

OCCUPATION/ANNEXATION AND SOVIETISATION OF LITHUANIA

In 1939-1940 the statehood of Lithuania came under threat from its aggressive neighbours - Germany and the Soviet Union. The latter, ruled by Stalin who introduced a totalitarian regime in it, launched an expansion onto the neighbouring states. In 1939 Poland and Finland suffered as a result of it. In 1940, taking advantage of a favorable international situation, the Soviet Union occupied the three Baltic States. Preparations for the occupation were completed during the first six months of 1940. They consisted of 1) aggressive foreign policy; and 2) military preparations. On 15 June 1940 Lithuania was occupied. With the occupational army deployed [in the country] the groundwork was laid for the country's annexation. Convocation of the "People's Seimas" and decisions subsequently adopted by it meant the elimination of Lithuania's statehood. Annexation was achieved when the Soviet Union announced about Lithuania's incorporation into the USSR (3 August 1940).

Historiography. Contemporaries, witnesses or active participants of events of that time were the first to speak out about the problem. It was clear to them that the Red Army had occupied Lithuania and that sovietisation [of the country] was carried out as a result. The post-soviet press was referring to Red Army-"the liberator", pointing out that thanks to it "the possibility to form a new government has been offered".¹ Communists and members of J. Paleckis' Government were also accentuating that "the entry of the RA into Lithuania brought to an end the reign of Smetona's regime"² or offering their gratitude to the Soviet Union and the RA, owing to which "our people delivered and translated into practice the ultimatum to the old plutocratic regime"³. Consequently, they were of the opinion that Lithuania had been occupied, its regime replaced and the country sovietised. They treated the annexation as an independent act.

The diplomats of Lithuania, who were observing with concern the unfolding events until 21 July, later evaluated them as occupation and subjugation of the country.⁴ The émigré community of Lithuania, in their appeal to the US President to refuse the recognition of the occupation, called it the loss of Independence.⁵ In their memoirs issued in 1942 the former members of "the Peoples' Seimas" L. Dovydėnas⁶ and A. Garmus⁷ also referred to the events under discussion as an aggression, occupation and a forcible sovietisation of the country. In addition, the repression campaign [which followed] was revealed and a number of details of the events of 1940-1941 disclosed. Therefore, already in the summer of 1940, two lines of thinking became evident: the communist line, which accentuated RA's importance in the elimination of the country's independence, and the objective line which held that the RA occupied the country while the local commissars under the guidance of Moscow eliminated country's statehood and annexed it to the USSR. A factor, which reinforced this approach, was documents discovered in the German archives. They revealed the existence of the secret part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact outlining division of the Baltic countries into zones of influence. They provided the proof of USSR's aggressiveness and rebutted a thesis formulated by the soviets, which maintained that the people were seeking to join the Soviet Union. Soviets claimed that the secret protocols had been a falsification, nevertheless, acknowledged their existence and published them only in 1989.⁸

In the summer of 1940 the Soviets started promoting another idea, which sounded like this: “the people, aided by the powerful Red Army, threw off the oppressive yoke of Smetona’s regime”⁹. Thus, already at that time there were efforts to nurture the idea that a situation leading to revolution was ripe in Lithuania and that the RA only made sure that it did take place. The idea found in the Soviet historiography that the situation was ripe for revolution, that it altered into revolution and that an actual revolution took place with the assistance of the RA was brought to its final shape at the end of 50’s -- beginning of 60’s.¹⁰ An additional explanation has been added to it by that time. Vl. Niunka brought forward an idea that the Soviet rule was only suppressed in Lithuania in 1919. In 1940 the Soviet power was restored in Lithuania.¹¹ At the time of commemoration of the 15th anniversary of the events in 1940 this concept already existed in its finite form.¹²

Since the beginning of the 50’s the emphasis on the RA’s role in the events of 1940 diminished. Such emphasis ran counter the concept of a peaceful socialist revolution being devised at that time. After a few years a concept was brought into existence that the situation in Lithuania had been ripe for revolution and that it altered into a socialist revolution. A new government formed and the “Peoples’ Seimas” elected restored the Soviet rule in the country and Lithuania thereby joined the Soviet Union.¹³ This concept was enshrined in the first synthesized history of Lithuania¹⁴ and remained in essence unchanged until the end of the 80’s.

In 1988 the historians of Lithuania began the review of politicized concepts. The articles of that time reflected a transitional period from the Soviet to objective history.¹⁵ In 1989 the historians of Lithuania put together a concept that in 1940 Lithuania had been occupied, annexed and unlawfully incorporated into the Soviet Union.¹⁶ In the last decade several works have been produced reinforcing this concept and supplementing it with new facts.¹⁷

USSR Foreign Policy in the Period of Preparation for Lithuania’s Occupation

On 15 June 1940 Lithuania was occupied by the Soviet Union. The latter country started building up the international preconditions for this act of aggression from 1939. Later, amidst WWII, it took advantage of a situation favorable for its plans and occupied Lithuania.

Laying down of preconditions started after the Soviet Union improved its relations with Germany and on 23 August 1939 both countries signed a Non-Aggression Treaty¹⁸ and a secret additional protocol to it¹⁹. Several European states were divided into the zones of influences [by it], where Lithuania came under the German sphere of influence. However, when Lithuania refused to accept Germany’s proposal to join the war against Poland and recover Vilnius this way, Germany, at the request of the Soviet Union, agreed to transfer Lithuania into the USSR zone of influence. This was accomplished by the 28 September 1939 Border and Friendship Treaty²⁰ between Germany and the Soviet Union and a secret protocol attached to it.²¹

World War II made the Soviet Union aggressive. On 28 September and 5 October 1939 it forced Estonia and Latvia into signing of the mutual assistance agreements²², which provided for the deployment of the Red Army garrisons on the territories of

these states. At the start of October the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs was invited to Moscow and proposed to sign an analogous mutual assistance agreement. Transfer to Lithuania of Vilnius, at that time occupied by the RA, was linked to this agreement. The delegation of Lithuania came under pressure: documents were produced to it evidencing that Lithuania was in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence and that it was even possible to occupy it.²³ During the negotiations the Soviet Union leaders, referring to the examples of Estonia and Latvia, were pressurizing Lithuania into conceding and signing an agreement.²⁴ Lithuania's proposal to sign a mutual assistance agreement leaving out the deployment soviet garrisons at the time of peace was rejected. Another intimidating argument submitted by the Soviet Union was that Vilnius would be annexed to the Soviet Belarus, as such was the will of the region's "workpeople".²⁵ Having considered the negative consequences of its refusal to sign the agreement, on 10 October 1939 Lithuania signed A Treaty on the Transfer of Vilnius and Vilnius Region to the Republic of Lithuania and the Mutual Assistance Agreement between Lithuania and the Soviet Union.²⁶ Lithuania recovered its Vilnius region, however, in the four locations – Alytus, Gaižiūnai, Naujoji Vilnia and Prienai - Red Army garrisons were established and 20 thousand troops deployed. The above-mentioned agreement imposed restrictions on Lithuania's independent foreign policy, the status of a neutral state was lost and in the eyes of democratic countries Lithuania became a country affiliated with the Soviet Union.²⁷

In the second half of 1939 the USSR laid down the international preconditions for the occupation of the Baltic States.

