

The Crimes of the Communist Regime in Lithuania in 1944-1953

The Role of the Political Bodies, their Local Subdivisions and Collaborators of the Soviet Union in Committing Crimes in 1944-1953

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

Ap. – inventory (inv.)
B. – file (f.)
CARC – the Council of the Affairs of Religious Cults
CK – the Central Committee
Col. – colonel
comsorg – the Secretary of the Komsomol Organization
doc. – document
f. – file
F. – the stocks (stk.)
Gen. – general
Glavlit – the Central Directorate on Literature and Publishing Houses
inv. – inventory
KGB – the Committee of State Security
L. – page (p.)
LYA – the special Lithuanian Archives (SLA)
LYCLL – the Lenin Young Communist League of Lithuania(the Komsomol of Lithuania)
LYCLU – the Lenin Young Communist League of the Union (the Komsomol)
LKP(b) – the Communist Party of Lithuania (the Bolsheviks)
LSSR – the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania
Lt. – lieutenant
Lt. Col. – lieutenant colonel
LTSR – the Soviet Socialist Republic of Lithuania
Maj. – major
Maj. Gen. – major general
MGB – the Ministry of State Security
MVD – the Ministry of Internal Affairs
NKGB – the People’s Commissariat of State Security
NKVD – the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs
p. – page
partorg – the Secretary of the Party Organization
SLA – the Special Lithuanian Archives
SRCDNHR – the Storage and Research Center of the Documents of the Newest History of Russia
SSKP – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
SSRS – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
stk. – the stocks
VKP(b) – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the Bolsheviks)

Introduction*

With the second Soviet occupation (reoccupation) in 1944, Lithuania was forcefully incorporated into the Soviet Union by initially employing the Red Army that was fighting against Hitler's troops and later, by using the repressive military units of the NKVD. The latter established their garrisons throughout the whole of Lithuania, particularly in rural areas, to defend and safeguard the bodies of the Soviet power. They also suppressed the armed resistance of the Lithuanian nation by far more numerous military forces. In 1944, neither in Lithuania nor abroad was there a real and legitimate political power (except several diplomatic missions) to represent the independent Lithuania. Therefore, there was no need for Moscow to resort to insidious political plots as in 1940. Moreover, after WWII, the international community and the most powerful democratic states of the Western world did not oppose the policy carried out by the SSSR in the Baltic States except for their general political reprimands.

The criminal totalitarian nature of the communist state led to terror and repressions that followed the Soviet regime in Lithuania. The overall policy of the SSRS, in regard to Lithuania, was criminal and executed by force in everything: its aims and objectives, its contents and character, and its ways and means of implementation. From the very beginning, the occupation regime resorted to terror, repressions, execution of war crimes, and the genocide of the Lithuanian nation seeking to keep Lithuania within the Soviet Union by force. Though there were attempts to justify these actions on the Bolshevik theories of "the intensifying class struggle" and "the proletarian dictatorship", they were of clearly anti-Lithuanian nature. (Lithuanians made up even 96 per cent of all the deportees and 93 per cent of all the imprisoned people).¹ In fact, people were punished for being Lithuanians and seeking to have an independent state. Force became a common daily follower of the Soviet regime and came to an end only in 1991 with the collapse of the communist system in the Soviet Union.

After the war, a single-party political system of the totalitarian state was rapidly reestablished. It had previously existed in the SSRS as early as in 1940–1941. It included political and state bodies trying to forcefully establish a communist society in Lithuania. Within a short period of time, Lithuania was to become an inseparable part of the SSRS. To establish their power, the communists instituted a totalitarian regime. Its main objectives were to politicize the society, impart their ideology to it, control all areas of social life and create a social support for the communist regime. To achieve this, political, ideological and repressive measures were used.

Political and state bodies of the Soviet Union in Lithuania (the occupation administration included citizens of the SSRS and local collaborationists) were eradicating everything pertaining to the independent Lithuania – national awareness, traditions and spiritual values, were destroying its social structure and economic system (mainly in the countryside), were exterminating the most politically active and intelligent part of the nation. The Lithuanian nation put up resistance to it; therefore, in 1944–1953, the Soviet Union continued the repressive policy that it had started before the war and which manifested itself in different forms of state terror and organized genocide. The status of the republic of the Soviet Union devoid of any attributes of independence was again imposed on Lithuania.

Formally, the structure of the Soviet power consisted of the state legislative, executive and judicial branches. However, under the conditions of the totalitarian regime, this principle of the division of powers was fictitious: the Communist Party enjoyed absolute power, imposing its will on all state and social institutions. The supreme body of the SSRS state power in Lithuania – the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, that according to the Constitution had to be the most important institution of the political power (Article 2 of the Constitution of 1940 of the LSSR stated that "Soviets of the representatives of the working people make up the political base of the Lithuanian SSR"), did not execute any political activity. The Supreme Soviet of the LSSR – "the supreme body of the state power of the Lithuanian SSR"(Article 20), "elected by the citizens of the Lithuanian SSR for four years"(Article 21) and "the only legislative body of the Lithuanian SSR"(Article 23), only duplicated the orders of the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS and formally approved annual budgets. Consequently, the local Soviets of the representatives of the working people did not carry out any political

* Literature page 17–19.

activity and had no political power, though Article 3 of the Constitution of the LSSR stated that all power in the LSSR belonged to the town and country working people “represented by the Soviets of the working people”.² Broadly speaking, the policy of the Communist Party was carried out by the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR, local Soviets, the Council of People’s Commissars of the LSSR, and local executive committees.

The most important political power of the Soviet Union was the Communist Party – the only political body of the SSRS that illegally and forcibly came to power as early as 1917. Its political status was legalized by the Constitution of the SSRS which also determined the structure of the totalitarian state, which made political competition of several parties impossible. The Communist Party – the Communist Party of the Union (the Bolsheviks) – and its constituent parts – the republican Communist Parties – were based on the principles of strict centralism, unconditional obedience and subordination. Its structure was multilevel: starting with the Political Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) (the institution of the highest power of the SSRS) and finishing with local party groups (organizations) consisting of several communists. The party consisted of republican parties, in fact, territorial communist organizations that were unconditionally subordinated to the Center – the Central Committee of the VKP(b), the Political Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) and personally to J.Stalin. However, there was no Russian Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It was not necessary for the Kremlin – the Russian VKP(b) had to cover the whole of the SSRS.

In Lithuania, the only political body of the this type, the core of the Soviet political system and the nucleus of the occupation regime was officially called the Communist Party of Lithuania (the Bolsheviks) – (LKP(b)). It was a territorial organization of the VKP(b) having the status of a regional organization. During the post-war period, the LKP(b) was neither a national organization nor a political party in the strict sense of the word due to the structure of its organization and dependence on the CK of the VKP(b). It was the most important institution of the occupation administration that controlled and directed the activities of all state and social bodies. Apart from the party organization of the VKP(b), there also existed some other political bodies of the SSRS in the post-war Lithuania: the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) and the Lenin Young Communist League of Lithuania (the Komsomol). These organizations actively contributed to the Sovietization of Lithuania, fought against the resistance, organized repressions and the genocide and participated in their execution. Communist terror in Lithuania was executed by the repressive agencies – the NKVD (MVD) and the NKGB (MGB). These institutions formally belonged to the executive power of Lithuania, to the group of Union-Republican Commissariats (Ministries), but, in fact, they functioned as subunits of the corresponding People’s Commissariats of the SSRS and were directly subordinated to Moscow. The institutions for the execution and supervision of laws, that is the Prosecutor’s Office and special courts, that sanctioned numerous actions of repressions and genocide, operated in a similar way. On the other hand, the heads of the repressive bodies of the LSSR held high posts at the top of the Lithuanian Party: J. Bartašiūnas, A. Guzevičius, D. Jefimov, N. Gorlinskij, P. Kapralov, P. Kondakov were members of the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b). All their criminal acts were performed in the name of the Communist Party and followed the idea of establishing communism.

In all institutions of the Soviet power, including the party organization of Lithuanian communists, working citizens of the former independent Lithuania became collaborationists – the invaders’ helpers making their countrymen to obey the invaders and carry out their will. Being better familiar with the country and its population, they suggested their own means and ways to Sovietize Lithuania and break down the armed resistance. To ground their collaboration, they despised the independence of Lithuania, tried to justify the extermination of the Lithuanian nation and attempted to involve wider layers of the Lithuanian society into collaboration with the invaders.

The aim of this study, based mostly on archival documents, is to disclose the role of the political bodies of the Soviet Union in Lithuania, that is the LKP(b), the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), the Lenin Young Communist League of Lithuania, and collaborationists in committing crimes in 1944–1953, to analyze the functions of these bodies, the relationship among them, their main goals and objectives, to demonstrate the extent and depth of their activity, to define the concept of the collaborationist, the authority and functions assigned to him/her by those in power, and, according to the possibilities, to reveal the backstage activities of the Soviet power.

The study focuses on the political aspect of the Sovietization of Lithuania. Therefore, the economic policy of the Communist Party in Lithuania, which was also of obvious criminal nature because of the economic terror of the countryside, the back-breaking state taxes and forced product deliveries, various kinds of forced labour, “the dispossession of the kulaks”, forced collectivization, annihilation of the remains of the private sector in industry and trade, etc. has not been analyzed.

Historiography

In Lithuanian and foreign historiography much attention is paid to the research of the criminal activities of the political bodies of the Soviet Union. Authors have analyzed the structure of this state, functions of the elements of its system, the evolution of its political bodies and their activities in the SSRS and Lithuania after WWII.

Foreign Literature

Researchers of foreign countries have conducted a thorough study of the political doctrine and practice of communism.* The greatest attention has been paid to the brutality of the Soviet regime and crimes committed by the Communist Party: violations of human rights and freedoms, political repressions, political discrimination of various social layers and nations, terror, genocide (massacres and deportations of nations), spiritual pressure, Russianization, and anti-Semitism. Having compared the political doctrines of the Russian Communists and the German National-Socialists and the evolution and the ways of their implementation, foreign researchers observed certain similarities and concluded that the Communist genocide is akin to the National-Socialist racial genocide. In Lithuania as well as in other states occupied by the SSRS, the genocide was primarily directed against their own nations³. The Communist Party of the Union (the Bolsheviks) and its local bodies organized the execution system and carried out the political command of the genocide as well as other crimes in the Soviet Union and the states annexed by it.

The prevailing concept in foreign historiography is that the Soviet Union illegally occupied Lithuania for the second time (1944-1945), because it violated the main principle of the Atlantic Charter of 1941: “to reestablish sovereign rights and independence of the nations that have been deprived of them by force”. However, the USA and other Western states did not make major claims to the Soviet Union, even though they did not acknowledge the legality of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the SSRS. A special memorandum adopted by the State Department of the USA in 1944 and the Yalta Conference in 1945 did not insist on granting independence to the Baltic States⁴. The SSRS took advantage of this and established here its political system which was uniform to all the states incorporated into the SSRS. Lithuania had to be Sovietized for the second time; therefore, the political bodies of the Soviet Union were assigned the following additional objectives: to liquidate the resistance, “cleanse” the society of “socially adverse elements”, instill the communist ideology and reorganize the economy in accordance with communist principles.

Yet, political exile forces did not comply with the concession policy of Western countries. Documents and factual materials illustrating the cruelties of the Soviet occupation were being collected. Attempts were made for the first time in 1953 in the USA to publicly disclose the crimes committed by the communist regime. The committee established by the Congress and headed by Ch.J.Kersten analyzed the occupation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union and attributed it to international crimes⁵.

In the historiography of Lithuanian emigrants, a particular attention was paid to the armed resistance of the Lithuanian nation, the force policy of the SSRS in Lithuania and the evaluation of its demographic damage⁶. These studies state that, having reoccupied Lithuania, the SSRS established a uniform Soviet political system within it and in 1944 transferred the LSSR puppet administration from Moscow to Lithuania where it set up local power bodies within a short period of time. The administration of the LSSR was under the command of the CK of the VKP(b) and the central agencies of the SSRS. The Communist Party of Lithuania acted as an intermediary and organized the implementation of the decisions taken by the CK of the VKP(b), though it did not have the right of making political decisions itself. The invaders sent their Russian-speaking representatives to oversee the Soviet power bodies in Lithuania and established the system of “shadow personalities”. The newly formed politically reliable command apparatus of the LSSR was employed for the im-

* In this section, the author seeks to review the historiography related to Lithuania only.

plementation of Sovietization, Russianization and genocide policy. J.Brazaitis, A.Damušis, K.Girnius, R.Mišiūnas and others, having a unanimous opinion in regard to the criminal and collaborative role of the LKP(b) leaders, emphasize that even the leaders themselves were not trusted. The historian K.Girnius claims that “neither the key personnel of the Lithuanian Communist Party nor the local cadre played a decisive role in the most important issues. Decisions were made by the Kremlin”⁷. In the opinion of V.Daugirdaitė-Sruogienė, Lithuania, as well as the other republics of the SSRS, “was allowed only certain cultural autonomy”⁸. Thus, all responsibility for terror and repressions fell to the SSRS and local collaborationists.

In order to implement its criminal policy, the VKP(b) made use of the republican body – the Communist Party of Lithuania. Its functionaries were attributed to the category of collaborationists. Historians have discussed the composition of the LKP(b). They pointed out that many people in the LKP(b) were not Lithuanians. The overall post-war policy of the invaders, political, economic, social, cultural and other kinds of reorganization effected by the Soviet power in Lithuania were of criminal nature and were more radical than those carried out in 1940-1941. The genocide of the Lithuanian nation planned by the authorities of the VKP(b), but organized and executed by the LKP(b) and the LSSR administration subordinated to it in conjunction with the central administration was the gravest crime of the occupation regime.

The shortcoming of all research by exile historians is the lack of original archival material. Many of their publications are based on remembrances of the people that lived in emigration and on facts of Soviet historiography. Writing about the political bodies of the Soviet Union, they neither made an analysis of the activities of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) nor sufficiently disclosed the role of the Komsomol – the LKP(b) satellite – in committing crimes. They also failed to discuss the relationship between the LKP(b) and the repressive bodies, etc.

Modern Lithuanian Historiography

During the last decade, on the basis of rich original historical sources, new Lithuanian and foreign scientific historical and memoir literature, historians have analyzed various aspects of the role of the political bodies of the Soviet Union, primarily the LKP(b), in carrying out the genocide of the Lithuanian nation and other crimes of the occupation regime.

All authors unanimously acknowledge that in 1944 the second Soviet occupation (reoccupation) started in Lithuania. Within a short period of time, the political system of the SSRS, with the Communist Party at the head, was reestablished. The Communist Party of Lithuania, a constituent part of the VKP(b), was the highest institution of the occupation administration of the LSSR, except in 1944-1947, when the course of the Sovietization of Lithuania and the activities of the LKP(b) itself were supervised by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b). The LKP(b) managed to stay in power only due to the support of the military and repressive bodies of the SSRS.

The Lithuanian nation did not acknowledge the Soviet occupation and opposed it in all possible ways. The Communist Party organized the suppression of the resistance by employing criminal methods (massacres, imprisonments, deportations, confiscation of property). Most Lithuanian citizens supported the resistance fighters; therefore, the repressions by the Soviet power became massive in character and were directed not only against those thinking differently, but against the Lithuanian nation itself. Almost half a million people became victims of the communist genocide and Soviet terror and experienced one or another form of extortion.

