general. Half of all committee members, division heads and instructors were workers, peasants and civil servants – a quarter each. 61.26 % of committee members were Lithuanians, 27.9 % – Russians, 9.9 % – Jews, and the remaining part held various nationalities. However, among heads of division committees and instructors, there were about 6 % less Lithuanians and Russians, whereas Jews were twice as many and they constituted even 22 % of the staff[530].

In early 1941, the Lithuanian communist organization was dominated by loyal, Bolshevik, illiterate and uneducated Lithuanian, Russian and Jewish soviet civil servants as well as workers of small industrial enterprises and peasants.

Changes Within the Lithuanian Communist Organization in January – June 1941

After the completion of the party cleansing, the composition of the Lithuanian communists was further on regulated by ways and methods characteristic of the CPSU (b), in order to ensure its sustainable growth, increase the number of workers and achieve greater involvement of local people, especially Lithuanians. Based on the practice of the CPSU (b) to replace regular mass cleansing with mass

recruitment, the 5th Congress of the LCP (b) set a target to enlarge the party[531]. The fact that increasingly more communists were needed to replace former civil servants of the Republic of Lithuania as the cleansing of Lithuanian civil servants progressed was taken into account. From January 1941 to 22 June, the LCP (b) grew by 2086 persons: from 2653 to 4739 communists[532], yet such growth was not stable and could not satisfy the need for new communist civil servants. In January and February very few communists joined the party. When the CPSU (b) introduced favourable conditions for the admission into the party, the process speeded up, yet there was no rush of those willing to join the LCP (b). The presentiment of the SSSR-Germany war, the policy of the communist party, terror and mass repressions strengthened the anti-soviet orientation of the Lithuanian public and pushed away from the communist party even workers and other poor levels of society, whereas the ones who anyway wanted to become members of the party could not do it easily due to strict political and social selection.

Communists delegated from the SSSR were the major source contributing to the LCP (b) growth. In early April, in Lithuania there were 1198, and in June – 1516 communists from the SSSR (except for the 167 communists of the Švenčionys and Švenčionėliai county communists transferred from the Byelorussian subordination to Lithuania, and the 179 communists listed in the temporary record of the LCP (b)). Including the latter, on the eve of the SSSR-Germany war in Lithuania there were some 1862 non-local communists, amounting to 40 % of all the members of the LCP (b)[533]. As the trend grew, the LCP (b) was gradually turning into an organization of foreign communists.

Due to strict regulation of the composition of the LCP (b), in the first half of 1941 in terms of social status the composition of the Lithuanian communist organization changed little, yet it had changed in terms of occupation, education and nationality. As the staffing policy of the CPSU (b) contributed to the rapid increase of communist civil servants within the party, among whom there was an increase of executives, it respectively caused the decrease of workers, peasants, artisans. During the six months of 1941 the number of workers in the LCP (b) almost halved (down to 8.65 %), the amount peasants decreased by 2.5 times (down to 7.2 %), whereas the number of civil servants increased up to 69.8 %. In the LSSR administration there were some 65 % of Lithuanian employees, almost 67 % of Russians and approximately 79 % of Jewish communists[534]. Regardless of the slogan of the 5th Congress of the LCP (b) to amass "workers into the party straight from the machines" and thus expand "its proletarian foundation," until June 1941 the opposite trend prevailed: workers enrolled into the party were shortly employed in the soviet institutions and added to the numbers of the soviet civil servants. As communists were increasingly seeking positions in the administration, the formerly "proletarian political avant-garde" party was becoming an organization of the soviet bureaucracy and political ruling elite.

The number of local residents in the Lithuanian communist party was rapidly decreasing, whereas the ranks of newcomers from the SSSR, mostly Russians, expanded. During the six months of 1941, the number of Lithuanian communists decreased to 46.4 %, Jews – to 12.6 %, whereas the number of Russians boosted four times, amounting to nearly 39 % of communists[535].That trend was especially evident in Vilnius and Kaunas, where many of the communists from the SSSR settled. In June 1941, in Kaunas Russians amounted to as much as half of the city's communists, Lithuanians – only 21.6 %, Jews – almost 26 %. In Vilnius, Lithuanians and Jews were even scarcer – approximately 11 % of each, whereas Russians totalled 77 % of communists. Moreover, in Vilnius there was not a single Polish communist. As Lithuanians were slow joining the LCP (b) and the number of communists from SSSR, mostly Russians, rose, Russian-speaking population was increasingly overshadowing Lithuanians and local communists of other nationalities. The LCP (b) was transforming into a non-Lithuanian communist organization.

On the eve of the SSSR-Germany war, in the Lithuanian communist party there were 4739, and including the 179 people listed in the temporary LCP (b) record, 4918 communists[536]. To make a comparison, in June 1941 in Estonian CP (b) there were 3732, and in Latvian CP (b) – 5057 communists[537].

4. Role of Political and Administrative Structures of LSSR in Implementation of Occupation Policy

One of the main policy objectives of the Communist Party was to reorganise the life in Lithuania according to Soviet principles and to implement the Soviet system in the country.

In order for the population of the LSSR and the population of the USSR to become uniform in their legal status, on 7 September 1940 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed its decree "On Procedure of Acquisition of USSR Citizenship by Citizens of Soviet Socialist Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia"[538]. Pursuant to the said decree applied retroactively, all nationals of the Republic of Lithuanian became USSR citizens as of August 3. On the grounds of the above decree the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR passed a decree on the LSSR citizenship[539] on 30 December 1940. According to this decree, all persons residing on the territory of the Republic of Lithuania on 1 September 1939, irrespective of whether they were Lithuanian nationals or not, became citizens of the Lithuanian SSR. The imposition of the citizenship of the occupation country on the Lithuanian nationals was an illegal act breeching international rules of law and infringing the civil rights of the Lithuanian residents.

In the spring of 1941 the procedure of replacing the citizens' passports of the Republic of Lithuania with the citizens' passports of the USSR began. On 8 February 1941 the Council of National Commissioners of the USSR introduced the Soviet passport system into the Lithuanian territory. On

that ground on February 22 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) gave orders to the People's Commissariat of the Interior of the LSSR to organise the replacement of passports[540]. The communist press and the Communist Party structures were instructed to promote the idea of the USSR citizenship and to achieve the imposition of the Soviet citizenship and Soviet passports on the residents of the Republic of Lithuania. In April the Council of National Commissioners of the USSR formalised the directive of the CC of the LCP(b) and instructed to start the passport replacement procedure on May 15. However, the majority of the Lithuanian residents did not wish to surrender their Lithuanian passports. As a result, the order was obeyed by only 20 % of all people instructed to surrender their Lithuanian passports in exchange for the USSR document on May 15-20[541].

Communists sought to destroy everything that would remind people of independent Lithuania, viz. State emblems, institution, street and square names, etc. The replacement of the Lithuanian emblems with the Soviet emblems was a constituent part of the implementation of the Soviet political system and the ideological indoctrination of the population. The intention was to use emblems for the representation of political changes and to indoctrinate the Lithuanian society with the values of the Soviet State and the communist regime. At the direction of the communists, on August 27 the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR introduced the State Flag and the National Emblem of the LSSR[542]. On August 5 the Council of Ministers of the LSSR resolved to set the clock 1 hour forward and to introduce the Moscow Time in Lithuania[543]. On September 26 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) banned such national public holidays of the Republic of Lithuania as February 16 and September 8, and established communist holidays[544]. Pursuant to the above resolution, it was forbidden to celebrate February 16; those who refused to obey were persecuted. Institutions, streets, etc., bearing the name of the Lithuanian historical figures as well as public and cultural figures of the Republic of Lithuania have been renamed. For example, the Council of Ministers resolved to delete the name of Vytautas, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, from any institution name. Thus, the Cultural Museum of Vytautas the Great was renamed to Kaunas State Museum, while Vytautas the Great University received the name of Kaunas University[545]. Demolition and destruction of cultural monuments that did not suit the regime from the ideological point of view started. Sculptures symbolising the occupation regime and the Bolshevik system were hurriedly erected on the site of such destroyed monuments. On 21 May 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the People's Commissariat of Education to demolish four monuments to officers and soldiers of the Republic of Lithuania erected in the garden square of the War Museum of Kaunas, including monuments to General Zukas-Zukauskas (Žukas-Žukauskas) and Commander of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union Putvis-Putvinskas, and to erect busts of Zemaite (Žemaitė) and J. Janonis instead[546]. On 29 December 1940 the Party leadership resolved to erect a monument to Lenin in Vilnius[547].

Role of Political Structures of LSSR in Implementation of USSR Legal System

At the instruction of the Communist Party structures and in order to implement the Soviet law and order in Lithuania the court structure and laws were changed and the legal system was reorganised according to the Soviet model. On August 29 the Council of Ministers of the LSSR adopted amendments to the Criminal Statute, the Criminal Procedure and the laws on the Protection of the Nation and the State, while on August 2 it adopted amendments to the laws on the Court Structure and on the Criminal Procedure[548]. On October 21 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) resolved to amend articles of the Criminal Statute and adopted the amendment draft[549]. On the following day the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR amended Articles 242, 262, 562, 563, 568, 578 and 639 of the Criminal Statute[550]. In order to intimidate the Lithuanian society and to force it to obey the regime, severe punishments were prescribed for activities directed against the USSR, the government and the Soviet system, for causing damage to the State property of the USSR, for profiteering, etc. For example, the punishment for the premeditated damage or destruction of property "in order to sabotage the socialist economy" was a 10-year sentence to hard labour; the abuse of the official status, intentional omission with the aim to weaken the Soviet power or to disturb the functioning of the State machinery was punished by up to 10 years in prison, etc. Such Soviet rules of law greatly restricted civil servants of the Republic of Lithuania employed at the LSSR administration after the annexation of Lithuania in their attempts to resist the communist dictatorship and to delay the implementation of certain resolution of the Communist Party.

On November 6 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR extended the application of the Criminal, Civil, Labour, Matrimonial and Guardianship Codes as well as the Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure of the RSFSR to the territory of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, effective as of December 1, until republican codes were developed in conformity with the Codes of the RSFSR (or, to be more accurate, until the said Codes were simply translated). On November 30 the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR issued a decree approving such resolution[551]. It was established that a person having committed a crime on the territory of Lithuanian prior to the occupation should be sentenced in compliance with the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. It was also provided that any case decided before 21 July 1940 should be retried in compliance with the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, unless the sentence of such case was carried out. This allowed the regime to illegally institute Soviet criminal proceedings against the Lithuanian residents for acts that were not considered a crime in the Republic of Lithuania but that were classified as being dangerous to the State and government of the USSR by the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. For example, pursuant to Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, the Lithuanian residents were punished for their membership in the political parties and organisations of the Republic of Lithuania ("participation in the activities of a counterrevolutionary organisation"), for any criticism of the Soviet State, its government or system ("carrying out of counterrevolutionary propaganda and agitation"), for

the employment in the public administration institutions of the Republic of Lithuania ("fight against the revolutionary movement", "activities directed against the Soviet Union", etc.) or for such "counterrevolutionary crimes" or "crimes against the State" established by the regime as the high treason of the USSR, provision of assistance to the international bourgeoisie, espionage, etc.[552] The imposition (and retroactive application) of Soviet laws on the nationals of the annexed Lithuania violated the generally accepted principles of law; it even contradicted the Soviet rules of law and the letter of the LSSR Constitution[553]. Other Soviet laws were similarly transposed and enforced in the Lithuanian SSR. For example, on 1 December 1940 the Matrimonial and Guardianship Law of the RSFSR (1926) came into effect.

At the instruction of the Communist Party structures and in order to implement the Soviet court structure, the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR issued a decree on November 30 regarding the reorganisation of the Lithuanian court system in compliance with the USSR Law on Court Structure (1938)[554]. All district courts had to be reorganised into people's courts, and all circuit courts – into circuit courts. It was provided that provisional executive committees had to appoint people's courts for the period preceding the election. In order for the election of assessors to appear democratic it was indicated that the so-called working people elected assessors in their meetings by a secret ballot. Such election procedure disguised the fact that in reality there were no elections at all; all judges and assessors were selected and appointed by the Communist Party structures, and the provisional executive committees as well as the meetings of the so-called working people just formalised the will of the communists. The control that the communists had over the selection of candidate assessors was further strengthened by the fact that all lists of candidate assessors had to be approved by provisional executive committees under the supervision of the communists. The provisional Supreme Soviet had to appoint members and assessors of the circuit court for the term of 5 years. In reality it only approved the nominees that were selected by the Communist Party structures. On November 30 the Council of National Commissioners established 5 circuit courts and 136 people's courts, and approved their territorial distribution[555]. County courts provided by the Constitution of the LSSR were not formed. In February and March of 1941 the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR appointed 8 members and 16 assessors of the Supreme Court as well as 23 judges and 264 assessors of circuit courts[556].

The Soviet Government gave orders to reorganise the Bar. On December 17 the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR dissolved the institute of lawyers and private defence counsels and instructed the People's Commissariat of Justice to reorganise the Bar of the LSSR according to the regulations of the Bar of the USSR and to form a provisional Bar of the LSSR[557]. Notaries' offices have been reorganised as well. On 11 January 1941 the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR identified 60 notary public offices and approved their territorial distribution[558]. The People's

Commissariat of Justice was instructed to supervise the activities of the Bar and notaries' offices. Pursuant to the USSR Law on Court Structure, all mortgage institutions were liquidated on 17 February 1941[559]. The prosecutor's department has also been reorganised. In addition, special courts came into existence and the jurisdictional system of the prosecutor's department and tribunals was formed: linear railway court, military tribunals, military prosecutor's department, etc. December 9 saw the foundation of the Military Tribunal of the People's Commissariat of the Interior of the LSSR[560].

The Soviet law and order introduced into the LSSR as well as the developed court system had to safeguard the state interests of the USSR and to secure the stability of the communist power. The courts, the prosecutor's department and the tribunals of the LSSR served an important purpose, viz. they had to suppress the resistance of the Lithuanian nation to the occupation and annexation and to use legislative acts in order to make the policy of terror pursued by the regime official. The majority of people arrested in Lithuania for political reasons were sentenced by such special courts or non-judicial bodies, especially by the Extraordinary Meeting of the People' Commissariat of the Interior of the USSR[561]. Judicial bodies operating on the territory of the LSSR were a constituent part of the LSSR administration, an instrument for governing the annexed Lithuania and a major support of the communist dictatorship and the totalitarian regime.

Role of Political Structures in Implementation of Social Policy of Communist Party and in Depriving Of Or Restricting Human Rights

The Communist Party pursued a policy that worsened the situation of the upper class and some sections of the middle class, discriminated such classes, deprived of or restricted human rights. The occupation authorities persecuted and discriminated those sections of the society that were hostile to the occupation regime.

The Council of Ministers of the LSSR took away the Lithuanian citizenship from the nationals of the Republic of Lithuania that were on a diplomatic mission abroad. It forbade them and all other persons condemning the occupation and annexation of Lithuania to return from abroad and ordered to confiscate their property. On July 23 the government deprived the Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to Germany Kazys Skirpa (Kazys Škirpa) of his Lithuanian citizenship, on July 26 the Lithuanian citizenship was taken away from the Ambassador to England Bronius Kazys Balutis and from Povilas Zadeikis (Povilas Žadeikis) who was on a diplomatic mission in the US, on August 2 – from the Plenipotentiary Minister of the Republic of Lithuania in Sweden Vytautas Gilys, from Stasys Lozoraitis in Italy, Stasys Girdvainis in Vatican and Kazys Grauzinis (Kazys Graužinis) in Argentina, on August 9 – from Jurgis Saulys (Jurgis Šaulys) in Sweden; they were all banned from returning to Lithuania, and a resolution was passed regarding the confiscation of their property[562].

On August 7 the Council of Ministers of Lithuania passed the Law on Confiscation of Property of Those Who Emigrated from Lithuania or Went Into Hiding; the law provided for the confiscation of

property of all persons who emigrated from Lithuania or went into hiding for political reasons[563]. Under the supervision of the communists the People's Commissariat of Agriculture made a list of such persons; the list was approved by the Council of National Commissioners on September 24. It was resolved to expropriate 143 farms (the total area of 13,382 hectares) from persons who emigrated from Lithuania, established a permanent residence abroad or went into hiding[564].

On August 16 the Council of Ministers of the LSSR revoked bonus payments for civil servants[565]. In order to impoverish former high officials of the Republic of Lithuania the People's Commissariat of State Control of the LSSR started recovering LTL 51,000 paid to the former ministers of the Republic of Lithuania as bonuses[566].

After the Soviet social security scheme was transposed to the Lithuanian SSR, everybody whom the regime considered to be politically unreliable or hostile was deprived of his/her pension rights. On 11 January 1941 the CNC of the LSSR approved instructions for the assignment of state social insurance pensions; such instructions banned the assignment of old-age pensions to former employees of institutions "the purpose of which was to fight the revolutionary movement" or to persons "who opposed the revolutionary movement with their employment activities or by nature of their work"[567]. Such ideological description left a lot of room for the interpretation of institutions and activities opposing the communist movement and allowed to expand the circle of discriminated people. As the majority of former civil servants of the Republic of Lithuania, especially those employed in the internal affairs or the legal system, were considered to be such people by the communists, the ban to assign pensions applied to quite a large number of people. In January of 1941 the People's Commissariat of Social Welfare began to review pension files[568]. Controlled by the communists, the Chief Commission for Assignment of Pensions put the discriminatory regulations into practice and discontinued the payment of pensions to people who did not approve of the activities of the illegal LCP or whose activities were directed against it. Such resolution of the LCP violated the social rights. It even conflicted with the right to financial provision in the old age declared by the Constitution of the LSSR. The translation of the discriminatory regulations into reality depended upon the determination of the administrative structures and especially of the employees of social security institutions to follow the letter of the instructions.

The regime deprived certain sections of the society of the right to free medical aid. As opposed to what was being declared in the Constitution of the LSSR, those who used hired labour did not have any right to free medical aid; they had to pay for the medical treatment according to the established rates[569].

The right to free education declared in the Constitution of the LSSR has been similarly abolished. In order to discriminate the well-to-do and the middle class and to prevent such people from acquiring secondary or university education the communists introduced study fees for the children of

the so-called "non-working class elements". On 22 February 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) introduced study fees for secondary school students of Grades 8 to 10, students of all types of specialised secondary schools (technical schools, pedagogical schools, teacher training seminary, etc.) and university students parents of which owned more than 30 hectares of land, had securities or other assets, owned nationalised industrial enterprises, commercial businesses, financial and credit institutions and other undertakings, had large houses, used hired labour, etc.[570] For ideological reasons such discrimination was disguised by the declaration that study fees were introduced only for the so-called non-working class elements and were not applied to the children of workers. With the view of implementing the communist directive, the Council of National Commissioners introduced study fees on March 13[571]. Instructions issued by the People's Commissariat of Education read that educational establishments had to secure the application of the discriminatory measures and to ensure that no child of former industrialists, merchants, large farmers and other well-to-do families could study for free.

Wishing to improve the situation of one part of the society favoured by the regime at the expense of the other part of the society and to worsen the living conditions of the latter the communists decided to evict well-to-do families from their flats and to raise the rent paid by them. On 22 February 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) introduced new rent rates, while on March 19 it established the discriminatory procedure of providing the population with living accommodation[572]. On that ground on 22 March 1941 the CNC of the LSSR resolved to apply administrative procedure and evict people from flats or "increase number of occupants per flat" if the living space of such flats exceeded the limit established in the Soviet Union[573]. The resolution of the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) emphasised that such "increase of the number of occupants per flat" should be applied to everybody, even to the so-called working people, with no exceptions made. The intention was to provide as many people in need for living accommodation as possible with housing quickly, effortlessly and without consuming any resources. First of all, housing had to be provided to the officers of the occupation army and to the families of communists and civil servants arriving to Lithuania from the USSR. For ideological reasons it had to look as if the regime took care of the underprivileged. Therefore, the underprivileged were also provided with living accommodation in flats taken away by the regime from the well-to-do. Following the example of the USSR, different rent rates were introduced for different sections of the society[574]. For example, the rent that the regular commanders and chiefs of the Red Army, border control and internal forces of the People's Commissariat of the Interior, leading officers of the State Security Board of the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR had to pay was Rb 0.30 to 0.80 per sq m of living space based on the monthly salary (Rb 300 to 750 or more). The rent was double for workers and Soviet civil servants, viz. Rb 0.80 to 1.50, based on the monthly salary (Rb 250 to 500). Irrespective of their income, all representatives of free professions engaged in private practice and self-employed artisans (if they did not use any hired

labour) had to pay the rent of Rb 1.80 per sq m, while the rent applied to merchants, industrialists and artisans who "made a living not out of work" was double than the rent applied to workers and civil servants, viz. Rb 3. Such social policy pursued by the CPSU(b) discriminated, impoverished and was directed against the upper and the middle class of the Republic of Lithuania.

In order to level the property and social conditions in Lithuania with those in the USSR, the CPSU(b) began to pursue its social policy in Lithuania. Activities of the Communist Party aimed at using the society for the industrialisation of the country, speeding the growth of industries, especially means of production, and strengthening the military potential of the USSR. For political interests and ideological reasons the communists had to guarantee minimum living conditions for the lower class and for certain sections of the middle class that the regime considered to be its political allies. However, this was being done with as little input as possible. Late 30's saw a rapid deterioration of the social situation in the USSR as well as decreasing income and the subsistence level. Due to slow construction of housing, slow production of consumer goods and low volumes of production in comparison with the heavy industry, there was a shortage of housing and basic goods. 1939 saw the introduction of rationing into the sale of basic goods in the USSR; the country was practically on the verge of the centralised distribution of goods according to ration cards. This has not been done entirely for ideological reasons. With almost all consumer goods becoming a deficit and with the aggravation of the crisis of supply, a closed system of trade and catering was formed; it was intended for the privileged sections of the society, first of all – for the bureaucracy, military officers, NKVD staff, etc. The policy pursued by the communists impoverished all social classes except the privileged ruling class[575]. The situation of classes of the Lithuanian society rapidly deteriorated following Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR.

In order to win the lower class and some sections of the middle class over to the side of the regime the communists gave instructions to raise salaries for workers of certain categories and for lower civil servants. The Government of the LSSR obeyed the communists and on August 7 ordered to raise salaries for workers of private enterprises and for certain categories of civil servants, on August 9 – for agricultural workers, on November 25 – for construction workers, and on 9 January 1941 – for agricultural workers employed by landowners[576]. On September 26 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the CNC of the LSSR to raise salaries for workers and civil servants[577]. On the same day the CNC of the LSSR and the CC of the LCP(b) issued a respective resolution[578]. Wishing to gain political advantage the leadership of the Communist Party and the administration emphasised that "they were deeply convinced that all workers, civil servants and working class intelligentsia would respond to the care shown by the Party and by the Government and would improve their efficiency of labour, contribute to the strengthening of our national defence and would unite even more closely round the Party of Lenin and Stalin". In order for the labour remuneration system of the LSSR to

become uniform with that of the USSR, on November 23 the Council of National Commissioners instructed people's commissariats to develop the service pay scheme, salary rates, etc.[579] However, the raise of salaries neither influenced the growth of actual labour remuneration nor improved the financial condition of such sections of the society. In October and November of 1940 as a result of rising retail prices food products became 2.1 times and manufactured goods – 2.9 times more expensive. Besides, there was a shortage of basic goods. Salaries paid to workers of certain categories and to civil servants only grew twice. In May of 1941 the average pay was Rb 290[580]. The financial condition of the population was very much deteriorating. Even the supporters of the regime were unhappy. The rise in prices was not felt by the officers of the occupation army, employees of the repressive structures and other sections of the Soviet bureaucracy (especially of the Communist Party machinery) receiving higher that average pay.

As a result of the implementation of the CPSU(b) directives the administration of the LSSR annulled contributions to patient funds and other social security funds deducted from salaries paid to workers and civil servants; in fact, the administration liquidated patient funds and introduced the state social insurance – the same kind of insurance that was effective in the Soviet Union; the administration also introduced free medical aid for the middle and the lower class; in 1941 allowances for mothers of many children were introduced, etc.[581] Working conditions in institutions and enterprises of the LSSR were made uniform to those in the USSR. On 19 March 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) introduced an 8-hour working day effective as of April 1[582]. Such resolution was followed by an appropriate decision of the Council of National Commissioners[583]. Pursuant to the decree of the CNC of the USSR dated 26 February 1941, the CNC of the LSSR introduced work record cards (based on the model used in the USSR) for employees of all enterprises and institutions on April 1[584]. Administrative structures of the LSSR established fixed living space standards, the procedure of provision with living accommodation (just like in the Soviet Union) and rent rates[585].