Occupation of the countries was carried out in the middle of 1940. Such time lapse should be explained by several reasons. Plans of the Soviet Union to interpret the mutual assistance agreements as friendly and beneficial to all countries, which had signed them, were disrupted by Finland's refusal to follow the suit. USSR's war against Finland finally revealed the Soviet Union's aggressiveness. Its expulsion from the League of Nations ruled out the intentions to exhibit friendliness. However, the USSR could resort to action only after the signing of a peace treaty with Finland, i.e. March 1940. In addition, a certain period of time was needed to draft a plan to provide legal lawfulness to the aggression (to accuse Lithuania of kidnapping the RA soldiers and lay the groundwork for a course of mounting tension) and to implement it gradually. And, in addition, the Soviet Union was waiting around for a convenient moment in international situation and in military terms to make its scheme a reality, and such a moment was inevitable once Germany launched an aggression on the Western frontline.

The plan on the occupation of the Baltic States could have been adopted in February of 1940 when the Soviet envoys from all three republics were summoned to Moscow.²⁸ On 19 February the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR passed a Resolution to intensify activities of the Soviet Envoys in Baltic countries in various areas, to actively co-ordinate their work, increase the exchange of information and to commit more specialists from the PCFA to these countries.²⁹

A convenient moment to act against the statehood of the Baltic States came when Germany launched a broad attack along the Western frontline on 10 May. In two weeks time it became evident that Germany was going to secure a victory. On 25 May the Soviet Union People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov summoned the

Lithuanian Ambassador in Moscow L. Natkevičius and made a statement in which the Government of Lithuania was accused of kidnap of troops and staging of provocations (Appendices. Doc No1). When on 7 June the Lithuanian Prime Minister arrived in Moscow the accusations were supplemented (Appendices. Doc No 2). Lithuania was accused of violating the Treaty of 10 October 1939 and organizing a military conspiracy of the Baltic States against the USSR. Accusations, this time in a harsher tone, were repeated to A. Merkys in a few days (Appendices. Doc No 3).

When on 14 June 1940 the German Army entered Paris, the Soviet Union took advantage of the situation in which the attention of democratic countries was concentrated on France, and issued an ultimatum to Lithuania (Appendices. Doc No 4-5-6). It incriminated Lithuania albeit completely groundlessly of the above mentioned acts and asked it to sentence its Minister of the Interior K. Skučas, Director of Security Department A. Povilaitis, to form a new Government acceptable to the Soviets, and ensure entry of additional and unlimited RA contingents into Lithuania. In addition to being entirely groundless, the ultimatum contained a request to respond to it in 10 hours, which was a violation of the international practice. Furthermore, its presentation was just a formal step, as the occupation of Lithuania had already been in the plans of the Soviet Union. When presenting the ultimatum V. Molotov commented, that “whatever your response is going to be, the army is already on its way to Lithuania”.³⁰

By issuing an ultimatum the Soviet Union violated all agreements concluded with Lithuania. Namely: the Lithuanian-Soviet Russian Peace Treaty of 1920, the 1926 Non-Aggression Treaty, which was extended in 1934 and which was in force until 1944, and the 1939 Mutual Assistance Agreement.

On the night of 15 June 1940 the Government of Lithuania decided to accept an ultimatum and in the morning the response was communicated to V. Molotov. The Soviet Union, by making use of the favorable international circumstances and through the exercise of a foreign policy aimed against Lithuania’s statehood, created the conditions enabling it to occupy Lithuania.

The Military Plan for Lithuania’s Occupation

Diplomatic preparations for Lithuania’s occupation were made alongside the preparation of military measures. In military terms Lithuania’s situation began to deteriorate from the fall of 1939 when 20 thousand troops, who constituted the Red Army’s 16th Special Riflemen battalion, were brought into and stationed in the country. A. Korobkov was appointed to command it.

Implementation of the military plan for Lithuania’s occupation started in the spring of 1940. April marked the start of massing of the RA troops at the border. On 26 May the USSR Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense A. Laktionov arrived in the country. He inspected the RA’s garrisons and military preparedness and introduced the planned military operations against the army of Lithuania. On 5 June 1940 all Soviet garrisons in the Baltic countries (70 thousands troops) from the competence of Belarussian, Kalinin and Leningrad military oblasts were transferred under the direct command of the USSR People’s Commissar for Defense S. Timoshenko. His deputy, the above-mentioned A.Laktionov, was commanding this force. (Appendices. Doc

No 7). On the eve of occupation, on 13 June 1940 A. Laktionov once again came to Lithuania to meet with the Ministry of National Defense Representative for the relations with the USSR Army in Lithuania Gen. M. Rėklaitis and not only to familiarize himself with conditions of garrisons. During the conversation A. Laktionov mentioned that “now he will have more time for the affairs of the soviet army in the Baltic countries”.³¹ During his visit the military preparedness of garrisons was assessed, the course of occupation was foreseen and discussed together with measures in case the Lithuanian army attempted to stage armed resistance. Coordination of action between the RA garrisons inside the country and the RA units to be introduced was discussed.

The importance of preparations for the occupation is revealed by the fact that the USSR People’s Commissar for Defense supervised them and by his deputy who inspected the garrisons in Lithuania several times.

At the same time implementation of the plans for occupation started in those RA units, which were meant to act against Lithuania from the territory of Belarus. On 8 June 1940 in Lyda the Deputy Commander of Belarussian Military oblast F. Kuznetsov called a secret meeting of unit commanders planned to be committed to the attack against Lithuania. During the meeting F. Kuznetsov also introduced himself as the Commander of the 11th army, one of those, which occupied the country, and discussed the “possible military actions against Lithuania”.³² On 11 June 1940 an analogous meeting took place, only this time under the leadership of the Commander of Byelorussia Military oblast D. Pavlov. During the meeting a final discussion took place on the military plans for Lithuania’s occupation, and the divisions and regiments were assigned specific tasks. The foreseen actions by their nature qualified as the actions of war. For example, concerning crossing of the border an instruction was issued to “act silently – with bayonets”, in case of a surprise firing “to execute on the spot by shooting”, if faced with determined defense – “do not attack, outflank and block” (i.e. take the territory under control as fast as possible), and when the second attack group and the artillery comes close, crush those who will attempt to defend themselves”. An order was issued “to wipe eliminate the enemy aviation in Šiauliai airport” and even the airborne troops had to take under control passing across the river Nemunas at Alytus.³³ (Appendices. Doc No 8). The army had to be on the alert from the evening of 13 June 1940, the foreseen date and time for attack was at 9 hours on 15 June.³⁴

Red Army’s crack force was assigned to carry out the occupation of Lithuania. The attack had to be launched by: 6th Cavalry corps of the 11th Army, 4th Leningrad Red Flag and K. Voroshilov Lenin Orders Don Battalion, 6th Red Flag and Lenin Orders S. Budyon Kuban-Terek Battalion, 33rd Riflemen Battalion, 23rd Kharkov Battalion, 188th, 176th, and 128th Riflemen Battalions, 6th and 22nd Tank Brigades and 10th Riflemen Battalion of the 3rd army³⁵, aviation and artillery units. This was equal to 150 thousand Red Army troops, who, as V. Molotov pointed out at the moment of presenting the ultimatum, were stationed in ten battalions. Out of battalions put on the alert for an attack the 4th and 6th battalions, which comprised the 6th cavalry corps, were especially able-bodied. Until 1938 this corps was under the command of the future Soviet Union Marshal G. Zhukov. In his memoirs he pointed out that the battalions were in a particularly good shape, their state of preparedness better than that of the others. According to G. Zhukov, apart from all other things, this was a

“Cossack corps”.³⁶ G. Zhukov’s successor in the position of commander of this corps was A. Yeriomenko, a would-be Marshal as well.