In 1988, attempts were made for the first time to historically evaluate the past of the LKP. The historians L.Truska, G.Rudis, V.Kašauskienė, Č.Bauža and others started seeking answers to many questions that were forbidden during the occupation (regarding post-war resistance, deportations, extermination activities, demographic changes, etc.). In 1989, by the commission of the CK of the LKP, a group of authors published a set of articles called “Thoughts about the Path of the Communist Party of Lithuania”⁹. Historians wrote about the anti-national activities of the LKP and post-war repressions of the Soviet regime quite openly and boldly (V.Kašauskienė – about the deportations, V.Pšibilskis – about the devastation of culture), but they did not emphasize the crimes of the LKP against the nation and humanity. They blamed this on the repressive bodies of the SSRS, the CK of the VKP(b) and the imperial policy of the SSRS.

In 1990, on the basis of known historical facts of that period and the newest archival documents, a group of historians (J.Bagušauskas, Č.Bauža, D.Blažytė, V.Kašauskienė, V.Kancevičius, V.Pšibilskis, V.Tininis,

R.Zizas) prepared a 48-page historical reference document called “The Idea and Practice of Communism in Lithuania”. The historians came to the conclusion that “the policy of the Stalinist genocide, terror and repressions, where members of the Communist Party were playing a minor or major role in it” was being executed in the post-war Lithuania. The LKP authorities refused to admit that the LKP itself was a criminal organization during the post-war period and did not agree with the conclusions of the historians. The document was not published. The LKP made no public evaluation of its past and admitted only some political errors and crimes committed by certain communists.

Later research by historians only once more confirmed that the Communist Party, secretly from the society, planned and executed crimes against humanism, their own nation and statehood. So far, there is no special study on the role of the VKP(b) and the LKP(b) in executing crimes in Lithuania. In 2000, the International Congress attempted to evaluate communism crimes.^{9a} Historians have given the widest coverage to the activities of the Communist Party in different publications dealing with specific historical topics.

A.Anušauskas¹⁰, E.Grunskis¹¹, L.Truska¹² and others analyzed the interaction of the LKP(b) and the repressive bodies in organizing and executing the genocide of the Lithuanian nation. The historians disclosed the aims of the repressive policy of the occupation regime and the reasons and purposes for terror and mass deportations, emphasized the communist doctrine statements, on which the extermination policy of the Lithuanian nation was ideologically based, investigated the activities of party and Soviet power and command institutions as well as repressive bodies in committing crimes and also analyzed the policy of the LKP(b) cadre in training employees (Lithuanians) for repressive bodies. A.Anušauskas drew an important conclusion that the function of the Soviet state to suppress the so-called resistance of the overthrown classes and the official communist ideology, first of all the class struggle theory, was a cover for seeking to exterminate part of the nation. As many as 332,000 of Lithuanian people were imprisoned and deported and 26,500 were murdered¹³. The lawyer Z.Šličytė evaluated the criminal policy of the Soviet regime from the legal point of view and defined the role of the LKP(b) and the repressive bodies in organizing and executing the genocide¹⁴.

The activities of the Lithuanian Communist Party during the post-war period were analyzed by L.Truska¹⁵ and V.Tininis¹⁶ in review-type textbooks on history. In 2001, a collective monograph “The Restoration of the Sovereignty of Lithuania in 1988-1991”¹⁷ was published. Almost a quarter of the book is devoted to the period of the Soviet occupation. The study emphasizes the idea of the continuity of the Lithuanian state and the immorality of the communist policy. The structure of the LKP and the character of its activities were dealt with in the study “The Lithuanian Soviet Nomenclature”¹⁸ by K.Antanaitis.

The role of the Communist Party in committing crimes against the members of the resistance movement as well as civilians was analyzed by L.Truska¹⁹, N.Gaškaitė²⁰, K.Kasparas²¹ and others. In 1999, a collection of articles “The Destruction of Lithuania and the National Struggle in 1940-1998” was published. J.Starkauskas wrote about the attempts of the Communist Party to form armed extermination platoons in Lithuania and about the military activities of the repressive bodies during the post-war period. He was also the first in Lithuania to do research on the special party-repressive bodies – “the threes”, “the fours” and “the fives”²⁴. A thorough analysis of Soviet and modern historiography of extermination battalions was performed by E.Grunskis²⁵.

Historians were also interested in other SSRS political bodies that operated in Lithuania after the war. The activities of the subunit of the CK of the VKP(b) – the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) – were mostly analyzed by H.Šadžius²⁶ as well as by E.Grunskis²⁷ and V.Tininis²⁸. The historian J.Bagušauskas carried out research on the post-war activities of the Lithuanian Komsomol that was seeking to Sovietize young people, to control their political and spiritual lives and to involve them into the criminal policy of the occupation regime²⁹.

During the last decade, dozens of articles on different post-war history topics appeared in periodicals and scientific continual publications. They analyze the activities of the Communist Party and the Komsomol in Sovietizing Lithuania and organizing struggle against those thinking differently by using criminal means. The historians A.Streikus³⁰ and R.Laukaitytė³¹ did research on the opposition between the communist power and the Catholic Church, M.Pocius³² wrote about the forced campaign for signing the letter to J.Stalin organized by the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945, D.Blažytė³³ – on the Soviet campaign against musicians of Lithuania, S.Atamukas and L.Tatarūnas³⁴ discussed the VKP(b) policy of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union,

V.Pšibilskis³⁵ and S.Gečas³⁶ researched the culture-destroying policy executed by communists, L.Truska³⁷ – the activities of the CK of the LKP(b) and the Glavlit, V.Kašauskienė³⁸ – the terrorization of teachers and students by the Soviet power, etc.

In 2002, the long awaited monograph by S.Vaitiekus called “Tuskulėnai: Executioners and their Victims (1944-1947)”³⁹ was published. The author paid much attention to the activities of special courts, including military tribunals, which maintained close relations with the CK of the LKP(b).

Soviet Historiography

Under the conditions of the totalitarian regime, the Communist Party was concerned with that treatment of history that had to form a favourable public opinion about the leading and infallible role of the Communist Party in establishing communism and about the exceptional and altruistic mission of the Soviet Union, especially of the Russian nation, in Lithuania. For that purpose, special state-maintained “scientific” institutions functioned. These included the Institute of the Party History at the CK of the LKP, the Division of Socialism of the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR, the Departments of Social Sciences (of the History of the SSKP, Marxism-Leninism, Scientific Communism) at all higher educational institutions of Lithuania, and Vilnius Higher Party School. Also, the special “scientific” journal called “The Issues of the LKP History” was published. Teachers and scientific research workers of these institutions published dozens of monographs, textbooks, collective and single-author works, collections of statistical data, and tendentiously selected archival documents. Attempts were made to prove the positiveness of the socialist regime (“the socialist system”). On the basis of “A Short Course in the History of the VKP(b)” tradition, Soviet authors kept totally silent about the occupation and annexation of Lithuania, the genocide of the Lithuanian nation and other crimes of the occupation regime. Such interpretations of the Stalinist Soviet history, the open apologetics for the policy of the Communist Party and the state of the SSRS dominated until the very beginning of M.Gorbachov’s perestroika (in the Soviet Union – until 1985, in Lithuania – until the spring of 1988). Academic publications of this type considerably increased in the 80s and the beginning of the 90s⁴⁰.

In order to ideologically disguise the second occupation of Lithuania and its tragic consequences, the so-called concepts of “the establishment of the foundations of socialism” and “the class struggle” were formed in the historiography of the LSSR. Having completed the forced collectivization and having nearly destroyed the main partisan forces, in 1951, the Soviet power declared that the foundations of socialism were established in Lithuania. Soviet historians were trying to prove that the Lithuanian nation favourably accepted the social and economic reorganizations, especially collectivization, executed by the Communist Party. Only a small part of the society – “the bourgeois nationalists, kulaks and reactionary Catholic clergy” – opposed them. Because of that, “the class struggle” began in the post-war Lithuania, with the death-toll of 25,000 lives. Hundreds of thousands of other Soviet genocide victims were not mentioned.

Taking into consideration the dominant position of the Communist Party in the state and society, historians paid the greatest attention to the analysis of the party organization activities of the Lithuanian communists. One of the most significant works about the post-war LKP(b) is the collective monograph “An Essay on the History of the Communist Party of Lithuania”, Volume 3 of which was published in 1985. The book was supposed to become the main guideline for all researchers of the newest Lithuanian history. The book falsely states that “the LKP(b) linked the establishment of the Soviet power primarily with the expansion of the Soviet democracy and the involvement of vast masses of working people in the management of state affairs”⁴¹. The same opinion was shared by authors of other publications who emphasized “the wise economic and national policy” not only of the LKP(b), but also of the VKP(b) in the post-war Lithuania⁴². E.Treiniene’s book that deals with the issues of the LKP(b) organizational evolution and the change in social and national composition of communists⁴³ should be singled out from the works of many historians who wrote about the post-war Communist Party.

A particularly large number of publications were devoted to the so-called policy of “the proletarian internationalism” pursued by the Communist Party. In spite of the obvious facts of the deprivation of rights and Russianization of Lithuania, attempts were made to prove that “Soviet Lithuania prospered in the family of Soviet republics”. K.Navickas, J.Paleckis, K.Strumskis, G.Zimanas dealt with these issues⁴⁴. In order to emphasize the fact that the LKP represented the interests of Lithuania, Soviet historians were always trying to find examples of the alleged independence of the LKP(b). In their articles of 1991 about the post-war pe-

riod, M.Burokevičius and J.Jermalavičius tried not only to justify the anti-human, anti-national and criminal activity of the LKP(b), but also to find some aspects of the independent political activity, though even they admitted that “under the conditions of the personality cult, the CK of the VKP(b) did not always take the interests of the republic into consideration”⁴⁵. The idea of the independence of the LKP(b) was most often associated with the personality of A.Sniečkus.

S.Atamukas wrote about the party nomenclature⁴⁶. People belonging to the nomenclature held commanding posts, had privileges; therefore, during the Soviet period the research of this subject was not encouraged. Trying to avoid the term “nomenclature”, the notion “party cadre” was used in official letters and documents. Works by S.Atamukas are of a lasting value due to the abundant and valuable statistical and factual materials. The Soviet system of law and order served the communist regime. Researchers of the history of the Soviet law⁴⁷ maintained that institutions of justice (courts, the Prosecutor’s Office) significantly contributed to the establishment of the socialist system in Lithuania, emphasized the validity and necessity of the functioning of legal acts and the whole system of the Stalinist law and order, tried to prove that the socialist legality was possible only under the command of the Communist Party, etc. From the standpoint of R.Stanislovaitis, such policy of the Soviet power was “an objective necessity” and was being implemented in three ways: military, economic and political-judicial⁴⁸. It was also pointed out in a few sentences that there had been violations of the socialist legality in the post-war Lithuania (too severe penalties imposed by courts, “middle peasantry” persecuted alongside “the kulaks”, etc). All these violations were presented as individual cases, thus trying to conceal the criminal role of the Communist Party and deny the mass violation of human rights and freedoms, the genocide policy of the Lithuanian nation. In general, this subject (deportations, illicit arrests, massacres) was evaded or simply hushed up. Whenever a necessity to explain the reasons for the genocide and the anti-humane activities of the repressive bodies used to arise, the wording that these were “individual facts of the violation of the socialist legality” was used or it was claimed that the actions of the bodies of Internal Affairs and State Security were incited by the terror from “bourgeois nationalists and kulaks”. The above-mentioned Volume 3 of “An Essay on the History of the LKP” states that “working peasantry and collective farmers supported the liquidation of the kulaks as a class and temporary displacement of the family members of the armed underground beyond the boundaries of the republic. [...] The extraordinary measures taken by the party and Soviet power against the kulaks had a positive influence on the political and productive activity of the working peasantry”⁴⁹. However, the number of the deported was not indicated. According to the historian A.Augus, “bourgeois nationalists provoked the Stalinist repressions in Lithuania”⁵⁰. In 1988, J.Jermalavičius wrote in the “Tiesa” that the purpose of the deportations was “to undermine the social basis of the bourgeois terror”. He insisted that “the innocent people who suffered made up an insignificant part of the displaced”. The role of A.Sniečkus and other Lithuanian communists in committing these crimes was hushed up⁵¹.

Soviet historiography not only kept silent about the role of the Communist Party in organizing mass deportations, but in the published collections of documents (series “The Facts Accuse”) tried to represent the resistance as “the class struggle” and show the cruelty of the partisans by tendentiously selected documents. The most famous studies analyzing “the class struggle” was a dissertation by A.Augus⁵² and a monograph by A.Rakūnas⁵³. The authors, following the official interpretation, called the partisans “bandits” and those who were not involved in the unarmed resistance or supported partisans – “misled” people. They tried to depreciate the significance of the resistance as much as possible and show it as a phenomenon of “banditism”. Historians made no analysis of the anti-partisan documents by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) and the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b), which made party and repressive bodies responsible for organizing and carrying out not only the suppression policy of the partisan resistance, but also the repressive policy of the civilian population (because of their top secrecy or in order not to discredit the Soviet power, they could not comment on them – v.t.).

Nothing was said about the punitive anti-partisan actions by the troops of the NKVD-NKGB or MVD-MGB, either. The above-mentioned dissertation by the lawyer R.Stanislovaitis, demonstrating a close relationships between military, administrative and punitive legal measures and the liquidation of the traditional economic conditions of the peasantry, should be considered exceptional. It is, most probably, the only work published in the Soviet period which deals with the annihilation of partisans by military units and mentions the fact that deportations (as a “suppressive” measure) were carried out. According to R.Stanislovaitis, all power bodies

in Lithuania were associated with such actions – beginning with the lowest (local executive committees that attributed peasants farms to those of “the kulaks”) and finishing with the highest – the CK of the LKP, the Council of People’s Commissars (the Council of Ministers of the LSSR), the NKVD(MVD)-NKGB (MGB) of the LSSR, under the adopted acts, decisions, orders or directives of which the function of “suppression” was carried out⁵⁴. Apparently, due to such openness, the dissertation by R.Stanislovaitis was not published⁵⁵.

Soviet historiography paid a particular attention to the aides of repressive bodies and combat units of the Communist Party – extermination battalions (exterminators, who were called “the defenders of the people” by the Soviets) and to the armed groups of party-Soviet activists. This topic was touched upon in nearly all publications about the post-war period. The Soviets aimed to prove to the society and, in particular to the younger generation, that there was no opposition of any kind to the Soviet occupation, but a class struggle was going on among Lithuanians themselves – supporters of the Soviet power (“working” peasants, workers) and “bourgeois-nationalists” (kulaks, land owners, capitalists).