On October 2-3 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) discussed and approved draft resolutions of the CNC of the USSR (developed by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR) on taxes and dues withheld from the residents, enterprises and organisations and transferred to the budget[586]. On 22 November 1940 the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU resolved to introduce the same wage, dues and tax rates and retail price rates that were applicable in the Soviet Union as well as the Soviet currency, viz. the Rouble, into the annexed Baltic States[587]. The Council of National Commissioners of the Lithuanian SSR was instructed to raise taxes for private enterprises and small businesses, to recover taxes in arrears, etc. In order to devalue Litas it was made equivalent to 90 kopecks, even though its exchange rate was Rb 3 to 5[588]. Administrative structures of the LSSR formalised such resolutions of the CPSU(b) and started their implementation. On the following day the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR announced the decision of the USSR Government to

release the Rouble into circulation as of November 25[589]. On 22 March 1941 the CC of the CPSU(b) and the CNC of the USSR resolved to remove Litas from the circulation, therefore on March 24 the Bureau of the CC of LCP(b) and the CNC of the LSSR formalised such resolution and announced Rouble to be the sole legal tender as of March 25[590]. On the very same day all savings exceeding LTL 1,000 that residents kept in banks and savings banks were expropriated. As a result, about 10,000 depositors lost their savings totalling to approx. LTL 38,000,000[591].

The Bureau of the CC of LCP(b) and the CNC of the LSSR introduced the same income tax as was applied in the Soviet Union, raised profits tax, tax on land and other taxes, made measures used for the recovery of taxes in arrears more severe[592]. Profits tax for commercial undertakings was raised by 50-100 %, and for industrial enterprises – by 25-100 %. The People's Commissariat of Finance was instructed to recover taxes in arrears and raised taxes from proprietors of nationalised and other enterprises before 1 January 1941. Farmers were heavily burdened with taxes and mandatory delivery of agricultural products (grain deliveries to the State)[593]. The majority of owners of medium or small-sized land parcels were not able to make such payments. More than 1,000 peasants were sued for the failure to meet their obligations. Such measures were intended to pave the way for the collectivisation of farms. The failure to meet obligations was an excellent pretext for the communists to start an ideological campaign directed against the detrimental activities of the so-called kulaks and to disguise the planned mass repressions. When the spring sowing time came some of the landowners did not bother to sow up their fields; they thought that the communists would soon start up collective farms and take away their areas under crops. The Communist Party considered it to be sabotage and started terror activities against them. On May 28 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) gave orders to the Public Prosecutor of the LSSR to institute criminal proceedings against farmers for the so-called sabotage and to impose severe punishments on them, including the confiscation of land, buildings, cattle and other property[594].

The USSR Government wanted to win certain lower sections of the society of the annexed Lithuania over to its side and to make them into the supporters of the totalitarian regime. Therefore it favoured such groups of the society. Following such attitude of the CPSU(b), the administration of the LSSR granted privileges to people who distinguished themselves in the communist movement, also in the occupation and annexation of Lithuania. For example, on August 7 the Council of Ministers of the LSSR assigned the extraordinary benefit of LTL 500 and the pension of LTL 300 to the father of communist Juozas Greifenbergeris who was executed on 27 December 1926[595]. In order to create the system of privileges for the supporters of the regime, on 11 January 1941 the CNC of the LSSR approved regulations (based on the USSR model) for the social welfare of "especially distinguished" persons and their families[596]. Based on such regulations communist movement activists, Soviet statesmen and other zealous supporters of the regime and their family members could receive special

pensions and benefits. They were entitled to such advantages as 50 % discount of the rent and electricity charges, free urban transport, free medical treatment and rest in sanatoria and resorts, special provision, etc. Salaries of Soviet civil servants, especially the staff of the Communist Party machinery, were raised.

An important objective of the CPSU(b) policy pursued in the annexed Lithuania was to regulate and control the private life of people. In order to do that, on August 9 the Council of Ministers of the LSSR passed the laws on matrimony and on civil registration[597]. These were the laws transposed to the annexed Lithuania from the USSR that consolidated the dictatorship of the Soviet State over the private life of people. The Law on Civil Registration introduced the state civil registration. The Law on Matrimony imposed the Bolshevik approach to the role and functions of the family in the totalitarian society as well as the Soviet way of life and Soviet values on the Lithuanian population.

Role of LSSR Administration in Nationalisation of Economics and in Development of System of Planned Economy

In order to transpose and introduce the Soviet economic system into the annexed Lithuanian SSR the CPSU(b) used the administration of the LSSR for the implementation of its economic policy. Such policy was aimed at abolishing the private ownership of means of production and at the introduction of state ownership; at the creation of the state socialist sector by nationalising land, industry, trade and banks and by confiscating the property of its citizens; at the development of socialist mode of production and industrial relations. The key economic goal of the communists was to nationalise the economy and to replace it with the centralised planned economy. By nationalising the private sector, the CPSU(b) also aimed at changing the social structure of the society; its intention was, first, to weaken large, medium and some of the small-scale proprietors of agricultural, industrial, commercial, etc., enterprises economically and then to completely destroy them. Using communist terms, the objective was to liquidate the urban and rural upper bourgeoisie as a class, then to weaken and gradually destroy the medium-scale bourgeoisie, and then to restrict and dispossess the kulaks[598]. Administrative structures of the LSSR did implement such policy of the CPSU(b).

On July 24, August 14 and August 20 the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(b) passed framework resolutions on the implementation of the Soviet economic system in the annexed Lithuania[599]. Public institutions of the USSR concretised such resolutions and made them official by respective acts of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of National Commissioners of the USSR. In order to give an impression that it was the local administration that carried out the sovietisation process in the annexed country, administrative structures of the LSSR were instructed to formalise the decisions of the CPSU(b) and of other political structures of the USSR, also to organise and supervise the implementation of such decisions.

Prior to the nationalisation of private enterprises, V. Dekanozov's machinery ordered to introduce the communist control over such enterprises. At the end of June the communists formed workers' committees out of the Communist Party and trade union activists; such committees were instructed to control the activities of the proprietors and administrations of enterprises, to make a list of the property of such enterprises. In order to prevent workers from acting wilfully and from disorganising the production, the communists gave orders to the workers to avoid self-wilful acts and to make economic demands only through trade unions and Communist Party bodies[600]. On July 11 the Ministry of State Control appointed 172 of its representatives to banks and other credit institutions, industrial enterprises and commercial undertakings in order to supervise their activities and to audit documents, cash and warehouses. At the end of July almost 200 commissioners were sent to larger industrial enterprises by the Ministry of Industry and about 1,600 commissioners – by the Ministry of Trade; they were instructed to supervise the administration of such enterprises. County administrations and local communist structures appointed commissioners to smaller enterprises. When the nationalisation process started, commissioners led nationalisation commissions and administered nationalised enterprises until people's commissariats appointed new directors. Some of the commissioners became the new directors. Commissioners obeyed the instructions of people's commissariats and Communist Party structures and guaranteed the communist control over the nationalisation process and the activities of nationalised enterprises[601].

Respective structures were established for carrying out the nationalisation. On July 26 the Council of Ministers set up the State Commission of Agriculture[602]. A. Zukauskas (A. Žukauskas) was appointed its chairman, and K. Didziulis (K. Didžiulis) and P. Sklerius (P. Šklėrius) – its deputy chairman; members of the commission included M. Meskauskiene (M. Meškauskienė), J. Grigalavicius (J. Grigalavičius), D. Pundzius, R. Zibenka (R. Žibenka), A. Guogis, P. Vasinauskas. The commission had to organise the nationalisation of land, to form the state stock of land and to distribute part of the land to the landless peasants who wished to acquire it. On July 29 the Council of Ministers set up the Nationalisation Commission[603]. Its members included Acting Minister of Industry Ch. Alperavicius (Ch. Alperavičius), Secretary General of the State Control J. Kalvinis and Director of the Department of Finance A. Drobnys. The Commission had to draw the list of facilities to be nationalised, to organise and control the nationalisation process and to take care of all other issues related to the nationalisation, following the instructions of the political institutions of the USSR. In order to control commercial undertakings and to create preconditions for their nationalisation, on August 10 the Government authorised the Ministry of Trade to appoint commissioners to all private commercial undertakings, trade depots, restaurants, hotels, cinemas, etc., which had the annual turnover of LTL 150,000 or higher[604].

The goal of the agrarian policy of the CPSU(b) was to collectivise agriculture. The Lithuanian Communist Party had the same attitude. However, due to various reasons the CPSU(b) did not accelerate the collectivisation of agriculture in the annexed Baltic States[605]. The intention was to follow the so-called Leninist plan of the socialist reorganisation of agriculture and the position of the Communist International. The USSR Government considered the fact that the accelerated collectivisation in Western Ukraine and Belarus in 1939-1940 did not bring the expected results, and that the destabilisation of the economy and provoking of negative reaction of the population would not be to their advantage in the eve of the Soviet-German war. Therefore, the communists did not start the mass collectivisation of farms during the first Soviet occupation. Representatives of the USSR instructed the local administration to nationalise the land and to distribute part of the land to landless peasants and to peasants having little land. In July the administration of the occupied Lithuania started the land reform. The Lithuanian Communist Party expected it to be completed in two or three months; the following actions had to be carried out: nationalisation of the land owned by large and medium-scale landowners in excess of the maximum limit of 30 ha per farm established by the People's Parliament; formation of the state stock of land; assignment of part of land to landless peasants and to peasants having little land.

On August 5 the Council of Ministers of the LSSR passed the resolution on the formation of the state stock of land, and on September 24 – on the distribution of land to farm labourers (commoners), petty tenant farmers, agricultural workers and peasants having little land[606]. Wishing to control the land reform, the CC of the Lithuanian Communist Party ordered to establish agricultural divisions in all county committees[607]. Such divisions had to supervise the activities of agricultural commissions and to appoint commissioners to larger nationalised farms. On September 24 the CNC approved the State Stock of Land formed by the Commission of Agriculture; such stock consisted of 559,913 ha of land expropriated from 26,526 landowners[608]. On November 20 the stock consisted of 607,592 ha of land. In September and October the Commission of Agriculture distributed 576,518 ha of land, out of which 68.3 % was distributed among more than 75,000 families of peasants (each family received approx. 7.53 ha) and 12.6 % – among state farms, machine and tractor stations, cooperatives, other state and public organisations[609]. After the distribution of the expropriated land was completed, on December 17 the Council of National Commissioners liquidated the State Commission of Agriculture as well as commissions of counties and regions[610]. During the land reform land was expropriated from large and medium-scale landowners, Lithuanian nationals who emigrated abroad and former high officials of the Republic of Lithuania; also, farms of large-scale landowners were restricted, while farms of medium-scale landowners were decreased in size. In 1941 taxes were raised and high rates of mandatory grain deliveries to the State were established; thus, the regime economically burdened all large-scale landowners and a major part of medium and small-scale

landowners[611]. The policy of the dispossession of large-scale landowners (the "kulaks") pursued by the communists was directed not only against large-scale farmers but also against medium-scale and even some of the small-scale farmers. The agrarian reform violated the rights of such sections of the society and their economic and property interests.

On April 12 the CNC of the USSR resolved to organise state farms in the LSSR. On the grounds of the above resolution the CNC of the LSSR passed a respective resolution and instructed the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to organise state farms[612].

Following the Soviet model, machine and tractor stations (MTS) and machine and horse leasing centres were established in the LSSR. Their function was to provide services to the newly established state farms and to render assistance to the new settlers who received land as a result of the land reform. On December 13 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) resolved to set up MTS[613]. With the view of implementing communist directives, on 11 January 1941 the CNC of the LSSR authorised the People's Commissariat of Agriculture to set up 50 machine and tractor stations, 3 machine and tractor overhaul shops and 250 machine centres; on 7 March 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) and the CNC of the LSSR resolved to set up machine and horse leasing centres under MTS[614]. On February 19-20 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the Communist Party structures to select candidate directors of MTS and present them to the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) for approval[615].

In July the communists started the nationalisation of the large industry and banks. The CC of the LCP drafted plans for the nationalisation of industrial enterprises and banks and appointed commissioners to the facilities under nationalisation. On July 27-28 the CC of the LCP and the Ministry of Industry held a meeting of commissioners in order to discuss the nationalisation of industrial enterprises. It was instructed to carry out the nationalisation of enterprises within a few days without discontinuing their operations or disorganising the production[616]. Following the directives from the representatives of the USSR, on July 25 the Council of Ministers passed the Law on Nationalisation of Large Industry and Banks[617]. On the following day J. Paleckis announced the Law on Nationalisation of Banks. On that ground on July 27-29 the Ministry of State Control nationalised 46 credit institutions (202 credit institutions if branches were added on); the capital of such nationalised credit institutions totalled LTL 113.8 million, the real estate and the movable property was valued at LTL 33.4 million[618]. Only credit cooperatives under the control of the Ministry of State Control escaped the nationalisation. It took two months for the Ministry of Industry to nationalise all industrial enterprises employing more than 20 workers, also enterprises employing at least 10 workers and having mechanical engines important for that branch of industry. The nationalisation process was later expanded to include smaller enterprises as well. By 1 October 1940 administrative structures of the LSSR nationalised 562 industrial firms, and by 1 June 1941 – approximately 1,000 large and

medium-scale industrial enterprises the total value of which was LTL 413,4 million[619]. By a decision of the nationalisation commission, the proprietors of nationalised enterprises had to repay all debts incurred by their enterprises prior to the nationalisation using their personal property. Thus, their personal savings were also expropriated. Commissioners chosen by the communists and appointed by the Ministry of State Control supervised activities of the nationalised facilities. The majority of them later became directors of banks and other credit institutions. Nationalised enterprises were used for the increase of the state property of the USSR and for the formation of the state economic sector in the Lithuanian SSR. The nationalisation abolished the private ownership of means of production, undermined the economic power of large and medium-scale industrialists, and violated their rights as well as economic and property interests. The nationalisation also violated the interests of foreign investors whose investments into the Lithuanian industry totalled LTL 35.7.

On September 26 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) discussed the nationalisation of private trade. It was decided that all undertakings with the annual turnover of LTL 150,000 or higher should be nationalised without compensation[620]. The communists approved the list of undertakings to be nationalised and gave the People's Commissariat of Trade three days to nationalise such undertakings without discontinuing their activities. The Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR formalised resolutions of the CPSU(b) and LCP(b): on the following day the Presidium issued a decree ordering the nationalisation of private commercial undertakings[621]. On the very same day the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR instructed the People's Commissariat of Trade to nationalise undertakings and to appoint commissioners for the administration of nationalised undertakings[622]. Commissariats were given the freedom to entrust former proprietors of commercial undertakings with the administration of nationalised undertakings for some time and under the supervision of commissioners. On October 2-3 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) discussed the progress of the nationalisation[623]. As some of the proprietors of commercial undertakings decreased their annual turnover in order to escape the nationalisation, the communists instructed the People's Commissariat of Trade to find out such undertakings and to nationalise them. By February of 1941 the administrative structures of the LSSR nationalised 1,597 commercial undertakings, which had the total annual turnover of LTL 500 million, assets of LTL 211 million, and were owned by approximately 1,500 proprietors and their family members. More than 80 % of the nationalised undertakings were owned by the Jews. Nationalised commercial undertakings also included 27 undertakings owned by proprietors who repatriated to Germany. Articles of gold and other jewellery withdrawn from jewellers' were valued at LTL 1,237 million[624]. After the nationalisation was completed, only 10 % of small shops remained privately owned[625].

Other facilities were nationalised following the same procedure. On July 30 the Council of Ministers of the LSSR passed the Law on Sequestration of Premises, which was amended on August

16[626]. August 9 saw the nationalisation of Kaunas Jewish Hospital, and August 16 – the nationalisation of hospitals, sanatoriums and other medical institutions financed by organisations and private individuals[627]. Directives of the Communist Party regarding the nationalisation of facilities were made official by decrees of the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR. On September 27 a decree was issued on the nationalisation of publishing houses and bookshops, on October 8 – on the nationalisation of navigation companies, marine and inland water transport, on October 28 – on the nationalisation of private cinemas, hotels, pharmacies, medicinal product stores, chemical and pharmaceutical enterprises, on October 31 – on the privatisation of large residential houses, on December 24 – on the privatisation of buses and lorries, etc.[628] The Council of National Commissioners passed similar resolutions. For example, on October 10-11 the CNC announced resolutions on the nationalisation of passenger vehicles, private cinemas, etc.[629]

On September 27 the CNC of the LSSR instructed the People's Commissariat of Trade to nationalise publishing houses and bookshops[630]. The State Publishing House was established under the CNC of the LSSR, which took over 10 nationalised companies, bookshops (including publishing houses that belonged to such bookshops) and 4 previously nationalised printing houses.

On October 26 the Council of National Commissioners instructed the People's Commissariats of Finance and State Control and the representatives of the People's Commissariat of Inland Water Transport of the USSR to nationalise navigation companies, marine and inland water transport[631]. These administrative structures nationalised 6 sea-going vessels, 7 river steamers, larger barges and motor vessels with the total value of LTL 13.2 million. As the majority of vessels were owned by foreigners, the regime wanted to give an impression that some property interests were indeed considered. Therefore, the CNC instructed the People's Commissariat of Finance to assign funds for the compensation of 25 % of the value of nationalised vessels. A structural subdivision of the People's Commissariat of Inland Water Transport of the USSR, i.e. the State River Navigation of the LSSR, was established and entrusted with the administration of the inland water transport. The port of Šventoji and 5 steamships were handed over to the People's Commissariat of the Merchant Marine of the USSR.

On October 28 the CNC of the LSSR gave orders to the People's Commissariat of Municipal Economy to nationalise and take over hotels and hostels, to the People's Commissariat of Health – private pharmacies, also medical product, dressing, ontology, and medical equipment stores and companies, chemical and pharmaceutical laboratories[632]. On November 26 the People's Commissariat of Municipal Economy was instructed to nationalise large residential houses in Vilnius, Kaunas, Šiauliai and Panevėžys the area of which exceeded 220 m^2 and in other cities – houses the area of which exceeded 170 m^2 [633]. Irrespective of their area, houses of all liquidated public and political organisations and all persons who emigrated abroad or went into hiding were nationalised. Workers'

houses and houses of the so-called labour intelligentsia were not nationalised for ideological reasons, even though their area exceeded the established standard. In order to increase the scale of nationalisation of private houses, on 22 February 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) gave orders to nationalise residential houses owned by the so-called non-working class elements and approved a respective decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR[634]. By the spring of 1941 the People's Commissariat of Municipal Economy nationalised about 12,000 houses with the total area of over 4 million m^2. It comprised more than one half of the total urban housing resources of the LSSR.

On December 24 the CNC of the LSSR instructed the People's Commissariat of Municipal Economy to nationalise private busses, lorries, garages, workshops and bus stations[635]. On 22 February 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) gave orders to extend the nationalisation of transportation to passenger vehicles of the so-called non-working class elements[636]. An appropriate decree was issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR. On the grounds of such communist directive and resolutions of the administrative structures of the LSSR 320 buses and 630 lorries[637] owned by private individuals were nationalised. On 13 March 1941 the CNC of the LSSR instructed the People's Commissariat of Municipal Economy to employ provisional executive committees and "municipalize" baths, automated laundries, dry-cleaners and dye-houses owned by the so-called non-working class people[638].

At the end of 1940 cooperative enterprises were nationalised. At the instruction of the communists, small producers' cooperative associations were either liquidated or reorganised into public cooperative associations. For example, on 30 January 1941 the CNC of the LSSR closed cooperative associations of meat producers and authorised the People's Commissariat of Food Industry, its company "Maistas" and the Organisation Bureau of the Cooperative of Home Economics to take over their assets[639]. Based on "Lietūkis", the Consumers' Cooperative Societies Union of the LSSR was established; "Pienocentras" and "Sodyba" were handed over to the People's Commissariat of Food Industry and became its trusts, while "Linas" became a division of flax purveyance office of the USSR[640].

In order to regulate the management of the nationalised property, the CNC of the LSSR drafted Regulations for the Management of Nationalised, Confiscated and Other Expropriated Property by the Soviet State[641] (based on the USSR model). According to such Regulations, all nationalised property became the property of the Soviet Union. Part of it was handed over to the administrative structures of the USSR or the LSSR, other state and public organisations. Such structures and organisations were allowed to sell part of the nationalised property following the procedure established by the People's Commissariat of Finance.

The nationalisation defined by the CPSU(b) and carried out by the administrative structures of the LSSR destroyed the market economy based on private and cooperative property, deprived the Lithuanian people of the right to private property and violated economic and property interests of some sections of the society. The nationalisation first of all aimed at restricting the rights and property interests of the upper and middle class of the society, large, medium and some of the small-scale proprietors of agricultural and industrial enterprises, commercial undertakings, etc.

Having completed the nationalisation of economics, the Government of the USSR proceeded with including the economy of the Lithuanian SSR into the economic system of the Soviet Union, with the development of planned economy based on state ownership, and with the implementation of the unified and centralised management of economics. The LSSR administration started the implementation of the policy pursued by the CPSU(b), viz. the sovietisation of economics of the Lithuanian SSR.

The Government of the USSR used the nationalised assets for the formation of the property of the Soviet Union. Nationalised enterprises formed the basis for the development of industry of the LSSR. The CPSU(b) instructed the LSSR administration to use the nationalised property at its disposal and to administer the state property. The centralised planned management of the economy was transposed to the Lithuanian SSR, and the territorial trade management system was introduced. In order to impose severe regulation and control of activities of all branches of economy and state industrial enterprises, the economic administration machinery was rapidly expanded. As a result of the nationalisation of means of production and a large concentration of assets in the hands of the government of the USSR and of local administrative structures (ehich had such property at their disposal) the Lithuanian SSR saw the formation of the same bureaucratic system as in the Soviet Union. A new section of economic administrators and managers of the state property of the LSSR, i.e. the future economic nomenclature, developed. The main body of such section was composed of the senior and middle level officials of people's commissariats that administered economic branches and enterprises, also of commissioners and directors of enterprises and heads of industrial divisions of the LCP structures.

The centralised system of economic planning, distribution and accounting was introduced into the LSSR. The Communist Party and the administrative structures planned production, supply and sales; they distributed material, technical and financial resources and regulated other issues related to the organisation of the manufacturing procedure. The 1941 economic plan of the LSSR and plans for individual industries were drafted in compliance with directives of the Government and administrative institutions of the USSR. In September of 1940 the CNC of the LSSR established deadlines and the procedure of drafting the economic plan of the LSSR[642]. The State Planning Commission of the LSSR had to draft the plan using the model of the USSR and submit it to the Council of National

Commissioners for discussion. The CNC had to coordinate the plan with the CC of the LCP(b), i.e. with secretaries and divisions of the CC of the LCP(b) that were in charge of certain fields. After it was approved by the communists, the plan had to be submitted to the State Planning Commission (the Gosplan) of the USSR, the CNC of the USSR and the CC of the CPSU(b) for approval. In reality, the economic plan of the LSSR was drafted using the guidelines provided by the Gosplan and considering the funds expected to be allocated by the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR. The State Planning Commission had to establish specific indicators, which had to be further defined by a respective people's commissariat together with the division of the CC of the LCP(b) that supervised its activities. The State Planning Commission did not take the opinion of local administrators into consideration and regarded the position of the Gosplan, which was in conformity with the attitude of the leadership of the CPSU(b). In order to sustain the growth of extensive economics, the leadership of the CPSU(b) continuously forced the planning bodies of the USSR to raise targets without considering the resources. As opposed to political structures, the administrative institutions were interested in setting realistic targets in order for the enterprises under their control to achieve them. In the course of drafting the economic plan of the LSSR the desires of the State Planning Commission and its supporter, i.e. the leadership of the LCP(b), to speed up the industrial growth and increase the production clashed with the efforts of people's commissariats to set such indicators that would be in conformity with the existing resources. Differences in understanding economic and social priorities as well as the rate and cost of the industrialisation became obvious. For political and ideological considerations, especially considering the desire to compare economic growth rates in the Republic of Lithuania with those in the Lithuanian SSR, the attitude of the communists prevailed. On October 24 the CNC of the LSSR approved the draft plan. After a long period of coordination with the CC of the LCP(b) and the Gosplan of the USSR, the draft plan was submitted to the Government of the USSR. On 28 January 1941 the CC of the CPSU(b) and the CNC of the USSR adopted the 1941 economic plan of the LSSR. It was then approved by the CC of the LCP(b) and the CNC of the LSSR, which also instructed the Communist Party and the administrative structures to control the implementation of the plan[643].