The above-mentioned battalions were not only in a good state of preparedness; they also had the relevant experience for the march to Lithuania. In September 1939 they participated in the attack against Poland. In the beginning of June 1940 they were still deployed in the environs of Lomzha and Bialystok, and consequently, had the experience of carrying out an occupation.

On the morning of 15 June 1940 the special Red Army units were performing provocative acts on the Lithuanian territory. They opened machine-gun and rifle fire at the station of border police guards, where policeman A. Baranauskas was killed.³⁷ About 50 Red Army troops invaded the territory of Lithuania and remained on it within 150 meters distance from the border.³⁸ (Appendices. Doc No 9-10). Such actions were meant to provoke an attempted resistance of the border police to the invaders, dislodging of the Soviet troops from Lithuania and provide false grounds to accuse Lithuania of unfriendly behavior, infringement of [existing] agreements, perpetration of an armed incident, and thereby justify the occupation carried out by the RA.

At 8 hours on 15 June 1940, with the RA on the alert and ready to launch the attack within an hour, the order to attack was countermanded. A report came in that “Lithuania capitulated”.³⁹

In May-June 1940 the Soviet Union completed overall preparations for a military attack against Lithuania and for its occupation. The best forces were committed for this task commanded by the most talented officers. Lithuania’s military occupation consisted of three elements: aggression of the garrisons already stationed on the territory of Lithuania at the time, attacks from the direction of Belarus and provocative actions at the Lithuanian border. When Lithuania accepted Soviet Union’s ultimatum the military operation was replaced by the introduction of troops into the country.

Lithuania’s Internal Political Situation on the Eve of Occupation

Political developments in the country in the pre-run to the occupation were still under the impact of external shocks experienced in 1938-1939. The greatest shocks were the ultimatums delivered to Lithuania by Poland and Germany, the outbreak of WWII and the Treaty with the Soviet Union of 10 October 1939. These events led to the formation of two new successive governments in 1939 and intensified activities of the opposition Christian Democratic and Peasant People’s parties. A. Smetona eased up the regime and included in the government several representatives of the said parties, although prohibition on the activities of these parties had not been lifted. However, the President entertained doubts only for a limited period of time. At the end of 1939 the radicals gained strength in the Nationalists’ Union, and D. Cesevičius was elected its chairman. Radicals believed that it was indispensable to overcome all those who “are unwilling to accept the principles and practices of totalist ideas”.⁴⁰ Municipal elections held in the beginning of 1940 only reinforced the position of Nationalists.

Recovery of Vilnius and introduction of Soviet garrisons in the country were adding to the tensions among the general public. Some used this as an opportunity to offer praise to the regime of A. Smetona and the Nationalists; others were instigating pro-Soviet tendencies and speaking about the creation of the Lithuanian People's Republic.⁴¹ The Soviet Union started meddling in Lithuania's domestic affairs. Already on 21 November 1939 Lithuania was asked to create no hindrances to the functioning of organizations created in Vilnius region since the beginning of Red Army deployment there⁴², i.e. during the months of September – October. They were pro-Soviet and pro-Communist organizations. The Lithuanian Communist Party began to feel stronger, however, a powerful “revolutionary movement” was missing. The Soviet Union itself was against it, because it needed to simulate Lithuania's lawful annexation to the Soviet Union and therefore it was more purposeful to act through the official institutions of power and administration rather than a pro-revolutionary party.

Problems, which arose after stationing of the garrisons, were heightening the tension. The Red Army troops were absent from their units without leave; they loitered around in the surrounding area. For some time the command of garrisons tried to conceal this in an effort to abide by Moscow's order to secure a strict compliance with the 10 October agreement. However, at a later stage the Soviet authorities employed such facts to support its accusations against Lithuania of an alleged kidnap of soldiers. On 27 May 1940 the Government of Lithuania set up a special commission to investigate the accusations brought against it.⁴³ The Government was of the opinion that nobody aspired to kidnap the Soviet soldiers, although entertained a premise that this could have been the doing of agents of other states or Poland, which sought to aggravate Lithuania's situation.⁴⁴

At the places of RA garrisons deployment the Ministry of the Interior established special police stations instructed to carry out the surveillance of residents and clear up any misunderstandings. County governors received a directive prohibiting the local people from coming into contact with Soviet soldiers, surveying the objects of their sentry, or spreading any rumors.⁴⁵ Such measures had no impact on the situation given the Soviet Union's intentional efforts to escalate the tensions.

On 13 June 1940 Director of the Security Department A. Povilaitis and the Minister of the Interior K. Skučas were dismissed. Position of the latter was taken over by A. Merkys. Such replacement was meant to appease the Soviet Union and its demands; as it were K. Skučas and A. Povilaitis whom the Soviet Union was most fiercely accusing of alleged anti-Soviet activities.

The Lithuanian State Defense Council discussed the growing threat in its February meeting. At the start of May the Defense Council resolved that armed resistance would be offered in the event of an aggression from the USSR. The President and the Government were to retreat into Kudirkos Naumištis, and later, in case the situation deteriorates, would leave for Germany.⁴⁶ However, this decision was not realized in practice.

Opposition forces decided to take advantage of Lithuania's complicated situation. Officers who were in Moscow on 8 June together with the Prime Minister (M. Rėklaitis, A. Gustaitis and others) issued a demand for A. Merkys' resignation. In

their opinion, this was the only path to Lithuania's salvation.⁴⁷ On 12 June a meeting of Christian Democrats and Peasant Nationalists took place in Kaunas. Even members of A. Merkys' Cabinet K. Bizauskas and J. Audėnas were present in it. They were ordered to resign from the Government, as in the eyes of the opposition, they were simply exploited as a "cover for the dictatorship of nationalists".⁴⁸ Their resignations could lead to the crisis of the Cabinet, which was the goal sought after against the background of final disillusionment in the possibility of consolidating all political forces in the face of imminent threat⁴⁹ and aspirations to form a pro-Soviet government.⁵⁰ In addition, plans were made to arrange a conversation with A. Merkys and make a proposal for the resignation of the whole Cabinet. These plans were not implemented because A. Merkys was away for a few days in his farm, while later already came the Soviet Union's ultimatum. The situation was exacerbated by indetermination of A. Merkys whom even A. Smetona described as someone "incapable of making judgment and engaging in planning of preparations at a difficult hour".⁵¹ President A. Smetona, too, did not believe in a happy ending and on 13 June told his wife to start preparations to leave Lithuania.⁵² According to the Constitution of Lithuania, the President was the Commander of the armed forces and had to organize the army for defense operations, consider the plans for resistance, and call the nation to the battle. Only few days remained from the 12 June Cabinet meeting in which A. Merkys communicated Moscow's demands, till the occupation. And although, according to A. Smetona, it was clear that "Moscow's imminent demands were meaning a lot of evil, simply a terrible blow on Lithuania",⁵³ "no resolutions were adopted, only the army was ordered to be on alert", writes the then-Minister of Defense in his memoirs.⁵⁴

