

Content

Conclusions	2
1. Background to the occupation of Lithuania. Occupational repressive structures during the Second World War.....	2
2. Repressive structures in postwar Lithuania	3
2.1. "Ministry of fear" – Organs of Soviet State Security.....	4
2.2. System of the Interior	8
3. Collaboration with the Soviet repressive organs	10
3.1. LSSR NKGB (MGB) personnel.....	11
3.2. LSSR NKVD (MVD) personnel.....	13
3.3. The agency of repressive organs.....	14
4. Conclusions	17

Conclusions

1. Background to the occupation of Lithuania. Occupational repressive structures during the Second World War

After the Second World War started, in June 1941, part of the LSSR NKVD and NKGB apparatus was evacuated to various regions in Soviet Union. Having managed to move to the territory of the Soviet Union in time, the employees of repressive structures who had acted in Lithuania until the war, were integrated into the USSR NKVD and belonged to a special subdivision, the so-called “Lithuanian sector”, the head of which was the former Peoples Commissar of LSSR NKVD, Aleksandras Guzevičius. This subdivision was responsible for the personnel reserve, which included majority of the former employees of LSSR NKVD and NKGB, also for recruiting there new chekists, for organizing intelligence service, terrorist acts and sabotages on the Lithuanian territory occupied then by Germans, and also for managing the persons evacuated from Lithuania including the arrested. The main task set for the “Lithuanian sector” was to get properly ready for the reoccupation of Lithuania, and it had been systematically started since the beginning of 1943. On 3 January 1943, the USSR NKVD subordinate operative chekist groups of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian SSR were established. These operative chekist groups were to be ready to restore the repressive NKVD apparatus in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The central office of the operative groups was located in Moscow, while, if there were people evacuated from the Lithuania in other places, there were separate operational groups of 2-5 chekists formed. In Chkalov, where the LSSR NKVD and NKGB operational archives had been brought from Lithuania at the beginning of war, there was the biggest (of 5 persons) acting operative group which had to select the archival materials necessary for the operative-agencies work. On the whole, the LSSR NKVD operative chekist groups consisted of 67 workers, 55 of them being operational agents, 9 were employees of the administrative and economic apparatus, and 3 were assistants¹.

The armies of Briansk, North West and the special frontier third army also established three LSSR NKVD operative groups subordinate to the subdivisions of NKVD military counterintelligence, the Special Divisions (*Osobyj otdel, OO*). Those divisions within the acting army were responsible for organising transfer of agents and special groups through the frontier to the Lithuanian territory occupied by Germans, for collecting information about dislocation and

¹ The regulations of 3 January 1943 regarding the establishment of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian operative chekist groups. LYA (Lithuanian Special Archives), fund K-1, folder 3, file 200, p. 145-146.

movements of the German army, also for arresting and interrogating war prisoners fleeing Lithuania.

According to the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium of 14 April 1943, the USSR NKVD was split into two separate Commissariats, NKVD and NKGB. In November 1943, established there was an LSSR NKGB operative group acting in the former Pavlovo Posad, near Moscow, assigning A. Guzevičius the head of it. This group, later being the core of LSSR NKGB restored in Vilnius in the middle of July 1944, started establishing separate structural subdivisions: Second and Fourth divisions, “V” division, “A” group, personnel group, administration, economical, and financial group. Thus, the reserve chekists started getting prepared for work in specific spheres.

In the second half of 1944, two operative groups together with the Red Army units were sent to the North and Central regions of Lithuania. The aim was to get established in the biggest Lithuanian towns and districts centers, and to take over the materials of administrative, military and intelligence services of Germans, their radio stations, transportation units, and as well to get in touch with the security police units already operating in the Lithuanian underground². So was ensured the possibility to transfer the central USSR, NKVD and NKGB executing organs of repressive policy from Russia to Lithuania. They moved to Vilnius in the middle of July 1944, and straight away started acting as legitimate state administration institutions.

2. Repressive structures in postwar Lithuania

The second Soviet occupation of Lithuania having started, the repressive organs of Soviet authorities were restored. They were directly subordinate to the central USSR authorities and party institutions. In summer 1944, also restored were the two independent Peoples Commissariats, of the Interior and of State Security supervised by Lavrenty Beria himself. NKVD and NKGB establishment and their work Lithuania from November 1944 till March 1947 were coordinated by the USSR NKVD-NKGB agent, major-general I. Tkachenka, in January-April 1945 deputized by major-general D. Rodionov.

In spring 1946, by the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 14 March 1946, the Peoples Commissariats were renamed to ministries³, so respectively NKVD became the Ministry of the Interior MVD (*Ministerstvo vnutrennich del*), NKGB became the Ministry of State Security MGB (*Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoj bezopasnosti*). State security organs acted as independent institutions until the death of Josif Stalin. Then, during the united meeting of 15 March 1953, in

² The report by the head of Fourth division of LSSR NKGB operative group, A. Syrych of 20 June 1944 to the deputy head of LSSR NKGB operative group, Y. Rudakov, *ibid.*, file 536, p. 13-14.