In the spring of 1941 the administrators realised that the plan was too difficult to be implemented. In order to forestall the criticism of the communists, some national commissioners started looking for somebody to blame. Planning bodies, supplying institutions and transportation departments, especially the Railway Administration, were perfect for the role. Also, accusations poured on the State Planning Commission for drafting the plan "out of the touch with reality". Influential Communist Party and administrative leaders did try to adjust plans. For example, M. Sumauskas (M. Šumauskas) convinced the Gosplan of the USSR that the economic plan was not practicable, and permission was given to the People's Commissariat of Local Industry to lower the

targets. All M. Sumauskas had to do was to agree with the Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the LSSR P. Glovackis on the amendments and to formalise them accordingly. Not wishing to set precedent, the latter stubbornly refused to make amendments to the plan approved by the leadership of the Communist Party. A. Snieckus (A. Sniečkus) hesitated as well. On the one hand he agreed with the arguments of M. Sumauskas and other national commissioners, on the other hand he wanted to escape the possible negative reaction of the CC of the CPSU(b). The idea to stick to the plan established by the Party and thus to create the image of a politically reliable national authority capable to withstand the pressure from the administrative structures outweighed. The discussion of plan-related issues revealed A. Snieckus' intentions, viz. to strengthen his position in the political bureaucracy of the USSR, to create the image of a reliable individual who weighs all circumstances, a leader capable of "state" thinking, capable to overcome departmental interests of local bureaucracy and to subordinate them to the policy of the Party. A. Snieckus pointed out to administrators that all decisions made by the Party could be adjusted only following the established bureaucratic procedure, strictly adhering to all Party subordination rules (i.e. all issues had to be coordinated with the LCP(b) structures first), that they should not "fight like M. Sumauskas and P. Glovackis did". It was the very first time that he criticized M. Sumauskas in public for the following unreliable and inconsistent behaviour: he tried to have the production reduced, but at the same time he did his best in order to receive more resources for the industry; he demanded and achieved the lowering of general targets of the plan for the local industry by the Gosplan, but at the same time he showered the CC of the LCP(b) with his requests to include the unscheduled construction of facilities into the plan and to assign additional funds and other resources for such construction. However, his initiative and "fighting" was to M. Sumauskas' advantage. He acquired the reputation of an active administrator who took care of his institution and of the field that such institution regulated, he tried to represent the interests of the local administration and of the economic nomenclature that started to take shape. Soon he was appointed the Deputy Chairman of the Council of National Commissioners in charge of the economic sector. The discussion of the economic plan of the LSSR demonstrated the technocratic attitude of M. Sumauskas and other national commissioners towards economic issues, their efforts to separate the political interests of the Party from the needs of the industries and to give priority to the latter in the economic regulation field. The LSSR administration supervising the economic sector started taking over technocratic attitudes and jurisdiction of the USSR structures that directly administered economics. The Lithuanian SSR saw the formation of the economic nomenclature, which tried to reduce the influence of the Communist Party structures to the administration of economics, and to concentrate actual leverage of the economic planning and control of the functioning of economics into its hands. This witnessed the efforts of some sections of the bureaucracy to separate the fields of political leadership and administration.

Role of LSSR Administration in Sovietisation of Culture, Education and Information

An important objective of the policy pursued by the CPSU(b) in the annexed Lithuania was the sovietisation of the spiritual life of the population and its subordination to the interests of the totalitarian State and the Communist power. In order to implement such goals the Communist Party started to destroy education, culture and science of the Republic of Lithuania and to introduce the cultural, educational and scientific system of the USSR[644]. The CPSU(b) pursued such policy with the assistance of its territorial organisation, viz. the LCP(b), and the administrative structures of the LSSR under the guidance of the CPSU(b) and the institutions of the Soviet Government.

The Bolsheviks viewed education as the means to shape the Soviet society and as an instrument to subordinate the society to the interests of the Soviet State and the Communist power. Therefore, the introduction of the so-called socialist educational system into the LSSR was a very important objective of the CPSU(b) policy. The Communist Party sought to expand the network of schools of general and adult education so as to include different sections of the society. The goal was to use the process of learning for indoctrinating people with the Marxist outlook on the world and the society, with the Bolshevik doctrine and ideology, and with communist values. The educational system had to subordinate the society to the Soviet State and power. Under the totalitarian regime the school was the instrument that the communists used to control the spiritual and the private life. For propagandistic reasons the regime sough to create an impression that it encouraged education, that there were more educational establishments and students in the Soviet Union and that the Government assigned more funding to education than any other country of the world.

The Lithuanian SSR saw the implementation of the Soviet educational model using administrative methods. As early as July 1 the People's Government banned the religious instruction at schools and excluded teachers of religion from the school staff. Pursuant to such resolution, teachers of religion were dismissed from schools. On August 8 and August 24 all training and educational establishments were nationalised. Following the instructions of the People's Commissariat of Education of the USSR, the People's Commissariat of the LSSR ordered schools to organise and carry out the process of teaching according to new educational programmes. These were the educational programmes of Soviet schools adapted to the conditions of the Lithuanian SSR. As a result, all courses conflicting with the Bolshevik ideology were removed from school curricula and the content of many courses, especially the humanities, was changed. Such courses as the history of Lithuania and the Lithuanian literature suffered most of the changes. Students were taught to view natural and social phenomena and the process of history based on the Marxist and Bolshevik doctrine and ideology. In order to ideologically affect students, the course on the USSR constitution and other ideological courses were introduced in the schools of the LSSR. The mandatory teaching of the Russian language was introduced against the will of the majority of students and their parents. Soviet textbooks or their

compendia replaced textbooks published in the Republic of Lithuania. As new textbooks of history, literature and other courses were not ready for the 1940-1941 academic year, pages in conflict with the communist ideology were simply ripped out of the old textbooks. At the same time the commission led by the Deputy National Commissioner of Education L. Gira started to confiscate books in conflict with the Bolshevik ideology from school libraries. Books by Lithuanian, Russian and other writers as well as works by world literature classics have been withdrawn.

The Communist Party structures controlled the activities of educational establishments. The Propaganda Division (and later – school divisions) of the CC of the LCP(b) supervised the People's Commissariat of Education, while territorial organisations of the LCP(b) controlled educational divisions of provisional executive committees and local educational establishments, including schools. The Communist Party and the Young Communist League (the Komsomol) interfered in the activities of schools and teachers and tried to ideologise and politicise students. In order to strengthen the control that the Communist Party and the Komsomol structures exercised over the training and educational process, on October 30 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) established 40 fully-paid jobs for the Komsomol organisers in gymnasiums and progymnasiums[645]. Jobs for pioneer leaders were provided as well. On October 8 the People's Commissariat of Education instructed schools to establish Komsomol organisations, and on October 14 – pioneer organisations[646].

Following the example of the USSR, the LSSR administration started the campaign of abolition of illiteracy and semi-literacy in 1941. The communists and members of the Komsomol politicised and ideologised the campaign. They sought to set off measures undertaken by the Soviet Government in the field of education against the education policy of the Republic of Lithuania, to belittle the efforts of the Lithuanian State in raising the level of education, and to indoctrinate illiterate and uneducated people with the communist ideology using the campaign of abolition of illiteracy. The communists wanted to instil the educational workers and the society with the notion that the Government of the Republic of Lithuania was interested in sustaining the illiteracy and that such illiteracy was a natural result of its education policy. The objective of the campaign of abolition of illiteracy was to help create the image of the regime and to attract uneducated people. People to whom the Soviet Government helped receive education were expected to identify themselves with the regime. On February 22 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the People's Commissariat of Education to abolish illiteracy that was the consequence of "Smetona's regime" and "an obstacle for the working people to build socialism"[647]. The content and the direction of the campaign clearly indicated its ideological aspect. The campaign was organised by the Communist Party and the Komsomol structures that had very few educated people among their members. Very often the teachers of illiterate people were semi-literate communists, members of the Komsomol and other activists of the regime. They were mostly concerned with teaching people some reading skills very

quickly (within several months) in order for them to read communist reading material. Educational workers realised that the campaign of abolition of illiteracy organised by the communists could not provide people with any systematic knowledge. Some leaders of the LSSR administration, especially J. Paleckis, M. Gedvilas (who himself worked as a teacher for a long time) and the governing body of the People's Commissariat of Education, viewed the abolition of illiteracy in a different light. To their opinion, the most important priority of the education reform was the introduction of compulsory primary education.

The higher education system was modelled on the Soviet system as well. On July 16 the Government of the LSSR closed down the Faculty of Theology and Philosophy of Vytautas the Great University[648]. Institutions of higher learning were reorganised and expanded. In order to devalue the level of preparation of students by institutions of higher learning, especially by the universities, the LSSR administration followed the Soviet example and reorganised junior colleges into institutions of higher learning. Institutions of higher learning saw the introduction of the instruction system based on courses and sessions (just like in the USSR); also, educational plans and programmes were changed, and the compulsory course in Marxism and Leninism was introduced. Under the guidance of the CC of the LCP(b) departments of Marxism and Leninism were set up, which had to indoctrinate students and their teachers with Marxism and Leninism. As during the times of Stalin the Bolshevism was identified with the dogmatic views and schemes of Stalin, it was revolting even to the teachers supporting the ideas of Marxism. Professors and students of Lithuanian universities who prior to Lithuania's occupation studied or worked in scientific surroundings that differed from those of the USSR found it hard to understand the doctrine of the Bolshevism due to its conflict with the reality, its scholastic nature and the abundance of statements that were illogical and contradicted one another. The majority of teachers and students were well grounded in their assessment of the Bolshevism as a utopian and futuristic scheme. Confronted with such situation the CC of the CPSU(b) sent teachers of Marxism and Leninism to Lithuanian institutions of higher learning from the Soviet Union. Local communists also showed interest in teaching Marxism. The CC of the LCP(b) employed communists who did not even have a secondary education as teachers or lecturers at the institutions of higher learning.

In order to have institutions of higher learning under the control of the Communist Party structures, the CC of the LCP(b) provided a group of communists with permanent jobs at institutions of higher learning. On 2 February 1941 the CC approved the Party organisers intended for institutions of higher learning. Their task was to set up the Communist Party groups there. The Party organisers and other communists who were provided with jobs at schools controlled the activities of school administration, the content of the teaching process, watched the behaviour of teachers and students. The LCP(b) used the Young Communist League of Lithuania (the Lithuanian Komsomol) in order to

indoctrinate students and to have them under the control of the communists. The Lithuanian Komsomol established its organisations in institutions of higher learning; such organisations tried to control the spiritual life of students and to win them over.

As it was mentioned before, the regime tried to create obstacles for young people from well-to-do or the middle class families to acquire secondary and university education. They had to pay for their studies, they were deprived of the opportunity to receive scholarships or get a place in a student dormitory. Communists and the Communist Party structures supervising institutions of higher learning sought to reduce the university enrolment of young people from well-to-do families. For political and ideological reasons the regime favoured young people from the lower class. They were exempt from study fees, the majority of them received scholarships, and many of them were provided with residence in student dormitories. In order to make the enrolment of such young people easier and to change the social composition of institutions of higher learning, especially the universities of Vilnius and Kaunas ("to make universities more proletarian"), preparatory courses for young people from the lower class were introduced at the universities of Vilnius and Kaunas. Uneducated young people attended such courses, received their school leaving certificates and had no trouble enrolling to universities. In this way the regime was shaping the student body into politically reliable and socially close to the regime. Following their graduation from institutions of higher learning such people had to form the main body of the new Soviet intelligentsia.

After the Bolsheviks usurped the power, the science had to undergo the same transformation as all other fields. The process of scientific knowledge was subdued to the practical needs of the Soviet State and power, and to ideological interests. The Communist Party was mostly interested in the applicability of scientific research and the possibility to use the research results for dealing with economic and ideological issues of the CPSU(b) policy. Therefore, they shaped the activities of scientific institutions into dealing with issues important to the state and power, especially related to the prospecting and study of natural resources, distribution and development of productive forces, development of industrial know-how and military equipment. From the very birth of the Bolshevism it viewed the humanities, especially history, as subjects that should interpret the development of the man and the society based on the doctrine of Marxism and Bolshevism (which was a strain of Marxism). Social and political phenomena should ideologically substantiate the futuristic projects of the Communist Party and the Party activities undertaken in order to implement such projects. Having made the applicability of the humanities absolute, the Bolsheviks viewed them pragmatically as fields that should frame the laws of social development and control, present the ruling party with recensions how to regulate social processes, exercise overall rule and control the society. As a result of the extensive Soviet science model and in order to demonstrate its alleged growth to the world, the Soviet Union saw the foundation of many state research establishments of different subordination (and

frequently duplicating one another's activities) and the growth of the number of people engaged in this field. The State Academy of Sciences was incorporated; it had to coordinate the activities of its subordinated institutes and to direct them in favour of the regime. The Communist Party controlled Soviet scientific establishments by administrative methods and using financial, staff and other leverage.

The model of the Soviet science and the Soviet scientific system organisation scheme was transposed to the Lithuanian SSR. All scientific centres were closed down and the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR was established based on the Soviet model. Research centres subordinated to the Academy or to other structures were set up. In order to win the scientific society over, the communists tried to give an impression that they would support an independent development of science and would not regulate the process of scientific knowledge. They did not advertise the principles and objectives of the policy pursued by the CPSU(b) in the field of science; rather, they emphasised their alleged concern with the development of science. Administrative structures were entrusted with the organisation of scientific institutions modelled on the Soviet type. However, the communists reserved the formation of the governing body of the Academy to themselves.

On 16 January 1941 the CNC of the LSSR closed down the Institute of Lithuanian Philology and established the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR under the CNC of the LSSR instead[649]. An organisational committee was set up in order to organise a scientific institution of the Soviet type. It was presided by prof. V. Kreve-Mickevicius (V. Krėvė-Mickevičius), its members included prof. M. Birziska (M. Biržiška), prof. St. Kolupaila, prof. V. Kuzma, prof. A. Purenas (A. Purėnas), prof. A. Rimka and A. Venclova. On 10 March the Council of National Commissioners approved the statute of the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR[650]. This statute was the discourse of the statutes of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and republican academies of sciences adapted to the Lithuanian SSR. The statute declared that the Academy of Sciences was the supreme scientific institution of the LSSR under the direct subordination to the CNC of the LSSR. The Academy had to unite scientific forces "for the improvement of the scientific potential and for dealing with scientific issues in the life of the Lithuanian SSR". The statute outlined the objectives and the priority activities of the Academy of Sciences. Apart from objectives general to all academies of sciences of the USSR, the statute also declared the commitment to investigate issues related to the Lithuanian SSR. In the field of the humanities, social and economic sciences such objectives included studies of the past and the present of the LSSR, its culture, its social, economic and national composition, the Lithuanian literary language, folklore, etc. In the field of natural sciences it included the investigation of nature and natural resources of the LSSR. The statute gave the priority to the humanities, social, economic and natural sciences and to issues related to the needs of the LSSR. In the Soviet Union the research in the field of mathematics and technical sciences was concentrated in central scientific institutes. Therefore,

they were not even mentioned in the statute of the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR. Most probably it was somewhat influenced by the fact that at that time the LSSR had no potential for the development of such research. For example, the 13 members of the Academy of Sciences included 1 doctor of philosophy and philology (V. Kreve-Mickevicius), 1 professor of philosophy, 3 professors of philology, 1 professor of law, 2 professors of economics, 1 professor of medicine, 2 professors of chemistry, 2 professors of natural sciences and not a single representative of such fields as mathematics, physics or technical sciences. The statute defined the composition of the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR and provided for the establishment of three divisions, viz. the division of the humanities, the division of social and economic sciences and the division of natural sciences.

On April 2 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) appointed 13 full members of the Academy of Sciences who were nominated by the machinery of the CC of the LCP(b)[651]. On April 9 the Council of National Commissioners approved such resolution of the Communist Party[652]. A meeting was held on April 18, which announced the formation of the Presidium of the Academy and the election of secretaries of three scientific divisions. In May of 1941 six institutes were established following the administrative procedure[653].

Some sections of the scientific society of the LSSR favoured the establishment of the Academy. Even though it was established by the Soviet Government and was under the guidance of the Communist Party from the start, they believed that the communists would not directly interfere with scientific research. Illusions that the communists would not interfere with scientific research were also supported by the fact that the communists were poorly educated, therefore they could not understand scientific activities or give an expert assessment of the results. The Soviet-German war broke out before the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR had time to commence any scientific research (except for research performed by individual scientists). Therefore, there was no time to realise that the structures of the CPSU(b) used not only the direct dictatorship for the control of scientific activities but other leverage as well.

The Communist Party introduced a strict control of the press and literature. On September 11 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) established that the periodicals could only be published with the authorisation of the CC of the LCP(b); the CC of the LCP(b) was also in charge of appointing editors[654]. Publications were forbidden to publish Government resolutions or declarations, unless specifically sanctioned by the CC of the LCP(b) and the CNC of the LSSR. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) introduced censorship and established the official censorship body, viz. the Main Administration for Literary Affairs under the CNC of the LSSR (the Glavlit). The Administration was instructed to censor all publications and to withdraw books in political and ideological conflict with the regime from all libraries and bookshops. By withdrawing and destroying books undesirable to the

communists, the Communist Party sought to create conditions that would help the Party impose the Bolshevik doctrine and ideology on the society.

In order to tighten the control over the media and the official communication channels between the USSR Government and the society, on August 23 ELTA was subordinated to the Council of Ministers of the LSSR[655]. On September 26 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) appointed Leibas Sausas (Leibas Šausas) as the director of ELTA[656]. On 19 March 1941 he was demoted and became a deputy director[657].

The subordination of the periodicals was also changed. Newspapers became a body of administrative structures or organisations, and were completely dependent on them. On September 11 newspaper "Tarybų Lietuva" (formerly "Darbo Lietuva") and "Truženik" became a body of the Supreme Soviet, "Valstiečių laikraštis" – a body of the CC of the LCP(b), "Tiesa" – a body of the CC of the LCP(b) and the Committee of Kaunas, "Komjaunimo tiesa" and "Pionierius" – a body of the Central Committee of the Komsomol and the Committee of Kaunas, while "Darbininkų žodis" – a body of the Central Organisational Bureau of Trade Unions. The Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR issued a decree, thus formalising the Communist Party decision regarding newspapers "Tarybų Lietuva" and "Truženik", and appointing Jonas Simkus (Jonas Šimkus) to be the editor-in-chief of "Tarybų Lietuva" and Eugenijus Vicas – the editor-in-chief of "Truženik"[658]. On December 8 newspaper "Folksblat" was reorganised into "Emes", which became a body of the CC of the LCP(b)[659]. Communist Joselis Sochatas (Joselis Šochatas) was appointed its editor. On September 17 the CNC of the LSSR closed down "Vyriausybės žinios"[660].

On September 11 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) gave the permission to the Organisational Committee of Soviet writers of Lithuania to publish its newspaper and appointed Petras Cvirka its editor. In April of 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) decided to name it "Literatūra ir menas" and asked the CC of the CPSU(b) for the permission to publish the newspaper[661]. The month of March saw the reorganisation of magazines "Žemės ūkis", "Žemėtvarka ir melioracija", "Veterinarija ir zootechnika" and "Naujoji sodyba" into magazine "Žemės ūkis"[662]. The National Commissioner of Agriculture B. Leonas Pusinis (B. Leonas-Pušinis) was appointed its editor-in-chief.

In order to expand the communist propaganda the LCP(b) kept establishing new bodies of the communist press. The idea was for each county to have its communist newspaper that would spread the Bolshevik ideology among the population. On December 8 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) gave orders to the Division of Propaganda and Agitation to immediately organise the publishing of communist newspapers in four counties[663]. The CC of the CPSU(b) was asked for the permission to establish communist newspapers in all counties. There was a shortage of staff-members, therefore the Division of Propaganda and Agitation was instructed to organise courses and in one month and a half to have 40 to 50 people trained for the job in the field of communist press. The Communist Party

structures had to supervise editorial offices of communist newspapers, to control the content of the periodicals, especially the political and ideological aspect, and to select the staff. Communist newspapers were not very popular among the population, and the communist structures could not sell them. Communist newspapers in the Lithuanian language were especially loss-making. Almost on a monthly basis the leadership of the LCP(b) instructed the Council of National Commissioners to make budgetary assignations against losses sustained by its newspapers. For example, on December 29 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the CNC to assign Rb 331,615 in order to redeem debts incurred by five communist newspapers, including Rb 160,000 against the loses sustained by the main semi-official newspaper of the CC of the LCP(b) "Tiesa"[664].

The purging of books conflicting with the regime was started already in June of 1940. Under the instruction of V. Dekanozov's structure, on June 20 the Minister of Education issued a circular note ordering to withdraw works by A. Smetona and works by other authors about A. Smetona from bookshops and libraries[665]. On the following month the Ministry instructed to withdraw publications criticising the Soviet power and the communist system from libraries. In the spring of 1941 the Glavlit started inspecting libraries and bookshops and withdrawing books undesirable to the regime. 30,000 books were withdrawn by May.

In order to speed up the withdrawal of books undesirable to the communists from libraries and bookshops, on 28 May 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) gave orders to the Glavlit to speed up the process[666]. The Party structures were authorised to set up special communist brigades that would withdraw such books within 2 weeks. The Glavlit and the People's Commissariat of Education were instructed to establish special divisions for keeping such withdrawn books (special holdings) under the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR, universities of Vilnius and Kaunas, central libraries of Vilnius and Kaunas. With the view of implementing the communist directive, the Glavlit withdrew 18,542 books and destroyed 45,500 kg of publications by June 21[667]. The campaign for the destruction of books undertaken by the Glavlit under the guidance of the communists was extremely detrimental to the Lithuanian culture and the spiritual life of the society. The door was closed for the society to get to know the works of the world literature, belles-lettres, scientific works, etc. The right to information and to scientific and cultural achievements was restricted. Such activities of the communists demonstrated their nihilistic attitude towards cultural values in conflict with the ideological canons of the Bolshevism.

In order to introduce the Soviet model of culture into Lithuania, the Lithuanian Communist Party pursued the policy of the CPSU(b) in the field of culture. The communists sought to implement the Bolshevik concept of culture socialist in content and national in form. The idea was to form a unified culture based on the Bolshevik ideology and values in which the nationality would be an optional and ideologically unacceptable superficial attribute. Culture was inflicted with ideological

functions to indoctrinate the society. Under the totalitarian regime culture was an instrument of the communist control over the spiritual and private life of the society and private individuals. Because of the unified cultural model and the centralised control of all spheres of life of the society, the Lithuanian SSR experienced the introduction of the same cultural content, forms of cultural life and the centralised culture control model as anywhere else in the Soviet Union. The CPSU(b) used the Party structures and state institutes to dictate to cultural establishments and control their activities[668]. Administrative structures of the LSSR were used for the implementation of such cultural policy pursued by the CPSU(b).

Cultural establishments were supervised by the Division of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the LCP(b), they were under the direct guidance and control of the People's Commissariat of Education of the LSSR and (since 1941) the Committee of Art under the CNC of the LSSR. Following the Soviet model, in the spring of 1941 the process was started under which the subordination of all museums and institutions of protection of cultural monuments had to be transferred to the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR. As in the USSR, on August 5 archives of all ministries were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior[669]. On August 16 the Council of Ministers resolved to establish an Archive Division in the Ministry of the Interior that would supervise and control the activities of archives, and on August 20 the Council passed the Law on Archives[670]. The People's Commissariat of the Interior became the body of administration, supervision and control of the system of archives. On 12 April 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(b) gave orders to the Lithuanian communist organisation to establish the archive of the Communist Party documents. On that ground the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) established the Communist Party Archive on May 28[671]. The Personnel Division of the CC of the LCP(b) was instructed to select staff members for the archive, and the special secretary was instructed to organise the transfer of documents of the Communist Party structures to the archive and to ensure their security.

The cultural establishment system was reorganised following the Soviet model. On December 8 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) resolved to reorganise cultural centres into reading-rooms in regions and towns and into recreation centres in cities[672]. The People's Commissariat of Education was instructed to establish reading-rooms in places that did not have them. The reorganised cultural centres were nationalised. The Communist Party and the administrative structures were instructed to regulate and control their activities. Reading-rooms and recreation centres had to perform ideological functions, i.e. to spread the Bolshevik ideology and to implement forms and traditions of the Soviet cultural life.