Such was the situation in domestic politics when the ultimatum of the Soviet Union arrived (Appendices. Doc No 4. No 6). In it Lithuania was being groundlessly accused of unfriendly behavior and kidnap of soldiers. Of conspiring in the Baltic countries' Military Alliance aimed against the USSR and violation of the 10 October 1939 Treaty. By interfering brutally in Lithuania's domestic affair demands were made for the following: 1) to commit to trial the Interior Minister K. Skučas and the Security Department director A. Povilaitis; 2) to form an new government in Lithuania, and 3) give assurance that additional RA troops will be allowed a free entrance into Lithuania. The Government of Lithuania convened its meeting to consider whether to defy or accept the ultimatum delivered to it at 1 hour in the morning of 15 June 1940 and remained in session until 7 hours in the morning of the same day. The following was known at the outset of the meeting: 1) the RA troops were going to enter Lithuania irrespective of whether the ultimatum was to be ignored or accepted; 2) around 9-12 battalions were to be introduced, which was equal to 150 thousand troops; 3) they were to be deployed in the country's strategic locations, including Kaunas; 4) the new government had to be pro-Soviet; and 5) "the measures will be of temporary character, however they will depend on the future government of Lithuania."⁵⁵ This, in essence, meant country's military occupation and its eventual annexation, ensuing from the relevant decisions to be taken by the "pro-Soviet" government.

In the meeting opinions of politicians dissented. The President proposed to consider only one clause of the ultimatum – the question of a new government. To refuse committing K. Skučas and A. Povilaitis to trial, defy the ultimatum and resist.⁵⁶ Some ministers were against resistance, as the ultimatum contained a request to allow

“additional” units in, which enabled to presuppose that since the already stationed troops did not interfere in the internal affairs, additional ones would behave in the same way. The opposition preferred to treat the ultimatum as a chance to overthrow A. Smetona’s government rather than a prediction of the country’s fate.⁵⁷ Therefore, K. Bizauskas suggested that demands be accepted. The Prime Minister A. Merkys, Minister of Agriculture J. Audėnas, backed him.⁵⁸ Majority of the Cabinet members ruled out the option of armed resistance. The Commander-in-Chief Gen. V. Vitkauskas on the impossibility of armed military resistance strengthened this attitude after the intervention, Gen. S. Pundzevičius supported him and Gen. S. Raštikis summoned to the meeting later. Following the decision to show no resistance and accept the ultimatum, A. Smetona decided to leave the country, delegating A. Merkys to act as the President of the country and assigning S. Raštikis to form a new government. Although the idea of expressing protest to the Soviet Union was discussed in the meeting, it was concluded without actually naming the aggression and including the words of protest in the text informing about the acceptance of the ultimatum. Moscow was informed, “the Government agrees”.⁵⁹ The ultimatum was accepted by the time indicated by the Soviet Union (Appendices. Doc No 11).

On the morning of 15 June S. Raštikis was considering the composition of the new Cabinet, however, Moscow informed that his candidacy was not acceptable to them and that the matter will be co-coordinated after the Soviet Union’s Envoy to Lithuania V. Dekanozov arrived in Kaunas. In addition, it informed that the Soviet army was going to enter Lithuania at 15 hours on 15 June. Members of the Government were once again summoned to the President’s Office and familiarized with the state of affairs. A. Smetona drafted a decree, in which he appointed A. Merkys to substitute him in the position of the President.⁶⁰ Members of the government were to remain in Lithuania, although they were granted an opportunity to leave the country. In a few days, at 15 hours on 15 June the RA crossed the Lithuanian frontier, tanks started off from soviet military bases stationed inside the country with a mission to occupy towns and sites. The occupation of Lithuania started.

The Soviet Union took advantage of country’s complicated political situation, heightened the tension, disunited Lithuania’s political elite and started the occupation.

Occupation of Lithuania

On 15-16 June 1940 the Red Army took the territory of Lithuania under the occupation. On the morning of 15 June, when receiving the response of the Lithuanian Government about acceptance of the ultimatum, Molotov indicated the time of the start of RA introduction and the main directions of its entry. Details were to be discussed in the meeting between Gen. V. Vitkauskas and Gen. D. Pavlov in Gudagoj railway station. (Appendices. Doc No 11). The RA entered Lithuania from three main directions and spread on its territory occupying on the way strategic cities and towns lying at the main roads. (Appendices Doc No 12). In the meeting of generals, Lithuanian representatives could not discuss the locations of deployment of the RA troops and signed the document produced by the Soviets. (Appendices. Doc No 13). Lithuanian military aviation was prohibited to fly, soviet aircraft landed at Kaunas, Šiauliai, Radviliškis and other airports. Soviet tanks from Naujoji Vilnia military base took Vilnius, and the tanks from Gaižiūnai training ground entered Kaunas at 15 hours 20 minutes. Towards the evening soviet sentries were already

posted at the President's Offices, the Council of Ministers, Security Department, Bank of Lithuania, telephone exchange, Kaunas broadcasting station, other public offices, bridges over the rivers Nemunas and Neris⁶¹. In their memoirs of these events the contemporaries would write: "drunken Red Army troops were loitering around in Kaunas".⁶² Apologist of the new regime Petras Cvirka maintained: "streets in the cities which a few days ago were breaking down under the flow of mighty tanks have returned to normal rhythm. The Red Army troops are now patrolling them in groups of two and four..."⁶³ The RA also took the south-western part of the river Nemunas basin, which, according to the agreement of 28 September 1939, was assigned to Germany. On 10 January 1941 this territory became Soviet Union's own after it paid 7.5 million gold dollars.

V. Dekazonov who arrived by plane had to provide a justification to the country's military occupation and annex it. The drafted operational plan was based on the intention to incorporate Lithuania into the Soviet Union pursuant to the Lithuanian Constitution and its legislation. It required a President with a broad mandate. Once he was forced into resignation, a Prime Minister, chosen, in this case, from pro-Sovietly-minded group of people and ready to obey the will of Soviets could replace him. The plan suffered a defeat, because A. Smetona left and A. Merkys stayed behind to substitute, not govern. At V. Dekazonov's categorical demand A. Merkys attempted to persuade the President to come back. After he failed, E. Galvanauskas was sent to A. Smetona with the same mission. When he failed too, the decision was made to violate the Constitution of Lithuania and delegate someone new - J. Paleckis - to form the government. According to the Constitution, when the Prime Minister is acting as the President, his deputy, i.e. K. Bizauskas had to assume the functions of the head of government.