During the post-war period, Lithuanian culture and intelligentsia badly suffered from the brutal communist regime. Soviet historiography tried to circumvent this topic or belittle the spiritual oppression (spiritual genocide) executed by communists as much as possible. M.Burokevičius and A.Bendžius wrote about the post-war intelligentsia, the activity of cultural, educational, scientific institutions and creative organizations under the conditions of “the cultural revolution”. In 1982, the collective monograph “The Culture of the Soviet Lithuania” and other books were published⁵⁶. On the basis of Bolshevik dogmas, the authors claimed that, due to the agitation and propaganda of the LKP, Lithuanian intelligentsia took “the path of the establishment of socialism” and after short hesitations supported all reorganizations executed by those in power, though archival documents pointed to the opposite. The historians “turned a blind eye” to the consequences of the Russification of Lithuania, devastation of national culture, political persecution of the intelligentsia, ideological blackmail and direct repressive actions.

After the war, particularly on the eve of Stalin’s demise, anti-Semitic tendencies grew stronger and stronger. In Soviet historiography this problem was not analyzed at all.

The Soviet regime had a painful impact on Lithuanian believers and the Catholic Church, a very important force of spiritual, moral and national self-expression of the society of that time. The attitude of the Communist Party towards religion had always been negative and this predetermined the atheistic and anti-religious nature of the published literature. It is abundant, though works by J.Aničas, J.Mačiulis, J.Jermalavičius, specially prepared collections of documents discrediting the Church, might be singled out⁵⁷. In all their books and articles, the authors despised the Church, tried to ground the need for the repression against the clergy, though no data was given on how many churches were closed and priests imprisoned or deported – the society was to have no knowledge of this. The role of the Communist Party and the Komsomol in taking repressive actions against the Church was made secret.

The tragic state of the population in the post-war Lithuania depended not only on the central Communist Party, repressive and other departments in Moscow, but also on the Lithuanian leaders of the LSSR – collaborationists, on the radicalism of their ideological beliefs and personal qualities. In the Soviet time, little was written about party officials of Lithuania. This topic was not encouraged, and those that did write limited themselves to biographical data and facts of allegedly positive political activity of these people. Among these works, the collection of biographies “Lithuanian Revolutionaries” by the historian R.Šarmaitis should be mentioned⁵⁸. The author described the most famous communist officials of the Soviet Lithuania following a single-colour pattern – at first, all communists fought against Smetona’s “fascist” regime, in 1940, they were the organizers of the “socialist revolution” in Lithuania, in the post-war period–active creators of socialism. Certainly, no mention was ever made that these officials organized repressions and committed crimes against humanism.

In the works of Soviet historians any directive from Moscow was presented to the society of Lithuania as a friendly support and assistance of the Soviet Union. Writing about the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) that functioned in Lithuania in 1944-1947, they claimed that the Bureau helped the LKP(b) because this support was not only greatly necessary, but also indispensable. The historian Z.Zalepūga wrote that the reason was that “the primary party organizations were young, not yet sufficiently strong and numerous, whe-

reas the tasks assigned to them were particularly important and complex.”⁵⁹ However, the activity of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) was not specifically investigated.

Researches on the history of the Komsomol were of great importance in Soviet historiography. In 1955-1990, 15 doctoral theses were defended, and dozens of articles were written on this subject in Lithuania (the journal “Problems of the History of the LKP” alone published 21 articles).⁶⁰ These works tried to prove that young people approved of the communist ideology and the Soviet power; they also justified the execution of terror and repressions and emphasized the loyalty of the Komsomol to the Communist Party. O.Pakėnienė, A.Lukoševičienė, K.Volchkova-Barzdaitienė and others wrote mostly on the issues of the history of the post-war Komsomol.⁶¹ A few books of collective works were published: “The Komsomol of Lithuania”, “50 years of the Komsomol of Lithuania”, “The Komsomol of Lithuania in Figures. 1919-1979”⁶², etc.

Quite a few researchers of the Soviet history wrote on different problems of the political evolution of the post-war period, in the analysis of which the activity of political bodies of the Soviet Union in Lithuania was touched upon. All works stressed the positive leading role of the VKP(b) and the LKP(b). The authors maintained that “only with the altruistic help of other republics of the SSRS” Lithuania managed to overcome all difficulties of the post-war period. One of the major historians of the post-war period was H.Šadžius. In his numerous publications, from the standpoint of the Soviet apologetics, the author analyzed the “conceptual” problems of “the transitional period from capitalism to socialism”: its stages, peculiarities, processes, historiography, the development of the “social-class” structure, etc.⁶³

Sources

The primary documentary sources for the investigation of the crimes of political bodies of the Soviet Union are in the archives of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. In Lithuania, the most documentary materials on the Communist Party and the Komsomol have been accumulated in the Special Lithuanian Archives (Central) and its branch – the Division of the LKP Documents. Documents concerning the activity of central and primary organizations are stored here (documents of the CK of the LKP in Stock 1771, documents related to A.Sniečkus in Stock 16895, those of the Komsomol in Stock 4421, etc.). The LKP documents are a very significant primary source which helps to reveal the role of the Communist Party of Lithuania in organizing and carrying out the crimes of the communist regime.

The most informative are protocols of the congresses of the LKP(b), the plenums and Bureau sittings of the CK of the LKP(b), directives of the CK of the LKP(b), notes by the divisions of the CK of the LKP(b), accounts of the correspondence with the CK of the VKP(b) and administrative institutions of the LSSR and other documents which reflect the activity of the Communist Party. Letters, directives and other documents by the CK of the VKP(b), the Council of People’s Commissars (the Council of Ministers) of the SSRS, the Prosecutor’s Office of the SSRS and other central agencies, sent to the Central Committee of the LKP(b), disclose the objectives and tasks of the criminal policy planned by Moscow in Lithuania. The documents indicate that the CK of the LKP(b) played the role of the intermediary and organizer: it immediately forwarded the directions from Moscow to its lower bodies requiring timely accounting and later reported the generalized results to the CK of the VKP(b).

The LKP documents testify to the fact that this organization unconditionally obeyed all Moscow requirements, was a loyal aide of the occupants, a consistent organizer and executor of the criminal policy. The decisions by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) make it evident that the party organization of the Lithuanian communists consistently implemented the political decisions by the Kremlin concerning the genocide of the Lithuanian nation, organized the suppression of the resistance and deportations of the population, gave political command to them and carried out other crimes.

The stocks of criminal intelligence (1st Division) and operational cases from the depositories of the archival documents of the former KGB, now the Special Lithuanian Archive (Central), are of a particular value. The stocks of operational cases (K-1, inventories 3,10 and others) hold the accounts by different divisions of the NKVD-NKGB, the MGB, units of the interior troops and operational sectors which were prepared and sent not only to the heads of the corresponding agencies in Lithuania and Moscow, but also to the most important leaders of the CK of the LKP(b) – A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas, J.Paleckis, V.Niunka, the Second Secretaries of the CK of the LKP(b) and also to the Chairmen of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M.Suslov and V.Shcherbakov.

It has been established by Lithuanian historians that quite a few documents (the data on killed, deported, imprisoned, convicted, arrested, politically persecuted and other people) are inaccurate and there is a fairly large number of cases of forged or doctored facts. Therefore, summary tables abound in increased or decreased figures. Yet, these documents were meant for Lithuanian agencies for secret internal use, having made absolutely sure that they would never be accessible to the public. Though there are some statistical inaccuracies in them, they best disclose the course of the implementation and the consequences of the criminal policy common to both the Communist Party and the repressive bodies. Their language is most often natural, frequently cynical, without ideological embellishments that abound in the LKP documents. For instance, top secret documents of the State Security openly specify the numbers of imprisoned, killed or deported people, describe the operational activity of security agents, spying on famous people of Lithuania, collecting compromising material on high-ranking officials of the LSSR administration and other aspects of the activity of MGB employees. Taking this into consideration, the language of the historical texts in the commentaries of the documents tried to follow the language of the published documents and, only in case of necessity, generalizations, analyses and facts presented by historians were used. Materials in facsimile are published so that the documents prepared by the Soviet officials themselves would today unmask crimes planned and executed by them and disclose gross violations of human rights and freedoms.

In 1994, when some of the stocks of the State of the Russian Federation were made public, the Lithuanian historians A. Anušauskas⁶⁴, M. Pocius⁶⁵, H. Šadžius⁶⁶ and others made use of them. On the basis of these archives, they not only revealed some new historical facts, but also provided readers with copies of these documents translated into the Lithuanian language. This proved very useful in preparing this publication, particularly the part about the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), all documents of which were taken to Moscow in 1947. Besides, during the last decade, quite a few collections of documents which throw light on various aspects of the activity of the political bodies of the Soviet Union in Lithuania have been published.

Having examined thousands of archival sources (including the published ones), the necessary documents or their extracts for this publication were selected not in their chronological order, but in direct connection with various aspects of the topic under investigation. In the facsimile annexes, 236 documents are presented (except several decisions by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) translated into Lithuanian by the historian H. Šadžius), 80 per cent of which were published for the first time.

The most characteristic documents that to the greatest extent disclose the crimes of the Soviet occupation and communist regime in Lithuania were selected for this publication. Certainly, due to the limited space of the publication, thousands of other equally important documents were not included into these volumes. The aim of the publication was to throw more light not only on the secret activity of the Communist Party in organizing the suppression of the underground resistance, deportation of the population, persecution of the Church and the intelligentsia, cleansing of the cadre and Russianization, but also to show the anti-humane nature of the totalitarian state itself, when the creators of this very communist system or people loyal to the power could find themselves in the ranks of “the enemies”.

Memoirs

An important source for the investigation of communist crimes are reminiscences of people that have survived the post-war period, particularly of those who opposed the compulsion bearing arms or in other ways, who experienced the horror of camps and prisons of the SSRS. This literature largely describes the fighting of partisans with the Army and local collaborationists, deportations and imprisonments, shows the extent of the support of the population to the underground and the treacherous criminal activity of communists and their sympathizers. Among the printed publications, perhaps the most valuable ones are by the famous partisan commanders – J. Lukša⁶⁸ and A. Ramanauskas⁶⁹, written shortly after the mentioned events. No less important are testimonies by other resistance fighters⁷⁰, reminiscences about deportations and mass imprisonments⁷¹.

Reminiscences of resistance fighters and deported people disclose the true picture of the crimes of the Stalinist regime, however they can tell little about the actions of terror and repressions planned by the political bodies of the SSRS. Such reminiscences are nearly non-existent because functionaries of the Soviet power consciously concealed their past, and those that executed lower-ranking crimes – exterminators, party activists – knew about the hatred of the nation and, therefore, did not make much effort to remember the post-

war period. With the assistance of the journalist A.Čalnaris, only two books⁷² and a collection⁷³ have been published. Former exterminators mostly talk about the battles won against the partisans, make mention of their service in shock-troops, disguised as partisans⁷⁴.

During the revival period, reminiscences of the famous former party functionaries – the First Secretary of Kaunas city Committee of LKP(b) J.Grigalavičius⁷⁵ and the First Secretary of the CK of the LYCLL J.Macevičius were published⁷⁶. They described the contradictions that existed then between the local communists and the newcomers. Having been removed from their posts by radical communist forces, they accused the SSRS but not the administrative authorities of the Lithuanian SSR of the political dictate. Reminiscences by A.Štromas, an adopted son of A.Sniečkus, about the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP are fairly objective. He claimed that during the post-war period A.Sniečkus did his best to obliterate the opposition and “class enemies”⁷⁷.

Structure

The publication consists of two parts, but because of the great extent of the documents and their commentaries, they are published in two volumes. The first part that consists of three chapters, analyzes the political bodies of the Soviet Union that operated in Lithuania in 1944-1953 (the LKP(b), the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) and the LYCLL). The second part (chapters 4–12) deals with the activity of these bodies and their role in establishing the communist regime and executing crimes. A document indicated in the commentaries can be found by the number of the corresponding chapter. Documents that cover several topics are presented in the chapter which is more important in regard to the topicality. The publication includes such documents as decisions, directives, accounts, reports, complaints, statistical summaries, notes, plans, extracts from speeches, etc.

Each document has an editorial heading (at the bottom of the page) and its legend in Lithuanian and English. The editorial heading indicates the number of the document, the date of its preparation, the author, the addressee and the title. The code of the document (the name of the archives, numbers of the stock, file and page) is briefly indicated in the legend of the document.

In the English text, Lithuanian names, surnames and first names are written using the letters of the Lithuanian alphabet, whereas Slavic surnames – using those of the English language.

1. The Communist Party of Lithuania (the Bolsheviks)*

1.1. The LKP(b) – the Executor of the Stalinist Criminal Policy in Lithuania

With the beginning of the second Soviet occupation (reoccupation), the Communist Party of the Union (the Bolsheviks) again became the most important and the only official political body and the pillar of the political regime in Lithuania. Its constituent part – the Communist Party of Lithuania (established in 1918) – was a territorial organization of the VKP(b). In 1945, it had 3,536 and in 1953 – 36,178 members. The LKP(b) performed the most important functions of the occupation administrative power.

The number of communists was especially small in rural areas. To strengthen its positions there, the CK of the LKP(b) sent communists and members of the Komsomol for permanent work to the country. However, in places where there was lack of civilian communists, party organizations were formed of the employees of the NKVD-NKGB (doc. No. 1.1).^{*} In 1945, as many as 40 per cent of its members worked in repressive bodies.¹ At that time, the LKP(b) consisted mainly of people that came from the SSRS or local Russian-speaking population: in 1947, it comprised 18 per cent, in 1953 – 38 per cent of Lithuanians.² Lithuanians in the LKP(b) had the rights of “a national minority”: almost all party functions, documents, major part of party literature and office-work were in Russian. In 1944–1953, the LKP(b) was the core of Russianization of Lithuania.

During the initial period of the establishment of the Soviet regime, many members of the LKP(b) had poor education (in 1945, 300 communists out of 3,536 had higher education, whereas 1,344 had primary education). Later, the level of education increased, but in 1953, those having higher education made 6.3 per cent of all communists and those having primary education – 35 per cent.³ Poor education, disregard of the general Christian and moral values of the society and even contempt for them had an impact on the immoral behaviour of communists and manifestation of their senseless cruelty. A large number of documents prove that communists and newcomers in general, mainly personnel of military or repressive bodies, tended to drink heavily and lacked elementary culture of behaviour (doc. No.1.2* , doc. No.1.3*). Other documents published in this book also testify to the immoral behaviour of the officials in power (doc. No.1.59, 1.60, 2.17, etc.).

The whole actual policy of the Communist Party in establishing the Soviet regime in Lithuania was carried out in total secrecy. Not only planned repressions or actions of terror, but also elementary everyday matters were kept secret from the society. Decisions adopted by all levels of party committees were made secret; ordinary members of the party could not know about them. The adopted documents were given the code “Secret” or “Top secret”, and those that were most discrediting to the LKP(b) went to “The Special File”. All these decisions by party committees would become a state secret. On the other hand, owing to the repressive bodies and their secret activity, the authorities of the Communist Party were aware of the true attitude of the majority of the population. Not only public, but also private life of people was under scrutiny. Every month, the NKGB-MGB of the LSSR used to send accounts on the censored letters of the civilian population and military personnel to the administrative authorities of the LSSR; apart from military correspondence, approximately half a million of them would be examined, e.g. in June of 1945 – 458,064 letters (doc. No.1.4*).