³ *Lubianka. VChK-KGB*, Moscow, 1997, p. 48.

order to concentrate the repressive structures in one hands, the Central Committee of the USSR Communist Party, USSR Council of Ministers, and USSR Supreme Soviet decided to join MGB and MVD into one apparatus, MVD. Talking about the shift of Soviet repressive organs in Lithuania, special emphasis must be placed on the so-called territorial period (July 1950 – June 1953). After the administrative-territorial arrangement in Lithuania had been changed and four districts had been established (the districts of Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, and Šiauliai), in each of them there were MGB and MVD district departments, subject to central LSSR MGB and LSSR MVD organs, established. Thus, in the last years of armed resistance, the structure of repressive organs was noticeably expanded in the biggest towns of Lithuania by establishing subdivisions with more authority than the town and district divisions which had acted before in the periphery. As well as territorial LSSR NKVD (MVD) and NKGB (MGB), there were also divisions directly under the Union operating in Lithuania: USSR NKVD-MVD-MGB interior and border army units, USSR NKGB-MGB divisions of transportation (railroad and basin of Lithuania) security, and of military counterintelligence (until May 1946 these were: USSR NKVD counterintelligence SMERSH (9th division of KGB) divisions, later, special divisions).

Even though during the first years of the second Soviet occupation, there were attempts made to assign the coordination of activities of NKVD and NKGB in suppressing the anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania to one hands (from the end of 1944 until April 1946, there were the NKVD-NKGB operational sectors operating; they had to organize and supervise the work of NKVD and NKGB district divisions, and actions of NKVD army units dislocated in Lithuania), nonetheless the roles of those two institutions in executing repressions were not of equal importance. In 1944-1947, NKVD (MVD) was the most significant repressive structure. Since 1947, they started to reduce the influence of MVD in Soviet Union (and also in Lithuania) in order to forward more power to the state security apparatus which had received part of divisions with important functions of executing repressions: the army of the interior and the border, military counterintelligence, divisions for fight against “banditry”, *stribai* (local destroyer squads collaborating with NKVD), militia, subdivisions for search of exile or prison fugitives, and other divisions with less important functions.

2.1. "Ministry of fear" – Organs of Soviet State Security

The state security systems of the Soviet Union, often called as “Ministry of fear”, had much bigger plans than mere physical violence against anti-Soviet regime minded powers or individual elements. In order for the Soviet empire to successfully exist and strengthen its influence in the world, i.e. to realize Stalin’s idea of conquering the world, the Soviet Union had to become a

state where there would be not a single person questioning or countering the existing regime. This could be achieved by indoctrinating fear, resignation, unconditional humility in people's minds, also awareness that one is constantly being watched; thus, any their action can end either in punishment or in encouragement. In this respect most Lithuanians who had gone through the regime of Antanas Smetona was the generation "corrupted" beyond retrieve and they had to either be made incapable or, at the very outside, to be exterminated. After the war, failing quickly to neutralize nation's opposition to the occupation, extremely strong measures were used against those who would refuse to surrender.

All the functions performed by the organs of the Soviet State Security like intelligence, political and ideological counterintelligence, economic espionage, control of correspondence, constant observation, telephone wiretap, which were serving for the purposes of the totalitarian state ruled by the Communist Party, in respect to Lithuania, they were primarily used to neutralize opposition to the Soviet regime and preclude possible manifestations of resistance or discontent with the existing system.

During the first decade of the second Soviet occupation, the most important NKGB (MGB) branch was the Second division established uniting two divisions, the secret politic and counterintelligence divisions. The new division had all spheres of counterintelligence operations within the scope of its powers: search for and exposure of "anti-Soviet elements", operative-agency work with intellectuals, youth, clergy, search for people considered the state criminals, finding out about foreign intelligence agents, contacts of Lithuanian underground organizations with foreign countries, operative-agency work in strategically important industry enterprises and factories, agriculture. The operational agents of this division would carry out searches, arrest and interrogate people suspected of "anti-Soviet activities", the members of the legalized underground organizations⁴. In 1944, the Second division under NKGB comprised 9 subdivisions, some of which were later reorganized to separate divisions. In January 1945, there was an Operative division established (searches, arrests, operative detection, exterior observation); in March 1945, "B" division (application of operative technologies, analysis of documents and dactylographic expertise) was set up; in October 1946, the Fourth division (search for persons considered the state criminals) was launched; in December the same year, "O" division (persecution of the clergy and believers of all confessions existing in Lithuania) was finally established.

At the end of 1946, the structure and functions of the Second division settled: until 1950, the division was occupied with the political counterintelligence (observed the foreign intelligence

⁴ The reference about the interrogation work of LSSR NKGB Second division. May 1945. LYA, fund K-1, folder 10, file 22, p. 185.

services, repatriates, people corresponding with foreigners or those having relatives abroad) and ideological counterintelligence (operative-agency work with youth, intellectuals, the employees of science and art spheres). To perform the latter function, in 1950, a separate subdivision was established. Until the end of 1946, the central NKGB apparatus had a separate, Second town (i.e. Vilnius) division operating. It was responsible for Vilnius, the South East of Lithuania and other territories in Lithuania where it was searching for Polish anti-Soviet underground centers, their leaders and members, emissaries of the Polish emigration centers.