From 16 June V. Dekazonov undertook to lead the formation of a pro-Soviet government. A special group was set up, comprising members chosen from among the staff of the USSR embassy and the NKVD who just arrived in the country, the Command of RA garrisons and members of the LCP's Central Committee, mandated to solve the issue of government formation and its activities; it was also issuing instructions to the press. The LCP co-ordinated appointments to staff positions, public addresses and statements. V. Dekazonov was being advised by N. Pozdniakov, who was a former Envoy in Kaunas and knew well the public figures and situation in Lithuania. The LCP CC and its member Ch. Aizen assisted with selection of the cadre.⁶⁴

On 17 June the new government, entitled "the People's Government" was formed and sworn in by the Acting President A. Merkys. J. Paleckis became its Prime Minister, V. Krėvė-Mickevičius - his deputy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Vitkauskas - National Defence Minister, P. Pakarklis - justice minister, E. Galvanauskas - finance minister, M. Mickus - agriculture minister, L. Koganas - healthcare minister. Members of the government took an oath of loyalty to the Constitution of the state of Lithuania, and later laid a wreath at the grave of the Unknown Soldier which was a symbol of the Independence fights (Appendices Doc No 15). Such acts were meant to illustrate the strive of the government to preserve and defend country's statehood. Majority of the Cabinet members were prominent politicians or public figures, a factor, which, too, had to signify the continuity of policies. Besides, there were no communists among them and before 25 June the

Lithuanian Communist Power was not lawful. The purpose for such a government was to serve the ambitions of the Soviet Union, conceal a military operation, calm the population down and persuade them that communists were nowhere near being involved in any events. In addition, statements made by the government members and ascertaining that the regime in the country was not going to change, that private ownership will be inviolable, that only the Litas, not roubles, was the valid currency to pay for goods, strengthened the belief that the country's economy will not be subject to sovietisation (Appendices. Doc No 16).

The plan for occupation could not draw on "non-partisan" soviets only. Therefore, appointments of communists to the government gradually became more frequent, they came to work in the strategic ministries. On 19 June M. Gedvilas became the Interior minister, A. Sniečkus – Director of Security department. (The fully answered the purpose, and during the sovietisation of Eastern and Central European countries in 1945-1948, the soviets in the first place were taking the Interior ministries under their control). Communist L. Adomaskas was appointed the State controller, M. Šumauskas – Chairman of the Chamber of labour, K. Korsakas became the chief of ELTA news agency and controlled the press. S. Pupeikis became the Minister of transport, K. Didžiulis (Grosmanas) – Government representative in Vilnius region. Another way employed to make the presence of communists stronger was creation of new ministries. On 26 June the Ministry of Labour was created, and M. Junčas-Kučinskas was appointed its head. On 5 July E. Galvanauskas in the post of the Finance minister was replaced by J. Vaišnoras of communist views. Thus, by the start of July (4-5) the communist influence in the government already was significant, and non-partisan ministries did not play any significant role in it.

In his description of the period from the creation of "the people's government" till the beginning of July famous lawyer M. Rėmeris wrote: "in the brief 2-3 weeks period, despite the freedom of Lithuania or even a fiction of state independence and patriotism is still being maintained, the soviet orientation and repainting of communist Lithuania is making a hasty and clearly visible progress".⁶⁵

It became clear during this period that the "people's government" was only a puppet government, unable to take any independent decisions and govern without the permit and licence of V. Dekanozov "staff".

Simulation of constitutionality involved not only formation of the government and its functioning. When A. Merkys resigned, J. Paleckis took the office of the President of the Republic. J. Paleckis swore under the Constitution, despite the fact that this act was not lawful. The President of Lithuania was meant to rule an independent and sovereign state of Lithuania. And, furthermore, to discharge this function independently from an outside influence. However, Lithuania was taken under the occupation by a military force of another country, it was under its political control, and V. Dekanozov was dictating the instructions. After J. Paleckis became this sort of president, V. Krėvė-Mickevičius automatically became the Prime Minister.

After the government was formed and J. Paleckis assumed the functions of the President, it marked the start of destruction of political and social structures of the state of Lithuania, limitation of population's rights, and reform or erosion of the established way of life. During several days political prisoners were released from

prisons, majority of whom were tried for their anti-state activities. The Lithuanian CP (25 June) and the Lithuanian Young Comsomol League (28 June) was legalised. In the other words, the forces who were against Lithuania's statehood and were commanded by the All-Union Communist party and the Comintern, were liberated. Already on 29 June the LCP issued a demand to abolish the Constitution, "to purge [the country of] the state enemies", nationalise the land. The end of June witnessed the start of layoffs of county governors and police chiefs, rural district governors and judges. For the purposes of introducing a new order, the Militia of Workpeoples was created on 6 June. With a view to exerting influence via the press, the Editor of *Lietuvos aidas* daily was replaced, and communist daily *Tiesa* was launched into publication. Issue of all publications registered before 20 June was suspended at the end of July. Only the print of pro-communist press was allowed. The features of dictatorship proliferated. Works by unacceptable authors were removed from libraries, and Collection of Works by A. Smetona was the first to be hit. Private individuals were prohibited from making telephone calls abroad. As of 1 July, all political, social, cultural and religious organisations and associations, as well as student corporations were prohibited. Since the ban on the parties, whose activities were prohibited in 1936, had not been lifted, and activities of the Lithuanian Nationalist Union and *Jaunoji Lietuva* youth organisation were suspended, Communist Party remained the only one. Political transformations were accomplished with J. Paleckis signing the decree on the dismissal of the Seimas as of 1 July.

By the start of July it became evident that the "people's government" was just a cover to conceal other, real administrations. They were: Soviet Union embassy with A. Dekanozov at its lead, which de facto supervised everything, Ministry of the Interior, the channel for Lithuanian communists and the Red Army to act, which acted locally. The government was there to "conceal" the occupation.

Organisation of public meetings and demonstrations was used as a way to change the public opinion. They were also employed to form an opinion about the support for the government policies and a necessity for closer relations with the Soviet Union. Thereby, the groundwork for annexation was laid. As it is evident from the memoirs of V. Krėvė Mickevičius, leaders of "the people's government" learned about Lithuania's annexation to the Soviet Union only at the end of June.⁶⁶ V. Krėvė-Mickevičius was notified of "the decision to incorporate the Baltic States into the family of soviet Republics" made by the Soviet Union leadership⁶⁷ on 30 June by V. Molotov during their conversation in Moscow (Appendices. Doc No17).

Election of the "People's Seimas" as an Instrument to Pave the Way for Lithuania's Annexation

A new phase in the functioning of the "people's government", advanced by the Soviet Union plans to incorporate Lithuania into the USSR, came on 5 July when the date for the elections to the Seimas was announced and a relevant law promulgated. (Appendices. Doc No 18). Co-ordination of the plan of action took place a few days earlier. On 1 July 1940 at the USSR Embassy in Kaunas a meeting was held led by V. Dekanozov and N. Pozdniakov. Apart from the embassy staff, members of the LCP CC were also invited to attend, A. Sniečkus, I. Meskupas-Adomas, M. Gedvilas, Ch. Aizen, J. Paleckis and others among them. During the meeting an instruction was

issued to conduct the elections in 10 days and seek for a massive voters turnout. Several measures were available to achieve this goal: stamping of passports to indicate that its owner has cast their vote, and the threat of repression in fear of which the people were expected to attend the voting. Although in the soviet terminology this sounded somewhat differently: “Democratisation of the country involves a ruthless struggle against all the enemies of people ... whose deserve to be in prisons”.⁶⁸ Term “enemy of the people” was incomprehensible to the population of Lithuania of that time, arrests had to be made to reveal its true nature.

Law on the Election to the Seimas titled “the People’s Seimas” was promulgated on 6 July (Appendices Doc No19). The date of election foreseen in the law – 14 July – did not comply with laws of Lithuania which stipulated that 2 months had to elapse from the moment the elections were announced till the actual day of election. The Law on election was not a democratic one. For example, it specified that everybody had to vote (§ 24), that passports were to be marked (§ 35) and that candidates were to be nominated only in the gatherings of “workpeople”. A few days later came an announcement that the right to nominate candidates was reserved only to the organisations allowed to operated [in the country], i.e. only the communist associations, as activities of all other entities were already prohibited by that time. Member of the LCP CC VI. Niunka was appointed Chairman of the Election Commission (Appendices. Doc No 18). In an effort to disguise the LCP’s active supervision, a bogus organisation “Alliance of the Workpeople of Lithuania” was created. It was nominating communists and non-partisan individuals and participated in the elections.