* **Literature and Sources page 41.**

* **Doc. No. 1.1.** The decision of 23 July 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP (b) *On Reinforcement of the Country by the Party, Komsomol and Soviet Cadre*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 83. p. 18–19.

* **Doc. No. 1.2.** An explanatory letter of 2 February 1945 by the instructor Jacko of the Instructor Organizational Division of the CK of the LKP(b) to the Head of the Instructor Organizational Division of the CK of the LKP (b) D. Shupikov. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 265. p. 30.

* **Doc. No. 1.3.** A letter of 21 June 1951 by the Head of the Secretariat of the MGB of the LSSR N. Jermakov to all the Heads of Divisions of the MGB of the LSSR. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 390. p. 16.

* **Doc. No. 1.4.** An extract from the report of 31 July 1945 on the monthly results of censorship in Lithuania (for June 1945) by the Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR Col. A. Kolotushkin and the Head of Section “V” Lt. Col. M. Makarov to the Head of Section “V” of the NKGB of the SSRS Maj. Gen. Smorodinskij. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 22. p. 159–166.

The whole Lithuania, forcibly separated from the civilized world, led a closed way of life which was controlled by the Communist Party. The communist power resorted to different segregation measures to prevent Lithuanian people from freely leaving or fleeing abroad, from communicating with friends or relatives living there, from listening to foreign radio stations, etc. The right to freely choose the place of residence was also restricted, and a strict order of its registration and passport control was introduced. In this way, the communist regime controlled public and private life of each person.

For propaganda purposes, the Communist Party declared that only due to the Soviet power Lithuania regained its historical territories – Vilnius and the region of Klaipėda. Nonetheless, during the Stalinist period, the policy of Russification was carried out in Vilnius and Klaipėda; therefore, from the demographic point of view, these cities remained non-Lithuanian. In fact, Vilnius was still a Slavic city as it had been before (Lithuanians constituted a third of the population). At that time, not only tens of thousands of Russian-speaking people, but also quite a few Lithuanians moved to the scarcely populated Klaipėda (in 1950, Lithuanians made up 40 per cent). The latter seemed unreliable to the Soviet power. A strict passport control was introduced in the residential territories along the Baltic coastline, but this was not done in Klaipėda. On 19 September 1951, the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus addressed the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) G. Malenkov requesting him to give Klaipėda the status of the “regime” city of the first category, because “due to the unrestricted order of the registration of people, Klaipėda has become contaminated with counter-revolutionary elements, criminals [...]; facts of planning to flee and fleeing abroad have been registered” (doc. No. 1.58*). In 1956, A. Sniečkus managed to prove that Kaunas also needed the status of “a regime area”.**

The LKP(b) did not have any authority or political power to maintain its command in the society without the support of the NKVD troops. On 6 November 1945, the Head of Vilnius Operations Sector of the NKVD-NKGB Col. I. Rudyka informed the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania I. Tkachenko and the Commissar of the NKVD of the LSSR J. Bartašiūnas that “in their anti-Soviet activity, Lithuanian nationalists totally ignore the authority of local party and Soviet bodies among the local population. Their proclamations straightforwardly state that as soon as the NKVD troops withdraw, they will again become masters of the situation in rural districts”.⁴

The main function of the LKP(b) was unconditional implementation of the directives of the CK of the VKP(b), the Politburo of the CK of the VKP(b) and J. Stalin, whereas its key aims and objectives were Sovietization of Lithuania and full establishment of the communist regime, organization of fighting against the national underground and execution of the Stalinist policy of the cadre. To serve this purpose, there was a strictly centralized and closed structure of the Communist Party of Lithuania: the apparatus of the Central Committee of the LKP(b) and the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) – the highest standing administrative institutions of the LSSR – and their local bodies: party committees of cities, their districts, counties (in 1950-1953 – regions), which were headed by 6-9-person-strong bureaus, party committees of rural districts, party organizations at work places, partorgs.

The main task of these party bodies was daily search for “people’s or class enemies” and organization of their repressions. Those who became victims of the repressive policy of the VKP(b)-LKP(b) in Lithuania can be divided into 4 categories or social groups: 1. partisans, members of underground organizations and their supporters (“bourgeois-nationalists”); 2. farmers (“the kulaks”); 3. office employees, teachers, the intelligentsia, former politicians, employees, military personnel and other officials of the independent Lithuania (“politically and socially unreliable, counter-revolutionary elements”); 4. Catholic clergymen (“the reactionary Catholic clergy”). All these people were placed under arrest, imprisoned, deported or killed. This was the most important area of the criminal activity of the LKP(b). In other areas (e.g. in organizing forced elections,

* **Doc. No. 1.58.** A letter of 19 September 1951 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus to the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) G. Malenkov in regard to giving Klaipėda the status of a “regime” city. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 1771-108. f. 2. p. 8.

** In general, during the years of Stalinism, foreigners were forbidden from visiting Lithuania. Specially selected groups were first allowed to come to Vilnius in 1959. The rest of the Lithuanian territory was a closed zone. The restrictions were mitigated in 1987, with more freedom in visiting Kaunas, Trakai, Druskininkai and Rumšiškės. A new tourist route was designed by the “inturist” travel agency covering Kaunas, Klaipėda and Palanga.

in executing the policy of Russianization, spiritual pressure, militant atheism, persecution of believers and the Church, tendentious justice, anti-Semitism, etc.), the activity of the LKP(b) was characterized by political discrimination of people and was also of criminal nature.

In 1944-1945, that is in a fairly short time, the LKP(b), though not numerous but supported and safeguarded by repressive bodies, expanded its party network in major Lithuania centers – big cities, county- and rural district towns and townships. More than 90 per cent of communists were appointed to work in party and Soviet bodies, 1,600 of them undertook the command of enterprises and organizations.⁵ Such distribution of communists allowed the LKP(b) to command the most important agencies and organizations of Lithuania. But in rural areas this process did not have much success. There were almost no communists or supporters of the Soviet system here; therefore, the CK of the LKP(b) sent party organizers – partorgs – to the country. They would become the highest local political power. In 1945, there were 308 (320 positions) partorgs or secretaries of party organizations. According to M.Suslov, “partorgs of rural districts are party eyes in the country” (the 6th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), 1945).⁶ As far as it is possible to judge from archival documents and people’s reminiscences, they, like the exterminators, left perhaps the most oppressive impression, because they were the initiators and organizers of local repressions, notorious for their brutal behaviour, anti-human actions and immoral way of life. For instance, in the autumn of 1945, the partorg of Šeduva rural district Grinčavičius(?) imprisoned 40 peasants for two weeks for grain deliveries that were out of the set timeframe (doc. No.1.5*). On 1 December 1944, the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) stated that partorgs of rural districts in Panevėžys county mostly fulfil functions of administrative (repressive – V.T.) bodies (doc. No.1.6*). On 7 February 1947, in a letter to A.Sniečkus and V.Shcherbakov, the Prosecutor of the LSSR D.Salin requested them “to condemn and forbid the existing practice when partorgs of rural districts and some representatives of party organizations personally deprive people of their property and carry out searches, thus replacing the corresponding executive bodies” (doc. No.1.7. p. 46*). Later, at the Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) (27 November 1947), this prosecutor provided more examples of crimes committed in the country by the officials of the Soviet power (doc. No. 1.59*).

On 29 March 1947, the CK of the VKP(b) adopted the decision to establish committees of rural districts of the LKP(b). With the establishment of party organizations, partorgs were replaced by secretaries of party organizations or committees. These lower-level party bodies (on 1 January 1949, there were 209 committees numbering 4,443 communists)⁷ alongside executive committees and repressive bodies became the stronghold of the communist regime – the institutions of local occupation power. Being well aware of the frame of mind of the population, party committees of rural districts (volcoms) became much more than an important source of information for repressive bodies. “Volcoms” actively participated in all actions of violence and terror, were their initiators, particularly regarding deportations of partisan families and confiscation of their property.

By the scanty remaining archival documents it is possible to conclude that there were mixed party-repressive bodies, “the threes” (“troiki”) and “the fives” (“piatiorki”) intended for fighting against the armed underground. They were headed by the secretaries of party committees of counties (more about that in the section “Suppression of the Resistance against the Soviet Occupation”).

* **Doc. No. 1.5.** The explanatory letter of 16 November 1945 by the Acting Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR D. Jefimov to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP (b) M.Suslov, the First Secretary of the LKP (b) A. Sniečkus, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the LSSR M. Gedvilas and the Secretariat of the NKGB of the LSSR *On the Violations of Soviet Justice in Grain Deliveries in the Counties of Panevėžys and Biržai*. SLA. stk. K–1. inv. 10. f. 23. p. 140–141.

* **Doc. No. 1.6.** An extract from the resolution of 1 December 1944 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Activity of the Primary Party Organizations and Work of Partorgs of the Rural Districts in Panevėžys County*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 64. p. 64.

* **Doc. No. 1.7.** The letter of 7 February 1947 by the Prosecutor LSSR D. Salin to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP (b) A.Sniečkus and the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V. Shcherbakov *On the Violations of Socialist Justice in the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 5. p. 37–46.

* **Doc. No. 1.59.** An extract from the speech of 27 November 1947 by the Prosecutor of the LSSR D. Salin at the 15th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 10. f. 36. p. 80–81.

The relations between the LKP(b) and central party organs in Moscow were one-sided – decisions of the CK of the VKP(b) were to be unconditionally carried out and not to be discussed. Recommendations by the LKP(b) would be taken into consideration only in those cases when they coincided with the interests of the Kremlin (e.g. requests by the CK of the LKP(b) to deport partisan families, send specialists from the SSRS, etc.). Similar relations were established in the structure of the LKP(b) itself: county or city party committees, having the role of the intermediary or supervisor, would send the instructions of the CK as directives to the committees of counties or city districts which the latter would pass on to primary party organizations and partorgs. Their responsibility was only to carry out the given instructions, but not to comment on them. However, if local party committees requested stricter repressive policy (e.g. to deport partisan families from a county or rural district), the authorities of the CK of the LKP(b) would take measures to help their subordinates. Primary party organizations had no political independence and could make no influence on higher party bodies. Such internal activity of the Communist Party was based on the principle of the so-called “democratic centralism”, i.e. total obedience.

Vicegerents of the CK of the VKP(b) not only supervised Lithuanian communists, but also kept control over them; in many cases, local officials or party functionaries were replaced by Russian-speaking or a more radical people sent to the country (e.g. in 1944, the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) Lithuanian V.Niunka was replaced by the Secretary of the VKP(b) Committee of Moscow Region A.Isachenko; in 1945, after the dismissal of the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR A.Guzevičius, the post was taken by D.Jefimov).

The first months of 1944 in the territory of Lithuania occupied by the Red Army showed that the Kremlin was seeking to still widen the scope of repressions. Vicegerents of the CK of the VKP(b) even started threatening the authorities of the CK of the LKP(b) in regard to the allegedly infirm and reconciliatory attitude towards “nationalists”. In his reports to the CK of the VKP(b) on 15 July 1944, the Head of the Organizational Division of the CK of the LKP(b) D.Shupikov (in the war period he was A.Sniečkus’s deputy) expressed his dissatisfaction with the activity of all Lithuanian leaders of the LKP(b), because they “were categorically against the simultaneous mobilization of the population of Lithuania” in the rear of the Red Army (doc. No.1.8*). On 6 September, he wrote that “the authorities of the CK have not yet got rid of bourgeois - nationalistic tendencies, therefore, in many cases, hinder the implementation of measures which are of utmost political importance”⁸. The Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Gen. I.Tkachenko was of similar opinion; on 12 July 1945, he informed the CK of the LKP(b) and the authorities of the Kremlin on the badly organized campaign by the CK of the LKP for signing the letter to Stalin (doc. No.11.3).

Trying to integrate themselves with the newcomers, being afraid of them or having ideological stimuli, the majority of Lithuanian communists often demonstrated their nihilistic attitude towards their nation, traditions, common national values and behaved hypocritically. They approved of the anti-human measures directed against their country-men (deportations, actions of terror and political repressions). Taking part in the execution of Stalinist crimes became the norm of their life and they had no pricks of conscience about this. Later, none of them expressed regret at their criminal activity; many of them laid the blame for it on the period they lived in – the Stalinist epoch.

During the post-war period, the LKP(b), a tool of the occupation regime of the SSRS, was considered by the majority of the Lithuanian population as an organization alien and hostile to the Lithuanian nation. The name of the communist was largely associated with the betrayal of aspirations of the Lithuanian nation; therefore, communists were most often shot dead on the spot when captured by partisans. True, there were Lithuanian communists, particularly among the intelligentsia, who made attempts to slightly mitigate the assault of the Stalinist forces, helped their families, saved acquaintances, though these were but rare exceptions. The Commissioner of the People’s Commissariat for Deliveries of the SSRS in Lithuania K.Banys tended to better represent economic interests of Lithuania (doc. No.1.9* and doc. No.1.10*). The Deputy Chairman of the

* **Doc. No. 1.8.** An explanatory letter of 15 July 1944 by the Head of the Instructor Organizational Division of the CK of the LKP(b) D. Shupikov to the Head of the Instructor Organizational Division of the CK of the VKP(b) Shamberg. SLA. stk. 3377. inv. 58. f. 854. p. 1-2.

Council of People's Commissars and the Chairman of the Planning Commission J.Vaišnoras kept in touch with his brother Balys, who was a partisan and in hiding, and was even accused of that in 1945-1955 (doc. No.1.11*). The Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars M.Gregorauskas had contacts with the family of the repressed A.Geneitis (doc. No.1.12*). As J.Vaišnoras said under interrogation, M.Gregorauskas did not approve of "the deportation of anti-Soviet elements", because that was "the shame of all Lithuanian executive personnel". According to the Minister of Finance A.Drobnys, Gregorauskas stated: "The Soviets brought shame on us in the face of the Lithuanian nation" (doc. No.1.56*). The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council J.Paleckis was against the open Russianization of Lithuania, political persecution of the intelligentsia and mass repressions (doc. No.1.13* , doc. No.1.36*). The People's Commissar for Agriculture of the LSSR J.Laurinaitis criticized the poor situation of Lithuanian peasantry (doc. No.1.14*). The brutal Russianization of Lithuania found no approval among other representatives of the Soviet authorities: J.Bulavas, V.Vazalinskas, M.Mickis, etc. However, with the exception of J.Vaišnoras, they did not suffer any repressions in 1944-1946. Some of them were demoted, others were transferred to the fields of science, education or culture. A new wave of criticizing and dismissing the leading Lithuanian communists in Lithuania started in 1950 and continued until the demise of Stalin (more about that in the section "The Relationship between the LKP(b) and Repressive Bodies").