Nationalised museums, libraries and other cultural and educational establishments had to perform the same ideological functions. The Museum of Ecclesiastical Art was closed down, as it was unacceptable to the regime from the ideological point of view. New museums were established

following the Soviet model, viz. Museum of People's Struggle in Kaunas, State Museum of Fine Arts, State Literature Museum, A. Miczkiewicz Museum and Pushkin Museum in Vilnius, Museum of Regional Studies in Rokiškis, Švenčionys, Utena, etc. Even amateur art was used for the ideological indoctrination of the society. Following the Soviet model, in April of 1941 the Republican Centre of Folk Art was established; its objective was to steer amateur groups from cherishing the folk art and traditions of the Lithuanian people to the implementation of the Soviet culture and Bolshevik traditions.

In order to implement the Soviet culture the USSR model was followed and new state theatres, the Philharmonic and Newsreel Studio were established in 1940-1941. The Division of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the LCP(b) and other administrative institutions of the LSSR supervised their artistic activities and controlled the repertoire. Theatres had to promote the Soviet art and stage ideological plays written by Soviet authors. The Communist Party structures controlled the creative work of the Lithuanian authors, supported and encouraged works important from the ideological point of view and approved by the communists.

The CC of the CPSU(b) resolved that the Ten-day Festival of Arts of the LSSR will be held in the autumn of 1941. The CC of the LCP(b) set up a commission in charge with holding the Festival, decided upon the repertoire and discussed the level of preparation for the Festival on March 26. The communists wanted the Ten-day Festival of Arts to be a proper ideological representation of the culture of the LSSR. The intention was to show the government of the USSR that the local administration consistently implemented the policy pursued by the CPSU(b) in the field of culture, that it was capable of controlling artists and shaping their creative activities towards ideology favoured by the Bolsheviks.

In order to win the Lithuanian intelligentsia and other sections of the society the Communist Party wanted to create an impression that it supported the development of the Lithuanian culture and was not indifferent to the cultural heritage. The leadership of the LCP(b) publicly denounced the nihilistic approach to the cultural heritage. However, the actual policy pursued by the communists was based on the Communist Party approach that rejected many cultural values. The Stalinist approach to the value and use of the cultural heritage was transposed to the LSSR. According to this approach, only such culture that was in conformity with the Bolshevik canons and that supported the stability of the regime and the communist power was of any use to the communists. Therefore, all literary and art works perceiving the good and the beauty differently than the Marxists did and showing the creator's personal outlook on the surrounding world were termed to be reactionary and non-ideological. The leadership of the LCP(b) was especially fierce in its criticism of artists who portrayed the national values of the Lithuanians and the political values of the Lithuanian State, who gave a negative assessment of the communist doctrine and practice, and who criticised the Russian culture, traditions

and the way of life. In order to weaken the national consciousness of the Lithuanian nation the communists started a campaign against the ideology of the Lithuanian national liberation movement and its reflections in literature and social ideas.

Employment of Public Organisations for Implementation of Party Policy

In order to control all spheres of public life the Communist Party closed down all ideologically conflicting public organisations and introduced the Communist Party dictatorship and control over the remaining public organisations. Organisations were employed for the implementation of the Communist Party policy measures.

On 30 October 1940 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) transferred the property of liquidated public organisations to the Communist Party structures[673]. They were allowed to keep as much of the movable property as they wished; however, the real estate had to be transferred to the People's Commissariat of Municipal Economy. Monetary funds and securities had to be transferred to the People's Commissariat of Finance, except for monies that the communists expended prior to the adoption of the resolution.

The Communist Party sought to subordinate mass organisations of workers, especially trade unions. Following the nationalisation of the economy the Soviet State became the single employer. Therefore, trade unions were actually transformed from the organisation protecting the interests of employees to the organisation representing the interests of the new employer, viz. the Soviet State. In order to subordinate trade unions to the interests of the State and the Party, the Communist Party reorganised the structure of Lithuanian trade unions, changed their mission and functions, and introduced the communist dictatorship and control. Trade unions were given a task to recruit hired workers and civil servants for the implementation of the interests of the Soviet State and the objectives of the Communist Party. They had to secure that the working people carried out plans established by the State and maintained state discipline. Conventional objectives of trade unions, viz. to secure the rights of hired workers, were abandoned. They could no longer make economic demands to the employer or organise strikes in order to secure the rights of the working people. Trade unions had to perform ideological functions, i.e. to indoctrinate the working people with the communist ideology, to consolidate the attitude that the interests of the State and of the ruling Communist Party should have the priory over the human rights and interests.

On 11 September 1940 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) resolved to reorganise trade unions operating in Lithuania into 16 organisations uniting hired workers and civil servants engaged in certain industries or fields of activities under the communist guidance[674]. The Central Organisational Bureau of Trade Unions was set up; it entirely consisted of the Communist Party activists. Juozas Stimburys was appointed the Chairman of the Bureau, Aleksandras Simanas (Aleksandras Šimanas) and Adolfas Butkus were appointed his deputies, and Zelmanas Sapiro (Zelmanas Šapiro) was appointed the

member of the Bureau. The leadership of the Communist Party gave one month to the Bureau to reorganise trade unions according to the Soviet model, to change their mission and objectives, and to turn them into organisations committed to the USSR and the ruling party. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the Communist Party structures to promote new objectives of trade unions and to implement the new Soviet trade union model. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) ordered to liquidate the "unduly established" trade unions of craftsmen. It indicated that only hired workers and civil servants could become members of trade unions.

On October 2-3 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) approved the framework and staff of the Central Organisational Bureau of Trade Unions of the LSSR and of 16 trade unions[675]. The Organisational Bureau could have 5 members on the staff, while industrial trade unions – 70. The month of November saw the rapid growth of the trade union machinery and the expansion of the list of staff members, especially various instructors. For example, on November 5 the CC of the LCP(b) added 3 more members to the staff of the Central Organisational Bureau[676]. On October 8 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) appointed Mitrofan Derevnin (who arrived from the USSR) the Chairman of the Central Organisational Bureau of Trade Unions; on November 28 the appointment of Viktoras Brigmanas as a member of the Bureau was confirmed, etc.[677] The personnel and the organisational division of instructors of the LCP(b) controlled the establishment procedure of trade union organisations and the process of selection and appointment of leading trade union workers.

Financial leverage was used for the control of trade unions. The deliberately expanded trade union framework and its bureaucratic machinery could not survive on trade union funds alone. Large resources were required. In order to support trade unions, the Soviet State financed them from funds of employers, i.e. enterprises and institutions. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) established the procedure (identical to the one used in the Soviet Union) of deducting 1 % from wages funds of state and cooperative enterprises (3-5 % from funds of private enterprises and proprietors) for trade union needs[678].

Independent trade unions were liquidated during a comparatively short period of time. They were nationalised, and their politicisation started. However, it was not easy for the Communist Party to transform trade unions from the independently acting organisation representing the interests of hired workers into the officially public, but in reality nationalised structure representing the single employer, i.e. the State.

Trade unions of the Republic of Lithuania were numerous; they were a comparatively active and organised force. They had deep-rooted traditions of independent trade union movement that the communists found hard to crush. Trade union activists even included LCP(b) members who wanted to preserve the traditional role and functions of trade unions[679]. They still did not identify the interests of hired workers with the interests of the employer, i.e. the State. They considered trade unions to be the

organisation that had to introduce the workers' control into enterprises and to demand and obtain favourable working conditions for workers. The most active members of trade unions were rather sceptical about the efforts of the communists to increase rates of work of industry workers of the LSSR and to equalise them with those applicable in the USSR. As a result, the end of 1940 witnessed the emerging friction between the most active members of trade unions and the Communist Party and administrative structures. The most active members of the Central Organisational Bureau acknowledged the communist dictatorship to trade unions; however, they were not ready to accept the restriction of the competence of trade unions and the role that the Communist Party inflicted on trade unions. They were especially reluctant to accept the direction to become an appendix to the administration that would only take care of the labour discipline, fulfilment of rates of work and production plans, supervise the activities of enterprises, inform the Communist Party and administrative structures about the situation in enterprises, but could not directly deal with any important issue. Communist J. Stimburys could no longer accept the belittling of trade unions and said, "if they are restricting us, we will have to prove that our job is not only to watch and report…"[680]. The hint to organise the disobedience of trade unions was just a rhetoric that the most active members of communist trade unions used in order to gain more influence in the Party leadership and in the eyes of the administration. Neither J. Stimburys nor any other trade union activist thought of preserving the former role of trade unions. No possibility was discussed and no efforts were made to enter the same trade union route that was taken by the so-called workers' opposition in Soviet Russia in the 20's. The political dictatorship and control that the Communist Party exercised over the trade union leadership prevented any loyalty of trade unions to the regime. However, the mood of disobedience in trade unions of the LSSR without any doubt reflected the still present trade union traditions of the Republic of Lithuania. It showed the failure of the Communist Party to form the trade union model that would be exactly the same as in the Soviet Union.

In order to break the remains of trade union independency and to make trade unions fully subordinated to the communists, in the spring of 1941 the LCP(b) started the campaign of replacing the leaders of trade union bodies at all levels. On February 1-20 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the Communist Party structures to convene trade union meetings from March 15 to May 1 during which reports would be heard and new governing bodies would be elected[681]. Meetings had to be held following the timetable drafted by the Central Organisational Bureau of Trade Unions and in accordance with instructions of the USSR Trade Unions. The Communist Party structures were instructed to select people who were committed to the regime and to the ruling party, and to make sure they were included into governing bodies of trade unions. Pressing demands were made for the communists to control meetings and prevent trade union members from electing people into the governing bodies who sought to preserve the traditional functions of trade unions and resisted the

communist dictatorship. The communists wanted to take advantage of trade union election meetings and to enforce new functions on all trade union organisations and implement the principle of representation of the employer's interests into their activities. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the Communist Party structures to make every effort in order for trade unions to change their guidelines of activities and start taking care only of the organisation and speeding of the manufacturing process, especially the efficiency of labour and discipline. Trade unions had to concentrate on the organisation and development of the socialist emulation and the Stakhanovite movement in order to increase the efficiency of labour, to speed the manufacturing process and to manufacture more goods. The campaign for forming the governing bodies of trade unions had to formalise communist resolutions regarding the nationalisation of trade unions, the framework and leadership of trade unions and to make them appear legitimate.

In April and May governing bodies of trade unions subordinated to the Communist Party were formed at all levels under the supervision and control of the communists. However, the communists failed to enforce their dictatorship on some of the trade unions. In some cases workers of industrial enterprises disobeyed the communists and elected people to trade union committees who were undesirable to the communists. Railway, aviation and artillery workers and specialists caused much trouble to the Communist Party, as they tried to elect people to trade union committees who criticised the policy of the CPSU(b) and the communist dictatorship. The leadership of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the Central Bureau of Trade Unions and the Communist Party structures to select politically trustworthy people and to send them to the above enterprises in order to "purge such enterprise of anti-Soviet elements" and subordinate trade unions to the communist dictatorship[682]. Basically, instructions were given to commence the purge of trade unions disobedient to the communists and to start the terror against their activists.

In April and May the communists convened meetings of 16 industrial trade unions that had to complete the reorganisation. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) authorised secretary I. Meskupas to select and appoint communists who could directly preside over such meetings, control the delegates and guide them towards the direction acceptable to the communists[683]. Such communists had to draft all documents that would be approved by the meeting and to coordinate them with the leadership of the CC of the LCP(b), also to provide the composition of the trade union leadership. They had to attend to the smooth running of the meetings according to the established scheme, to ensure that such meetings approved documents drafted by the communists and elected the provided leadership. The timetable of trade union meetings was drafted and the agendas of such meetings were approved.

After many trade unions formed governing bodies that were obedient to the communists, the LCP(b) succeeded in enforcing new objectives and functions on trade unions. Trade unions became a

state organisation under the guidance of the Communist Party structures and representing the interests of the employer, viz. the USSR.

Before the occupation of Lithuania the Young Communist League of Lithuania (the Lithuanian Komsomol) was an underground organisation, an ally to the Lithuanian Communist Party and the source of its members. On June 28 the People's Government legalised the Komsomol. Based on incomplete data, about 1,000 members of the Komsomol became official[684]. The summer saw the rapid growth of the number of the Komsomol members. The Komsomol joined the Communist Party, and together they participated in political rallies supporting the occupation regime. Members of the Komsomol were active campaigners during the elections to the People's Parliament, organised communist rallies and participated in them. When the campaign of placing the communists in different institutions was started, some members of the Komsomol were provided with jobs in the State Security Department and other establishments.

On 18 October 1940 the Young Communist League of Lithuania joined the Leninist Young Communist League of the Soviet Union (the Komsomol) and was named the Leninist Young Communist League of Lithuania[685]. The organisational structure of the Lithuanian Komsomol was reorganised according to the Rules of the Komsomol. In October the replacement of the Komsomol cards commenced that could be compared to the so-called purging campaign. In November there were 9,140 members of the Lithuanian Komsomol, on 1 January 1941 the Lithuanian Komsomol had 7,375 members, while on 1 May 1941 the number grew up to 13,271[686]. Based on incomplete data, approximately 2,000 members of the Komsomol were expelled during the purge.

In November the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) approved the leadership of the Lithuanian Komsomol structures[687]. The following were appointed as members of the Central Bureau of the Lithuanian Komsomol: Feliksas Bieliauskas (First Secretary of the CC of the Lithuanian Komsomol), Mira Bardonaite (Secretary for Propaganda and Agitation), Feliksas Gladutis (Secretary for Schools and Work with Pioneers), Izraelis Icikovicius (Head of the Personnel and the Organisational Division of Instructors), Stasys Perminas (Head of the Division of Rural Youth), Eduardas Miezelaitis (editor of "Komjaunimo tiesa" newspaper) and Anatolij Cistov (Secretary of the Lithuanian Komsomol Committee of Kaunas). Heads of divisions and sectors of the CC of the Lithuanian Komsomol were also approved[688]. St. Perminas became the Head of the Division of Rural Youth, Jonas Burakevicius became the Head of the Division of Military and Physical Training, I. Icikovicius became the Head of the Personnel and the Organisational Division of Instructors, and Vincas Kliukas became the Head of the Special Sector. In November 25 secretaries of the Lithuanian Komsomol committees in cities and counties were approved. 13 secretaries were workers, 3 were peasants, 7 were civil servants, 2 were students. 4 of them were Russians, 1 was a Jew, and the remaining were Lithuanians.

In July and August of 1940 the Komsomol organisations were set up in cities and counties, and their committees were formed. The Lithuanian Communist Party encouraged the Komsomol to expand the organisation and to include more members in order to strengthen the ideological influence on the youth. On October 30 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) established the office of the Komsomol organiser for work in schools[689]. The CC of the Lithuanian Komsomol and the People's Commissariat of Education were authorised to select and approve the Komsomol organisers for schools, while the Council of National Commissioners was instructed to assign LTL 19,950 for their training. The CC of the CPSU(b) was addressed with the request to establish fully-paid offices for the Lithuanian Komsomol organisers in 40 secondary schools. During 1940-1941 academic year the CC of the Lithuanian Komsomol sent 35 Komsomol organisers to schools; at the end of the academic year there were 182 Komsomol organisations with 2,341 members[690].

The Komsomol sought to ideologise and politicise the life of the youth, to indoctrinate it with the communist ideology, therefore the Komsomol tried to extend their activities to schools of general education, universities and other groups of young people. When the reorganisation of the educational system according to the Soviet model commenced, in the summer of 1940 some of the Komsomol organisations started to interfere with the educational process and tried to control the work of schoolteachers and headmasters. The Lithuanian Komsomol organisations tried to administer the library work. Following the example of the Communist Party some of the Komsomol structures and members wanted to control the hiring and dismissal of cultural and educational workers[691].

The Lithuanian Communist Party tried to involve the Komsomol in certain areas of the education and youth policy pursued by the Party. For example, on 22 February 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the People's Commissariat of Education to abolish the illiteracy; the Komsomol organisations were authorised to take part in this campaign and to assist educational establishments in selecting teachers for the semi-literate people[692]. Members of the Komsomol had to make sure that only people that were committed to the communists and to the occupation regime were selected. The Lithuanian Communist Party controlled the changes in the composition of the Komsomol; its approval was required for all appointments and promotion of the Komsomol leaders. The budget of the CC of the Lithuanian Komsomol had to be discussed and approved by the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b)[693].

As the Komsomol organisation was ideologically close to the Communist Party, it participated in political campaigns organised by the Communist Party, assisted in the reorganisation of the educational system, ideologisation and politicisation of the life of young people. The Communist Party used the Party structures and administrative institutions as the main instrument for the implementation of its policy, therefore the assistance of the Komsomol in the implementation of the education policy, etc., was used on a rather small scale.

The communists established new and reorganised the existing public organisations according to the Soviet model. The League of People's Assistance operating under the guidance of the illegal Lithuanian Communist Party and supporting it financially was reorganised[694]. It became a Soviet branch of the International Organisation for Assistance to Revolutionaries (MOPR). Not only did the LCP(b) structures preserve their influence over this organisation, they also strengthened it. The Central Administration of the organisation became subordinated to the Division of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the LCP(b), while local administrations – to city and county committees. The communists changed the composition of administrations in order to include people who were ideologically and socially suitable to the regime. Under cover of reorganisation, the purging of the MOPR commenced. The territorial organisation of Alytus County was the first to experience it. According to the communists, the leadership of this organisation was infected with class enemies, i.e. it included tradesmen and large landowners. Other territorial organisations experienced purging on a lesser degree. The Central Administration also had the so-called class enemies among its members. However, this administration maintained good relations with the leadership of the LCP(b), which allowed it to escape serious trouble. The League of People's Assistance was one of those communist organisations that easily adapted to the new regime.

The Society for Ethical Culture of Free-Thinkers was reorganised under the guidance of the Communist Party structures. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) instructed the Division of Propaganda and Agitation to hold a conference of the Society in June, and set up the Organisational Commission under the leadership of V. Niunka, a member of the CC of the LCP(b)[695]. The LCP(b) structures were given orders to check the members of the Society and to expel those who were politically undesirable to the communists. Basically, sanctions were given to start the social and political purging of the Society. In order to have the odds in the favour of the communists, instructions were given to accept more communists and members of the Komsomol into the Society. Party committees in cities and counties were charged with the formation of the governing bodies of societies. The Organisational Commission had to select candidates to the Central Administration of the Society who were devoted to the regime and to submit the candidacies to the CC of the LCP(b) for approval. In May and June the Communist Party structures changed the composition of the Society and formed governing bodies that were devoted and fully subordinated to the communists. The Society for Ethical Culture of Free-Thinkers was practically liquidated. The remaining members formed an organisation that the LCP(b) sought to employ in its ideological activities, especially in its atheist propaganda.

The territorial branch of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Society of the Soviet Union was established in the Lithuanian SSR according to the Soviet model. On 10 June 1941 the Council of National Commissioners set up the Red Cross Society of the LSSR and approved its bylaws and the

organisational bureau of the central committee of the Society consisting of 7 members[696]. Viktoras Micelmacheris was appointed the Chairman, and Antanas Garmus – the Deputy Chairman of the Organisational Bureau. Its activities were officially supervised by the People's Commissariat of Health. However, in reality it was under the control of the Communist Party structures, just like all other branches of public organisations of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was a militaristic state. As of the middle of the 30's the country experienced a rapid growth of the war industry and military spending. In September 1939 the general military service was introduced. The communist propaganda indoctrinated the society with the myth of the unity of the army and the people, and involved different sections of the society, especially people of the military age, into the strengthening of the military power of the state, into providing support to the army and into the activities of paramilitary organisations. One of such mass organisations was the Voluntary Society for Assisting Army, Air Force and Gas Defence ("*Osoaviachim*"), which had a large network of various military and technical clubs, hobby-groups, etc. Officially the Society promoted aviation sports and organised the training for air force and anti-aircraft defence. However, the scope of its activities was much wider and included the military training of people of the military age, especially the young people, according to plans drafted by the leadership of different types of the army, including the land forces, the air force and the navy; practically the Society prepared and trained the amateur yet numerous army reserve. The Society aimed at forming and implementing Soviet military traditions in the population, especially among the young people.

In order to make various sections of the Lithuanian society support the occupation army and to include them into the reserve of the Soviet Army, on 19 March 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) established a territorial branch of the *Osoaviachim* Society in the Lithuanian SSR[697]. A Central Council was set up consisting of 9 members, including the Head of the Military Division of the CC of the LCP(b) Piotr Jakovlev, the Secretary of the CC of the Lithuanian Komsomol Feliksas Gladutis, the Military Commissioner of the LSSR Bogdanov, the Chairman of the Physical Training and Sports Committee under the CNC of the LSSR Simanas, etc. S. Vasiljev was appointed the Chairman of the Central Council. The Council was instructed to form branches of the Society in all counties and to include as many people of the military age as possible. The Central Committee of the Komsomol was instructed to select members of the Komsomol and to refer them for work in the Society. The flying clubs of Vilnius and Kaunas as well as magazine "Liaudies sparnai" were assigned to the Society. Activities of the LSSR branch of the *Osoaviachim* Society were controlled by the Military Division of the CC of the LCP(b) together with the Military Commissioner of the LSSR and the command of the Soviet Army stationed in Lithuania.

Due to the unification of public organisations in the Soviet Union, it was forbidden to establish organisations in the Lithuanian SSR it they did not exist in the Soviet Union. The Soviet government

did not even tolerate the establishment of organisations of communist orientation if they did not conform to the scheme of public organisations of the USSR. For example, J. Paleckis proposed to establish a Society of Lithuanian Revolutionaries and Former Red Army Men of the October Revolution; however, the proposal was rejected by the CC of the LCP(b)[698]. The official explanation was that the establishment of such organisation was inexpedient, as "the true revolutionary elements joined the LCP(b)". However, the true reason for such a negative reaction to J. Paleckis' proposal was a different one. In the 30's Stalin initiated the rewriting of the history of the Bolshevik Party and of the October Revolution of 1917. The intention was to praise the true or alleged merits of Stalin and to belittle or even conceal the role of Lenin and of those brothers in arms of his who opposed Stalin. If an organisation of the participants of the October Revolution was established in the Lithuanian SSR, the communists would have to exercise a strict control over it in order to prevent its members from making some facts contradicting the Stalinist version of the events known. And this would have been difficulty to do. Also, the regime was not ideologically inclined to remind that some of the Lithuanian participants of the October Revolution were subjected to repression.

During the first Soviet occupation the communists did not always succeed in controlling and enforcing the dictatorship on public organisations. There were some cases of mass disobedience of organisation members to the communists. For example, the LCP(b) and the Lithuanian Komsomol structures experienced a complete failure in their attempts to win the Union of Groups of Young Farmers (Groups of Young Peasants) and their newspaper "Jaunasis valstietis". These groups enjoyed popularity among the rural youth; they had their organisational network and newspapers, and had a big influence on young people. The communists were especially disturbed to find out that such groups of young farmers actually overshadowed the Komsomol organisations in the country and were winning the young people over. Having realised that the Komsomol had no chance of subordinating these groups, in May of 1941 the CC of the LCP(b) resolved to liquidate the groups and to close down their newspaper[699]. The People's Commissariat of Education, the Communist Party and the Komsomol were instructed to replace these groups with groups of young naturalists and to transfer all assets and funds of the liquidated groups of young farmers to such newly established groups. In order to prevent members of young farmers' groups to revive their activities in such newly established groups of young naturalists, the LCP(b) gave orders to its structures and to the Komsomol organisations to exercise a strict control over the activities of the naturalists.

All public organisations were nationalised and politicised in the totalitarian state of the USSR. After all organisations of the Lithuanian SSR were reorganised according to the Soviet model, they became territorial branches of respective organisations existing in the USSR and had the same ideological functions. The regime employed these organisations in order to subordinate the society to the interests of the State and the Communist Party, in order to strengthen the ideological control over

the life of people, groups of people and the society as a whole, and in order to implement the communist ideology. Stalin's statement regarding the "belt" of the Party reflected the place and the role of organisations in the political system of the USSR. The abundance of organisations created an impression that independent organisations were operating in the USSR representing different sections and interests. They helped the communists formulate the image of a civil society. However, the political reality was such that all those organisations were formed and their activities were guided and controlled by the ruling Communist Party. They obeyed the political will of the Party. The Party manipulated them and exercised direct dictatorship as well as personnel and financial leverage. Legally, politically, organisationally and financially such organisations were completely dependent upon the State and the government. In reality these were not public organisations but nationalised structures employed for the control of the society and used as instruments for the subordination of the society to the State and the government.