The announcement of elections was followed by an unrestrained, misleading and even deceitful propaganda campaign and politicking. The announced “Election Platform of Alliance of the Workpeople of Lithuania” promised writing-off of taxes due and debts for farmers, higher salaries and good work conditions for workers, free social security, development of healthcare and education etc. It was promising everything to all social groups and at once (Appendices. Doc No 20). Item thirteen of the platform read: “Inviolability of person and ownership”⁶⁹ and all of this were lies. No reference was made to the pending overthrow of regime and Lithuania’s annexation to the USSR. Thus, even given willingness to call the elections legitimate, decisions of the “people’s Seimas” cannot be identified with the will of people.

A broad propaganda and agitation campaign was aimed at attracting as many people as possible to the polling stations. Organisers of [country’s] annexation to the Soviet Union sought to meet their goal by creating the impression that all people of Lithuania participated in the election of the Seimas whose decisions resulted in Lithuania’s annexation to the USSR. Attendance on a massive scale was meant to demonstrate that the nation by its own free will surrendered its independence. Promises alone were insufficient to safeguard participation in the election. Therefore, a new explanation was added to the propaganda campaign – those failing to vote shall be “the enemy of the people”. This term became meaningful on 7 July 1940 when a decree was issued to arrest the unreliable individuals and to prevent thereby any impediments to the plans of the soviets. (Appendices. Doc No 21). The first arrests were made on the night of 11 July. Thus, in the pre-rerun to the election arrests were made and repression unleashed to intimidate the people and make them vote this way. Organisations, which could speak out and act against the elections, were eliminated

from the public life. On 11 July such fate befell the Riflemen Union whose activities became prohibited. Before the election, 19 out of 23 burgomasters were replaced as well as 175 out of 261 rural district governors.⁷⁰ Polling period was extended for another day in the face of pending negative election results.⁷¹ The LCP CC issued additional instructions to enhance the propaganda campaign “organise public jamborees... at the polling stations: with squeeze-boxes, singing etc. Contact must be made with the Red Army troops to employ their services in this work.”⁷² (Appendices. Doc No 22). Besides, voters lists had not been compiled and this offered even greater freedom for rigging and tampering with the elections.

The authoritarian regime in Lithuania failed to create a civic society and that is why many inhabitants of Lithuania came to vote and the voting itself proceeded without major interruptions. However, the course of elections was not absolutely harmonious. V. Dekanozov who was observing them actively concluded that there were attempts to destroy ballot papers, that some provocateurs showed up and that some persons “had to be detained” (Appendices. Doc No 23). In the memoirs issued later members of the election commission described numerous violations of election rules and inconsistencies in the data publicised (Appendices. Doc No 24). Among the outstanding facts was the announcement that 106% of voters came to vote in Pasvalys rural district.⁷³ (Appendices. Doc No 25).

For a considerable time the election results were unknown. Although already on 16 July it was announced that 1.386.569 or 95.51% of all eligible voters cast their vote in favour of the People’s Alliance list.⁷⁴ These were almost identical results that the Soviet Union would quote after each election and this raised doubt. Ballot papers have not survived. Different results are quoted in the memoirs [of contemporaries] : 30-50% of country’s inhabitants participated in the elections, and 16-18% of those who voted were in favour of the candidates.⁷⁵ (Appendices Doc No 26). The most recent research data obtained by L. Truska suggests that 964.2 thousand of the country’s population, who represented 85.2% of all voters, attended the election.⁷⁶ The Election commission “improved” the results by around ten per cent. 55% of all that cast their votes voted in favour of the candidates.⁷⁷ As many as 39 LCP members and 40 non-partisan individuals were elected to the Seimas.

Actual election of candidates to the members of the Seimas had been rigged entirely. Individual voting for each candidate was held and only those who gained more than 50% of votes could expect to be elected. Despite the Election Law, all the candidates who ran for election were declared as elected to the Seimas, irrespective of the number of votes they collected if any. For example, L. Truska indicates that in the city of Vilnius and its whereabouts one out of ten candidates could be elected,⁷⁸ while all ten were eventually registered as members of the Seimas.⁷⁹ The communication that votes were cast in favour of the list of workpeople is inconsistent with the Election Law, as it was necessary to announce how many votes each candidate gained. Election of the Peoples’ Seimas involved violation of the law, committing of other unlawful acts and rigging of the results, with communists and Red Army troops interfering in the process of elections.

Role of the People’s Seimas of Lithuania in the Annexations of Lithuania

Election of the People's Seimas was followed by the most important stage in the process of country's annexation. Resolutions and laws adopted by this Seimas had to play an instrumental role in this.

On 17 July in Tallinn met the executors of the plans for the occupation and annexation of the three Baltic countries V. Dekanozov, A. Vyšinskis and A. Zhdanov. They discussed the course of annexation, foresaw organisation of the seimas' and the ways for debating issues in the plenary and adopting the resolutions.⁸⁰ After a few days an organisational commission was set up to lay the groundwork for the "People's Seimas", which included the LCP CC members A. Sniečkus, Vl. Niunka and other prominent communists. The first acts they promulgated concerned the organisation of mass meetings in squares, factories and barracks. During these events slogans were chanted and demands made: to proclaim Lithuania a Socialist Republic, annex Lithuania to the USSR, nationalise banks and enterprises (Appendices. Doc No 27). Sometimes, with participants of the meetings without even realising this, resolution of the above described nature would be "adopted" and sent to the Kaunas State Theatre, the future seat of the Seimas sessions. At times such meetings would be attended by the already elected Communist members of the Seimas or individuals known as pro-Soviet supporters. All these demonstrational actions sought to achieve one goal: to pronounce the alleged aspirations of the "workpeople" which later had to be implemented by the Seimas. Newspapers were printing not only the demands made to the Seimas, but also articles by J. Paleckis, A. Venclova, P. Cvirka and others. They sought to prove and justify why becoming a 13th soviet republic was necessary. When this image of aspirations of the masses was created, an announcement was made that the Seimas was being convened on 21 July.

Some 78 out of 79 elected members of the Seimas came to take part in it (election of J. Abrakonis had been rigged, his place was necessary for J. Paleckis who was elected in the additional election held on 22 August). Work of the Seimas was organised in violation of the rules yet with an intention to prevent anybody's opposition to the annexation plan. All the Seimas members were seated in the pit together with the invited guests, i.e. they melted into the crowd. Old revolutionists and communists – L. Adomaskas, M. Gedvilas, J. Grigaravičius were called to chair sessions of the Seimas. The same arrangements were applied to the Commission of Mandates (A. Sniečkus, J. Bieliauskas, G. Paleckienė).⁸¹ The proceedings in the Seimas are described in the memoirs of L. Dovydenas and A. Garmus (Appendices, Doc No 78-79). Voting took place in violation of the valid procedure, as not only the Seimas members, but all the others present in the plenary voted as well. M. Gedvilas, who chaired the meeting, will write in his memoirs later: "the declaration was submitted for voting: a forest of hands went up. Although only representatives of the Seimas were supposed to vote the guests could not remain uninvolved – everyone raised their hands. Unanimously".⁸² (Appendices. Doc No 30). Thus, not only everybody voted, but there was nobody there to count the votes. Any resolution could be taken after such a system of voting was set up.