The most important object of LSSR NKGB (MGB) intelligence (1st) division during postwar was Lithuanian émigré in Western countries. Separate branches of the division were spying after Lithuanian organizations operating in the emigration, collected data about the anti-Soviet underground organizations operating in Lithuania, their relations with the émigré. The division organized constant observation after the actions of foreign intelligence services, finding out their contacts with the Lithuanian emigrants in the West and also with Lithuania. During the first postwar years, the guerilla war still taking place, it was especially urgent to find out about the relations of armed underground with foreign countries, and to block the channels for exit and information transmission to the West. The First and the Second NKGB (MGB) divisions were rather closely cooperating in preparing the agency supposed to be sent abroad; they collected information about the Lithuanian emigrants, detected the links of underground organizations with Western countries.

During the postwar period, the Soviet security concentrated a lot of their attention on the search for so-called “state criminals”. The “state criminals” punished by extreme penalty included: 1) agents and coworkers of the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services; b) the members of national underground and partisan squads; c) persons who had collaborated with the German occupational authorities, members of the emigrational organizations; d) prison and exile fugitives; e) people hiding away from the security organs; f) Red Army deserters. With the increasing number of exile or prison fugitives, or people hiding away from the exile, one division was not enough, thus in 1948, established was a separate division (in 1950, MVD forwarded it to the MGB) to look for those fugitives and Red Army deserters. After 1953, search for the “state criminals” became one of the functions of MVD, which later were assigned to the Fourth department of KGB.

Alongside with the divisions executing main functions in the state security apparatus, there were also smaller divisions, the functions of which included supportive operational work in exterior observation, searches, arrests, interrogation, internal prisons, storage of archives, control and censorship of international and local correspondence, governmental VCh (*Vysokochastotnaja*

radio sviazj; high range radio connection) contacts, installation of wiretap equipment, graphical expertise, encoding, governmental security.

The NKGB (MGB) had a constantly operating division, employees of which in correspondence to the orders by operative divisions would watch people in public places (in transportation means, streets, etc.), execute searches, arrest, collect personal data to prove the identities of suspected persons⁵.

The archives played a very important role in the “Ministry of fear”. All the departments had to organize strictly the documentation, file them, make card records. The record about persons, the family would be stored for years to have this information; having accused them of the “indecent” biography, “bad” past or background, the departments would use it against those persons in case they did not surrender to the Soviet regime or the Communist Party. While the documents were used in the operative work, there were employees or branches responsible for the storage of documents working within every larger NKGB (MGB) division. Later the documents would be given for storage to the NKGB (MGB) “A” division for records and archives. This division compiled and stored, and would give out the documents needed for operative work from all state security subdivisions. All the documents were highly classified and available only for the state security employees.

Correspondence was controlled by the subordinate divisions of NKGB (MGB) “V” division; their branches for control, internal censorship, were operating in all big towns and district centers in Lithuania. It was both the local and international correspondence controlled. The correspondence was checked to find any slightest information about links of the foreign intelligence with Lithuanian national underground, provocative anti-Soviet pronouncements and thoughts, sights about the treasons of state and military secrets. Moreover, this was also the way to learn about the attitudes of people from different layers towards the interior and foreign affairs, to the processes within the country, and the like. The correspondence containing impermissible information would be partly or fully destroyed. The “V” division was also making records, and observation files on persons corresponding with foreigners⁶.

LSSR NKGB (MGB) had its divisions in towns, districts, and also in communities. There were town divisions operating in Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda (since 1948, there was a department operating in Kaunas). The district centers had NKGB (MGB) district divisions established, and the community centers had NKGB (MGB) community subdivisions operating. From July 1950 until June 1953, there were four MGB district departments operating; the liquidated divisions of districts and communities then were replaced by regional divisions.

⁵ The report on the work of LSSR NKGB Operative division in 1945, *ibid.*, p. 32-45.

⁶ The account of the work of LSSR NKGB “V” division of May 1945, *ibid.*, p. 103-111; the certificate about the work of LSSR MGB “V” division of April 1952, *ibid.*, file 146, p. 134.

2.2. System of the interior

Unlike the state security, the “ministries of fear”, the system of organs and of the interior was the force apparatus used by the totalitarian state for executing physical summary against those counter minded in respect to the state. The LSSR NKVD restored in Lithuania in July 1944 consisted of the central apparatus and the subject institutions: militia, prisons, corrective labor colonies, war prisoners’ camps, institutions of children’s imprisonment, local air-defense, fire protection, road department, archives, peripheral NKVD subdivisions. Most of the divisions operating within the central apparatus were responsible for supervising and controlling all the above mentioned institutions. For instance, the division of prisons controlled over all the prisons which were located in Lithuania. The number of people employed within almost all institutions under the NKVD (MVD) control was by several times higher than that of the whole NKVD (MVD) central apparatus. They had their leadership and their structure. Therefore, in 1946, after the redistribution of spheres of influence in USSR, the most important divisions which executed repressions (army, the department on fight against banditry that controlled local destroyer squads, special troops, militia) with all their personnel were assigned to MGB. From 1950 until 1953, MVD played the secondary role in the system of the USSR repressive institutions.