Role of Political Structures of LSSR in Pursuing Repressive Policy and Terror Against Lithuanian Population

Lithuania was held in the USSR by force and using extortionate power. The occupation government was backed by extortionate power assumed by the State from the very start. Force and extortionate power was one of the principal sources of the occupation government. The Lithuanian army was controlled by and subordinated to the totalitarian State and government by force and using repressive measures. The political dictatorship of the CPSU(b) was also backed by the use of extortionate means against administrative institutions, political structures and the population. The social theory of Marxism and the political doctrine of the communists formed the ideological basis of the repressive policy pursued by the government. Referring to the Marxist attitude that the State was an instrument of force used for the consolidation of power of one social class over another class, it was declared that the suppression of the resistance of the so-called overthrown classes was one of the key functions of the Soviet State. Lenin stated that even after the socialist society was formed and its social structure was changed class contradictions did not disappear; rather, they assumed different shapes. Stalin further developed this idea and made his infamous statement about the intensification of class struggle in the process of building socialism. Such attitude allowed to keep the continuous social and political tension running high in the society and to ideologically disguise the terror pursued by the Communist Party against its political opponents, social and ethnic groups. Repressions helped strengthen the totalitarian regime, the dictatorship of the Communist Party and the personal power of Stalin.

In order to destroy the political consciousness of the Lithuanian society and to break the resistance of the population to the occupation and occupation regime, the Communist Party pursued a repressive policy against such classes of the society that were politically or socially undesirable to the occupation

regime, as well as against any other section of the population. Repressions against the Lithuanian people, social and political groups and nationalities were a constituent part of the policy pursued by the CPSU(b) and its territorial organisation in Lithuania.

On 2-3 October 1940 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) resolved to deport large landowners from Lithuania[700]. The Head of the Division of Agriculture of the LCP(b) Karolis Didziulis, his deputy Pavel Nikitin and Piotr Gladkov were instructed to make a list of the so-called landlords to be deported and to submit it to the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) for approval, also to establish the procedure of their deportation and to make proposals regarding the property of the deportees. On October 8 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) resolved to "request the CC of the CPSU(b) the permission to deport all landlords from the territory of the Lithuanian SSR"[701]. The Division of Agriculture of the CC of the LCP(b) and the People's Commissariat of the Interior were instructed to adjust the list of large landowners to be deported.

On 7 January 1941 the Secretary of the CC of the LCP(b) A. Snieckus and the Chairman of the Council of National Commissioners M. Gedvilas submitted a request to the Secretary of the CC of the CPSU(b) A. Andreyev regarding the permission to deport all landlords from Lithuania[702]. The request stated that "the CC of the CPSU(b) consented in principle to this matter; however, the NKVD of the USSR did not start this job".

After the USSR government introduced the Soviet passport system into the territory of the Lithuanian SSR, the so-called counterrevolutionary and criminal elements had to be deported from the cities of Kaunas and Vilnius and from frontier regions, as provided by Passport Regulations of the USSR. However, the leadership of the LCP(b) did not confine itself to this. On February 22 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) decided that it was "expedient" to deport a wider circle of individuals, social and political sections of the society from the cities of Kaunas and Vilnius and from frontier regions; in order to use this opportunity it instructed the People's Commissariat of the Interior of the LSSR to carry out the replacement of passports[703]. The deportation of the owners of nationalised industrial enterprises, commercial undertakings, financial and credit institutions and other undertakings, also of well-to-do industrialists and entrepreneurs, large landowners, i.e. of all sections of the bourgeoisie, as the Bolsheviks called them, was initiated. The proposal was made to include former members of political organisations and high officials of the Republic of Lithuania, officers of the Lithuanian army, officials of the authorities subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, etc., into the categories to be deported.

On 16 June 1941 the CC of the CPSU(b) and the CNC of the USSR passed a resolution on the deportation of residents from the Baltic Republics, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Moldavia[704]. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP(b) approved this resolution at the beginning of June; on June 10 the resolution was approved by the LCP of the LSSR. The NKVD and NKGD structures of

the LSSR carried out deportations with the assistance of county committees of the Communist Party and provisional executive committees; the latter also took care of the recording and the appropriation of the property of the deportees.

¹ Z. K. Brzezinski, *Der Sowjetblock. Einheit und Konflikt*, Kóln–Berlin: Kiepenheuer end Witsch, 1962, S. 45.

² *История России. XX век,* Москва: ООО «Фирма «Издательство АСТ», 1999, с. 190–196; К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940,* Москва: Высшая школа, 1999, с. 64–73; Н. Верт, *История Советского государства. 1900–1991*, Москва: Весь мир, 2000, с. 123, 139; *Новейшая история отечества. XX век,* Москва: ВЛАДОС, 1999, т. 1, с. 341–344, 421–432, т. 2, с. 80–112.

³ *История России. XX век*, с. 174–182, 193–194, 278; *Новейшая история отечества. XX век,* т. 1, с. 341–433; т. 2, с. 80–112; А. К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940,* с. 102, 195; А. В. Макарин, *Бюрократия в системе политической власти*, Санкт-Петербург: Издательство Санкт-Петербургского университета, 2001, с. 128–140; М. Восленский, *Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза,* Москва: МП «Октябрь», «Сов. Россия», 1991, с. 33.

⁴ Ю. А. Агафонов, С. В. Визнер, С. И. Самыгин, С. И. Шило, Л. И. Щербаков, *Основы политологии*, Ростов-на-Дону: Феникс, 2000, с. 44–52; *История России. XX век,* с. 190–196; К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940,* с. 64–73; *Новейшая история отечества. XX век,* т. 1, с. 341–344, 421–432, т. 2, с. 80–112.

⁵ Ю. А. Агафонов, С. В. Визнер, С. И. Самыгин, С. И. Шило, Л. И. Щербаков, *Основы политологии*, с. 51.

⁶ Z. K. Brzezinski, *Der Sowjetblock. Einheit und Konflikt*, S. 45; Н. Верт, *История Советского государства. 1900–1991*, с. 116–264; М. Восленский, *Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза,* Москва: МП «Октябрь», «Сов. Россия», 1991, с. 21–33, 47–50, 58–62, 68–78, 80–81, 90, 353–360, 552–554, 570–574, 608–609; *История России. XX век*, с. 193, 195–196, 279; А. В. Макарин, *Бюрократия в системе политической власти*, с. 128–140; *Новейшая история отечества. XX век,* т. 1, с. 341–344, 421–432, т. 2, с. 80–112.

⁷ R. J. Misiūnas, R. Taagepera, *Baltijos valstybės: Priklausomybės metai, 1940–1980*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1992, p. 37–45, 293–296; V. St. Vardys, "Soviet colonialism in the Baltic States: a Note on the Nature of modern colonialism", *Lituanus*, 1964, Vol.10, No. 2, p. 8, 21; Z.K. Brzezinski, *Der Sowjetblock. Einheit und Konflikt*, p. 25–45, 89–103; J. Hazard, *The Soviet System of* Government, Chicago, 1957, p. 189–191; A. Inkeles and R. A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a totalitarian Society*, p. 246–254; Н. Верт, *История Советского государства. 1900–1991,* с. 117–139; А. К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940*, с. 219–239; ir kt.

⁸ B.V. Mačiuika, "Istoriniai leidiniai okupuotoje Lietuvoje", *Works of the Meeting of Lithuanian Catholics of the Science Academy,* IX, Rome, 1982, p. 134–145; V. Trumpa, "Lietuvos istorikų darbai ir dienos", *Adai*, 1960, Nr. 6, p. 258–263.

⁹ K. Antanaitis, "Lietuviškoji sovietinė nomenklatūra" *Darbai ir dienos*, 1998, Nr. 7 (16), p. 8; *История России. XX век*, с. 195–196.

¹⁰ *История России. XX век*, с. 195–196, 279–280; А. К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940*, с. 221–224, 238–239.

¹¹ Z. Norkus, *Istorika. Istorinis įvadas*, Vilnius: Taura, 1996, p. 161–162.

¹² М. Восленский, *Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза*, с. 21–33, 47–50, 58–62, 68–78, 80–81, 90, 353–360, 552–554, 570–574, 608–609; А. К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940*, с. 5.

¹³ A. Lozuraitis, *Metodologiniai marksistinės socialinės filosofijos bruožai*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1986, p. 104–161; Г. Н. Манов, *Государство и политичкская организация общества*, Москва: Наука, 1974, 320 с.; *Политические системы современности: Очерки*, Москва: Наука, 1978, 253 с.; ir kt.

¹⁴ М. Восленский, *Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза*, с. 21–23, 358, 552–553.

¹⁵ *Политические системы современности: Очерки*, с. 8, 34–42; *История национально государственного строительства в СССР*, т.1 (1917–1936), с. 484; ir kt.

¹⁶ V.I. Leninas, "Valstybė ir revoliucija", V.I.Leninas, *Full Collection of Works*, t. 33, Vilnius: Mintis, 1986, p. 8–9, 23; V.I. Leninas, "Proletarinė revoliucija ir renegatas Kautskis", Ibid., t. 37, Vilnius: Mintis, 1986, p. 261; V.I. Leninas, "Apie valstybę", ibid, t. 39, Vilnius: Mintis, 1987, p. 68.

¹⁷ V.I. Leninas, "Valstybė ir revoliucija", V.I.Leninas, *Full Collection of Works* , t. 33, p. 22, 87.

¹⁸ Н. Верт, *История Советского государства. 1900-1991*, с. 192, 196, 230, 263; А. К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940*, с. 64, 192, 215; М. Восленский, *Номенклатура. Господствующий класс Советского Союза,* с. 21–33.

¹⁹ V. Trumpa, "Lietuvos istorikų darbai ir dienos", *Aidai*, 1960, Nr. 6, p. 258–263.

²⁰ *Lietuvos Komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1985, t. 3, p. 47–48; K. Navickas, *Lenininės nacionalinės politikos reikšmė lietuvių tautai*, Vilnius: Valstybinė politinės ir mokslinės literatūros leidykla, 1960, 94 p.

²¹ V.I. Leninas, "Valstybė ir revoliucija", V.I.Leninas, *Full Collection of Works*, t. 33, p. 84, 86; V.I. Leninas, "Proletariato diktatūros epocha ir politika", Ibid., t. 39, Vilnius: Mintis, 1987, p. 266.

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[174] Ibid.; A.Anušauskas, *Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940–1958 metais*, p. 25–26; R. Šarmaitis, *Lietuvos revoliucionieriai*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1988, p.188–189, 203–204, 360–361.

[175] M. Maksimaitis, St. Vansevičius, op. cit., p. 220; M. Rőmeris, op.cit, p. 20–23.

[176] Official acts of Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis on 18 June 1940, 19,24, 27, July 1 No 761, 763, 805, 838, 888, 889, ibid., f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 807, l. 113, 115, 120, 123, 126,127.

[177] Ibid.; Official acts of Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis on July 5 1940 No 953, 959, ibid., l. 129, 131.

[178] V. Krėvė-Mickevičius, "Bolševikų invazija ir liaudies vyriausybė", LCA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 25–36; *Baltijos valstybių užgrobimo byla (JAV Kongreso Ch.J.Kersteno komiteto dokumentai 1953–1954 metai),* p. 329–333.

[179] Rõmeris, M. op. cit., p. 20-21.

[180] June 25, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, 1.7.

[181] July 12, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, ibid, 1.17.

[182] June 22, July 19, 1940 acting President's of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis Act No 805 a, 1173, ibid, b 807, 1.121, 134.

[183] Anusauskas (Anušauskas), A. *Lietuviu tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais*. p. 27

[184] July 17, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, 1.22.

[185] July 30, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, ibid, 1.33.

[186] Ibid.

[187] July 29, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, ibid, 1.332.

[188] Truska, L.&V. Kancevicius (Kancevičius), op. cit., p. 159; Anusauskas, A. *Lietuviu tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais*. p.27.

[189] July 18, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 59, 1.24.

[190] June 18, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, ibid, 1.2; July 12, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, ibid, 1.17; Truska, L.&V. Kancevicius, op. cit., p. 159.

[191] June 25, 1940 Letter of the Press and Associations Department of the Ministry of the Interior, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 135, 1.1; Bagusauskas (Bagušauskas), J. R. *Lietuvos jaunimo pasipriesinimas sovietiniam rezimui ir jo slopinimas*. p. 28-29; Truska, L. &V. Kancevicius, op. cit., p. 157.

[192] *Lietuvos komunistu partijos istorijos apybraiza*. Vol. 3, p.34- 43, 120-122; *Uz ateiti sviesia*. Part 2, p. 17- 56; Memoirs of Sapiraite-Meskupiene, (Šapiraitė- Meskupienė) S. LSA, f. 77, ap. 28, b. 10893, 1.56; Memoirs of Aizenas, Ch. ibid., f. 3377, ap. 59, b. 301, 1. 93-95.

[193] June 27, 1940 acting President's of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis Act No 839, ibid, ap. 58, b. 807, 1.124.

[194] July 26, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, ibid, b. 59, 1. 29.

[195] Declaration of acting President of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis, the "Lietuvos Aidas", June 19, 1940; July 25, 29 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 59, 1 27, 31.

[196] Truska, L. *Lietuva 1938-1953 metais*. p. 62.

[197] July 2, 1940 Minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Lithuania, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 59, 1. 10.

[198] Truska, L. *Lietuva 1938-1953 metais*. p. 76.

[199] *The case of Baltic states' occupation*…, p. 482-483, 668.

[200] Kreve- Mickevicius, V. *Bolseviku invazija ir liaudies vyriausybe*. LSA, f. 3377, ap.58, b. 274, 1. 25-36; Glusauskas, J. *Negirdetas smurtas socializmo vardu*. ibid, 1. 37-39; *The case of Baltic states' occupation*…, p. 482-483, 595-596, 668, 680.

[201] Kreve- Mickevicius, V. *Bolseviku invazija ir liaudies vyriausybe*. LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, 1. 25-36; Glusauskas, J. *Negirdetas smurtas socializmo vardu*. ibid., 1. 37-39; Skirpa, K. op. cit., p. 380-395.

[202] Misiunas, R.& R. Taagpera. *Baltijos valstybes: priklausomybes metai, 1940- 1990*, p. 24-38; Lebedeva, N. *VKP(b) CK Politbiuras ir 1939- 1941 m. prijungtu prie SSRS teritoriju sovietizavimas. Genocidas ir rezistencija*. 2000, No 1/7: 95.

[203] *Lietuvos komunistu partijos istorijos apybraiza*. Vol. 3, p. 34-43, 120-122; *Uz ateiti sviesia*. Part 2, p. 17- 56.

[204] Rõmeris, M. op. cit., p. 20-24; Kreve- Mickevicius, V. *Bolseviku invazija ir liaudies vyriausybe*. LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, 1. 25-36; Glusauskas, J. *Negirdetas smurtas socializmo vardu*. ibid., 1. 37-39.

[205] *Lietuvos komunistu partijos istorijos apybraiza*. Vol. 3, p. 41-43, 120-122.

[206] Kreve- Mickevicius, V. *Bolseviku invazija ir liaudies vyriausybe*. LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, 1. 25-36.

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[208] Anusauskas, A. *Lietuviu tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940- 1958 metais*. p. 25- 26, 36-37.

[209] Personal file of Meskupas. LSA, f. 77, ap. 28, b. 720, 1. 172; Memoirs of Sapiraite-Meskupiene. Ibid, b. 10893, 1. 56; Memoirs of Aizenas. Ibid, f. 3377, ap. 59, b. 301, 1. 93-95.

[210] March 21, 1977 Ziman's report at a meeting to commemorate Meskupas, LSA, f. 77, ap. 28, b. 720, 1. 172.

[211] Glusauskas, J. *Negirdetas smurtas socializmo vardu*. ibid. f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, 1. 40.

[212] Lists of candidates to high-rank posts. 1940. ibid. f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 324, 1. 1-2 (in Russian).

[213] Ibid. 1. 15- 16.

[214] Ibid. 1. 3.

[215] RKKA (in Russian)- The USSR Red Army of Workers and Peasants.

[216] Ibid. 1. 9.

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[218] July 26, 1940 acting President's of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis Act No 1224, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 807, 1. 151.

[219] Personal file of Mecislovas Gedvilas. ibid. f. 77, ap. 28, 1. 49.

[220] Personal file of Valerijonas Knyva. ibid. f. 1771, ap. 3, b. 151, 1. 1- 7.

[221] Personal file of Juozas Vaisnoras. ibid. f. 1771, ap. 3, b. 979, 1. 1- 23.

[222] Personal file of Meskupas. ibid. f. 77, ap. 28, b. 720, 1. 164- 172; Declarations of communists and other citizens sent to the LCP CK and the LCP CK correspondence with party and administrative institutions regarding their employment in 1940. ibid. f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 334- 338.

[223] June- July 1940 acting President's of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis Acts. Ibid. b. 807, 1. 111- 149; June 17- August 23, 1940 Minutes of the Lithuanian People's Government meetings. Ibid. b. 591, 1. 1- 62; Truska, L. &V. Kancevicius. op. cit., p. 144- 200.

[224] June- July 1940 acting President's of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis Acts. LSA, 3377, ap. 58, b. 807, 1. 111- 149; Maslauskiene, N. *Valdininkijos salinimas is okupuotos Lietuvos administracijos ir jos keitimas okupantu talkininkais 1940 m. birzelio- gruodzio men. Genocidas ir rezistencija*. 2000, No 2/8: 17. The number of Lithuanian officials removed from their posts indicated in the article (not less than 350 people) was calculated according the LSA (former LSA) documents and historical sources. It has to be emphasized that due to the lack of generalized data, it is difficult to give the exact number of officials dismissed from administrative institutions. The data now announced is based on LSA and LCSA documents. However, they also cannot reflect the scale of the process of Lithuanian officialdom dismissal because the above mentioned archives do not possess full and generalized accounts of it.

[225] June 24- August 23, 1940 Minutess of the Lithuanian People's Government meetings. Ibid. f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, 1. 5- 8, 10, 18, 27.

[226] Personal files of Gedvilas. Ibid. f. 1771, ap. 227, b. 4474, 1. 1- 11; f. 77, ap. 28, b. 3020, 1. 1- 102; Personal file of Glusauskas. Ibid. f. 1771, ap. 3, b. 75, 1. 1- 14.

[227] *Lietuvos komunistu partijos atsisaukimai*. Vol.4.1963.p.461. Vilnius: Valstybine politines ir moklines literaturos leidykla.

[228] June 29, 1940 Meskauskiene's speech at a meeting. LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 155, 1. 11.

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[230] Paleckis, J. op. cit., p.143.

[231] June 25, 1940 the *Liaudies Balsas*. July 1, 1940 the *Tiesa*. July 15, 21, 1940 the *Darbo Lietuva*; Gedvilas, M. op. cit., p. 43-45.

[232] Gedvilas, M. op. cit., p. 43-45.

[233] Maslauskiene, N. *Lietuvos komunistu tautine ir socialine sudetis 1939 m. pabaigoje- 1940 m. rugsejo men. Genocidas ir rezistencija*. 1999, No 1/5: 86.

[234] Aizenas, Ch. Memoirs. LSA, f. 3377, ap. 59, b. 301, 1. 92- 95.

[235] Declarations of communists and other citizens sent to the LCP CK and the LCP CK correspondence with party and administrative institutions regarding their employment in 1940. ibid. f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 334- 338.

[236] March 15, 1941 LCP (b) CK worker's reference. Ibid. ap. 2, b. 468, 1. 70. (in Russian).

[237] Maslauskiene, N. *Lietuvos komunistu tautine ir socialine sudetis 1939 m. pabaigoje- 1940 m. rugsejo men. Genocidas ir rezistencija*. 1999, No 1/5: 91.

[238] Lists of the LCP city and district communist organizations. 1940. LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 172, 173.

[239] Anusauskas, A. *Lietuviu tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940- 1958 metais*. p. 26.

[240] *The case of Baltic states' occupation…*, p. 333, 483, and 681.

[241] Gedvilas, M. op. cit., p. 36- 37.

[242] *The case of Baltic states' occupation…*, p. 333.

[243] Kreve- Mickevicius, V. *Bolseviku invazija ir liaudies vyriausybe*. LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 33- 36.

[244] Anusauskas, A. *Lietuviu tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940- 1958 metais*. p. 30- 34; Grunskis, E. Lietuvos gyventoju tremimas 1940- 1941, 1945- 1953 metais. p. 20- 21.

[245] July 16, 1940 Gedvilas' letter to the acting President of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis regarding the arrest and exile of Merkys and Urbsys. Lithuanian Central State Archive (hereafter LCSA). f. R- 758, ap. 1, b. 40, l. 1.

[246] *The case of Baltic states' occupation…*, p. 483, 681.

[247] L. Truska, *Lietuva 1938–1953 metais*, p. 63–64.

[248] Minutes of Former People's Parliament Representatives Meeting on 13 June 1980, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 53, b. 43, l. 2; L. Truska, V. Kancevicius, op. cit., p. 167; M. Romeris, op. cit., p. 29–30.

[249] Ibid.; *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 43.

[250] M. Rőmeris, op. cit., p. 29; *Baltijos valstybių užgrobimo byla …*, p. 338–342.

[251] *The People's Parliament of Lithuania. Stenographs and Materials*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1985, p. 19–24.

[252] L. Truska, *Lietuva 1938–1953 metais*, p. 64.

[253] Minutes of Former People's Parliament Representatives' Meeting on 13 June 1980, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 53, b. 43, l. 2; Minutes of People's Government Meeting on 5 July 1940, ibid., ap. 58, b. 591, l. 13.

[254] Minutes of People's Government Meeting on 5 July 1940, ibid., l. 13–14.

[255] Acts No. 976, 977 of Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania Paleckis, 6 July 1940., ibid., ap. 58, b. 807, l. 133, 134.

[256] *Lietuvos okupacija ir aneksija, 1939–1940*: Dokumentų rinkinys, Vilnius: Mintis, 1993, p. 330–331.

[257] List of Candidates to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, *Lietuvos Aidas*, July 11, 1940

[258] Reports and Recollections from the Meeting of Former People's Parliament Members in Kaunas on 30 August 1942, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 10, 20, 68,83, 86, 91–92.

[259] List of Candidates to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, *Lietuvos Aidas*, July 11, 1940; List of People's Parliament Members, *Tiesa*, July 17 – 18, 1940; Minutes of Former People's Parliament Representatives Meeting on 13 June 1980, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 53, b. 43, l. 3.

[260] *Vyriausybes Zinios*, July 17, 1940, No. 717, p. 500–501; *Tarybų valdžios atkūrimas Lietuvoje 1940–1941 metais*: Dokumentų rinkinys, Vilnius: Mintis, 1965, p. 12–123.

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[262] *The People's Parliament of Lithuania. Stenographs and Materials*, p. 26–29; *Reestablishment of Soviet Rule in Lithuania in 1940*: Collection of Documents, Vilnius: Mokslas, 1986, p. 89–91.

[263] *The People's Parliament of Lithuania. Stenographs and Materials*, p. 27.

[264] Reports of Former People's Parliament Members, made in Kaunas on August 30, 1942, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 74–81; M. Romeris, op. cit., p. 20–21.

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[270] Ibid.

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[272] Minutes of Former People's Parliament Representatives Meeting on 13 June 1980, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 53, b. 43, l. 3.

[273] *Stenographs of the People's Parliament. The Extraordinary Session. August 24 – 25, 1940*, p. 149–150.

[274] L. Truska, V. Kancevicius, op. cit., p. 179–180.

[275] *Lietuvos Komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 46.

[276] *Stenographs of the People's Parliament. The First Session. July 21–23, 1940*, Kaunas: LSSR SS Presidium Edition, 1940, p. 3–137.

[277] *Baltijos valstybių užgrobimo byla …*, p. 772–775.

[278] A. Anusauskas, *Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940–1958 metais*, p. 29; M. Remeris, op.cit., p. 34–39; Reports and Recollections from the Meeting of Former People's Parliament Members in Kaunas on 30 August 1942, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 1–123; Minutes of Former People's Parliament Representatives Meeting on 13 June 1980, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 53, b. 43, l. 3.

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[281] Declaration Announcing Land to be Public Property, ibid., l. 5.

[282] Declaration of the Nationalisation of Banks and Large-Scale Industry, ibid.

[283] Declaration on the State System, Declaration of Lithuania's Accession to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Declaration Announcing Land to be Public Property, Declaration of the Nationalisation of Banks and Large-Scale Industry, LCVA, f. R-758, ap.1, b. 40, l. 2–5.

[284] *Stenographs of the People's Parliament. The First Session. July 21–23, 1940*, p. 132–133.

[285] Law on Incorporation of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 3, 1940, LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 105, l. 1 (in Russian)

[286] M. Rőmeris, op. cit., p. 48–49

[287] L. Truska, V. Kancevicius, op. cit., p. 187.