1.2. "Education" and Control of Lithuanian Communists in 1944-1946

During the first post-war years, Moscow demanded that Lithuania accelerate the tempo of Sovietization and make the policy of repressing enemies of the Soviet power stricter. In order to intimidate communists of Lithuania, especially Lithuanians, in 1944-1946, the CK of the VKP(b) adopted three decisions: "On the Drawbacks in the Work of the Party Organization of the Lithuanian SSR and Tasks in the Field of Political Work" of 30 October 1944, "On the Drawbacks and Faults in the Party-Political Work of the Party Organization of the Lithuanian SSR" of 15 August 1945 and "On the Work of the CK of the Lithuanian KP(b)" of 5 October 1946. They severely criticized the authorities of the LKP(b) for inadequate actions against "bourgeois nationalists", demanded to speedily liquidate the armed underground – "banditism", to cleanse party, Soviet, economic and other institutions of "politically unreliable elements" and "nationalists", to more actively fight against "kulaks", "private-property psychology", "bourgeois and nationalistic ideology". The Lithuanian Bu-

* **Doc. No. 1.9.** A note of 12 September 1945 by the Acting Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. D. Jefimov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP (b) A.Sniečkus regarding the Commissioner of the People's Commissariat for Deliveries K. Banys. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 118. p. 64-67.

* **Doc. No. 1.10.** The decision of 19 October 1945 by the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Improper Behaviour of the Party Member Kazys Banys, patronymic Aleksandras*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv.8. f.116. p. 11.

* **Doc. No. 1.11.** The documents: The decision of 19 October 1945 by the CK of the LKP (b) *The Case of Juozas Vaišnoras, patronymic Tomas*. SLA. stk. 1771, inv. 8. f. 118. p. 40; *ibid.* f. 116. p. 10-11. A letter of 29 September 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS for Lithuania I. Tkachenko to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus and a letter by Juozas Vaišnoras to his mother. SLA. stk 1771. Inv.8. f.118. p.41-42.

* **Doc. No. 1.12.** The report of 31 October 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS for Lithuania I. Tkachenko to the Deputy Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) F.Kovaliov and the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus regarding the political impropriety of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR M. Gregorauskas to hold the current position. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 10. f. 23. p. 106.

* **Doc. No. 1.56.** A note of 2 August 1946 by the Head of the 2nd Department of the MGB of the LSSR I. Pochkaj about the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR Marijonas Gregorauskas. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 102. p.185-187.

* **Doc. No. 1.13.** The decision of the CK of the LKP(b) of 5 January 1951 condemning the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR J. Paleckis, the Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR S. Pupeikis and others for relations with "the anti-Soviet masonic organization". SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 8. p. 84.

* **Doc. No. 1.36.** An extract from the speech by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus at the 8th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 16 November 1950. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 90. f. 21. p. 61.

* **Doc. No. 1.14.** The decision of 1 September 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP (b) *On the Improper Behaviour of the Party Member Jonas Laurinaitis*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 100. p. 47.

reau of the CK of the VKP(b) and the authorities of the CK of the LKP(b) controlled the implementation of these decisions. In 1944-1953, they developed into decisions and resolutions by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) and plenums of the CK of the LKP(b), which led to gross violations of human rights, crimes against humanity and genocide. These documents focused attention on different groups of people and layers hostile to the Soviet power: “socially alien elements”, “bourgeois nationalists”, “kulaks”, “reactionary clergy”, “people’s enemies”, etc. In the decisions, repressive measures were designed against these people, or they were included in the lists of politically unreliable persons.

Various commissions and inspection brigades were sent to Lithuania to control the implementation of the decisions of the CK of the VKP(b). One of them was an inspection brigade headed by V.Zhavoronkov from the CK of the VKP(b) that came to Lithuania in June 1946 ready to dismiss A.Sniečkus and other leaders of the LKP(b) (V.Shcherbakov, I.Tkachenko, D.Shupikov approved of it). However, after the intercession of V.Molotov and M.Suslov for A.Sniečkus, the latter maintained his post. The authorities of Kaunas city (J.Grigalavičius, F.Krastinis, etc.) were dismissed “for making concessions for nationalism”⁹. Such punitive measures – or the Stalinist “education” of communists – helped the CK of the VKP(b) totally control the authorities of the LKP(b) and channel them in the desired direction.

Communists of Lithuania made a lot of effort to justify Moscow’s expectations. Together with repressive military bodies, the LKP(b) established the communist regime in Lithuania, pursued the policy of violence and state terror in the society, created the atmosphere of suspiciousness, distrust and fear, organized deportations and cleansing of the cadre and took part in executing them, tried to command the fighting against the resistance (their attempts were not altogether successful because this was the prerogative of the repressive bodies of the SSRS), approved of Russianization and devastation of the national culture.

Although the armed resistance against the Soviet power continued as long as 1953, in the period between the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1953, the work of the LKP(b) was no more specially discussed by the CK of the VKP(b). This indicated that the Kremlin was satisfied with the efforts of communists of Lithuania in turning Lithuania into a Soviet republic. At the August Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945, after the usual criticism of Lithuanian communists, M.Suslov stated that “comrades Sniečkus, Gedvilas, Paleckis and others have perceived the criticism by the CK of the VKP(b) and admit the faults and drawbacks in their work” (doc. No.2.4 p.185*).

Nonetheless, between the end of 1952 and the beginning of 1953, when the new mass cleansing of the cadre incited by Stalin was about to break out in the Soviet Union, the LKP got into the focus of attention of the CK of the SSKP. On 16 February 1953, the newspaper “Pravda” pointed out that in selecting personnel in some organizations of the LKP, political qualities of employees were ignored. Taking this criticism into account, on 25 February 1953, the CK of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On Deficiency of Political Vigilance in Selecting the Cadre for Certain Bodies of the Communist Party of Lithuania” and admitted the criticism published in the newspaper. The Bureau stated that in 1952, due to political motives, 65 executive employees of kolkhozes were repressed (doc. No.1.15*).

Seeking to increase the control of the implementation of the instructions by the CK of the VKP(b), beginning with December of 1944, almost at all levels of the LKP(b) non-Lithuanians sent by the CK of the VKP(b) had to be assigned as second secretaries of party committees. By 1 January 1952, 82.8 per cent of Lithuanians held the posts of first secretaries of city and district committees of the LKP(b) (this corresponded with the demographic composition of Lithuania), whereas 2 per cent were second secretaries¹⁰. Beginning with 1944, second secretaries of the CK of the LKP(b) were A.Isachenko (1944 – 1946), A.Trofimov (1946 – 1952), V.Aronov (1952 – 1953). Their responsibility was to supervise the work of the First Secretary, observe the overall political situation over the territory under their control, shape the policy of the cadre. The Russian institution of second secretaries at all levels of the LKP(b) was one of the distinctive features of the political control and supervision of the local communists by the CK of the VKP(b) in the post-war Lithuania.

* **Doc. No. 2.4.** The list of the participants of the 8th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 6 December 1945. The Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) was represented by 11 persons. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 20. p. 1.

* **Doc. No. 1.15.** The decision of 25 February 1953 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On Deficiency in Political Vigilance in Selecting the Cadre for Certain Bodies of the Communist Party of Lithuania*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131. f. 238. p. 9–10.

1.3. The Party Nomenclature and Cleansing of the Cadre

Alongside the entire Soviet political system, the Stalinist policy of the cadre – the practice of forming party nomenclature – was established in Lithuania, which in a short period of time enabled the Communist Party to expand and reinforce its influence on all state, economic, cultural and other institutions. Persons belonging to the nomenclature, most often the leading personnel of party and Soviet administrative institutions of the LSSR, made up a privileged layer of the officials of Lithuania, the composition of which was covertly controlled by the commanding bodies of the VKP(b) and the LKP(b). In assigning nomenclature officials, “the Stalinist principle in selecting the cadre” was observed; it was essential that representatives of “adversary classes” and politically unreliable persons be prevented from getting the posts. The party nomenclature, or “the leading class” of the SSRS, was an inseparable part of the communist totalitarian state.

The policy of the cadre based on the reliability of “political and professional” qualities of employees was by its nature anti-democratic, anti-national, discriminatory and criminal (if employees were imprisoned as a result of political distrust). Those belonging to the nomenclature in party committees were assigned to posts or dismissed from them secretly, the society being completely unaware of that. There was no competition. Having received a nomenclature post, a person was forced to carry out all party instructions. In the post-war period, nearly half of the nomenclature personnel were non-Lithuanians, mainly Russian-speaking persons, sent by the CK of the VKP(b). By 1 January 1951, Lithuanians made up 1,398, i.e. approximately 54 per cent, out of 2,577 leading personnel belonging to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b) (doc. No.1.16*). The formed party nomenclature together with the repressive bodies became the main pillar of the Soviet regime in Lithuania.

The nomenclature had an elaborate hierarchical system. The highest positions in the LSSR (in 1952, there were 275 of them: secretaries of the CK of the LKP(b) and other bodies, heads and leaders of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers, the Komsomol, trade unions) were the prerogative of the CK of the VKP(b). Approximately 2,000 leading personnel of the LSSR belonged to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b). Party committees of regions and party committees of cities and districts also had their own nomenclature; in 1952, it was 4,900 and 35,100 respectively. It comprised heads of local institutions, organizations and enterprises, school directors, etc. (doc. No.1.17*). In 1952, the sum total of nomenclature positions in Lithuania exceeded 42,00011. The functioning of the nomenclature system was controlled and supervised by the Personnel Division of the CK of the LKP(b) (heads M.Junčas-Kučinskis, D.Shupikov, E.Ozarskij, etc.).

On 1 November 1950, a new structure was approved by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b). The CK consisted of 8 divisions which encompassed all fields that were under the supervision of the administration of the LSSR: 1. party, trade union and Komsomol bodies; 2. propaganda and agitation; 3. agriculture; 4. administrative bodies; 5. planning, finance and trade; 6. machine building; 7. light industry; 8. transport (doc. No.1.18. p.14*). A group of the highest officials of the administration of the LSSR (2,451 persons) belonged to these divisions. The composition of some nomenclature groups of the CK of the LKP varied: it depended on the political situation in Lithuania. After the annihilation of the major part of the armed resistance, the number of the nomenclature personnel of the Division of Administrative Bodies in 1950 decreased from 400 to 247, whereas the number of the leading functionaries subordinate to the Division of Propaganda and Agitation increased from 253 to 374. According to the competence of their activity, these divisions were higher than ministries and their subdivisions. All state, economic and cooperative institutions and organizations had to obtain the consent of the division supervised by the CK of the LKP(b) in settling one or another issue, with the exception of the MGB supervised by the Administrative Division. Due to the secrecy of its activity, this

* **Doc. No. 1.16.** The summary table of 1 January 1951 of the commanding nomenclature of the LSSR. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 130. f. 67. p. 33.

* **Doc. No. 1.17.** A note of 1 January 1952 by the Personnel Department of the CK of the LKP(b) about the positions of the nomenclature in Lithuania. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 130. f. 124. p. 4.

ministry planned intelligence, operational and military operations independently and was directly accountable to the MGB of the SSRS, and in Lithuania – only to A.Sniečkus, M.Suslov, V.Shcherbakov, the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b), occasionally to M.Gedvilas, V.Niunka. Most often, the authorities of the MGB would send special reports, notes and other information about the accomplished work to the CK of the LKP(b).

By the decision of 14 March 1946, the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) determined the order of the approval of nomenclature employees. When the candidature of an employee was submitted for approval, there had to be a decision by the party committee or institution about the candidate's acceptance for work, personnel registration form with a photograph, hand-written autobiography and explicit reference on political activity and work¹².

Following the decision of 5 October 1946 by the CK of the VKP(b), nomenclature lists of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) were submitted to Moscow for approval. According to the set order, candidates for nomenclature posts were submitted by all agency heads or deputy heads for personnel after having been coordinated with the city and county party committees concerned, that in their turn, had to inform the CK of the LKP(b) about the strengths and weaknesses of the employees. On 15 November 1946, the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) formed a registered reserve nomenclature that trained a change of the nomenclature cadre.

People belonging to the nomenclature, that is, the layer of the leading employees, had quite a few privileges: they were speedily provided with good accommodation, fatter salaries (additionally, they received various bonuses that used to be 2-3 times larger than the salary), had service cars, were supplied with deficiency goods and foodstuffs, had meals in special canteens, etc. Until 1948, the nomenclature of the highest level enjoyed the right to get manufactured products and foodstuffs free of charge (the "prodlimit" right) (doc. No.1.19*). On 27 December 1947, this order was changed (doc. No.1.20* and No.1.21*). The most important administrative positions in the LSSR were assigned fat salaries: the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b), the Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR received 6,000 roubles per month, ministers – 5,000-4,250 roubles, city and county secretaries of the LKP(b) – 2,800 roubles, employees of the CK not less than 2,000 roubles (in 1950, the average salary was about 540 roubles.)¹³.

The nomenclature formation process was followed by gross violations of human rights. The CK of the VKP(b) and the CK of the LKP(b) organized mass campaigns of dismissal from work for political reasons against the leading personnel and specialists (office employees), mostly Lithuanians. These people were illegally dismissed from their posts, prevented from getting other employment, arrested, interrogated and frequently imprisoned. Political decisions in reference to "the cleansing of the unreliable cadre" were entered in the decisions by the CK of the VKP(b) in 1944-1946, regarding the inadequate work of the LKP(b) in the resolutions of plenums of the CK of the LKP(b) (4th in 1944, 5th – 7th in 1945, 10th – 11th in 1946) and in the decision by the CK Bureau of the LKP(b).

On 23 August 1945, at the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), M.Suslov declared the slogan: "To cleanse the Soviet-economic apparatus of hostile and questionable elements" ¹⁴. The resolution of the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 30 December 1944 stated that "the CK and republican party organizations were tolerant towards those leading employees whose behaviour was conciliatory towards nationalists and their ideology, [...] enemies penetrated the Soviet apparatus and started their destructive activity" (doc. No.1.22*). The 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 24 August 1945 decided "to take measures to cleanse the state, cooperative and economic apparatus of Lithuanian-German nationalists that have penetrated it" (doc.

* **Doc. No. 1.18.** An extract from the decision of 1 November 1950 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) approving the divisions and lists of nomenclature positions of the apparatus of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 90. f. 121. p. 2, 6, 14, 34-37.

* **Doc. No. 1.19.** The decision of 26 October 1945 by the Council of People's Commissars of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Approval of Additional Limits of Food for the Most Active Soviet-Party and Regional Personnel for the 4th Quarter of 1945*. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 8. f. 121. p. 18-19, 21.

* **Doc. No. 1.20.** The decision of 27 December 1947 by the Council of Ministers of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP (b) *On the Revocation of the Existing Order of Using the Social Consumer Service Fund and Allocation of Allowances for the Commanding Soviet and Party Personnel*. SLA. stk. 1771, inv. 190. f. 5. p. 190, 191, 195, 196. *

No.1.23*). The resolution of the 11th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 24 November 1946 reiterated: “The CK of the KP(b) of Lithuania, county and city committees have not yet cleansed the state and cooperative apparatus of bourgeois nationalists and other anti-Soviet elements” (doc. No.1.24*).