One of the most important spheres of activities by the Soviet repressive organs during the postwar and the entire fifth decade was the fight against armed resistance of Lithuanians. In reference to this, already in July 1944 there was a division for fight against banditry (*Otdel borby s banditizmom, OBB*) operating under the subordination of LSSR NKVD. According to the order of LSSR NKVD Peoples Commissar of 15 February 1946, it was reorganized to a department (*Upravlenije borby s banditizmom, UBB*)⁷ which was assigned to LSSR MGB on 4 February 1947; instead there was established the 2N department of LSSR MGB⁸. Direct responsibilities of this subdivision included detecting and exterminating the participants of the Lithuanian national underground. Until 1946, it was also responsible for repressing the Polish national underground. The OBB operating from 1944 until February 1946 had two subdivisions and several units (units of operative communication, information, and statistics) each of which consisted of up to seven branches. In February 1947, having assigned this division to MGB and consequently having established 2N department, the fight against Lithuanian resistance significantly extended its functions. The First division of 2N department observed the leadership of Lithuanian national underground, the Second division supervised the work in peripheral MGB organs which were fighting against the partisan underground, and also was directly involved in campaigns against

⁷ Arvydas Anušauskas, *Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais* (Soviet Extermination of Lithuanian Nation in 1940-1958). Vilnius, 1996, p. 268.

⁸ Historical certificate of the record, LYA, fund K-1, record 3.

the partisans. The Third division of the 2N department organized radio communication between the central apparatus and the peripheral organs, prepared the so-called special devices (radio games)⁹. All the period it was operating, the division of fight against banditry controlled *stribai* (the local destroyer squads), special troops; peripheral divisions had branches for fight against “banditry” operating within them.

Having suppressed the armed resistance to the Soviet occupation in 1953, the fight against “banditry” was transformed to fight against protagonists of the Lithuanian independence. In March 1953, the 2N department of MGB was merged with other MGB subdivisions, and in the following way formed was the secret political department under LSSR MVD, later the Fourth department.

The suppression of the national resistance and subjugation policy executed by the Soviet occupants are closely linked with imprisonment organs. Within its influence, NKVD (MVD) had prisons, correctional institutions, war prisoners’ camps (liquidated in 1947-1948), and institutions of children’s imprisonment. All imprisonment institutions of Lithuania under NKVD were subordinate to the general system of USSR imprisonment institutions, and this meant that a person arrested in Lithuania could be imprisoned within any prison or camp in Soviet Union. The prison department of LSSR NKVD (MVD) controlled two prisons in Vilnius, and the prisons in Klaipėda, Kaunas, Panevėžys, Šiauliai, Marijampolė, Ukmergė, Šilutė, Raseiniai, Utena, Telšiai, and Švenčionys. The NKVD (MVD) department for correctional institutions controlled the work of penal work camps and their branches. In 1944, there were two separate stations of camps in Rasų Street in Vilnius and in Pravieniškės¹⁰. At the end of 1950 there were eight camp subdivisions (correctional institutions in Vilnius, Klaipėda, Klaipėda district, Akmenė district, separate stations of camps in Vilnius Pravieniškės, and Šilutė), Vilnius transfer camps, republican prisoners’ camp, and the central base of material technical provision¹¹. In April 1953, the penal work camps were transferred from MVD authority to the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice, and in February 1954 they were retransferred back.

From 1944 until 1948, there were five war prisoners’ camps operating in Lithuania (Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda, and Šilutė). These camps were supervised by the division of war prisoners and internee matters established in July 1946 by LSSR MVS; it was liquidated in 1953.

Appealing to the decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 24 November 1948 *Regarding the evicted persons* which ordered to stiffen the search for exile and prisons fugitives, Red Army

⁹ The certification about the operative-agency work of LSSR MGB 2N department of April 1949, folder 10, file 84, p. 9

¹⁰ A. Anušauskas, *Lietuvių tautos sovietinis naikinimas 1940-1958 metais* (Soviet Extermination of the Lithuanian Nation in 1940-1958) p. 452-453.

¹¹ Assignment and acceptance act of LSSR MVD division for correctional work camps of December 12-19 1950. LYA, fund 142, folder 1, file 66, p.32.

deserters, there was a division on special settlements subordinate to LSSR MVD established. In 1949, it was reorganized to the division on fight against banditry and search for criminals, also including the inquisitional group. A little later this subdivision was restructured to the Operative-search division and additionally enlarged; it controlled the territorial and Operative-inquisitional divisions, the Operative search group of MVD Kaunas department, and the Operative search pike. In August 1950, this division with all the subordinate subdivisions, and also with the subdivision on search for exile and prison fugitives was assigned to the competence of LSSR MGB¹².

The militia apparatus comprised the republican militia department, a separate Vilnius town department, militia departments of Kaunas and Klaipėda, since August 1947, also the militia department of Kaunas, militia divisions of Šiauliai and Panevėžys, district militia departments, and community militia departments. The scope of militia's functions included criminal search, fight against the embezzlement of socialistic property, interrogation, state road inspectorate, recording visas and foreigners, passport issue offices, civil registry offices, military record departments. In October 1949, militia and its archives were transferred from MVD to MGB.