[288] *Baltijos valstybių užgrobimo byla ...,* p. 357–369.

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[290] Resolution Passed by Former People's Parliament Members during their Meeting in Kaunas on August 30, 1942, LYA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l.

[291] M. Rőmeris, op. cit., p. 35–36; M. Maksimaitis, St. Vansevicius, op. cit., p. 220–222.

[292] M. Rőmeris, op. cit., p. 36.

[293] Ibid.,

[294] B. Nemickas, "Pavergtos Lietuvos valdymo sąranga", *Naujoj Viltis*, 1975, No. 8, p. 4; P.V. Raulinaitis, "Tautos suverenumas", *Lietuva*, 1954, No. 5, p. 28; P.V. Raulinaitis, "Okupanto įsakymų teisinė vertė", *Tevynes Sargas*, 1954, No. 1(11), p. 136–141.

[295] D. Zalimas, "Pagrindiniai Lietuvos Respublikos tęstinumo teisiniai ir politiniai aspektai", Politologija, 2000, No. 1 (17), p. 9.

[296] *Evaluation of Crimes Commited by Communism. International Congress. 12 – 14 June, 2000. Keynotes of Reports*, p. 24.

[297] В. Зотов, " Национальный вопрос: деформации прошлого", *Суровая драма народа: Ученые и публицисты о природе сталинизма,* с. 258–269; Н. Верт, История Советского государства. 1900-1991, с. 170–171.

[298] B. Puzinavicius, "Executive Functions of the Union Republic in the USSR Political System (Materials on Lithuanian SSR), *The Ninth Word Symposium on Lithuanian Science and Culture. November 21 – 25, 1995*: Keynotes, p. 190.

[299] Н. Верт, История Советского государства. 1900–1991, с. 170–171; В. Зотов, " Национальный вопрос: деформации прошлого", *Суровая драма народа: Ученые и публицисты о природе сталинизма,* с. 258–269.

[300] А. Г. Авторханов, «Технология власти» , *Вопросы истортии*, 1992, No. 2–3, с. 115–116; *История России. ХХ век*, с. 193–200, 264–280; К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940,* с. 64–73, 102–103, 128–139, 219–245; Н. Верт, *История Советского государства. 1900–1991*, с. 117–264, 338–340.

[301] А. К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940,* с. 245.

[302] *История национально государственного строительства в СССР*, т. 2 (1937–1972), с.70–75.

[303] Z. K. Brzezinski, *Der Sowjektblock: Einheit und Konflikt*, S. 26–27, 43–45, 103.

[304] N. Lebedeva, "VKP(b) CK Politbiuras ir 1939–1941 m. prijungtų prie SSRS teritorijų sovietizavimas", *Genocidas ir Rezistencija*, 2000, No. 1(7) , p. 94–95.

[305] Ibid., p. 95.

[306] *Stenographs of the People's Parliament. The Extraordinary Session. August 24–25,1940*, p. 141–222.

[307] The Constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (Fundamental Law), LCVA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 40, l. 10–17.

[308] Ibid., l. 10.

[309] Ibid., l. 10, 13.

[310] The Constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (Fundamental Law), LCVA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 40, l. 10.; M. Rőmeris, op. cit., p. 43–54; B. Puzinavicius, op.cit, p. 190.

[311] M. Rőmeris, op. cit., p. 47–57; Н. Верт, *История Советского государства. 1900–1991*, с. 170–171.

[312] *Baltijos valstybių užgrobimo byla ...,* p. 738 – 739.

[313] The Constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (Fundamental Law), LCVA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 40, l. 10; M. Maksimaitis, St.Vasnevicius, op. cit., p. 222.

[314] The Constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (Fundamental Law), LCVA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 40, l. 10.

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[321] The Constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (Fundamental Law), LCVA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 40, l. 13.

[322] Ibid., l. 10–12.

[323] Ibid.

[324] Ibid., l. 11.

[325] Ibid.

[326] Ibid.

[327] B.Puzinavicius, op. cit., p. 190.

[328] The Constitution of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (Fundamental Law), LCVA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 40, l. 12.

[329] Ibid.

[330] Ibid.

[331] M. Rőmeris, op. cit., p. 42–67; А. К. Соколов, *Курс советской истории. 1917–1940,* с. 224–225.

[332] V. Kreve-Mickevicius, "Bolševikų invazija ir liaudies vyriausybė", LYA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 26.

[333] J. Glusauskas, "Negirdėtas smurtas socializmo vardu*",* ibid. l. 40

[334] V. Tininis, *Snieckus. 33 metai valdzioje*, p. 44.

[335] List of Candidates to Governing Posts, 1940 m. , LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 324, l. 1–22 (in Russian).

[336] *Baltijos valstybių užgrobimo byla ...,* p. 329–333.

[337] Contemporaries in their memoirs say that the occupational government dismissed these appointed ministers of Jewish origin due to negative public reaction. Cf. J. Glusauskas, "Negirdetas smurtas socializmo vardu", LYA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 39;

[338] J. Glusauskas, "Negirdėtas smurtas socializmo vardu", LYA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l.39; List of Candidates to Governing Posts, 1940 , ibid., f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 324, l. 1–22 (in Russian).

[339] N. Lebedeva, "VKP(b) CK Politbiuras ir 1939–1941 m. prijungtų prie SSRS teritorijų sovietizavimas", *Genocidas ir Rezistencija*, 2000, No. 1(7) , p. 95.

[340] *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 58.

[341] *Stenographs of the People's Parliament. The Extraordinary Session. August 24–25,1940*, p. 222.

[342] *Stenographs of the LSSR Supreme Soviet. The First Session. August 25–26, 1940,* p. 1–34; *L-Minutes of the LSSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Meetings No. 1–6. August 27,1940 – March 28, 1941*, Kaunas: LSSR SS Presidium, 1941, 103 p.

[343] *Stenographs of the LSSR Supreme Soviet. The First Session. August 25–26, 1940,* p. 1–34.

[344] *Stenographs of the LSSR Supreme Soviet. The First Session. August 25–26, 1940,* LCVA, f. R-758, ap. 2, b. 1, l. 5..

[345] Ibid., l. 6–7.

[346] Ibid., l. 8.

[347] Ibid., l. 11–14.

[348] Ibid., l. 14.

[349] Ibid., l. 10.

[350] Excerpt from the CPSU(b) CC Politburo session on October 8, 1940 Minutes No. 21, LYA, f. 3777, ap. 58, b. 620, l. 3 (in Russian).

[351] Excerpt from the CPSU(b) CC Politburo session on September 21. Minutes No. 20, ibid., l. 4 (in Russian).

[352] M. Remeris, op. cit., p. 61–65.

[353] А. В. Макарин, op. cit., p. 9–12.

[354] *Stenographs of the People's Parliament. The First Session. July 21–23, 1940. The Extraordinary Session. August 24 – 25, 1940*, p. 3–4, 18, 151–155.

[355] Minutes No. 4, 20, 39 of the LCP(b) CC Bureau Meetings on October 2–3, 1940; November 23, December 21, LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 5; b. 43, l. 9; b. 92, l. 7 (in Russian).

[356] Minutes No 9 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on October 17, 1940 , LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 15, l. 2, 6–8 (in Russian).

[357] Minutes No. 4, 8, 9, 12, 15, 38, 46, 48, 50; 5 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meetings on 2–3, 10, 17, 30, October 1940; 12 November, 20–21 December 1940, 16, 21 January, 1, 22 February 1941, LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 5; b. 14, l. 2–3; b. 15, l. 1–2; b. 21, l. 2–4; b. 28, l. 13–14; b. 89, l. 1; ap. 2, b. 37, l. 5–7; b. 42, l. 7; b. 48, l. 6; b. 64, l. 10 (in Russian).

[358] А. Г. Авторханов, " Технология власти", *Вопросы истории,* 1991, No. 11, с. 71–72.

[359] Minutes No. 30 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on 4 December 1940, LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 67, l. 28 (in Russian).

[360] Minutes No. 33 and Documents of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on 8 December 1940, LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 75, l. 2; b. 76, l. 1–2 (in Russian).

[361] Minutes No. 45 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on 9 January 1941, ibid., ap. 2, b. 35, l. 7 (in Russian).

[362] Minutes No. 34, 42, 43 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on 11, 29, 30 December 1940, LYA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 77, l. 3–4; b. 100, l. 3–4; b. 102, l. 4 (in Russian).

[363] Ibid.,b. 77, l. 3; b. 100, l. 4.

[364] Minutes No. 38 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on 20–21 December 1940, ibid., ap. 1, b. 89, l. 2 (in Russian).

[365] Minutes No. 43 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on 30 December 1940, ibid., ap.1, b. 102, l. 4 (in Russian).

[366] LCP(b) CC Recommended Lists of Party Delegates to the Fifth Congress, ibid., ap. 2, b. 20, l. 13–14 (in Russian).

[367] List of Kaunas City LCP(b) Delegates to the LCP(b) Fifth Congress, ibid., b. 20, l. 10 – 12 (in Russian).

[368] LCP(b) Report by V. Niunka, Chairman of the Mandatory Commission, on the Fifth LCP(b) Congress on 7 February 1941, ibid., b. 3, l. 197 (in Russian).

[369] Ibid., l. 197–201; List of Delegates to the Fifth Congress of LCP(b), LYA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 12, l. 1 – 7 (in Russian); Lietuvos komunistų partija skaičiais. 1918 – 1975 : Statistikos duomenų rinkinys, Vilnius: Mintis, 1976, p. 61. History reference books often provide a different number of delegates (277 voting delegates and 65 advisory delegates), which does not include two communists of Russian origin who were late to the Congress.

[370] List of Delegates to the Fifth Congress of LCP(b), LYA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 20, l. 13 (in Russian).

[371] Stenograph of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on April 2, 1941, ibid., b.86, l. 11, 19 (in Russian).

[372] Stenograph of LCP(b) CC Fifth Congress Meetings on February 5–9, 1941, ibid., b. 3, l. 357–391, 412 (in Russian).

[373] Minutes of LCP(b) CC Vote Counting Commission Meeting on February 9, 1941, ibid., b. 3 l. 438–443 (in Russian).

[374] Minutes No. 1 of LCP(b) CC First Plenum on February 9, 1941, LYA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 23, l. 1 (in Russian).

[375] Minutes No. 7 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on March 7–8, 1941, ibid., b. 69, l. 1 (in Russian); Minutes No. 2 of LCP(b) CC Second Plenum on March 8, 1941, ibid., b. 26, l. 4–5 (in Russian).

[376] Ibid., l. 5.

[377] Minutes No. 17 of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on April 23, 1941, ibid., b. 99, l. 8 (in Russian).

[378] Stenograph of LCP(b) CC Bureau Meeting on April 2, 1941, ibid., b.86, l. 10–19 (in Russian).

[379] А. Г. Авторханов, " Технология власти", *Вопросы истории,* 1991, No. 11, с. 70–71.

[380] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meetings of 8,10 October 1940, No. 6, 8, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 10, l. 3; b. 14, l. 3 (Russian).

[381] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meeting of 8 December 1940, No. 33 ibid., b. 75, l. 3 (Russian).

[382] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meeting of 13 December 1940, No. 35 LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 80, l. 20 (Russian).

[383] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meetings of 8, 30 October 1940, No. 6, 12, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 10, l. 4; b. 21, l. 4 (Russian)

[384] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meeting of 12 February 1941, No. 1 ibid., ap. 2, b. 54, l. 5 (Russian).

[385] . Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meetings of 8, 30 October, 13, 16 December 1940, 19 March 1941, No. 6, 12, 35, 26, 9 LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 10, l. 4; b. 21, l. 3; b. 80, l. 19; b. 83, l. 9; ap. 2, b. 75, l. 13–14 (Russian).

[386] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meetings of 8, 13, 29 December 1940, 22 February, 19 March 1941, No. 33, 35, 42, 5, 9 LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 75, l. 3–4; b. 80, l. 19–20; b. 100, l. 10; ap. 2, b. 64, l. 10; b. 75, l. 13–14 (Russian).

[387] Scheme of post distribution among the LCP(b) CC Secretaries and Division Heads in 1941, ibid., b. 141, l. 3 (Russian).

[388] 25/12/1940 Directive of the LCP(b) CC Head of Schools' Division to LCP (b) City and County Committees on School Supervision, ibid., ap. 1, b. 250, l. 1; Orders, circulars and other documents of the LSSR National Commissariat for Education submitted to the LCP (b) CC for coordination with Secretary Preikšas and Divisions of Schools and Activism and Propaganda, ibid., l. 10–96.

[389] Letters of National Commissariats for Local Industry and Trade to the LCP (b) Industry Division regarding the coordination of the resolutions of the LCP and National Commissariats with the LCP (b) Division, and reports of National Commissariats on their activities in 1940 , ibid., ap. 1, b. 254, l. 1–38; b. 276, l. 1–6; b. 277, l. 13– 18 et al.

[390] Minutes of the LCP (b) CC Bureau meeting of 23 April 1941, No. 17, ibid. ap. 2, b. 99, l. 4–5 (Russian).

[391] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meeting of 7 May 1941, No. 20, ibid., ap. 2, b. 108, l. 9 (Russian)

[392] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meetings of 19 March and 23 April 1941, No. 9, 17, ibid., ap. 2, b. 75, l. 2; b. 99, l. 7 (Russian)

[393] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meetings of 7-8 March 1941, No. 7, ibid., ap. 2, b. 69, l. 2 (Russian).

[394] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meeting of 19 March 1941, No. 9, ibid., ap. 2, b. 75, l. 1, 3 (Russian).

[395] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC Bureau meeting of 7-8 March 1941, No. 7, ibid., ap. 2, b. 69, l. 2 (Russian).

[396] Report presented by Paleckis in the 5th Congress of the LCP (b) on 7 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 3, l. 231 (Russian).

[397] Stenograph of the LCP (b) CC Plenum II on 8 March 1941, b. 29, l. 85–87, 96.

[398] Ibid., p. 11, 40, 98; Sniečkus' report for the 5th Congress of the LCP(b) CC on 5 February 1941, ibid., b. 6, l. 57–64, 74–49 (Russian).

[399] Minutes of the meeting of the LSSR Council of Ministers of 26 July 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 29
[400] Minutes of the meetings of the LSSR Council of Ministers of 2,7,9 August 1940, ibid., l. 36, 40, 44.

[401] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 26 September 1940 No. 162, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1940 m.*, No. 3, p. 75.
[402] Resolution of the LSSR CPS of 9 January 1941 No. 19, LCSA (Lithuanian Central State Archive), f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 5, l. 31
[403] Minutes of the meetings of the LSSR Council of Ministers of 9,10 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 44, 45
[404] Minutes of the meeting of the LSSR Council of Ministers of 24 August 1940, ibid., l. 60–61.

[405] L.Truska, *Lietuvos 1938–1953 metais*, p. 77.

[406] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 20-21 December 1940, No. 38, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1,b . 89, l. 1 (Russian).

[407] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 16 April 1941, No. 15, ibid., ap. 2, b. 93, l. 14 (Russian).

[408] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 23 November 1940, No. 341, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, Kaunas: LSSR LKT, 1941, No. 3 (6), p. 131.
[409] Minutes of the meeting of the LSSR Council of Ministers of 20 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 53; Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 29 November 1940 No. 365, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, No. 3 (6), p. 135–136
[410] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 2 April 1941, No. 12, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 84, l. 14–15 (Russian).

[411] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 16 January 1941 No. 34, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, No. 6 (9), p. 323.

[412] Minutes of the meetings of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 3 January, 2 April 1941, No. 44, 12, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 32, l. 4; b. 84, l. 14 (Russian).

[413] Minutes of the meeting of the LSSR Council of National Commissioners of 27 August 1940, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 1,b. 1, l. 3.

[414] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 26 October 1940 No. 266, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, Kaunas: LTSR LKT, 1941, No. 1 (4), p. 31–32.
[415] Minutes of the meetings of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 13, 29 December 1940, No. 35, 42, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 80, l.17, 22–23; b. 100, l. 6 (Russian).
[416] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 12 February 1941 No. 103, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 5, l. 142.

[417] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 13 February 1941 No. 103, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 7 (10), p. 398; Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 23,28 January 1941, No. 49, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 45, l. 1 (Russian).

[418] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 13 February 1941 No. 103, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, No. 7 (10), p. 398
[419] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 16 April 1941, No. 15, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 93, l. 14 (Russian).
[420] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 17 December 1940 No. 421, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, No. 4 (7), p. 170–171.

[421] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 12 February 1941 No. 102 and its Annex, ibid., No. 7 (10), p. 397–398.
[422] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 13 December 1940, No. 35, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 80 l. 17–18 (Russian
[423] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 25 October 1940 No. 256, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 2, l. 135
[424] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau on 26 September 1940, No. 3, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 5, l. 5 (Russian); Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 26 September 1940 No. 166, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1940 m.*, No. 3, p. 75.

[425] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 5 September 1940 No. 53, ibid., No. 2, p. 30.

[426] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 11 September 1940, No. 1, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 1, l. 3 (Russian).

[427] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 21 October 1940, No. 10, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 17, l. 1 (Russian).

[428] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 26 October 1940 No. 265, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No. 1 (4), p. 30

[429] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 30 December 1940 No. 478, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No. 4 (7), p. 191.

[430] Resolution of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 2 April 1941 No.12, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 84, l. 1 (Russian).

[431] Orders of the LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet Presidium dated 3, 14 April 1941, LCSA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 44, l. 71, 93.

[432] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 25 October 1940 No. 260, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, No. 1(4), p. 27.

[433] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau on 26 September 1941, No. 3, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 5, l. 4 (Russian).

[434] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 17 December 1940 No. 431, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No. 4 (7), p. 178.

[435] Resolutions of the LSSR CNC of 15 March 1941 No. 225, 226, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 6, l. 110–111.

[436] Resolution of the LSSR CNC dated 17 December 1940 No. 418, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, No. 4 (7), p. 169–170.

[437] Resolution of the LSSR CNC dated 10 October 1940 No. 209, ibid., No. 1 (4), p. 11–12.

[438] Resolution of the LSSR CNC dated 14 April 1941 No. 343, ibid., *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No. 11 (14), p. 621–622.

[439] Resolutions of the LSSR CNC dated 16 October 1940 No. 234, 236, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No. 1 (4), p. 16–17.

[440] Resolutions of the LSSR CNC dated 14 May 1941 No. 497, 498, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 8, l. 275–276.

[441] Resolutions of the LSSR CNC dated 3 October, 9 December 1940 No. 201,388, 390, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.*, No. 1 (4), p. 10–11; No. 3 (6), p. 141–142.

[442] Resolutions of the LSSR CNC dated 3,16 October 1940, 14 April 1941 No. 193, 237, 344, ibid., No. 1 (4), p. 5–6, 17–18; No. 11 (14), p. 622.

[443] Resolution of the LSSR CNC dated 4 February 1941 No. 76, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No. 7 (10), p. 386.

[444] Resolution of the LSSR CNC dated 24 April 1941 No. 401, ibid., No. 11 (14), p. 632–633.

[445] Resolution of the LSSR CNC dated 28 November 1940 No. 361, ibid., No. 3 (6), p. 135

[446] Resolution of the LSSR CNC dated 24 May 1941 No. 543, *Lietuvos Liaudies Komisarų Tarybos nutarimai,1941 m. gegužės 5 – birželio 16 d.,* Kaunas: Tarybinių ūkių liaudies komisariatas, 1941, p. 76.

[447] . К. Соколов, op. cit., c. 249.

[448] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 4 March 1941, No. 6, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 66, l. 3, 15 (Russian).

[449] Orders of the LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet Presidium of 8 March 1941, LCSA, f. R-758, ap. 2, b. 2, l. 113.

[450] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 12 February 1941, No. 1, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 54, l. 4–5 (Russian).

[451] Ibid.; Minutes of the meetings of LCP(b) CC Bureau on 19 March, 23 April 1941 No. 9, 17, ibid, b. 75, l. 12; b. 99, l. 8 (Russian).

[452] The 13 February 1941 letter of the LSSR CNC to the Presidium of the Provisional SS of the LSSR, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 3, b. 377, l. 55–56.

[453] Orders of the Presidium of the Provisional LSSR SS of 14 February and 24 March 1941, LCSA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 44, l. 29, 31, 35, 37, 57; LSSR CNC Resolution of 22 February 1941 No. 156, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No. 8 (11), p. 439 .

[454] The LSSR CNC Resolution of 29 May No. 573, *Lietuvos Liaudies Komisarų Tarybos nutarimai,1941 m. gegužės 5 – birželio 16 d.,* p. 53.

[455] Minutes of the meetings of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 16, 18 April 1941 No. 15, 16, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 93, l. 12,; b. 96, l. 2 (Russian).

[456] The LSSR CNC Resolution of 24 April 1941 No. 407, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941 m.,* No.11 (14), p. 633.

[457] Minutes of the meetings of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 2, 9 April 1941, No.12, 14, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 84, l. 1; b. 90, l. 7 (Russian).

[458] The 12 April 1941 Law of the Provisional SS of the LSSR Amending Articles 14, 45, 48 of the Constitution of the LSSR, LCSA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 44, l. 89–90.

[459] Stenograph of the LCP(b) CC Plenary Meting II on 8 March 1941, ibid., b. 26, l. 39–40, 61, 96–98 (Russian)

[460] Ibid., l. 40, 61, 85, 97.

[461] Ibid., l. 7–2, 61 – 63, 85–88, 97–98

[462]. Ibid., l. 61–63, 97.

[463] Ibid., l. 97.

[464] Ibid., l. 40.

[465] The LCP(b) CC Secretary Sniečkus' letter to the CPSU (b) CC dated 10 May 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 217, l. 8 (Russian).

[466] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b)CC Bureau of 17 October 1940, No. 9, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 15, l. 2–3, 9–12 (Russian).

[467] N.Lebedeva, "VKP(b) CK Politbiuras ir 1939–1941 m. prijungtų prie TSRS teritorijų sovietizavimas", *Genocidas ir rezistencija*, 2000, No. 1(7), p.95.

[468] Minutes of the LCP(b) CC meeting of 12 November 1940, No. 15, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 28, l. 11,15 (Russian).

[469] Order of the Presidium of the Provisional SS of the LSSR dated 12 November 1940, LCSA, f. R-758, ap.2, b. 2, l. 41.

[470] Resolution of the LSSR CNC of 12 December 1940 No. 60, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 4, l. 95.

[471] Orders of the LSSR Provisional SS Presidium of 13 November, 17 December, 28 March 1940, LCSA, f. R-758, ap. 2, b. 2, l. 42, 83–86, 106

[472] The 20 May 1940 Note of the LSSR CNC to the LCP (b) CC, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 222, l. 4–7 (Russian

[473]) Ibid.; Letter of the LCP(b) CC Organisational –Instructors' Division to the LSSR CNC and the Note dated May 1941, LCSA, f. R-754, ap. 3, b. 226, l. 56–61

[474]. The LCP (b) CC Secretary Sniečkus' report in the 5th Congress of the LCP (b) on 5 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 6, l. 80 (Russian).

[475] А. В. Макарин, opp. cit., p. 136–137

[476] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 10-11 November 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 25, l. 1, 53–57 (Russian).

[477] Minutes of the meeting of the LSSR Provisional SS Presidium of 16 December 1940, LCSA, f. R-758, ap. 2, b. 2, l. 42–55

[478]. Resolution of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 16 November 1940 m. and letter of the LCP(b) CC to the CPSU (b) CC, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 109, l. 1–5 (Russian).

[479] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 11 December 1940, No. 34, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 77, l. 4 (Russian).

[480] *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 93

[481]. Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 17 December 1940, No. 37, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 86, l.1–4 (Russian)

[482]. Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 9 January 1941, No. 45, ibid., ap. 2, b. 35, l. 1 – 2 (Russian
[483]). The 28 December 1940 letter of the LCP(b) Trakai County Committee to the LCP(b) CC, ibid., ap. 1,b. 154, l. 64 (Russian).

[484] Data of the LCP(b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division of 12 January 1941 on the progress of the election to the SSSR SS, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 154, l. 149

[485]. Data of the LCP(b) CC Organisational – Instructors' Division of 12 January 1941 on the results of the election to the SSSR SS, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 154, l. 150–151.

[486] *Tiesa*, 17 January 1941

[487] *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 82.

[488]. Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 12 November 1940, No. 15, ibid., f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 28, l. 11(Russian

[489]). Order of the SSSR National Commissariat for Justice of 6 March 1941, ibid., b. 467, l. 10–11

[490]. Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (B) CC Bureau of 2 April 1941, No. 12, ibid., b. 84, l. 9–10 (Russian).