On 21 July the issue of state regime and the country's incorporation into the USSR was discussed. Majority of the Seimas members learned only after the start of the meeting that these items have been put on the agenda. The draft bills had not been considered in the commissions prior to this, and their adoption [in the plenary] was subject to three prior readings. Representatives of the soviets drafted the plan and

provided the leadership, while the Lithuanian communists completed the work of annexation. M. Gedvilas proposed to declare Lithuania a socialist country, and the First Secretary of the LCP CC A. Sniečkus – to accede to the USSR (Appendices Doc No 31-32). Debates on the first issue lasted for 1 hour 5 minutes only and consisted of statements of declarative nature. In addition, this Seimas was not empowered to change the regime of the country and the arrangements concerning its sovereignty.

M. Rrēmėris pointed out that according to the 1938 Constitution “sovereignty is not entrusted to the Seimas... [it] does not have the legal authority to decide the fate of the state itself”.⁸³ The Seimas violated laws and overstepped its competencies. [Lithuania’s] annexation to the USSR happened in the Seimas in 1 hour 24 minutes. On the next day already a declaration was issued about the country’s regime and accession to the Soviet Union (Appendices Doc No 33). The Soviet Union realised its plans and that is why on the evening of 21 July V. Dekanozov left Lithuania.

On 22 and 23 July decrees were issued concerning nationalisation of land, banks and heavy industry. They comprised a violation of pre-election vows given by communists themselves to leave the private ownership untouched. However, as such ownership did not exist in the Soviet Union, it could not exist in Lithuania either. In addition, the Empowered Commission was set up to go to Moscow and ask the USSR Supreme Council to accept Lithuania into the USSR. It comprised 20 members, famous communists and leftist writers among them. This was the last act of the first session of this Seimas, which, instead of being the outcome of the people’s will, was “the effect of the Soviet march into Lithuania”.⁸⁴ “The People’s Seimas” eradicated the statehood of Lithuania.

The end of July witnessed a rapid restructuring of Lithuania’s political and economic life. The nationalisation of enterprises and banks started, property was seized from persons who retreated abroad, the rights of family members of the “people’s enemies” were being restricted. Cleaning of libraries was launched, functioning of the Faculty of Theology and Philosophy was terminated. In a matter of one day only, 29 July, the police was renamed into militia, an address word “mister” replace by “citizen”, and instruction issued to teach Marxism and Leninism at the University. Lithuania was changing not only its external shape – a red flag was raised at the Gediminas Castle, and Laisvės (Freedom) avenue in Kaunas renamed Stalin avenue. Sovietisation in Lithuania was taking place even prior to Lithuania’s becoming a part of the Soviet Union.

Final annexation is linked to 3 August 1940, a day on which during the session of the USSR Supreme Council, a decision was taken to annex Lithuania to the USSR (Appendices Doc No 34).

Preconditions for Lithuania’s annexation were laid down in July 1940 when a new law on the election was promulgated. It was approved by the “Peoples’ Seimas” whose proceedings and decisions had been inspired by the Soviet Union. This was done in breach of the procedures of the Seimas and in violation of the Constitution of Lithuania. The LCP performed the part of a Soviet Union stooge and its activities were directed against statehood of the country and interests of its population.

Lithuania's annexation was completed on 3 August 1940 when the country was incorporated into the Soviet Union.

-
- ¹ Lithuania and the USSR// *Lietuvos aidas* daily. –1940.-20 June.
- ² A. Sniečkus. Report to the 5th Congress of the LCP (B). 5 February 1941.-K.-1941.-p.10-11
- ³ J. Paleckis. Report at the 1st session of the People's Seimas// The People's Seimas of Lithuania. P.40
- ⁴ K. Škirpa. The Dusk of Lithuania's Independence (1938-1940). Memoirs and documents. V.- 1996. – P.429-433.
- ⁵ History of the American Lithuanians. – Boston.- 1971.- P.552.
- ⁶ L. Dovydenas. My Road to the Peoples' Seimas/The Lithuanian Archive.- Vol.3. K.- 1942. P.50-67.
- ⁷ A. Garmus. Lithuania's Incorporation into the USSR. – Moscow's Dictatorship// Ibid. – P.35-48.
- ⁸ *Meždunarodnaja žizn* periodical . – 1989. – Issue No. 9
- ⁹ Declaration on Lithuania's Accession to the USSR// The Peoples' Seimas of Lithuania.- P.75.
- ¹⁰ J. Žiugžda. Soviet Union's Assistance Provided to the Lithuanian People in their Defence of their Freedom and Independence in 1939 and 1940.- V. – 1949.
- ¹¹ Vl. Niunka. The 30th Anniversary of the Soviet Power Establishment in Lithuania.- V.- 1949.
- ¹² M. Požarskas. Restoration of the Soviet Power in Lithuania (1940-1941).- V.- 1959.
- ¹³ R. Šarmaitis. Historic Decisions of the Peoples' Seimas// Revolutionary Movement in Lithuania. – V.- 1957.
- ¹⁴ History of the Lithuanian SSR. – V. 1958.
- ¹⁵ A New Approach to the History of Lithuania.- V.- 1989.
- ¹⁶ A. Jakubčionis. Filling In the Blank Spaces: What Was Unknown to the Émigré Historiography?- V. 1999.- P. 95.
- ¹⁷ L. Truska. Lithuania in 1938-1953.- V. – 1995; by the same author: Antanas Smetona and His Times.- V. – 1996; by the same author Elections of the People's Seimas of 1940. 1. Political Situation on the Eve of Election. 2. Election Results // *Lituanistika*.- 1995. No1.- P. 15-38.
- ¹⁸ Dogovor o nenapadenii meždu Germanijei i Sovjetskim Sojuzom // Polpredy soobščiajut Sbornik dokumentov ob otnošenijach SSRS s Latvije, Litvoi i Estonije. Moskva. – 1990. – S. 16.
(Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union// The Plenipotentiaries inform...
Collection of documents on the relations of the USSR with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Moscow. – 1990. – P.16).
- ¹⁹ Sekretny dopolnitelnyj protokol // Polpredy soobščiajut. – S. 17. (Secret Additional Protocols// The Plenipotentiaries inform...- P.17).
- ²⁰ Germano-Sovetskij dogovor o družbe i granice meždu SSRS i Germanijei // Polpredy soobščiajut. – S. 60 (German-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and the State Border of the USSR and Germany// The Plenipotentiaries inform. – P.60.).
- ²¹ Sekretny dopolnitelnyj protokol // Polpredy soobščiajut. – S. 61.(Secret Additional Protocols // The Plenipotentiaries inform. – P.61).
- ²² Pakt o vzaimopomošči meždu SSRS i Estonskoi Respublikoi. Pakt o bzaimopomošči meždu SSRS i Latviskoi Respublikoi // Polpredy soobščiajut. – S. 62-64; S. 84-85. (Pact on Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Republic of Estonia. Pact on Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Republic of Latvia// The Plenipotentiaries inform.- P. 62-64; p. 84-85.).
- ²³ J. Urbšys. Lithuania During the Decisive Years 1939-1940. – V. – 1988. – P. 24-25.
- ²⁴ Ibid. – P. 26.
- ²⁵ Ibid. – P. 33.
- ²⁶ Agreement on the Transfer of Vilnius and Vilnius region to the Republic of Lithuania and Mutual Assistance between Lithuania and the Soviet Union // Occupation and Annexation of Lithuania 1939/1940. Collection of documents. – V. – 1933. – P. 95-98
- ²⁷ L. Truska. Lithuania in 1938-1939. – V. – 1955. – P. 41.
- ²⁸ P. Misiūnas. R. Taagepera. The Baltic States: the Years of Dependence 1940/1980. – V. – 1992. – P. 26.
- ²⁹ Postanovlenije soveščanii zamestitelei Narodnogo Komissara inostranych del SSRS // Polpredy soobščiajut. – S. 295 (Resolution of the Meeting of the Deputies of the People's Foreign Affairs Commissar of the USSR// The Plenipotentiaries inform. – P. 295).
- ³⁰ J. Urbšys. Lithuania During the Decisive... – P. 50.
- ³¹ Pro memoria by the Ministry of National Defence Representative for Relations with USSR Troops in Lithuania Div. Gen. M. Rėklaitis // Occupation and Annexation of Lithuania 1939/1940. – P. 247.