After these plenums, campaigns for cleansing the cadre would start. All-level party committees took similar decisions and began to execute them. The CK of the LKP(b) formed special CK groups of authorized people who locally checked all employees, mostly office personnel. The Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) commanded the cleansing of the cadre, whereas the Personnel Department of the CK headed by M. Junčas-Kučinskas (doc. No.1.25*) and the Instructor Organizational Division of the CK (headed by D.Shupikov) organized the process itself. At first, due to the scarcity of specialists, the cleansing was slack; therefore, the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) adopted tens of decisions that severely criticized party committees, Heads of ministries, etc. The Bureau decision of 9 March 1945 prepared by M.Suslov, his deputy F.Kovaliov, the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Isachenko, A.Sniečkus, the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) K.Preikšas, M.Gedvilas obligated M.Kučinskas and D.Shupikov “to prepare a specific plan of actions and organize cleansing of the Soviet and economic apparatus of alien and unreliable people, including into the work all divisions of the CK of the LKP(b), also the NKGB, NKVD and the People’s Commissariat of the State Control” (doc. No.1.26*). The plan was prepared (doc. No.1.27**).

On 17 August 1945, the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On the Improvement of Work of the Executive Committees of Rural Districts and their Subdivisions and their Reinforcement with Cadre” that obligated the heads of party and executive committees at county level to take urgent measures and “cleanse the apparatuses of county executive committees and Soviets of the divisions of rural districts of people’s enemies, nationalist-kulak and other anti-Soviet elements” (doc. No.1.28*). On 3 October 1945, a new decision by the Council of People’s Commissars of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP(b) in reference to the Com-

* **Doc. No. 1.21.** The decision of 24 February 1948 by the Council of Ministers of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP (b) *On the Temporary Establishment of the Amount of the Allowances for the Commanding Party and Soviet Personnel.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 6. p. 14–15.

* **Doc. No. 1.22.** An extract from the resolution by the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP (b) on 30 December 1944. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 9. p. 5.

** **Doc. No. 1.23.** An extract from the decision by the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 24 August 1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 12. p. 8.

* **Doc. No. 1.24.** An extract from the decision by the 11th Plenum of the CK of the LKP (b) on 24 November 1946. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 15. p. 5.

* **Doc. No. 1.25.** The letter of 9 November 1944 by the Personnel Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) M. Kučinskas to the Secretaries of County Committees of the LKP(b) in reference to the reliability of the commanding personnel of sovkhoses and machine-and- tractor depots and their suitability to hold the positions. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 81. p. 37.

* **Doc. No. 1.26.** The decision of 9 March 1945 by the Bureau of CK of the LKP(b) *On the Unsatisfactory Work with the Personnel in Executing the Decision by the CK of the VKP(b) On the Drawbacks and Faults in the Party-Political Work of the Party Organization of the Lithuanian SSR.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 49. p. 100–101.

* **Doc. No. 1.27.** The work plan of March 1945 of the Personnel Department of the CK of the LKP(b) in reference to the party-Soviet cadre of Lithuania. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 8. f. 265. p 1.

* **Doc. No. 1.28.** An extract from the decision of 17 August 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Improvement of the Activities of the Executive Committees of Rural Districts and Regions and their Reinforcement by New Cadre.* SLA. stk.1771. inv. 8. f. 92. p. 13.

* **Doc. No. 1.29.** The decision of 3 October 1945 by the Council of People’s Commissars of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP(b) *On Cleansing Commissariats and Central Administrations at the Council of Commissars of the LSSR of Alien and Politically Unreliable Elements in Executing the Decision of the 7th Plenum of the CK of the Lithuanian KP(b).* SLA. stk.1771. inv. 8. f. 112. p. 24–25.

* **Doc. No. 1.30.** The decision of October 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On Executing the Decisions of the 5th and 7th Plenums of the CK of the LKP(b) in Cleansing the Cadre of Alien and Politically Unreliable Elements and Working with Personnel within the System of the Commissariat of Food Industry.* SLA. stk.1771. inv. 8. f. 118. p. 110–113.

* **Doc. No. 1.31.** The report of 4 May 1946 by the Managing Organizer of the CK of the LKP(b) Zolin to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus *On Cleansing the Soviet and Economic Cadre in Tauragė, Pagėgiai and Šilutė Counties.* SLA. stk.1771. inv. 9. f. 241. p. 30.

* **Doc. No. 1.32.** An extract from the report of 25 February 1946 by the Personnel Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) M. Junčas-Kučinskas to the Managing Organizer of the Cadre Administration of the CK of the VKP(b) Romanovich about the work of the CK of the LKP(b) with personnel in 1945. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 8. f. 266. p. 16–18.

missariats and Central Directorates at the Council of People's Commissars of the LSSR also provided for cleansing the apparatus of "alien and politically unreliable elements" (doc. No.1.29*). Later, this came down to concrete commissariats and other bodies of power. For instance, in October 1945, the Bureau considered the issues regarding cleansing of the cadre at the Commissariat of Food Industry (doc. No.1.30*). Secretaries of local party committees or people authorized by the CK supplied information in their reports on the execution of the decisions by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) in counties and rural districts. For instance, on 4 May 1946, the managing organizer of the CK of the LKP(b) Zolin reported that in the county of Tauragė, 86 nomenclature personnel were dismissed and 12 of them were imprisoned (doc. No.1.31*).

On 25 February 1945, in his report to Moscow, M.Kučinskas wrote that the Soviet "apparatus was reinforced not by mostly changing vacant positions, but by dismissing hostile or politically unreliable elements and substituting them by investigated and talented personnel." He pointed out that according to inconclusive data, by 15 October 1945, 6,127 people "have been driven away from the state apparatus", 4,045 of them for political considerations and 757 due to arrests (doc. No.1.32*).

At court it was impossible to defend one's work rights and oneself from political persecution, because judges were also in the nomenclature lists and carried out the will of the local party committee. In 1945, 7,128 employees from various institutions were dismissed; more than 4,000 of them for political considerations; in 1946 – 6,639 and 2,535 people were dismissed respectively¹⁵. "We have recently found out that there are quite a few people that must be isolated", said the Head of the Directorate of Production Cooperation N.Kalugin at the 5th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945. "I have informed State Security bodies of these people, namely, comrade Shcherbakov who has been assigned to us. A month and a half have elapsed, yet no measures have been taken to isolate these people, the right place for whom is prison and not freedom"¹⁶. This speech is typical of communists in command at that time. Lithuanian communists sometimes also complained about this policy. Lithuanians, even those loyal to the Soviet power, were not always trusted. "After the cleansing of ministries, Lithuanians were not appointed to the vacant posts, and to ensure a guarantee, people from other places were invited", said the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR M. Gedvilas at the 11th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1946¹⁷.

According to the data of repressive bodies, 6,267 office personnel were arrested during the entire post-war period (1944-1953), though most of them were arrested during the cleansing of the cadre in 1945-1947, i.e. – 5,190 people (doc. No.1.33*).

Although the Soviet Constitution proclaimed the equality of nations and races, during the years of Stalinism, Lithuanians were the least reliable in Lithuania for the Soviet power, particularly peasantry and the intelligentsia, then Germans and Jews followed. Though attempts were made not to demonstrate that openly, Moscow mostly relied on those that had come from the SSRS and the fanatically disposed Lithuanian communists. The latter were not numerous; therefore, the CK of the LKP(b) requested Moscow to form the power apparatus from commanding functionaries approved by the CK of the VKP(b). For instance, on 6 February 1945, the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) decided to request the CK of the VKP(b) to send 105 employees to Lithuania from the SSRS, because "in the nearest future it is impossible to staff the republican party and Soviet apparatus from the local population" (doc. No.1.34*). From July 1944 to 1 April 1945, Moscow sent 8,482 employees, 6,116 of which came to Lithuania for the first time (doc. No.7.8). (More about it in the section "Russianization"). Certainly, during the whole period of 1944-1953, the authorities tried to attract to their side as many Lithuanians as it was possible from those with little or no education – poor villagers and workers, actually, the degraded elements of the society, and to form a loyal social group of the local population – the nomenclature.

* **Doc. No. 1.33.** A note of 7 May 1953 by the Acting Chief of the 1st Special Division of the MVD of the LSSR Lt. Col. M. Jefimov and the Head of the 2nd Subdivision Maj. M. Vasev on the arrested intelligentsia and office employees in 1944-1953. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 6. f. 161. p. 59.

* **Doc. No. 1.34.** The decision of 6 February 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Formation of the Party and Soviet Cadre of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 35. p. 6.

* **Doc. No. 1.55.** A letter of 31 July 1951 by the Prosecutor of the LSSR G. Bakharov to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 108. f 21. p. 187.

The Party nomenclature maintained close relations with military personnel of the Soviet Army. A.Sniečkus was often invited to observe military exercises, was an intermediary in awarding high-ranking officers, assisted in providing them with accommodation, etc. Communication with military personnel also went on in informal environment – at hunting, in restaurants and cafes. This made the inter-relationship of the Soviet elite of Lithuania – Lithuanians and those that had been sent here – still stronger. For instance, on 30 March 1951, in Kaunas, at the café “Tulpė”, festivities of the officers from Kaunas garrison and the heads of the Party and Executive Committee started after working hours and continued until 2 o'clock in the morning (doc. No. 1.55*).

In fact, at the end of 1946, the process of the formation of the nomenclature in Lithuania, which was based on the decisions of the CK of the VKP(b) and the CK of the LKP(b), was completed. Some changes in the nomenclature during the later years were determined by administrative reforms or political transformations. It became impossible to independently get a job in any state institution or organization without the knowledge of the Communist Party. The CK of the LKP(b) with all its structural divisions controlled the whole distribution and planning of the cadre and their compulsory or voluntary dismissal from work.

1.4. The Activity of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b)

The Political and Organizational Bureaus established at the 7th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (the Bolsheviks) in 1919, became the most important bodies of the political power in the Soviet Union. Later, with the strengthening of tendencies towards centralization, all affairs for ruling the country got in the hands of the Politburo of the CK of the VKP(b) and the republican party bureaus. After the war, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) became the most important party institution of the occupation administration in the LSSR, though in 1944-1947, in reference to the most important political issues, it was substituted by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) headed by M.Suslov and V.Shcherbakov. The latter and other representatives of the CK of the VKP(b) by continually participating in the sittings of the Bureau channelled its work in the direction that suited Moscow.

The CK Bureau of the LKP(b) was not an independent political institution. Its main function was to organize the work so that all political directives (decisions) of the CK of the VKP(b) would be actually implemented. The decisions taken at the sittings of the Bureau served as directives for all party and state bodies of the LSSR. However, the CK of the LKP(b) paid the greatest attention to the work of all party bodies subordinated to it. At nearly all sittings of the Bureau, the results of the activity of a certain party committee were analyzed, controls were set on how the directives of the Bureau should be interpreted. For instance, at the beginning of 1945, party organizations of the LKP(b) of Zarasai county decided to leave “people’s enemies” 5 hectares of land each rather than confiscate all their property. On 16 February 1945, the Bureau cancelled this decision (doc. No.1.35*).

In the spring of 1947, having abolished the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), the political role of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) in further Sovietizing Lithuania and repressing its people, became more significant. Because of that, the composition of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) changed. In 1945, among the 11 members of the Bureau, only 2 had been sent from the SSRS (D.Shupikov and A.Isachenko), whereas in 1949, 5 of 13 Bureau members were people sent by the CK of the VKP(b). They had the actual power: the Minister of State Security (N.Gorlinskij, later – P.Kapralov, P.Kondakov) commanded the fighting against the armed underground and deportations, the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Trofimov (later – A.Aronov) controlled the activity of A.Sniečkus and the general political situation in Lithuania, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR V.Pisarev “was guardian” to M.Gedvilas and superintended economy, the Secretary for the Personnel of the CK of the LKP(b) D.Shupikov headed the policy in reference to the personnel and their Russianization, the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of the

* **Doc. No. 1.35.** The decision of 16 February 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Incorrect Decision by the Party Organization of Zarasai County in Resolving the Issue in Regard to the Farms of People’s Enemies.* SLA. stk.1771. inv. 8.f. 40.p. 92.

city of Vilnius “took care” of life in the capital. Other Russian-speaking persons (N.Gusev, A.Moskvinov, a candidate to the members of the Bureau A.Anushkin) also executed important functions.

The Bureau had many Lithuanian communists with Stalinist views: A.Sniečkus, V.Niunka, K.Preikšas, J.Bartašiūnas (the latter could not speak Lithuanian), F.Bieliauskas, K.Liaudis, A.Raguotis, M.Šumauskas, candidates to the members of the Bureau G.Zimanas, B.Baranauskas and others. J.Paleckis and M.Gedvilas were moderate in their views, though they directly organized repressions and participated in them (J.Paleckis’ participation in the repressions can be explained by the fact that, being a member of the Bureau, he approved of corresponding decisions).

Members of the Bureau were particularly intolerant of those thinking differently. Even allusions to the specific character of social and cultural life or the past (history) of Lithuania were considered by them as manifestations of “bourgeois nationalism”. The greatest political responsibility and the guilt for the consequences of the Soviet occupation, forced Russianization of Lithuania and anti-national and anti-humane actions of the genocide rest with these people (alongside all the authorities of the CK of the VKP(b). Such position of the leaders of the LKP(b) was determined not only by the fanatical belief in Stalin and communism, but also by the fact that they did not see any prospects of the existence of the Lithuanian nation without the guardianship of Russia. Such nihilistic standpoint towards the Lithuanian nation, its independence, statehood, culture and history was characteristic of many post-war Lithuanian communists.

During the post-war period, opinions in the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) sometimes did not coincide. Personal attitude, disagreement with the official party “line” regarding some fundamental issues of life in Lithuania (deportation of the so-called middle-class peasants, employment of Lithuanian specialists, Russianization, destruction of the national culture, persecution of the intelligentsia, forced collectivization, turning Vilnius region into a Polish territory, etc.) were expressed by J.Paleckis and, from 1950, by M.Gedvilas. At the Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1950, A.Sniečkus actually dissociated himself from them: “These people never see the great heroic work of party organizations, but only create the picture of compulsion and violations of justice, particularly in the area of the establishment of collective farms” (bold print by the author – V.T.). It must be pointed out that even A.Sniečkus himself admitted that the Party used force and carried out crimes, i.e. “violence and violations of justice” (doc. No.1.36*).

1.5. The First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) Antanas Sniečkus

Antanas Sniečkus (1903–1974) was a person of the Stalinist epoch, the creator of the Soviet system in Lithuania, the most important soviet collaborationist. Brought up by the Bolshevik Party and having come to believe the ideals of communism, he remained loyal to the traditions of Marxist dogmatism, obedience, intolerance of the opposite opinion throughout the whole of his life. During the entire post-war period, A.Sniečkus was a tool of the political activity of the CK of the VKP(b), a loyal vicegerent of Moscow in Lithuania. It was his name that the forced Sovietization and Russianization of Lithuania, organization of fighting against the national underground, mass deportations of innocent people, imprisonments, persecution of those thinking differently and the Catholic Church, destruction of the national culture are associated with.