[491]   J. Glušauskas,"Negirdėtas smurtas socializmo vardu", LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 274, l. 39–42; L. Truska,"'Lietuvos valdžios įstaigų rusifikavimas 1940-1941 m", *Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimo instituto darbai*, No. 1, 1996, p. 4–9.

[492] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 16 April 1941, No. 15, ibid., b. 93, l. 1–4 (Russian).

[493]. Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 21 May 1941, No. 23, ibid., ap. 2, b. 117, l. 15 (Russian)

[494] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) C Bureau of the 11 June 1941, No.27, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 129, l. 3–4 (Russian)

[495]. Stenograph of the LCP(b) CC Plenary Meeting II of 8 March 1941, ibid, b. 29, l. 80, 87, 96–101; Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 11 June 1941 No. 27, ibid., b. 129, l. 3 (Russian).

[496]. Stenograph of the LCP(b) CC Plenary Meeting II of 8 March 1941, ibid, b. 29, l. 80, 87–88, 99–100 (Russian).

[497] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 21 May 1941, No. 23, ibid., ap. 2, b. 111, l. 13– 14 (Russian)

[498] Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 8 December 1940, No. 33, ibid., ap. 1, b. 75, l. 3 (Russian); Minutes of the meeting of the LCP (b) CC Bureau of 9 January 1941, No. 45, ibid., ap. 2, b. 35, l. 8–9 (Russian); Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 7 May 1941, No. 20, ibid., b. 108, l. 10 ; Minutes of the meeting of the LCP(b) CC Bureau of 21 May 1941, No. 23 (Russian), ibid., b. 117, l. 15 (Russian).

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[509] Lists of communist members of the LCP city and county organisations, LPOA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 172, 173.

[510]. ibid, l. 2. Since, according to the CPSU (b) record procedure communists of that system were not included in the LCP record and lists of communists, there is no accurate data on this issue.

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[530]. Ibid., l. 13

[531]. Report by the LCP (b) CC Secretary Snieckus in the 5th Congress of the LCP (b) on 5 February 1941, ibid., b. 6, l. 50 - 56

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[541] Minutes No. 24 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 28 May 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2,b. 120, l. 8 (in Russian).

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[546] Minutes No. 23 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 21 May 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 117, l. 12 (in Russian).

[547] Minutes No. 42 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 29 December 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 100, l. 4 (in Russian).

[548] Minutes of Meetings of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 29 July 1940 and 2 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 31, 35.

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[562] Minutes of Meetings of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 23, 26 and 29 July 1940, 2 and 9 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 26, 30, 32, 36, 43.

[563] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 7 August 1940, ibid., l. 39.

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[565] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 16 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 49.

[566] Report on Activities of People's Commissariat of State Control of LSSR to CNC of LSSR, LCA, f. R-758, ap. 3, b. 387, l. 6.

[567] Instructions for Assignment of State Social Insurance Pensions issued by People's Commissariat of Social Welfare of LSSR in compliance with USSR laws, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 6 (9), Kaunas: CNC of LSSR, 1941, p. 322.

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[569] *Tarybų Lietuva*, 3 December 1940.

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[571] Resolution No. 218 (incl. Appendix) of CNC of LSSR dated 13 March 1941, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 6, l. 101–103.

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[573] Resolution No. 261 of CNC of LSSR dated 22 March 1941, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 9 (12), p. 500.

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[577] Minutes No. 3 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 26 September 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap.1, b. 5, l. 2–4 (in Russian).

[578] Resolution No. 164 of CNC of LSSR dated 26 September 1940, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1940.*, No. 3, Kaunas: CNC of LSSR, 1940, p. 54–55.

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[582] Minutes No. 9 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 19 March 1941, ibid., ap. 2, b. 75, l. 1 (in Russian).

[583] Resolution No. 276 of CNC of LSSR dated 25 March 1941, Resolution No. 352 of CNC of LSSR dated 14 April 1941, ibid., No. 10 (13), p. 564–565.

[584] Resolution No. 257 of CNC of LSSR dated 22 March 1941, ibid., No. 8 (11), p. 453–454.

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[588] R. Misiūnas, R. Taagepera, *Baltijos valstybės: priklausomybės metai, 1940–1990,* p. 39.

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[592] Minutes No. 30 and Documents of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 4 December 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 67, l. 28; b. 69, l. 6–8 (in Russian); Resolution No. 31 of CNC of LSSR dated 31 August 1940, ibid., 1940, No. 1, p. 7–8; Resolution Nos. 337 and 339 of CNC of LSSR dated 23 November 1940, ibid., 1941, No. 2 (5), p. 94, 95; Resolution No. 448 of CNC of LSSR dated 24 December 1940, ibid., No. 4 (7), p. 184; Resolution No. 56 of CNC of LSSR dated 30 January 1941, ibid., No. 6 (9), p. 332, etc.

[593] Resolutions of CNC of LSSR and CC of LCP(b) dated 14 April 1941, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 169, 173, 176, 178.

[594] Minutes No. 24 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 28 May 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2,b. 120 l. 12–13 (in Russian).

[595] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 7 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 40.

[596] Resolution No. 30 of CNC of LSSR dated 11 January 1941, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 6 (9), p. 316–321.

[597] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 9 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 42.

[598] *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 62–69,73, 105.

[599] N.Lebedeva, "VKP(b) CC Politbiuras ir 1939–1941 m. prijungtų prie TSRS teritorijų sovietizavimas", *Genocidas ir rezistencija*, 2000, No. 1(7), p. 94–96.

[600] *LKP atsišaukimai*, t. 4, p. 814–815.

[601] 1940 Report on Activities of People's Commissariat of State Control of LSSR, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 3, b. 387, l. 2–7; Order of Minister of Local Industry of LSSR Ch. Alperavicius on Appointment of Commissioners for Nationalisation of Industrial Enterprises dated 29 July 1940, ibid., f. R-771, ap. 1a, b. 248, l. 16; List of Commissars of Enterprises, 1940, ibid., l. 1–12.

[602] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 26 July 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap.58, b. 591, l. 29.

[603] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 29 July 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap.58, b. 591, l. 31.

[604] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 10 August 1940, ibid.,l. 45.

[605] G.Vaskela, *Žemę išdalysim iki rudens…*, p. 52–53, 74, 90, 92–94.

[606] Resolution No. 139 of CNC of LSSR dated 24 September 1940, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1940*, No. 2, p. 40.

[607] *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 71.

[608] Resolution No. 139 of CNC of LSSR dated 24 September 1940, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1940*, No. 2, p. 40

[609] G.Vaskela, *Žemę išdalysim iki rudens…*, p. 95–99; Lietuvos TSR istorija, t. 4, p. 36–37.

[610] Resolution No. 414 of CNC of LSSR dated 17 December 1940, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 4 (7), p. 167–168.

[611] G.Vaskela, *Žemę išdalysim iki rudens…*, p. 76.

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[615] Minutes No. 4 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 19-20 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 62, l. 1 (in Russian).

[616] *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža*, t. 3, p. 63–64.

[617] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 25 July 1940, LSA, f. 337, ap. 55, b. 591, l. 27.

[618] 1940 Report on Activities of People's Commissariat of State Control of LSSR, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 3, b. 387, l. 2–3.

[619] *Lietuvos TSR istorija*, t.4, p. 26.

[620] Minutes No. 3 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 26 September 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap.1, b. 5, l. 3 (in Russian).

[621] Decree of Presidium of Provisional Supreme Soviet of LSSR dated 27 September 1940, LCA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 42, l. 15.

[622] Resolution No. 172 of CNC of LSSR dated 27 September 1940, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys 1941*, No. 1 (4), p. 3–4.

[623] Minutes No. 4 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 2-3 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 3 (in Russian).

[624] 1940 Report on Activities of People's Commissariat of State Control of LSSR, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 3, b. 387, l. 4.

[625] L.Truska, op. cit., p. 78; R. Misiūnas, R. Taagepera, *Baltijos valstybės: priklausomybės metai, 1940–1990,* p. 39.

[626] Minutes of Meetings of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 30 July, 1940 and 16 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap.58, b. 591, l. 33, 49.

[627] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 9 and 16 August 1940, ibid., l. 43, 49.

[628] Decrees of Presidium of Provisional Supreme Soviet of LSSR dated 27 September 1940, 8, 28 and 31 October 1940 and 24 December 1940, LCA, f. R-758, ap. 1, b. 42, l. 13, 19, 57, 61, 107.

[629] Resolution Nos. 202 and 208 of CNC of LSSR dated 10 and 11 October 1940, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 6, l. 79, 86.

[630] Resolution No. 173 of CNC of LSSR dated 27 September 1940, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 1 (4), p. 4–5.

[631] Resolution No. 266 of CNC of LSSR dated 26 October 1940, ibid., p. 31–32.

[632] Resolution Nos. 258 and 263 of CNC of LSSR dated 28 October 1940, ibid., p. 26–28.

[633] Resolution No. 353 of CNC of LSSR dated 26 November 1940, ibid., No. 3 (6), p. 132–133.

[634] Minutes No. 5 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 22 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 64, l. 9 (in Russian).

[635] Resolution No. 450 of CNC of LSSR dated 24 December 1940, ibid., Nr. 4 (7), p. 184.

[636] Minutes No. 5 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 22 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 64, l. 9 (in Russian).

[637] L.Truska, op.cit., p. 78.

[638] Resolution No. 217 of CNC of LSSR dated 13 March 1941, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 8 (11), p. 446–447.

[639] Resolution No. 61 of CNC of LSSR dated 30 January 1941, ibid., No. 6 (9), ibid., p. 333.

[640] L.Truska, op. cit., p. 78.

[641] Resolution No. 139 (incl. Appendix) of CNC of LSSR dated 17 September 1940, ibid., No. 5 (8), p. 251–254

[642] Resolution No. 115 of CNC of LSSR dated 17 September 1940, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 1, l. 92.

[643] Resolution of CNC of LSSR and CC of LCP(b) dated 14 February 1941, LCA, f. R-754, ap. 1, b. 5, l. 162–168.

[644] V.Kašauskienė,"Lietuvos mokyklos sovietizacija ir priešinimasis jai 1940–1941 m.", *Lietuvos istorijos metraštis, 1993,* p. 106–121; V.Pšibilskis,"Kultūrinio švietimo įstaigos 1940–1941 metų ir pokkario ideologinėje situacijoje", *Mintys apie Lietuvos komunistų partijos kelią*, p. 198–205.

[645] Minutes No. 12 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 30 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 21, l. 1–2 (in Russian).

[646] L.Truska, op. cit., p. 81.

[647] Minutes No. 5 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 22 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 64, l. 2–4 (in Russian).

[648] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 17 July 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 19.

[649] Resolution No. 36 of CNC of LSSR dated 16 January 1941, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 6 (9), p. 323–324.

[650] Resolution No. 201 (incl. Appendix) of CNC of LSSR dated 10 March 1941, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 10 (13), p. 542–549.

[651] Minutes No. 12 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 2 April 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 84, l. 11 (in Russian).

[652] Resolution No. 320 of CNC of LSSR dated 9 April 1941, *Lietuvos TSR Vyriausybės nutarimų ir potvarkių rinkinys, 1941*, No. 11 (14) , p. 624.

[653] *Lietuvos TSR Mokslų Akademija*, Vilnius: Mokslas, 1981, p. 12.

[654] Minutes of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 11 September 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 1, l. 3 (in Russian).

[655] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 23 July 1940, ibid., l. 23.

[656] Minutes No. 3 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 26 September 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 5, l. 5 (in Russian).

[657] Minutes No. 9 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 19 March 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 75, l. 17 (in Russian).

[658] Minutes of Meeting of Presidium of Provisional Supreme Soviet of LSSR dated 19 September 1940, LCA, f.R-758, ap. 2, b. 2, l. 5.

[659] Minutes No. 33 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 8 December 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 75, l. 1 (in Russian).

[660] Resolution No. 101 of CNC of LSSR dated 17 September 1940, LCA, f. R-745, ap. 1, b. 1, l. 76.

[661] Minutes No. 17 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 23 April 1941, ibid., ap. 2,b. 99, l. 8 in Russian).

[662] Minutes No. 9 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 19 March 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 75, l. 9 (in Russian).

[663] Minutes No. 33 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 8 December 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 75, l. 1 (in Russian).

[664] Minutes No. 42 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 29 December 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 100, l. 4–5 (in Russian).

[665] V.Pšibilskis, "Kultūrinio švietimo įstaigos 1940–1941 metų ir pokkario ideologinėje situacijoje", *Mintys apie Lietuvos komunistų partijos kelią*, p. 201.

[666] Minutes of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 28 May 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 120, l. 10–11 (in Russian).

[667] V.Pšibilskis, op. cit., p. 202.

[668] Ibid., p. 198–212.

[669] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 5 August 1940, LSA, f. 3377, ap. 58, b. 591, l. 38.

[670] Minutes of Meeting of Council of Ministers of LSSR dated 16 and 20 August 1940, ibid., l. 49, 52.

[671] Resolution No. 24 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 28 May 1941, ibid., b. 120, l. 9 (in Russian).

[672] Minutes No. 33 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 8 December 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 75, l. 2 (in Russian).

[673] Minutes No. 12 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 30 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 21, l. 2 (in Russian).

[674] Minutes No. 1 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 11 September 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 1, l. 1–2 (in Russian).

[675] Minutes No. 4 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 2-3 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 5–7 (in Russian).

[676] Minutes No. 13 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 5 November 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 23, l. 3 (in Russian).

[677] Minutes Nos. 6 and 26 of Meetings of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 8 October 1940 and 28 November 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 10, l. 3; b. 57, l. 15 (in Russian).

[678] Minutes No. 6 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 8 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 10, l. 3 (in Russian).

[679] Stenograph of 2nd Plenary Session of CC of LCP(b) dated 8 March 1941, ibid., ap. 2, b. 29, l. 79–84 (in Russian).

[680] Ibid., l. 80.

[681] Minutes No. 4 of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 19-20 February 1941, ibid., b. 62, l. 2–3 (in Russian).

[682] Minutes No. 15 of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 16 April 1941, ibid., b. 93, l. 8 (in Russian).

[683] Minutes No. 16 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 18 April 1941, ibid., ap. 2, b. 96, l. 2 (in Russian).

[684] *Lietuvos komjaunimas skaičiais. 1919–1979*, Vilnius ; Mintis, 1980, p. 13.

[685] *Lietuvos komunistų partijos istorijos apybraiža. 1940–1959*, t. 3, Vilnius: Mintis, 1985, p. 97.

[686] *Lietuvos komjaunimas skaičiais. 1919–1979*, p. 36.

[687] Minutes No. 15 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 12 November 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 28, l. 11–13 (in Russian).

[688] Ibid.; Minutes No. 26 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 28 November 1940, ibid., b. 57, l. 15 (in Russian).

[689] Minutes No. 12 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 30 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 21, l. 1–2 (in Russian).

[690] *Lietuvos komjaunimas skaičiais. 1919–1979*, p. 35.

[691] J. R. Bagušauskas, *Lietuvos jaunimo pasipriešinimas sovietiniam režimui ir jo slopinimas*, p. 32.

[692] Minutes No. 5 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 22 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 64, l. 2–4 (in Russian).

[693] Minutes Nos. 4 and 18 of Meetings of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 2-3 October 1940 and 21 November 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 1, 9–13; b. 37, l. 29, 32–34 (in Russian).

[694] Minutes No. 12 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 2 April 1941, ibid., b. 84, l. 9 (in Russian).

[695] Minutes No. 20 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 7 May 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 108, l. 7 – 8 (in Russian).

[696] Resolution No. 617 (incl. Appendix) of CNC of LSSR dated 10 June 1941, *Lietuvos Liaudies Komisarų Tarybos nutarimai,5 May – 16 June 1941,* p. 11–13.

[697] Minutes No. 9 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 19 March 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 75, l. 11 (in Russian).

[698] Minutes No. 4 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 2-3 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 7 (in Russian).

[699] Minutes No. 23 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 21 May 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2, b. 117, l. 7–8 (in Russian).

[700] Minutes No. 4 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 2-3 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 7, l. 2 (in Russian).

[701] Minutes No. 6 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 8 October 1940, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 1, b. 10, l. 3 (in Russian).

[702] Letter of CC of LCP(b) to CC of CPSU(b) dated 7 January 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2,b. 217, l. 5 (in Russian)

[703] Minutes No. 5 of Meeting of Bureau of CC of LCP(b) dated 22 February 1941, LSA, f. 1771, ap. 2,b. 64 l. 4–5 (in Russian).

[704] E. Grunskis, opp. Cit., p. 27.

THE SYSTEM OF THE CRIMINAL OCCUPATIONAL POLICY: THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC STRUCTURES AND COLLABORATION WITH THEM IN 1940-1941

CONCLUSIONS

After the Soviet Union had occupied Lithuania, it forcibly put an end to the historical process and political development of the Lithuanian society. Lithuania was forcibly engaged into the political and public life and developments of the USSR. The Soviet Union made Lithuania its administrative territorial unit, the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR), and imposed the social relations of the USSR and a uniform social, economic, and political system on it. Due to the centralized political structure, the Soviet Union had a consistent political system and a totalitarian regime, a bureaucratic type of government, and a coherent executive as well as administrative system. The political dictate for the society imposed by the Communist Party after it had monopolized the government was the essential trait of the Soviet political system and totalitarian political regime. In order to retain the monopoly of the illegitimate government and make the public life go in line with the communist doctrine, its interests and aims, the Communist Party brought under its control social and political institutes. The political dictate enabled the Communist Party to form and implement a top-down political system with a party at its core, which united the powers of undivided and absolute government and imposed the unconditional dictate for all the other elements of the political system.

From the very beginning, the occupational authorities formed the mechanism of its government structures and public administration as well as the system of the Communist Party policy. The Communist Party implemented its power via the system of the political institutes, primarily, through the structures of the Communist Party, links of the state apparatus, and the political bureaucracy (nomenclature). Lithuania was governed by making use of the executive and administrative system. After the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR, the Soviet authorities established their apparatus there, namely, the system of the USSR public institutions, which enabled the Communist Party to implement its power, fulfil the state tasks and functions of the USSR, and govern and administer the country. Each administrative institution of the LSSR was formed by the will of the USSR for the organisation and administration of the areas of the Lithuanian public life. Under the totalitarian regime, the Communist Party sought to encompass all the areas of the public life, and to organise, govern, and control them. Therefore it expanded the functions and activities of the executive and administrative system, and increased the role of the state apparatus in the area of the regulation and control of the public life. The type of the bureaucratic administration and bureaucratic government system was formed in the USSR, where the organisation and apparatus of the Communist Party played an important political and administrative role, and where bureaucracy, or political nomenclature, was formed on the basis of the political ideological loyalty.

The Communist Party could not implement its policy aimed at consolidation of the principles of the Communist system in Lithuania without the system of the political institutes, which it made use for the expression of its political ideas, objectives and interests, and organised, ruled as well as transformed the public life, and without the application of sanctions, i. e., without the formation of the enforcement mechanism. After the monopolisation of government, the Communist Party implemented its policy primarily through the party structures, Lithuanian executive and administrative system, and by making use of the organised state force, political and administrative dictate, as well as by other state means for the formation of the public. The Communist Party structures and the institutions of the LSSR administrative system were the major instruments of the occupational policy.

Incorporation and forced retention of Lithuania in the Soviet Union, transformation of the Lithuanian social political reality on the basis of the Communist principles, party interests and aims, as well as organisation and control of the developments in the society were the objectives of the occupational policy. It aimed at the destruction of the Lithuanian statehood, its political system and structure of economy, eradication of all the forms of the Lithuanian social and spiritual life, breaking

of the national and political consciousness of the Lithuanian people as well as the suppression of its resistance to the occupational regime, physical extermination of the politically most active and most conscious Lithuanian people, implementation of the Soviet political system and social planned economy in Lithuania, the formation of the uniform social structure of the society, and reorganisation of other areas of public as well as spiritual life on the basis of the Communist principles. The functions of the occupational policy were the expression and implementation of the interests of the ruling Communist Party, reformation of public life in the occupied Lithuania according to the Communist doctrine, organisation as well as control of the developments in the society on the basis of the Communist principles, and integration of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, thus ensuring the unity and stability of the Soviet social political system.

The Formation of the Marionette Political Structures in the Occupied Lithuania in June 1940

After the USSR had occupied Lithuania, the government of the USSR tried to make an impression of the legitimacy of the occupational regime and an implication that it was the Lithuanian political structures themselves that effected the political transformations in the occupied country on the basis of its constitution. Therefore the USSR authorities disguised their political dictate for the Lithuanian government and staged the ostensibly legitimate changeover of all the most important institutes of the Republic of Lithuania, i. e. those of the President and the Government. Due to the similar considerations, the occupational authorities made an effort to retain for some time the formal procedures of the changeover of the political system and political structures of the Republic of Lithuania.

The Justas Paleckis Government was the first political institution made up of the USSR representatives in the occupied Lithuania; it was controlled by the USSR dictate and used for the implementation of the political plans of the Soviet Union. The Paleckis Government was made up of the USSR representative in Lithuania V. Dekanozov's group, which, in fact, functioned as a centre of the occupational government that forced upon the Lithuanian institutions decisions made by the occupational authorities on the transformation of the Lithuanian public life into the one that followed the USSR interests. The major Lithuanian political institutes, i. e., the President and the Government, were the institutions that could neither independently make political decisions nor implement an independent policy. They functioned in line with the orders made by the USSR representatives. Since all the executive and administrative institutions of the Republic of Lithuania were accountable for and hierarchically subordinated to the President and the Government, the USSR representatives were able to use them for the implementation of the occupational policy.

After the occupation of Lithuania, the mechanism of the Communist Party policy was started to be formed there. The CPSU (b) authorities set the objectives and aims of the Communist Party policy as well as the ways of their implementation in the occupied Lithuania and made all the major political decisions on the transformation of the Lithuanian social political reality into the one that followed the party's interests and objectives. This policy was being implemented through the Lithuanian political institutes subordinated to V. Dekanozov's group. V. Dekanozov's group was the chief instrument for the implementation of the occupational policy. It politically dictated to the institutions of the executive and administrative system as well as directed and coordinated their activities during the implementation of the occupational policy. The Lithuanian Communists organisation implemented the CPSU (b) policy and functioned according to V. Dekanozov's directives from the first days of the occupation. V. Dekanozov's group engaged the Communists organisation into the mechanism of the occupational government and turned it into the instrument of that mechanism.

After the government of the Soviet Union forced its political power upon Lithuania, it started transformation of the Lithuanian political system, beginning with the principles of the relations between the authorities and the public, and the basis of the organisation and functioning of, and interrelations between the political institutes. The USSR implemented these tasks gradually, by manipulating the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and by making use of the Lithuanian

executive and administrative system. Until the formalization of Lithuania's annexation, the government of the USSR left the title of the Republic of Lithuania, the formal validity of the Constitution and other legal acts, and the organisation of the executive and administrative system of the Republic of Lithuania. The USSR representatives made use of those links of the state apparatus, primarily, the executive, which they could easily, without arousing the suspicions of the public, subordinate to the implementation of the occupational policy. Once the People's Government started the implementation of reforms, plans of action of the institutions and social political content of functions were changed. The political institutes of the Republic of Lithuania were gradually eliminated. A single-party system was formed after legalization of the Lithuanian Communist Party and suppression of other political organisations. Due to the political interests, the USSR representatives started the swift changeover of the civil servants at the top by Communists and other administrators enjoying the political confidence of the invaders. Communists and other new administrators chosen on the basis of the political confidence by the invaders and employed for the work in institutions formed bureaucracy that was assimilated to the occupation authorities. After the USSR representatives had made use of the Lithuanian executive and administrative institutions for the implementation of the occupational policy, part of the Lithuanian bureaucracy was engaged into that process and gradually became closer to the occupational government.

In order to stage the ostensibly voluntary annexation of Lithuania, the occupational government organised elections into the People's Parliament. On July 21, controlled by the USSR representatives and the local Communists, the People's Parliament announced declarations on the formation of the Lithuanian Soviet Social Republic, its integration into the Soviet Union, nationalisation of land, banks, and the heavy industry. On August 3, in order to formalise the annexation of Lithuania, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR synchronically incorporated the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist Republics into the Soviet Union. Resolutions passed by the People's Parliament were forced by an alien state, illegitimate in terms of both the constitutional law of the Republic of Lithuania and the international law, and did not comply with the interests of the Lithuanian people.