NKVD (MVD) had its subdivisions acting in districts, communities, town divisions in Kaunas and in Klaipėda; in 1947, the MVD department was established in Kaunas. In 1950, four more MVD territorial departments were established, however after the district divisions and community subdivisions had been liquidated, MVD territorial divisions were not set up. Each NKVD division had acting militia branches and *stribai* squads (local destroyer squads), later assigned to MGB.

3. Collaboration with the Soviet repressive organs

During the first decade of the second Soviet occupation, the occupational authorities were keeping to the stiff personnel policy of repressive organs. Only those communists, who were reliable in the ideological respect and had had chekist work experience, would be employed within the repressive structures. On 24 August 1945, the deputy Peoples Commissar of USSR state security, A. Kobulov explained the situation on Lithuania in the CC VII Plenum: “(...) It is our disaster, that there is no suitable personnel in Lithuania, and that Lithuanians are not able to supervise district divisions. We cannot find at least 2 to 3 Lithuanian employees who could take the leading positions in the institutions of state importance. The Lithuanian Communist Party has

¹² Assignment and acceptance act of LSSR MVD Operative-search division of 18 August 1950. *ibid.*, fund K-1, record 10, file 115, p. 17.

not yet managed to bring up its own staff of chekists”¹³. Most employees in both the interior, and in the state security organs were of Russian nationality. Just like before the war, during the postwar it was common that only chekists sent from the Soviet Union would be appointed in the leading positions. The persons of Lithuanian nationality would mostly be employed in lower positions (e.g., the most Lithuanian were militia and *stribai* squads). The reason to employ more Lithuanians in the repressive organs was based on practical purposes; most workers sent from USSR did not know the Lithuanian language and they would not study it, they did not know local traditions, which would impede the work, especially in the province. There was also some ideological motive; the authorities aimed to show that the very Lithuanian nation was fighting against the armed resistance to the Soviet system. Nonetheless, due to possible “undesirable elements concealing their political past”, the highest USSR authorities of the Party and repressive organs did not trust in local people.

The situation started to change after Stalin’s death in spring of 1953 when Lavrenty Beria manifested his political concept regarding national personnel and usage on national language in the party and state institutions in the allied republics. In June 1953, when the Russian speaking officials who had arrived during the postwar were forced to leave Lithuania, 1,133 employees of repressive organs were deported¹⁴. Later this action was withdrawn, however starting with 1954, increasingly more Lithuanians would be accepted to work in the organs of state security and of the interior.

3.2. LSSR NKGB (MGB) personnel

Having started its work in Vilnius in July 1944, LSSR NKGB was Russian from the very beginning. The first and the only LSSR NKGB (MGB) Peoples Commissar of Lithuanian origin until 1953, A. Guzevičius was removed from his post in July 1945. Then, not until 1953, Lithuanians were permitted to supervise this institution. In April 1945, USSR sent 664 persons to work in LSSR NKGB¹⁵, most of which took the key positions. At the beginning of 1945, 131 NKGB officials accounted for 97 (74.8 percent) Russians, 11 (8.4 percent) Lithuanians, 10 (7.6 percent) Jews, and 12 workers of other nationalities.

During the following years, the number of employees of Lithuanian origin in the leading positions was gradually dropping: at the beginning of 1946, out of 194 high officials, there were 12 (6.2 percent) Lithuanians, 34 (17.5 percent) people of other nationalities, 148 (76.3 percent)

¹³ Tininis, Vytautas *Sovietinė Lietuva ir jos veikėjai*. (Soviet Lithuania and Its Activists) Vilnius, 1994, p.40-41.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.74-75.

¹⁵ Truska, L., Anušauskas, A., Petravičiūtė, I. *Sovietinis saugumas Lietuvoje 1940-1953 metais*. (Soviet security in Lithuania in 1940-1953) Vilnius, 1999, p.77.

Russians. Yet two years later, at the beginning of 1948, the proportion of leading MGB personnel which was then 787 people divided up as follows: 37 (4.7 percent) Lithuanians, 143 (18.2 percent) employees of other nationalities, the rest 610 (77.5 percent) were persons of Russian nationality¹⁶. In spring 1952, among 575 officials holding high positions in MGB, the number of Lithuanians was 46 (8 percent).

Such was the situation in the periphery: in summer 1946, the Lithuanians were 2 (6.7 percent) out of total 30 high MGB officials, in 1947, they had only one post (2.7 percent) among 37 leaders of district divisions, and at the end of 1948, there were 3 officials of Lithuanian origin. At the end of 1947, among the heads of MGB community division there were 12 Lithuanians (4.1 percent) out of 293. According to the data of 1952, out of 87 MGB district heads, there were 6 (9.2 percent) Lithuanians. Referring to the data of the First of January 1948, out of 98 leaders of town and district divisions and their deputies, there were 3 (3 percent) Lithuanians, 24 people of other nationalities (24.8 percent), and all the rest 71 (72.7) were Russians. The national composition of lower ranking positions in the divisions considered was analogous: out of 231 leaders of subdivisions and their deputies, there were 6 (2.6 percent) Lithuanians, 36 (15.6 percent) persons of other nationalities, the remaining 189 (81.8 percent) were Russians; out of 601 operative agents, there were 63 (10.5 percent) Lithuanians, 107 (17.8 percent) workers of other nationalities, the rest 431 (71.7 percent) were Russians.