During his political (party) career, A.Sniečkus developed qualities typical of a Soviet politician: prudence, loyalty and obedience. Most Kremlin leaders took a liking to A.Sniečkus, because he did not seek higher party posts in Moscow, never posed any revisionist questions, consistently implemented any directives by the party command, notwithstanding their political trend, was modest and friendly. His diligence, qualities of an administrator, strong-willed character, strictness, perfect memory and determination also helped him persevere in power for many years. Having good political awareness, he always managed to change his orientation in time and channel events in the direction favourable for himself. This was confirmed by the Stalinist period in Lithuania. When the threat to the physical existence of the Lithuanian nation occurred, A.Sniečkus did not only oppose this process, but on the contrary, supported and even encouraged genocide actions executed by party and repressive bodies, always backed the repression policy towards “people’s enemies” or “socially alien”

* **Doc. No. 1.36.** An extract from the speech by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus at the 8th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 16 November 1950. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 90. f. 21. p. 61.

persons. His reports at party conferences and his personal signatures sanctioning the practice of repression policy towards various people or social groups testify to that. A.Sniečkus encouraged public court trials of partisans. A.Sniečkus was awarded 6 orders for the resolute and consistent implementation of the political policy of the VKP(b) in Lithuania in 1944-1953.

After the demise of Stalin, taking into consideration the political conjuncture, A.Sniečkus began to change; he even started to pay heed, with certain reservations, to the economic, social and cultural interests of Lithuania; however, he was always faithful to the traditions of Bolshevism. Throughout the whole period, he was merciless to the national underground, dissidents or those thinking differently. "Thanks" to him, most deportees were released from the places of their deportation at the latest time (1958) and could not return to the Motherland for a long time or did not at all. To the end of his life he remained loyal to Moscow, forbade any political initiatives, suppressed public attitudes which were hostile to the ruling regime. Following the directives of the VKP(b)-SSKP and giving timely response to the changing situation in the Soviet Union, A.Sniečkus and his entourage had always attempted to control political processes. This helped him remain the head of the administration of the LSSR for a long period (1940-1974).

1.6. The Relationship between the LKP(b) and the Repressive Bodies

One of the most important pillars of the Soviet regime in the Soviet Union was not the Army or the system of justice, but the repressive bodies (the NKVD-MVD, the NKVD-MGB, the Prosecutor's Office and special courts). Their ruling and party leadership constituted a very important condition for the political existence of the communist regime or the Communist Party. In the post-war Lithuania, by executing the mission of the Political Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) and central repressive agencies of the SSRS these bodies, acquired a great political influence, because the existence of the Soviet power and the Communist Party in Lithuania actually depended on their activity, that is, on their daily fighting against the resistance of the Lithuanian nation. Taking this into consideration, the authorities of the LSSR took care of the living conditions of the leading employees of repressive bodies, provided them with accommodation and granted them other nomenclature privileges. If problems arose, the CK of the LKP(b) and personally A.Sniečkus, became the last institution in Lithuania to settle the issues of material support. For instance, on 29 September 1945, Gen. I.Tkachenko requested A.Sniečkus to mediate in providing apartments for 105 NKVD and 80 NKGB employees and officers. I.Tkachenko warned that these people would be returned to the SSRS unless the request was granted: "You know what consequences this might have on our Commissariats..." (doc. No. 1. 37*).

As in the whole Stalinist SSRS, repressive bodies were formally (in the broad sense) subordinate to the party – the VKP(b). In Lithuania, the CK of the LKP(b) approved the nomenclature of the leading personnel; for instance, on 1 November 1950, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) approved 42 heads of divisions and their deputies for the MGB of the LSSR and 24 for the MVD of the LSSR (doc. No. 1.18. p. 35, 37); it also imposed party penalties on some officials, alongside their superiors discussed plans of the deportation of the Lithuanian population, fighting against the armed underground and other actions, decisions and directives. A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas and second secretaries of the CK of the LKP(b) were personally informed (top secretly) of the plans and results of their activity; however, the LKP(b) actually did not command these bodies administratively. The NKVD (MVD) of the LSSR and the NKVD (MGB) of the LSSR belonged directly to the central agencies of the SSRS in Moscow and, in 1944-1947, also to the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b). Some archival documents indicate that the authorities of the LKP(b) attempted to directly command the heads of repressive bodies (they were members of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) or the CK of the LKP(b). For instance, in January 1946, the CK Bureau decided to send the Deputy Commissar of the NKVD of the LSSR Gen. P.Kapralov to the county of Marijampolė in order to suppress the underground resistance (doc. No. 1.38*). However, the LKP(b) actually had no political power to subject the whole repressive apparatus to itself. Though the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted many documents of antipartisan nature, its su-

* **Doc. No. 1.37.** The letter of 29 September 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Lt. Gen. I. Tkachenko to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus in reference to providing accommodation for the personnel and officers of the NKVD-NKGB in Vilnius. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 179. p. 113.*

pervision of repressive bodies was more of party-ideological character. Decisions by the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) and resolutions by the plenums of CK of the LKP(b) obligated repressive bodies to execute common policy towards reinforcing the Soviet regime and state terror, but the means for carrying that out were beyond the competence of the CK of the LKP(b). In fact, the LKP(b) could not control their activity. Most often, military operations against partisans would be planned, coordinated and carried out only with the approval of the central agencies in Moscow.

The Deputy Minister of the MVD of the LSSR L. Martavičius spoke about the autonomy of these bodies in Lithuania at the 6th Plenum of the CK of the LKP in 1953: “Until the present time, according to the standing regulation, the MVD bodies (in 1953, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and State Security were combined into one – MVD) have always accounted for their operational work directly to the MVD of the SSRS, and there has been no practice requiring to coordinate all documents sent to Moscow with party bodies of the Lithuanian SSR”. (doc. No. 1. 39*).

Similar relations found expression between local party and repressive bodies. For instance, on 6 December 1948, the LKP(b) Committee of Kėdainiai county admitted that county party organizations did not control county security bodies while most of their heads “have adopted criminal anti-party attitude, [...] the heads of the divisions of rural districts of the MGB have alienated themselves from the Party organization and consider themselves independent of the Party Committees of rural districts and their supervision” (doc. No. 1. 40*).

At the 15th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947, the First Secretary of Kretinga County Committee of the LKP(b) V. Maksimavičius demanded to take legal actions against the Head of the Subdivision of the MGB in Mosėdis county Rudakov and several exterminators for their criminal activity (beating of people, plundering and drinking). According to V. Maksimavičius, their activity was “much worse than banditism”. When at the sitting of the County Bureau the issue arose whether to inform all party organizations of Rudakov’s conduct, the Head of the MGB division tried to defend his subordinate: “You know, you cannot do that because it compromises MGB bodies” (doc. No. 1. 60*). In 1945-1946, the relations between party committees and NKVD divisions in Alytus and Marijampolė counties were particularly strained.

In the Soviet political system, the Communist Party as the leading political power, was beyond criticism. However, based on the experience of Lithuania, its lower subdivisions in the republic, both the authorities of the LKP(b) and its ordinary members, could be critically assessed by the State Security subordinated to Moscow.

* **Doc. No. 1.38.** The decision of 20 February 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the MGB and the MVD Command in the County of Marijampolė in the Liquidation of the Bourgeois-Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 5. p. 12.

* **Doc. No. 1.39.** An extract from the speech by the Deputy Minister of the MVD of the LSSR L. Martavičius at the July Plenum of 1953 of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131. f. 189. p. 115.

* **Doc. No. 1.40.** The decision of 6 December 1948 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) of Kėdainiai County *On the Work of the Divisions of the MGB in Counties and Rural Districts in Fighting against Banditism in the County of Kėdainiai*. SLA. stk. 749. inv. 749-8. f. 1. p. 92–93.

* **Doc. No. 1.60.** An extract from the speech by the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Kretinga county V. Maksimavičius at the 15th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 27 November 1947. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 10. f. 36. p. 59.

* **Doc. No. 1.41.** The report of 12 May 1947 by the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD troops of the Lithuanian border region Lt. Col. Tulskij to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the crimes committed by military personnel. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 10. f. 293. p. 43.

* **Doc. No. 1.42.** Extracts from the report of 17 November 1945 by the Acting Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. D. Jefimov to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov, the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR M. Gedvilas and the Secretariat of the NKVD of the LSSR *On the Drawbacks in Political Mass Activities and Contamination of Soviet and Economic Organizations by Politically Unreliable Elements in the Counties of Marijampolė, Vilkaviškis, Šakiai and Lazdijai*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 23. p. 142–147.

* **Doc. No. 1.43.** The special report of 27 January 1945 by the Commissar of the NKVD of the LSSR A. Guzevičius to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov *On Illegal Actions of the Commanding Personnel of the Party and Executive Committees of the LKP(b) in Some Counties*. SLA. .stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 12. p. 40.

During the post-war period, there was constant intensive polemics between the LKP(b) and the NKVD-NKGB-MGB in reference to methods and means used to Sovietize Lithuania and break the resistance. These institutions used to constantly exchange letters of criticism in which party and security members accused each other of “violations of the socialist or revolutionary law”, concessions to “people’s enemies”, drinking, plundering, killings, etc. For instance, on 16 November 1945, the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR D. Jefimov in his letter to M. Suslov, A. Sniečkus and M. Gedvilas pointed out that party–Soviet organizations in Panevėžys and Biržai counties violated “the revolutionary law” (doc. No. 1.5). On 17 November 1945, D. Jefimov criticized the authorities of the local party-Soviet administration of Vilkaviškis, Šakiai and Lazdijai counties, on 21 November– the heads of Vilnius, Alytus and Trakai counties, on 29 November – those of Klaipėda, Kretinga, Tauragė, Pagėgiai.¹⁸ “The facts indicate”, wrote D. Jefimov, “that political work with the major part of the population is not carried out ...” Some Soviet and party personnel “keep constantly drinking, plundering and behaving indecently (“tvoriat različnyje besčinstva”), thus disrupting the authority of party-Soviet bodies” (doc. No. 1.42*). Military prosecutors were dissatisfied with the work of party organizations, too (doc. No. 1.41*).

State Security personnel of some counties refused to participate in repressions organized by communists or simply disapproved of them. In January 1945, in the county of Šakiai, under the direction of local authorities, the property not only of the arrested persons, but also of those in freedom was confiscated. People were told to leave their homes in 24 hours. The personnel of the NKGB division of Utena county refused to participate in the commissions for confiscation of property. The Party Committee accused State Security personnel of being “spineless and conciliatory”(doc. No.1.43*).

Commanders of repressive bodies and heads of lower subdivisions often simply openly ignored party committees, did not always share the operational information about the underground with communists or, for security reasons, concealed plans about the actions under way and behaved insolently. Acknowledging only the authority of the Kremlin leaders, the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania I. Tkachenko was particularly insolent with the local party members (doc. No. 1.44*). Some talk spread among State Security personnel that one of the reasons of the prolonged armed fighting against the underground was that the authorities of the LKP were rather tolerant towards “nationalists”, and some Lithuanian communists themselves shared nationalistic tendencies, for example, J. Paleckis and the apparatus personnel of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR (doc. No. 1.45*).

During the first post-war years, Moscow was not completely satisfied with LKP(b) members of the Lithuanian nationality. Though there were no cases of treason, with the exception of J. Vaišnoras’ contacts with his partisan brother, Lithuanians did not yet demonstrate the type of obedience that was expected by the communists sent to Lithuania, local representatives of the NKVD-NKGB as well as the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) headed by M. Suslov. There also lingered a suspicion that Lithuanian communists at lower levels of the LKP(b), particularly those that had stayed in Lithuania during the years of the German occupation (by 1950, 1,400 such persons were disclosed)¹⁹, were politically unreliable. Though the reliability of the members of the Communist Party had to be the concern of the party itself, the State Security took this over. On July 1945, following the order by the Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the SSRS B. Kobulov, the Head of Utena Operational Sector of the NKVD-NKGB of the LSSR P. Kapralov commanded the heads of the divisions of the NKVD-NKGB subordinate to him in Utena, Ukmergė, Švenčionys and Zarasai to urgently submit, via messengers and not later than by the evening of 19 July 1945, material on “the contamination with anti-Soviet and other politically unreliable personnel” of party, Soviet and various other institutions and orga-

* **Doc. No. 1.44.** The complaint of 23 December 1944 by the Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Vilnius County N. Fedorenko to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov *On the Incorrect Actions of the Commissar of State Security of the NKVD Comrade Tkachenko*. SLA. stk. 425. inv. 425. f. 18. p. 14.

* **Doc. No. 1.45.** The special report of 27 November 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus *On the Compromising Information Regarding the Employees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR Svičiulis and Veržbavičius*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 62. p. 133.

* **Doc. No. 1.46.** An urgent report of July 1945 by the Head of the Operations Department of Utena of the NKVD-NKGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the Heads of the Divisions of the Counties of Utena, Ukmergė, Švenčionys and Zarasai in regard to the contamination of party, Soviet and other organizations by anti-Soviet elements. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 18. f. 39. p. 75.

nizations in counties and rural districts (doc. No. 1.46*). Such instructions had to be sent to the heads of other operational sectors. B.Kobulov was also against the arming of party-Soviet activists. In 1945, at the August Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) he said: “As to the arming of Soviet-party activists in parts of rural districts, I think, this matter should not be given a wide scope now [...] You yourselves are witnesses to the disclosure of traitors in some lowest sections of activists. We cannot give arms to traitors”. A.Sniečkus was of the opposite opinion: “Such attitude should be rejected”.²⁰ Later, he managed to arm “the activists”.

Certainly, the relations between the LKP(b) and the repressive bodies should not overestimated . They, commanded from Moscow, did the same work disastrous to the Lithuanian nation. Disagreements between them would arise as to who was superior and due to personal ambitions (e.g. the relations between A.Sniečkus and the MGB leaders D.jefimov, P.Kapralov, I.Tkachenko were rather poor).

Throughout the post-war period, the LKP(b) strove to directly lead the destruction of the armed underground and subject repressive bodies (particularly the Ministry of State Security) to its own will. In 1945, at the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), A.Sniečkus called attention to the fact that party organizations did not lead the suppression of the resistance, but performed only “political mass” work. In his opinion, county party organizations had themselves to organize and operationally lead fighting against “bourgeois nationalists”. He also emphasized that many party organizations did not participate in the deportations of partisan families.²¹ The CK Bureau of the LKP(b) and county committees adopted quite a few decisions that criticized the work of repressive bodies mostly because of gross violations of “socialist justice” (arrests of unarmed innocent people, killings, plundering, drinking, etc.) and keeping aloof from actively fighting with partisans. But the greatest indignation was caused by the fact that State Security personnel refused to obey the party. A.Sniečkus and M.Suslov used to get complaints from various people, including communists themselves, about the unbridled behaviour of NKVD or NKGB personnel, for instance, in the county of Tauragė (doc. No. 1.47*). Such documents abound. Besides, in the Stalinist years, State Security personnel could arrest people that displeased them without the knowledge of local party committees. Even A.Sniečkus received reports stating that one or another well-known person in Lithuania was already under interrogation in the basements of the MGB.

In 1946, at the 11th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), A.Sniečkus severely criticized the fighting of the repressive bodies against the underground. He claimed that the MVD and the MGB operated slowly and ineffectively, their personnel lacked discipline. A.Sniečkus was not afraid to accuse them of cowardice, emphasized the absence of “planned offensive fighting”, stated that they resorted to defence and fight “only after terrorist acts.”²² On 10 January 1947, at the 12th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), A.Sniečkus pointed out that some talk was spreading within the system of these bodies that Lithuanians did not support their fighting against partisans. For instance, the Head of the MVD division of Kaunas county Col. M.Galickij let this information slip. “It is a very harmful theory”, said A.Sniečkus.²³ (In September 1947, M.Galickij was sent out from Lithuania – V.T.). On 24 January 1950, at the 6th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), A.Sniečkus openly criticized the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P.Kapralov for “violations of the Soviet justice” and pointed out that the Communist Party commanded everything: “MGB bodies must account to the party bodies for each violation of the Soviet justice the way a party member, a Soviet citizen, accounts to corresponding bodies for violations of Soviet justice. There should be no concessions here” ²⁴. The speech is not characteristic of that time. Attempts were made not to speak about the role of the party in relations with the authorities of the State Security.