The Formation of the Political Structures of the LSSR in August – September 1940

After incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR, the Communist Party started the implementation of the Soviet political system and the centralised model of government. The Communist Party aimed at the reformation of the Lithuanian public life on the basis of the Soviet principles. The CPSU (b) authorities made political decisions on the sovietisation of Lithuania. For example, on August 22 in 1940 the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU (b) endorsed the variant of the USSR Constitution adapted to the Lithuanian conditions and delegated the People's Parliament to adopt it. On August 24-25 the special session of the People's Parliament of the Lithuanian SSR promulgated the Constitution (the organic law) of the Lithuanian SSR, which established the principles of the Soviet political and social-economic system in the Lithuanian SSR. The Constitution defined the principles of the LSSR political system, established the political dictatorship of the Communist Party and the dictate of the party for other political structures, determined the uniform type of government in the Soviet Union and set up the administrative structure of the LSSR.

After the promulgation of the LSSR Constitution, the administrative sector of the LSSR started to be formed. When V. Dekanozov left Lithuania, his role was taken over by the CC of the CPSU (b) and the representative of the CPC of the USSR N. Pozdniakov and his apparatus. In August N. Pozdniakov's apparatus together with the heads of the Lithuanian Communist Party formed the chief administrative institutions of the LSSR: the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Court, and the Council of National Commissioners. On August 25 the special session of the People's Parliament granted the Parliament the title of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR. The special session appointed the Provisional Supreme Soviet, composed of 3 persons, the Presidium, composed of 15 persons, approved M. Gedvilas as Chairman of the Council of National Commissioners, on August 26 approved the Council of National Commissioners, made up of 16 persons, and formed the Supreme Court, composed of 9 persons. There were established major structures that had to directly

administer the annexed country according to the instructions of the USSR and to transform the public life into the one that followed the political interests and objectives of the Communist Party.

Structures of the Communist Party were the most significant elements of government and the mechanism of the party policy in the Soviet political system. They performed the crucial political and basic administrative role in the executive and administrative system of the USSR. The implementation of the Lithuanian sovietisation policy highly depended on the organisation and functioning of the party. The Lithuanian Communist Party had to become the political pillar of the occupational regime, the core of the Soviet political system that was being implemented in Lithuania, the key element of the party power and policy mechanism, and the nucleus of administration. In order to attain these objectives, the CPSU (b) changed the status and role of the Lithuanian Communist organisation in the Soviet political system. On October 8 the Political Bureau of the CPSU (b) incorporated the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Communist Parties into the CPSU (b). The Lithuanian CP (b) became the territorial organisation of the CPSU (b) with the rights of a district organisation. According to the statute adopted in the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b) the county party organisation could not independently deal with any political, organisational, staff and other issues; it was subject to the authorities of the CPSU (b) and was completely subordinated to them. The Political and Organisational Bureaus of the CC of the CPSU (b) dictated and controlled the activities of the county party organisation, determined its structure and staff, formed the authorities of the party, and allocated funds for it from the party and state budget via the political directives and through their representatives in the Lithuanian CP (b) as well as via the system of nomenclature that was started to be formed. The CPSU (b) had all the leverage for the subordination of the Communist organisation that functioned in Lithuania for the implementation of its policy. The LCP (b) became an important element of the executive mechanism of the CPSU (b) and an instrument of the implementation of its policy in Lithuania.

After the authorities of the CPSU (b) incorporated the Lithuanian Communist organisation into the CPSU (b), they formed the top-ranking organs of the organisation. On September 21 the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU (b) established the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b). The First Secretary A. Snieckus (Sniečkus), the Second Secretary I. Meskupas, the Third Secretary Kazys Preiksas (Preikšas), members: Chairman of the Presidium of the SS of the LSSR J. Paleckis, Chairman of the CNC M. Gedvilas, People's Commissioner of Home Affairs A. Guzevicius, and Head of the Organisational Instructors Department of the CC of the CPSU (b) Daniilas Supikovas (Šupikovas) were appointed the members of the Bureau. Alongside the officially appointed members of the Bureau, N. Pozdniakov participated in the Bureau meetings as well. Formally, he was not a member of the Bureau, however, he was entitled with the right of the casting vote. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) was granted the status of the principal institute of the Soviet political system in Lithuania. After the appointment of the heads of all the major LSSR administrative institutions as the members of the Bureau, the latter joined both the political and administrative areas. The Bureau could duplicate the functions of other administrative institutions. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) practically became a single political and administrative centre, the highest administrative institution in Lithuania.

With the establishment of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR, the Council of National Commissioners, the Supreme Court, and the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b), the key elements of the mechanism of the occupational government and the Communist Party policy were set up in Lithuania. These structures constituted the principal links of the USSR state apparatus in the Lithuanian SSR.

The Formation of the Political Structures in 1940-1941
LCP (b) as the Chief Political Structure

The structures of the Communist Party in the Soviet political system were the most important element of the government mechanism and the instrument of the party policy, which performed a

significant political and administrative role. The implementation of the sovietisation policy in Lithuania much depended on the party organisation and its functioning.

In order to restructure the public life according to the directives of the CPSU (b) that followed the Soviet principles, the LCP (b) expanded its organisation, founded its institutions, and formed the party organs as well as their apparatus. The December 1940 – January 1941 campaign of the reporting electoral meetings of the party organisations and the 5th Congress on February 5-9 in 1941 completed the formation of the LCP (b) structure. During this campaign, the party structure was formalized and the managing party organs of all levels were formed according to the statute of the CPSU (b). In the 5th Congress of the LCP (b) the Central Committee of the LCP (b), comprising 47 members and 16 candidates, was formed; 11 more people were elected members of the Auditing Commission. Heads of all the chief political and repressive structures of the LSSR were incorporated into the Central Committee. The nomenclatural staff made up 84 percent of the members of the CC of the LCP (b). Formally, the CC of the LCP (b) was the highest organ of the collective leadership of the party, however, in practice it was the structure subordinated to the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b), and had to endorse the rulings made by the authorities of the CPSU (b) as well as the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b).

On February 9 in 1941 the First Plenum of the CC of the LCP (b), together with the authorities of the CPSU (b), appointed the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) comprising 11 members. It had the following members: Secretaries of the CC of the LCP (b) A. Snieckus, I. Meskupas, N. Gridinas, and K. Preiksas, Secretary of the Party Committee of the principal and most influential Kaunas City Organisation J. Grigalavicius (Grigalavičius), Head of the Organisational Instructors Department of the CC of the CPSU (b) D. Supikovas (Šupikovas), heads of the central structures and the repressive institutions of the LSSR administration J. Paleckis, M. Gedvilas, A. Guzevicius, and P. Gladkovas, and representative of the authorities of the army deployed in the Lithuanian territory Vasilij Morozov. After the 18th Conference of the CPSU (b) resolved to establish the positions of several Secretaries for Industry in the party organisations of republics, regions, districts, and cities, on March 7-8 the Second Plenum of the CC of the CPSU (b) appointed two more secretaries. M. Cilys (Čilys), Head of the Industry and Transport Department, became Secretary for Industry of the CC of the LCP (b), and the former First Secretary of the party of Kaunas City Committee A. Petrauskas became the Secretary of the CC for the Food Industry. As the authorities of the LCP (b) could not find the right local communist for the supervision of transport, they had to request the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to send their person. The CPSU (b) sent Aleksandr Zubov, and on April 23 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) approved him as the Secretary for Transport. The Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) was the highest political and administrative institution of the LSSR, which united the chief political structures into a uniform political and administrative centre. The Bureau applied for the Lithuanian conditions and specified political resolutions of the CPSU (b) on the reformation of the Lithuanian life according to the Soviet principles, as well as organised and controlled the implementation of its policy. It was the chief instrument of the Communist Party policy in Lithuania.

In order to encompass all the major areas of public life, to politically dictate for the administrative institutions and control their activities, the authorities of the Communist Party began the formation of the party apparatus. There were established units and departments in the Central Committee of the LCP (b), which supervised certain spheres of public life and areas of party policy, organised the implementation of the political resolutions of the party as well as controlled the execution of these resolutions, directly dictated to the institutions administering particular areas as well as controlled their activities. After the control of the CC of the LCP (b) of the administrative institutions was extended, the CC departments began direct intervention to all their activities, from drafting of the rules of People's Commissariats and orders of the commissioners on various issues of the activities of commissariats, to the recruitment of staff for the commissariats and institutions subordinated to them. Frequently, the Central Committee departments used to duplicate some of the functions of the institutions. For example, Secretary K. Preiksas established strict ideological and administrative control of the People's Commissariat of Education. A procedure was set up for the

coordination of all the major orders and circular notes of the People's Commissariat of Education with Secretary K. Preiksas and Schools Department of the CC of the LCP (b), as well as planning of and accounting for all the measures that the commissariat applied for the implementation of the Soviet education system. Departments for Schools, Propaganda, and Agitation were especially censorious in their assessment of the ideological singleness of the orders of the People's Commissariat of Education. These departments dictated to the commissariat and controlled the entire its performance, intervened into the most of its activities, and aimed at the meticulous regulation of the actions of the commissariat and education institutions that were subordinate to it. Such supervision and control of the administrative institutions restricted the capacities of the institutions to make independent decisions. Similar process took place in the lower structures of the party, i. e. the city and county committees. They copied the structure of the Central Committee of the LCP (b) and the functions of its structural subdivisions.

On the eve of the USSR-Germany war, the party apparatus had a staff of 672 people. There were 4739, and together with the provisional party list, 4918 Communists in the party at that time.

Foundation of the Central Institutions of the LSSR Administrative System

After the institution of the chief political structures of the LSSR, the Communist Party continued the formation of the system of the political institutes and organised links of the USSR apparatus in Lithuania, which it used for the implementation of its policy. The system of the political structures and the administrative institutions was established by destroying the political institutes of the Republic of Lithuania that were not in line with the Soviet political system and the principles of the totalitarian regime; by restructuring and applying to the political system of the USSR those institutions of the Republic of Lithuania that could be used by the Communist Party for its own interests and applied to its power and policy mechanism; and by establishing new institutions that used to function in the Soviet Union and that did not existed in Lithuania before the occupation. Each structure was formed by the authorities of the CPSU (b) or according to the decision made by other political institutes of the USSR. The bureau of the CC of the LCP (b), the Council of National Commissioners, and the Presidium of the Provisional Supreme Soviet passed appropriate resolutions on the establishment of the specific structures on the basis of these decisions. For example, after the division of the USSR People's Commissariat of Home Affairs into two commissariats, on March 6 in 1941 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) reorganised the LSSR People's Commissariat of Home Affairs into the People's Commissariat of Home Affairs and the People's Commissariat of State Security; and the LSSR Presidium of the Provisional SS issued an appropriate decree. On February 12 the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) organised two new people's commissariats according to the model of the USSR: the People's Commissariat of the Forestry and the People's Commissariat of Meat and Diary Industry. On February 14 the Presidium of the LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet issued appropriate decrees, and on February 22 the Council of National Commissioners passed a resolution. The structure of the central administrative institutions of the LSSR was finally formed in the spring of 1941. Since the newly established people's commissariats and committees under the Council of People's Commissioners formed the administrative structure that did not comply with the organisation of the administration determined by the Constitution of the LSSR, the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) assigned J. Paleckis to make amendments to the constitution. On April 9 the Bureau approved the draft law on the amendments to the articles of the Constitution, and on April 12 the Second Session of the LSSR Provisional Supreme Soviet enacted the amendments to the Constitution of the LSSR. New people's commissariats and committees were added to the list of people's commissariats. On the eve of the USSR-Germany war, 18 people's commissariats, 8 board committees under the CPC of the LSSR, and 5 institutions of the representatives of the USSR people's commissariats functioned in the LSSR; 31 central administrative institutions of the union-republic and republic level subordination in total. 6558 people worked in these structures on the eve of the war (79 in People's Parliament, 8 in the Provisional Presidium of the SS, 67 in the Council of People's Commissioners, 3924 in the NKVD system, and 2480 in other commissariats). Moreover, 192 people were employed in courts, and 150 staff employees worked in the Prosecutor's Office.

The Formation of the LSSR Local Administrative Structures

In order to establish the local administrative system, the Communist Party started the formation of the local administrative organs. According to the resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 3, 1940, there had to be organised elections into the local Councils of the Labour deputies in Lithuania. However, the councils were not organised during the period of the first Soviet occupation. This did not have any impact on the functioning of the occupational government, because, in the political reality, councils were the formal political structure that did not have any practical powers and did not play any significant political or administrative role. The interests of the Lithuanian government only required the speedy establishment of the local regulative structures, i. e. the executive committees that were formally subordinate to the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR, but in fact subject to and controlled by the local structures of the Communist Party.

The provisional executive committees were established according to the resolutions of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU (b) of November 10-19 and the resolution of the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) of November 12, the decree of the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR of November 12, and the resolution of the Council of National Commissioners of December 12. The committees were comprised of the Communist Party structures, and the Provisional Supreme Soviet of the LSSR approved their composition. In October – December 1940, there were formed 4 executive city committees subordinate to the republic institutions, 32 executive city committees subordinate to the county institutions, 23 county, 267 borough, and 2866 district executive committees, in total - 3192 executive committees. According to the data of the Staff and Organisational Instructors Departments of the CC of the LCP (b), there were 8833 top-ranking employees in the provisional executive committees, or 10 000 high-level officials, people in the committee units included. According to the data of the provisional Budget Commission of the Supreme Soviet, there were 9 774 employees in the provisional executive committees in April 1941.

From the beginning of the formation, the local administrative institutions were subordinate to the appropriate structures of the party, i. e. to the units of the Central Committee of the LCP (b), and city or county committees as well as their apparatus. The party committees dictated politically to the provisional executive committees and controlled their activities. According to the model of the USSR, heads of the chief occupationa; political structures (party, administrative, and repressive organs) were appointed members of the provisional executive committees. The doubling of offices prompted the doubling of functions, provided the conditions for the consolidation of party and administrative structures on the local administrative level, induced the coordination of political and administrative areas and, in fact, eliminated the boundaries between the two.

Objectives, Functions, and Role of the LSSR Political Structures in their Implementation of the Occupational Policy

The policy objectives and tasks of the CPSU (b), the implementation strategy and tactics as well as the mechanism of the party policy determined the objectives, functions, and the role of the occupational political structures during the implementation of the party policy. After the incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR, forcible retention of Lithuania in the USSR and the transformation of the social political reality in Lithuania into the one that followed the communist doctrine and was in line with the Communist Party interests and aims constituted the chief objective of the Communist Party policy in Lithuania. In Lithuania, similarly to the other annexed Baltic States, the so-called transitional period was announced (according to the communist terminology, it was the transitional period from capitalism to socialism and the period of the establishment of the foundations of the socialism), which was devoted for the sovietisation of the incorporated countries. The sovietisation process took place synchronically in all the annexed countries according to a similar scheme and encompassed all the areas of their life. The political structures of the Lithuanian SSR organised and implemented measures for the reformation of all the areas of life according to the Soviet principles within the scope of authority granted to them. The objectives of the Lithuanian sovietisation policy determined the specific aims of the political organisations and administrative institutions of the LSSR. The organs of the Communist Party established and determined certain specific tasks of the political and

administrative structures according to the political norms of the party (directory regulations). For example, the 5th Congress of the LCP (b) prescribed the party and administrative institutions the implementation of the CPSU (b) policy in the sovietisation of Lithuania, specified and determined the tasks of the local administrative institutions.

Since the occupational political structures constituted part of the state and government mechanism of the USSR, they performed the functions of the totalitarian state and the occupational government as well as implemented their tasks and objectives.

In order to forcibly retain Lithuania in the Soviet Union, the government of the USSR established a mechanism that suppressed the resistance of the Lithuanian public to the occupation and subdued it to the occupational government. It was the repressive apparatus and other offices that had the leverage over the public. The army deployed in the Lithuanian territory, courts, the prosecutor's office, institutions of security and home affairs implemented repressive policy and functioned as the instruments of the organised force seeking to subdue the Lithuanian public to the occupational government. The suppression of the resistance to and critique of the occupation, the communist system, and the authorities of the party was the principle area of their activities. For example, after on June 16 in 1941 the CC of the CPSU (b) and the Council of National Commissioners of the USSR passed the resolution on the deportation of residents from the Baltic States, Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and Moldova, the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) in the beginning of June, and the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR on June 10 welcomed this decision. The structures of NKVD and NKGD of the LSSR exercised deportations, while the county parties and the ad hoc executive committees provided assistance and organised the management of the inventory and distribution of the property of the deportees. The repressive structures occupied a special position in the system of the USSR state apparatus. Nominally, they belonged to the administrative sector of the LSSR; however, in fact they were subordinate to the higher institutions of the USSR. The LCP (b) structures could exert influence over these structures only by making use of the system of the party cadres and informal relations of the political bureaucracy, the political responsibility of the administrators for the party structures that had nominated them, and hierarchical subordination to the party leaders.

In order to transform the Lithuanian social political reality according to the Communist doctrine and to shift the development of the society according to its objectives, the Communist Party sought the implementation of the all-inclusive organisation, government, and control of the society. The political and administrative structures of the LSSR were the ones that performed these functions. They had to encompass all the areas of the Lithuanian society, without leaving any space for the phenomena and processes not sanctioned and controlled by the occupational government. The organisation and control of the areas of social activities and forms of life according to the Communist ideology and policy objectives constituted an important field of the activities of the occupational political structures, primarily, those of the administrative institutions.

In order to implement the Communist ideology, a multiple ideological apparatus was being formed: the system of mass information and communication means, education, culture, science institutions, censorship organs ("Glavlit"), the party propaganda, and agitation apparatus. The political structures of the LSSR and ideological apparatus subordinate to them implemented in the Lithuanian society the only world-view that was sanctioned by the authorities, Communist ideology and values, and banned other ideas and views as well as the critique of the Communist doctrine. Making use of the ideological apparatus, the Communist Party pursued unification and levelling of the consciousness of the Lithuanian society and complete transformation of an individual and their inner life.

The implementation of the planned economy was one of the most significant areas of activity of the political structures. In order to restructure the economic relations according to the Soviet principles, a sector of the state property management and administration of economy, which was similar to the Soviet Union – huge, wide-stretching and multi-layered, inert and difficult to manage – was being formed. Line and territorial institutions functioning on the basis of exterritoriality implemented the system of planned economy, centralised planning and government, general accounting and control. They sought to encompass all the branches of economy, regulate the activities

of all the operators of the economy, as well as regulate and control all the stages of the production and realisation of products.

The mechanism of the Communist Party rule and its policy increased the role of the political structures of the LSSR. Since the CPSU (b) implemented its rule and policy by making use of the administrative methods and through the administrative sector in Lithuania, the administrative institutions in the LSSR constituted the chief element of the mechanism of the party rule and the instrument of the pursuance of its policy. The implementation of the political decisions of the party and the execution of its measures as well as various assignments represented an important field of activities of all the political organisations and administrative institutions. On the one hand, this provided an opportunity for the communists to concentrate all the administrative capacities at the maximum and to shift them towards the pursuance of the political objectives. On the other hand, this politicised the activities of institutions. This was especially obvious in the performance of the institutions administering culture, particularly, in the activities of the People's Commissariat of Education.

Due to the fact that the political power was concentrated in the hands of the authorities of the CPSU (b) and due to the way the Communist Party policy was formed, neither of the political structures of the LSSR could independently pass political decisions. It was the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU (b) that formed the Communist Party policy. Together with the Council of National Commissioners of the USSR, it passed all the political decisions on the sovietisation of Lithuania. The political structures of the LSSR used to make similar decisions on the basis of such resolutions. Due to the centralised government, the political structures of the LSSR were subordinate to the corresponding institutions of the USSR, which supervised the administrative institutions of the LSSR and controlled their activities. Moreover, representatives of the USSR supervised the activities of the LSSR institutions as well: Lithuanian representative of the CC of the CPSU (b) and of the CPC of the USSR N. Pozdniakov (Secretary for Cadres of the CC of the LCP (b) Nikolaj Gridin took over his functions in 1941, after Pozdniakov had left Lithuania) and his apparatus as well as the administrators sent from the USSR. In the party and bureaucratic hierarchy, these were the second parties formally subordinate to the local heads of the institutions, however, practically, they took the top-ranking positions and in fact often managed the activities of institutions.

The Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b), as the chief political structure in Lithuania and the highest administrative institution of the LSSR, dictated for other political organisations and administrative institutions as well as guided and controlled their activities, together with the activities of the institutions subordinate to them. For example, in order to control the way the institutions adopted the measures of the sovietisation of economy and implementation of the system of the planned economy, the Communist Party structures steered and controlled the activities of the institutions that administered the economy and doubled some of their functions. Secretaries of the CC of the LCP (b) and line departments subordinate to them controlled the implementation of the production plans, tried to regulate even the planning and accounting of the economy, working standards and conditions, and other issues.

The Presidium and the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR were the institutions that applied decisions of the institutions of the USSR authorities and the structures of the Communist Party, and accordingly passed the corresponding laws and orders. For example, on April 12 in 1941, the 2nd Session of the First Convocation of the Provisional Supreme Council of the LSSR ratified the laws on the amendments to the Constitution of the LSSR, which had been discussed and approved by the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) three days earlier. Following the resolutions passed by the Bureau of the CC of the LCP (b) and the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR, the Presidium of the Supreme Council issued orders on the sovietisation of Lithuania, the formation, elimination and reorganisation of the administrative institutions, appointment of heads of the institutions, etc.

Due to the centralised government and multi-functional subordination to the public institutions of the USSR as well as the structures of the Communist Party, the Council of National Commissioners of the LSSR did not exercise the executive powers and could not perform the ruling functions. It

performed the functions of expeditious management, application of the decisions of the government of the USSR to the Lithuanian conditions and the organisation of their implementation as well as the exercise of their control. The Council of National Commissioners played a major role in the organisation of the implementation of the CPSU (b) policy and control of the functioning of its measures. It passed resolutions on the basis of the decisions made by the Communist Party and the institutions of the USSR, and sovietised all the areas of life in line with these resolutions.

The provisional executive committees acted as regulative organs that executed decisions made by the Communist Party and central administrative institutions, organised their implementation in situ, and dealt with other economic, social and other issues of local interest. The implementation of some of the Lithuanian sovietisation measures in situ constituted an important area of their activities. For example, after the nationalisation of land, making of inventory and redistribution of property of the nationalised land owners was transferred to the authority of the provisional executive committees. Together with the local party and repressive structures, the provisional executive committees participated in the action of deportation of the Lithuanian citizens, and organised making of inventory and redistribution of property of the deportees.

The Cooperation of the Lithuanian Society with the Occupational Government

The Lithuanian society did not approve of the occupation and annexation of Lithuania; it found the loss of the Lithuanian statehood particularly poignant, and struggled against the occupants and their policy as much as it could. However, due to various reasons, part of the society supported the occupational regime, engaged into the activities of the political structures of the occupational regime, contributed in various ways to the implementation of the criminal activities of the invaders of Lithuania, aided the occupational regime, and collaborated with it. The participation of the Lithuanian citizens in the criminal occupational policy much depended on the occupational political structures or administrative institutions they operated in and the position they held.

All the political and administrative occupational structures pursued the policy of the invaders, were involved in the destruction of the Lithuanian political system and economic order as well as in the reformation of all the areas of the public life according to the Soviet principles; they were engaged in the suppression of the resistance of the Lithuanian people against the occupation regime and in the organisation and execution of the destruction of the Lithuanian people. It was the structures of the Lithuanian Communist Party, especially its authorities, that contributed most and to the greatest extent to the occupational regime. It performed a consistent implementation of the CPSU (b) policy and exercised the organisation of the political measures. The structures of the Communist Party were involved in the decision-making on the deportation of the Lithuanian people, participated in the actions of deportation, and were the accomplices of this crime.

It was the people at the top of the political and administrative structures, primarily, those of the Communist Party and the central administrative institutions, that aided the occupational regime in the organisation and implementation of the occupational policy as well as the committing of crimes of the occupational regime most. Communists and other administrators chosen by the invaders on the basis of the political trust and employed in the institutions formed the bureaucracy that was assimilated to the occupational authorities. Due to the common political interests and aims, the communist administrators identified with the occupation authorities. In the public eyes, the communist bureaucracy rightly embodied the occupational government. Communists as well as other party functionaries and administrators (nomenclature) appointed on the basis of the political trust played an important role in the organisation of the execution of the decisions on the Lithuanian sovietisation. However, there were officials among the staff of the political structures and administrative institutions that, due to various reasons, tried to resist the political dictate of the USSR and delay the Soviet reforms.