People of Russian nationality accounted for majority employees not only in the leading, but in the whole MGB apparatus. At the end of 1944, out of 931 people working in LSSR NKGB 604 people had arrived from other allied republics, 133 persons had returned from the prewar evacuation, 35 were the former Soviet partisans and underground activists; there were 192 (20.8 percent) Lithuanians, 579 (62.9 percent) Russians, 96 (10.4 percent) Jews, 54 (5.9 percent) persons of other nationalities¹⁷. According to the data of First January 1948, out of 2,310 MGB personnel (technical assistants not included), there were 237 (10.3 percent) Lithuanians, 359 (15.5 percent) workers of other nationalities and 1,714 (74.2 percent) Russians. In 1950, the MGB personnel (army, militia, and the local destroyers *stribai* not included) had 3,764 cadres, 888 of who were working in the ministries, others in the peripheral divisions. Out of 2,427 operative agents working in MGB, Lithuanians made 586 which equaled to 20.5 percent of the total.¹⁸

At the end of 1949, after MGB took over militia from MVD, MGB got more Lithuanian, since militia in comparison to other divisions of the repressive apparatus was nearly most “Lithuanian”. As to the data of January 1951, the percentage of Lithuanians, Russians, and other

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.127.

nationalities out of 5,667 employees in this institution was 3,279 (57.9 percent), 2,069 (36.5 percent), 319 (5.6 percent) respectively. However, the same does not apply to the composition of the militia leading personnel: among 399 high officials, there were 57 (14.3 percent) Lithuanians, 64 (16.2 percent) officials of other nationalities, and 278 (69.5 percent) Russians¹⁹.

Thus, during the first decade in the postwar period, the situation on personnel nationality in LSSR MGB did not change; the absolute majority in the state security system belonged to the personnel of Russian nationality. Although there had been attempts made to make the apparatus at least a little more Lithuanian (decrees of LKP(b) CC of 12 December 1947, and of 28 December 1951), still the majority of those Lithuanians applying for work in MGB, would be thwarted due to their “unsatisfactory” biography, social background, fear for their families of themselves being disposed, also due to the Russian speaking leaders’ mistrust in local cadres, even in Communists. The situation began to change after Stalin’s death, in spring, 1953.

33.2. LSSR NKVD (MVD) personnel

During the first years of postwar period, the personnel of LSSR NKVD was much more numerous and relatively more Lithuanian than that of the state security apparatus. By 20 December 1944, NKVD had employed 4,638 people, 300 of who were the officials having returned from the prewar evacuation and who had worked in the Peoples Commissariat of the Interior established in Lithuania before the war. The national composition of the NKVD personnel was the following: 1,161 (25.3 percent) Lithuanians, 2,387 (51.5 percent) Russians, 256 (5.5 percent) Jews, 834 people (22 percent) of other nationalities²⁰. The number of NKVD (MVD) employees was increasing very rapidly; in reference to the data of July 1947, having assigned the Department on fight against banditry with 1,745 of personnel to LSSR MGB, there were 11,534 employees left in the system of MVD. This staff accounted for 4,734 (41.1 percent) Lithuanians, 5,247 (45.5 percent) Russians, 1,553 (13.4 percent) employees of other nationalities. Judging by the numbers provided, it is evident that the proportion of Lithuanian employees within the system of the interior was respectively high, nonetheless this proportion was apparently different in the leading personnel; the majority of employees of the highest and middle rank were Russians. According to the data of June 1946, out of 798 people holding the high posts, there were 35 (4.4 percent) Lithuanians, 159 (20 percent) were of other nationalities, the rest 604 (75.6 percent) were of Russian nationality. Among 53 highest LSSR MVD officials belonging to LKP(b) (Lithuanian Communist (Bolshevik) Party) Central Committee

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 111.

nomenclature, there were two Lithuanians: the Minister of the Interior, J. Bartašiūnas and his deputy for personnel matters, A. Mickevičius (since 1950, D. Kučinskas).

Lithuanians would usually hold appointments in lower positions and the peripheral offices of the interior system: militia, fire protection, road department, infant institutions. In reference to the data of 1 July 1947, out of 363 cadres of ministry there were 44 (12.1 percent) Lithuanians, 2 of them in leading positions (3.6 percent of the total leading personnel). Then, out of 363 employees in town and district divisions, there were 86 (23 percent) Lithuanians 5 of which were in higher positions (16.1 percent). People of Lithuanian nationality would make an apparent minority among the personnel in war prisoners' camps (41 employees out of 867 (4.7 percent)), corrective work camps (11 out of 375 (2.9 percent)). Meanwhile, the proportion of personnel was 3,040 Lithuanians out of 5,673 employees (53.4 percent) in militia, 432 out of 1,251 (34.5 percent) in prisons, 602 out of 799 (76.4 percent) in fire protection, 199 out of 285 (69.8 percent) in road department, 81 out of 200 (40.5 percent) in infant institutions, 42 out of 142 (33.9 percent) in the archives, 66 out of 205 (32.2 percent) in MVD schools. Nevertheless, Lithuanians among the leading personnel in these MVD divisions accounted for minority; out of 485 people holding the leading positions, there were 90 Lithuanians (18.5 percent): 7 out of 67 (10.4 percent) were in prisons, 3 out of 24 (12.5 percent) in fire protection sphere, 5 out of 28 (18 percent) in road department, 1 out of 10 (10 percent) in infant institutions, and 2 out of 16 (12.5 percent) in the archives²¹.