-
- ³² A.I. Yeriomenko. God 1940-oi. Kaunas vstretil cvetami // Voенno-istoričeskij žurnal. – 1994. – Nr. 3. – S. 38. (The Year 1940. Kaunas Welcomed with Flowers// The Military-Historical Magazine. – 1994. – Issue No 3. – P.38.)
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ A. Anušauskas. Soviet Annihilation of the Lithuanian Nation in 1940-1958. – V. – 1996. – P. 23.
- ³⁵ G. Zhukov. Recollections and Reflections. Vol.. 1. – V. – 1983. – P. 51.
- ³⁶ Ibid. – P. 161-164.
- ³⁷ 15. 06.1940 telegram of the Minister E. Turauskas authorised by the MOFA Politics Department // Occupation and Annexation of Lithuania. –P. 268.
- ³⁸ Ibid. – P. 269.
- ³⁹ A.I. Yeriomenko. The Year 1940. – P.. 39.
- ⁴⁰ J. Audėnas. The Last Meeting. – V. – 1990. – P. 153.
- ⁴¹ L. Truska. Antanas Smetona and His Times. – V. – 1996. – P. 366.
- ⁴² Zapis besedy zam. narkoma inostrannyh del SSSR B.P. Potiomkina s poslannikom Litvy v SSSR L. Natkevičiusom // Polpredy soobščiajut. – S. 169. (Minutes of the Meeting of the USSR People's Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs B.P. Potiomkin and the Lithuanian Ambassador to the USSR L. Natkevičius// The plenipotentiaries Inform... - P. 169.)
- ⁴³ G. Rudis. Were the Red Army Troops Being Kidnapped in Lithuania in 1940 // *Kultūros Barai* periodical. – 1988. – Issue No. 10. – P. 63
- ⁴⁴ K. Musteikis. Pro memoria // Annexation of Lithuania. Documents of 1940. – V. – 1990. – P. 27-28.
- ⁴⁵ L. Truska. V. Kancevičius. Lithuania in the Swirl of Stalin and Hitler Conspiracy. – V. – 1990. – P. 117.
- ⁴⁶ L. Truska. Lithuania in 1938-1953. – V. – 1995. – P. 51.
- ⁴⁷ L. Truska, V. Kancevičius. Lithuania. – P. 120
- ⁴⁸ P. Karvelis. The Last Days of Independent Lithuania // Lithuania's Annexation. Documents of 1940. – V. – 1990. – P. 51.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid. – P. 32.
- ⁵⁰ L. Truska, V. Kancevičius. Lithuania. – P. 124.
- ⁵¹ A. Smetona. Pro memoria // Annexation of Lithuania. – P. 9.
- ⁵² Ibid.
- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ K. Musteikis. Pro memoria // Annexation of Lithuania. – P. 30.
- ⁵⁵ Zapis besedy narkoma inostrannyh del SSSR V. Molotova s Ministrom inostrannyh del Litvy J. Urbšisom // Polpredy soobščiajut. – S. 373. (Minutes of the Meeting of the USSR People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. Molotov and the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Urbšys// The plenipotentiaries Inform.. – P. 373)
- ⁵⁶ J. Audėnas. The Last Meeting. – P. 204.
- ⁵⁷ K. Musteikis. Fragments of Recollections. – V. – 1989. – P. 55.
- ⁵⁸ K. Musteikis. Pro memoria. – P. 31.
- ⁵⁹ J. Švoba. Lithuania of the Seimas and of the President. – V. – 1990. – P. 373.
- ⁶⁰ *Vyriausybės žinios* Official Gazette. – 1940. – Issue No. 709.
- ⁶¹ J. Audėnas. The Last Meeting. – P. 233-234.
- ⁶² Ibid..
- ⁶³ quote. According to: L. Truska, V.Kancevičius. – Lithuania. – P. 153.
- ⁶⁴ A. Eidintas. Antanas Smetona. – V. – 1990. – P. 195.
- ⁶⁵ M. Rėmeris. Sovietisation of Lithuania in 1940-1941. – V. 1989. – P. 24.
- ⁶⁶ V. Krėvė. Bolshevik Invasion and the People's Government. – V. – 1992. – P. 19-20.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid. – P. 1.
- ⁶⁸ Nemunaitis. Democratisation of the Country // *Lietuvos aidas* daily – 1940. – 1 July.
- ⁶⁹ Election Platform of the Alliance of the Workpeople of Lithuania. 6 July 1940 // People's Seimas of Lithuania. –P. 27.
- ⁷⁰ R. Misiūnas. R. Taagepera. The Baltic States. – P. 32.

⁷¹ On the extension of the elections to the Seimas for another day // People's Seimas of Lithuania. – P. 30.

⁷² The LCP CC Directive “Concerning the Elections to the People's Seimas 14.07. 1940” // Occupation and Annexation of Lithuania. – P. 357.

⁷³ Election of the Seimas. // Ibid. – P. 376.

⁷⁴ Communication of the Central election Commission concerning the Results of Elections to the People's Seimas // People's Seimas of Lithuania. – P. 31.

⁷⁵ L. Dovydenas. My Road to the People's Seimas // Archive of Lithuanians. – Vol. 3. – P. 53.

⁷⁶ L. Truska. Elections to the People's Seimas of 1940. 2. Election results // *Lituanistika* periodical. – 1995. – Issue No. 1. – P. 33.

⁷⁷ Ibid. – P. 37.

⁷⁸ Ibid. – P. 35.

⁷⁹ Communication of the Central election Commission // People's Seimas of Lithuania. – P. 33-34

⁸⁰ L. Truska. V. Kancevičius. Lithuania. – P. 179-180.

⁸¹ First Session of the People's Seimas // People's Seimas of Lithuania. – P. 46-47.

⁸² M. Gedvilas. The Fateful Turn. – V. – 1975. – P. 58..

⁸³ M. Rémoris. Sovietisation of Lithuania. – P. 36.

⁸⁴ Ibid. – P. 40