From 1947 until the beginning of 1951, the Ministry of the Interior was deprived of most of its divisions, consequently the number of employees decreasing more than twice. According to the data of 1 January 1941, out of 5,321 MVD employees, there were 1,709 (33.2 percent) Lithuanians, 2,420 (47.1 percent) Russians, and 1,005 (19.7 percent) employees of other nationalities. The proportion of Lithuanian employees within the Ministry of the Interior decreased significantly after MGB took over the control of one of the biggest and most Lithuanians divisions, militia where employees of Lithuanian nation accounted for 57.9 percent in 1951²².

3.3. The agency of repressive organs

A very important role in the repressive system belonged to the NKVD and NKGB system on total observation. The report of agents would become the grounds for any person to be included in the "operative records". Other people appearing in this record (for instance, looking over the

²⁰ Ibid., p.102.

²¹ Ibid., p.109.

²² Ibid., p.110-111.

archives of the forbidden organizations) would be observed by agents. The Soviet State Security system was planned so that it would comprise all social and professional layers of Lithuanian society; each NKVD and NKGB division had an exactly specified sphere of activities and the network of agents. This became the matter for some part of society to collaborate with the occupational government. Notwithstanding this, it is impossible to do unambiguous evaluation on this form of collaboration with the occupants, since during the postwar most persons were conscripted by force.

In 1944-1953, most agents were conscripted using discreditable materials, such like civil service or social status held during the period of Lithuanian independence, membership in public organizations, talks manifesting disloyalty towards the occupational authorities, also connections with the underground. During the guerrilla which took place in the first decade after the war, the chekists did not refine upon the psychological characteristics of candidates and would recruit any person in their range of vision. They would firstly get the collaboration note later used to blackmail the candidates. The chekists used physical constraint, psychological pressure, deceit, and pageants. The latter method was particularly successfully applied in the work of storm troopers.

Until the reform of agents' network in 1952, the secret MGB collaborators made two main groups, agents and informers. The agents would be grouped to those of the interior (infiltrated into the partisan troops and the underground organizations), the cross agents (given a task and sent to concrete territory), storm troopers (who would execute violence actions under the name of partisans), cell agents (they spied on the arrested), the agents of unfluence (they would form a certain opinion in the society), agents-recruiters (they would recruit other agents), the hosts of meeting and conspirational flats. The highest ranking agents-resistants had several other subordinate agents, and they would receive the reports of the latter, would prepare tasks for them. The lowest ranking ordinary spies, informers would report to the chekists about the situation in the surroundings, would inform about the anti-Soviet manifestations²³. In 1952, the category of informers was liquidated and replaced by the category of a reliable person. Relations with reliable persons were based on the voluntarism; their cooperation with the state security was regarded as the colleague assistance.

During the guerrilla warfare, most agents were directed to liquidate the partisan movement. Most often they would recruit village people who should spy on the persons going into hiding, observe the partisan camps, their routes, persons assisting to partisans. Since 1946, a new tactics for liquidating the partisan groups, "from inside" was started to be applied. Extremely ferocious

²³ Gaškaitė, N. „MGB-KGB agentūra okupuotoje Lietuvoje“, *Genocidas ir rezistencija*, 1997, No. 2, p.97-105.

functions were those of the special agents; disguised as partisans, they would make contacts with true fighters, and then would massacre or arrest them.

In the first postwar years, the repressive organs practically would not select between whom to recruit, and whom not; they would recruit almost every arrested person. It would often happen that even having signed the agreement of collaboration, the people never worked for the good of repressive organs, many of them would join partisans afterwards. Each year, because of their inactivity about four thousand agents would be written off to the category of archival agents (i.e. the category of the no more acting agents). As to the data of 1 January 1952, the number of acting agents reached up to 23.2 thousand. In order to clean up the repressive organs from useless coworkers who would not implement their tasks, in 1952, after the order of USSR MGB the network of agents was reformed. It was only during the year 1952 that the number of agents was reduced by 71 percent leaving 7.7 thousand of acting agents²⁴. The guerilla going to an end, in 1953, a turning point took over in the minds of society regarding conformance. The earlier motive for collaboration because of fear was followed by the motive of personal interest, ideological-political reason. The period of the resistance to occupation was shifted by conformance and resignation with the existing situation.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 102.

4. Conclusions

1. After the Second World War started, in June 1941, part of the LSSR NKVD and NKGB apparatus was evacuated to various regions in the Soviet Union. Having managed to move to the territory of the Soviet Union, the employees of the repressive structures who worked in Lithuania until the war were integrated into the USSR NKVD and belonged to a special subdivision, the so-called “Lithuanian sector”, the head of which was the former Peoples Commissar of LSSR NKVD, Aleksandras Guzevičius. This subdivision was responsible for personnel reserve, majority of which were the former employees of LSSR NKVD and NKGB, also for recruiting there new chekists, for organizing intelligence service, terrorist acts and sabotages on the Lithuanian territory occupied then by Germans, and also for managing the people evacuated from Lithuania, including the arrested. The main task set for the “Lithuanian sector” was to get properly ready for the reoccupation of Lithuania, and it had been systematically started since the beginning of 1943. They moved to Vilnius in the middle of July 1944, and right away started acting as legitimate state administration institutions.

2. The state security systems of the Soviet Union, often called as “Ministry of fear”, had much bigger plans than mere physical summary (susidorojimas) with anti-Soviet regime minded powers or single elements. In order for the Soviet empire to successfully exist and strengthen its influence in the world, i.e. to realize Stalin’s idea of conquering the world, the Soviet Union had to become a state where there would be not a single questioning or countering the existing regime. This could be achieved by indoctrinating fear, resignation, unconditional humility in people’s minds, also awareness that one is constantly watched and any action can end either in punishment or in encouragement. In this respect most Lithuanians who had gone through the regime of Antanas Smetona was the generation “corrupted” beyond retrieve and they had to wither be made incapable or, at the very outside, to be exterminated. After the war, failing quickly to neutralize the nation’s opposition to the occupation, extremely strong measures were used against those who would refuse to surrender.

3. All the functions performed by the organs of the Soviet State Security like intelligence, political and ideological counterintelligence, economic espionage, control of correspondence, constant observation, telephone wiretap, which were serving for the purposes of the totalitarian state ruled by the Communist Party, in respect to Lithuania, they were primarily used to neutralize opposition to the Soviet regime and preclude possible manifestations of resistance or discontent with the existing system.

4. Unlike the state security, the system of organs and interior affairs was the force apparatus which was used by the totalitarian state for executing physical summary against those counter minded in respect to the state. The LSSR NKVD restored in Lithuania in July 1944 consisted of the central apparatus and the subject institutions: militia, prisons, corrective labor colonies, war prisoners' camps, institutions of children's imprisonment, local air-defense, fire protection, road department, archives, peripheral NKVD subdivisions. The number of people employed within almost all institutions under the NKVD (MVD) control was by several times higher than that of the whole NKVD (MVD) central apparatus. They had their authorities and their structure. In 1946, after the redistribution of the spheres of influence in USSR, the most important divisions executing repressions (army, the department for fight against banditry that controlled local destroyer squads, striking troops of special agents, militia) with their all the personnel were assigned to MGB. From 1950 until 1953, MVD played the secondary role in the system of the USSR repressive institutions.

5. During the first decade of the second Soviet occupation, the occupational authorities were keeping to the stiff personnel policy of repressive organs. Only those communists, who were reliable in the ideological respect and had had chekist work experience, were employed within the repressive structures. Most employees of both the interior, and of the state security apparatuses were of Russian nationality. Just like before the war also during the postwar, there was a tendency was maintained that only chekists sent from the Soviet Union were appointed in the leading positions. The persons of Lithuanian nationality would mostly be employed in lower positions (e.g., the most Lithuanian was militia and *stribai* squads). The reason to employ more Lithuanians in the repressive organs was based on practical purposes; most workers sent from the USSR did not know the Lithuanian language and they would not study it, they did not know local tradition, which impede the work, especially in the province. There was also some ideological motive; the authorities aimed to show that the very Lithuanian nation was fighting against the armed resistance to the Soviet system. Nonetheless, due to possible "undesirable elements concealing their political past", the highest USSR authorities of the Party and repressive organs did not trust in local people. The situation started to change after Stalin's death in spring 1953.

6. A very important role in the repressive system belonged to the NKVD and NKGB system on total observation. The report of agents would become the grounds for any person to be included in the "operative records". Other people appearing in this record (for instance, looking over the archives of the forbidden organizations) would be observed by agents. The Soviet State Security system was planned so that it would comprise all social and professional layers of

Lithuanian society; each NKVD and NKGB division had an exactly specified sphere of activities and the network of agents.

In 1944-1953, most agents were conscripted using discreditable materials, such like civil service or social status held during the period of Lithuanian independence, membership in public organizations, talks manifesting disloyalty towards the occupational authorities, also connections with the underground. The chekists used physical constraint, psychological pressure, deceit, and pageants. The latter method was particularly successfully applied in the work of special agents. During the guerrilla which took place in first decade after the war, the chekists did not refine upon the psychological characteristics of candidates and would recruit any person in their range of vision. It would often happen that even having signed the agreement of collaboration, the people never worked for the goof of repressive organs, many of them would join partisans afterwards. The guerilla going to an end, in 1953, there was a turning point in the minds of society regarding conformance. The motive for collaboration because of fear was becoming the motive of personal interest, ieological-political reason. The period of the resistance to occupation was shift by conformance and resignation with the existing situation.