In fact, in initiating and executing repressions in Lithuania there existed political competition between the LKP(b) and the State Security.

The communist regime was immoral because not only ordinary citizens, but also friendly high-ranking officials in power – ideological communists, collaborationists – were secretly spied upon. Compromising material about them was secretly collected, cases were forged and the information available was used against them when the necessity arose. The main “evidence” was their former membership of “bourgeois” parties (People’s, Social-Democrats) or public organizations (the Riflemen’s Union, Sports associations, etc.), their

* **Doc. No. 1.47.** The decision of 28 June 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Facts of the Violations of Revolutionary Justice in the County of Tauragė*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 78.

relatives' contacts with the underground, prior living in "kulak" farmsteads, critical evaluation of the policy of Russianization and Soviet reality in Lithuania, etc.

According to contemporaries of A.Sniečkus (A.Štromas²⁵ and others), at the beginning of the 60s, he and his entourage faced the threat of losing power – a new cleaning campaign was under way in Lithuania. Archival documents testify to that. The attention of State Security personnel was focused on the highest officials of the administration of the LSSR, even though they had undergone strict procedures of the approval of the nomenclature. Moscow did not oppose this activity of the MGB of the Lithuanian SSR.

On 28 July 1950, the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P.Kapralov sent the secret letter to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Trofimov (supposedly, A.Sniečkus was on holiday) "On the Contamination of the Commanding Personnel of the Ministries and the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR", which included a list of 32 politically unreliable persons. Distrust for political unreliability was entered against 5 ministers, 7 deputy ministers and others. These people included A.Sniečkus' associates, ideological communists (A.Drobnyš, M.Meškauskienė, J.Blieka, A.Knyva, also the heads of scientific institutions J.Balčikonis, K.Daukšas, V.Girdzijauskas and others). "I think it expedient to discuss each person in regard to his suitability to fill in this or that position", wrote P.Kapralov. (doc. No. 1.48*).

On 24 October 1950, P.kapralov sent a list of 36 unreliable people from the personnel of educational institutions (school directors, etc.) of Vilnius and Klaipėda counties to the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) V.Niunka.²⁶ In December 1950, the Director of the Republican Pedagogical Office Albinas Iešmanta was arrested "for the activities of sabotage" (doc. No. 1.49).^{*} In November 1950, A.kapralov sent a report to Moscow that, based on the information by the MGB of the LSSR, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) dismissed from the position and expelled from the party the Minister of Trade of the LSSR Adolfas Ivaškevičius (allegedly for being "a member of the pro-fascist Riflemen's Union") (doc. No. 1.50*). On 9 January 1951, political distrust was entered against the Minister of Justice Jurgis Blieka²⁷ (doc. No. 1.51*), and on February 17 – against the former Minister of Education (1943-1948) and to the then Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR Juozas Žiugžda.²⁸ He was accused of giving instructions to allot less time to teaching the Russian language at schools in Lithuania than in other republics (doc. No. 1.52*). In February 1951, P.Kapralov reported to Moscow on the planned arrest of the Deputy Minister of Building of the LSSR Stanislovas Strielčiūnas (later he was arrested – V.T.) because he "has nationalistic attitude, slanders the Russian nation, collectivization", etc. (doc. No. 1.53*). On 29 October 1951, political distrust cast its shadow on the poets Eduardas Mieželaitis, Kostas Kubilinskas (a traitor of partisans) and the writer Aleksas Baltrūnas. P.

**** Doc. No. 1.48.** The special report of 28 July 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov *On the Contamination of the Commanding Personnel of the Ministries and the Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 62.p. 99-115.

Doc. No. 1.49. A special report of 6 February 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov in regard to the arrest of the Director of the Republican Pedagogical Office A. Iešmanta. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 62.p. 233.

*** Doc. No. 1.50.** A report of 21 November 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P. Kapralov to the Minister of the MGB of the SSRS V. Abakumov in regard to the Minister of Trade of the LSSR A. Ivaškevičius. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 99. p. 117.

*** Doc. No. 1.51.** The special report of 9 January 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus *On the Minister of Justice of the Lithuanian SSR J. Blieka*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv.10. f. 62. p. 158-160.

*** Doc. No. 1.52.** A special report of 6 February 1950 by the Deputy Minister of the MGB of the LSSR A. Leonov to the Head of the 5th Directorate of the MGB Col. A. Volkov in regard to the political distrust concerning the Vice-President of the Academy of Science of the LSSR J. Žiugžda. SLA. stk. K-1. Inv. 10. f. 100. p. 235-237.

*** Doc. No. 1.53.** A special report of 6 February 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P. Kapralov to the Head of the 5th Directorate of the MGB Col. A. Volkov in regard to the Deputy Minister of Building of the LSSR S. Strielčiūnas. SLA. stk. K-1. inv.10. f. 100. p. 188-190.

*** Doc. No. 1.54.** A special report of 29 October 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus in regard to the political distrust concerning E. Mieželaitis, K. Kubilinskas and A. Baltrūnas. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 135. p. 92-93.

Kapralov recommended that A.Sniečkus temporarily forbid them from going on a creative trip to Moscow (doc. No. 1.54*).

In April 1952, P.Kapralov (probably, V.Abakumov's protégé) was demoted and transferred to the MGB Directorate in Primorje (the Far East of Russia). In 1950-1951, in the Soviet union the preparation for the cleansing of the Communist party and the leading personnel of the State Security was going on, while in some places it was already being carried out (cases on the repression of the heads of the MGB of the SSRS, party members of Leningrad, Georgia). Thus, there is no reason to state that the relations between the LKP(b) and the MGB were good, although the work of the heads of repressive bodies in fighting against the resistance was very favourably estimated by the authorities of the LKP. On 27 October 1956, A.Sniečkus wrote to the Minister of the MVD of the SSRS I.Serov about P.Kapralov: "Regardless of some drawbacks in the earlier work of comrade kapralov, he has deserved more consideration and respect for his activity in Lithuania".²⁹

Gen. Piotr Kondakov became the new Minister of the MGB of the LSSR. In fact, he completely suppressed the partisan war, continued the policy of political vigilance, though he was not a strong supporter of drastic measures. Probably, the last of the high officials of the administration of the LSSR to get into the focus of the MGB attention was the Manager of the affairs of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR Danielius Petryla. On 10 April 1953, the Minister of the MGB-MVD of the LSSR P.Kondakov informed A.Sniečkus that after the war the suspected person, a former "member of Plečkaitis' group", and M.Gregorauskas were adversely disposed towards the VKP(b) and discontented with the policy pursued by the Soviet power in Lithuania.³⁰

Besides, A.Sniečkus, too, was interested in the political reliability of his subordinates and famous people of Lithuania. On 5 January 1953, he asked P.Kondakov for information on the former socialdemocrats academicians Antanas Purėnas, Vytautas Girdzijauskas, Juozas Žiugžda, dr. Dzidas Budrys, Matas Sabakonis and Jonas Sabaliauskas. P.Kondakov replied that the academicians were "nationalistically disposed" and J.Sabaliauskas and D.Budrys "now are secret collaborators" (doc. No. 1.57 p. 141*).

In June 1947, 342 Lithuanians worked in the MGB of the LSSR (doc. No. 1.41.A.)* The number of Lithuanians in repressive bodies was particularly small because they were not trusted. In 1948, there were only 36 Lithuanians (7.7 per cent) from 456 leading personnel of the Internal Affairs and State Security institutions of the LSSR belonging to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b). A particularly small number of the local population belonged to the lowest level: in 1948, from 299 heads of the divisions of rural districts, only 18 were Lithuanians.³¹ At the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 24 August 1945, B.Kobulov explained to the communists of Lithuania that Lithuanians could not work in State Security bodies because they were not ready for that.³² In general, the personnel of repressive bodies looked down on local communists, considered them to be inexperienced "creators of socialism", infected with "bourgeois nationalism", etc. In 1944-1953, about 10,000 Russianspeaking employees were sent to the MVD-MGB of the LSSR.³³

The authorities of the LKP(b) made a lot of effort to cause enmity among the population of Lithuania. For political purposes, they made attempts to create an impression of "class struggle" and tried to demonstrate that political and armed confrontation was going on among the Lithuanian population itself. During the entire post-war period, A.Sniečkus urged Moscow to form different Lithuanian armed and repressive bodies, make the apparatus of the Internal Affairs and State Security more Lithuanian. Well-armed and mechanized military units were planned to be formed for fighting against partisans. Groups of exterminators ("people's defenders") were established, party-Soviet activists were armed, but nothing else was done. The CK of the VKP(b) did not allow to form Lithuanian repressive military units. Moreover, the Lithuanian 16th and 50th Rifle Divisions were disbanded. This problem clearly revealed the actual face of the occupation regime and the hopeless efforts of local collaborationists to represent the nation. The occupants did not trust the local population (because they could see the obvious and strong resistance), whereas the latter did not support the

* **Doc. No. 1.57.** A note of 24 March 1953 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P. Kondakov personally to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in regard to the persons on whom the MGB has compromising information. SLA. stk. K-1. inv.10. f. 151. p. 135-141.

Dok. No. 1.41.A. The report of 20 June 1947 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR D. Jefimov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the number of Lithuanians in the Ministry of State Security of the LSSR. SLA. stk.1771. inv.10. f.279. P.30.

occupation administration. Moscow was seeking to resolve the problem of the armed resistance only by means of military force in conjunction with military-repressive bodies, leaving loyal to them Lithuanians only the function of making the communist regime legitimate.

1.7. Collaboration

In the broad sense, collaborationists are people who help invaders occupy a country and establish and maintain their power in it. Collaboration can be different – with a weapon in hand or with the help of a writer's quill or a painter's brush.³⁴ But in the narrower sense, these are people who have been authorized by the occupation power. Traditionally, citizens of a former independent state who, mostly for their political and ideological beliefs have betrayed their Motherland and its independence and started voluntary cooperation with the invaders, are considered to be collaborationists. Thus, a collaborationist is an aide to invaders, a traitor of his Motherland, an official, functionary or employee of the occupation or puppet power (administration), who executes its instructions (policy) and enforces the citizens of his country (his countrymen) to obey the will of the invaders. Some collaborationists who held leading posts had the administrative authorization and the right to sign documents. Others, with the status of an official (e. g. exterminators, militiamen), were empowered to coerce people (also, by applying physical force) into carrying out the instructions of their superiors.

When the second Soviet occupation began, collaboration did not involve as many people as before the war. Well remembering the repressions of 1940-1941, people were shocked by the state terror policy executed by the Soviet Union during the first post-war years. Educated people, mainly the intelligentsia, avoided cooperation with occupation authorities and hoped for the support from the West. Aides to the Soviet power were mainly those with leftist views, who, as early as 1940, contributed to the establishment of the communist regime and left for Russia during the war. Such famous and talented people in Lithuania were not numerous; they were, in most cases, writers, scientists and other intellectuals: petras cvirka, Antanas Venclova, Kostas Korsakas, Juozas Žiugžda, Juozas Baltušis, Teofilis Tilvytis, Juozas Jurginis, etc. The majority of intellectuals kept silent and did not oppose the authorities. The Communist Party called them “the silent ones”. They were under constant political pressure. It was not by accident that the spearhead of the Stalinist political repressions was, in the first place, directed towards educated people and farmers who were not then under control (before the collectivization). Forming its command apparatus from “the working people”, the communist authorities tried to gain the support of that part of the society that had poor education – workers, less well-off farmers, the poor, those emaciated by the war and, in general, less reasonable people of Lithuania.

In central and local power bodies of the occupation administration (with the exception of the repressive ones), in many cases, the leading nomenclature positions were held not by invaders, but former citizens of Lithuania, mainly communists who, because of their ideological beliefs, political interests, career or egotistic purposes supported the Soviet Union. Lithuanian collaborationists were against the independent state of Lithuania and for the united and indivisible Soviet Union. In the political sense, they did not see the future of Lithuania without its everlasting ties with Russia. The First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (the Council of Ministers) of the LSSR M.Gedvilas, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR J.paleckis, the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR A.Guzevičius, the secretaries of the Ck of the LKP(b) K.Niunka, K.Preikšas and many others became the leading executors of political and ideological directives from Moscow and organizers of repressions. They defended not the interests of Lithuania, but those of the SSRS, i.e. of the invaders; therefore, their activity can be considered as cooperation, assistance or collaborationism.

In 1944-1953, the leaders of the LKP(b) signed documents which obligated their subordinates to take repressions against those fighting for the freedom of the nation and thinking differently, those belonging to “socially hostile layers” – “the kulaks”, the clergy, former politicians, heads of the state and employees of the independent Lithuania. For example, A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas, K.Preikšas signed documents obligating their subordinates to organize deportations of the population and confiscate their property. Soviet collaborationists did not oppose Russianization and were seeking to destroy everything that reminded them of the independent Lithuania. For propaganda purposes, the LKP(b) used to declare that they were the true patriots of Lithuania, i.e. their socialist Motherland, and their fighting against “bandits” and “bourgeois nationalists” was fair. Howe-

ver, not only high-ranking, but also lower officials collaborated. For example, in the autumn of 1944, heads of many party and executive committees of counties and rural districts addressed the CK of the LKP(b) requesting to deport partisan families and confiscate their property.³⁵ These collaborationists were well aware of the life of concrete people, their moods and attitudes. Not all of them, though quite a few, prepared lists of people to be deported, aided in faster liquidating the resistance, executed spiritual and economic terror. Exterminators, armed party and Soviet activists, personnel of repressive bodies and others who directly contributed to the execution of crimes against the nation and humanity carried out by the Communist Party should be attributed to collaborationists. At the time of the total national resistance and armed fighting, it was clear who was who. Because of their collaboration with the occupation authorities, not only high-ranking Lithuanian leaders of the power bodies of the LSSR, but also ordinary communists, exterminators, various officials (including non-party people) were condemned by the nation and killed by partisans. Yet, the main legal, political and moral responsibility for the collaborationism falls to the highest officials of the Soviet administration who, in direct cooperation with the authorities of the invaders in Moscow and their vicegerents in Lithuania, provided specific ways for the implementation of their instructions and directives.

The armed resistance was broken down. People lost their hope to receive help from the West. Therefore, under the conditions of the long-lasting Soviet occupation, the collaborationism was no more openly condemned. After the demise of Stalin, with the mitigation of the political regime, the number of Lithuanians tending to adjust to the Soviet regime, for career and pragmatic rather than for reasons ideological, started increasing in the bodies of the Soviet power and the Communist party. The underground continued existing even after 1953, dissidents appeared; however, with the lessening of terror, two options emerged: to choose between death (imprisonment) and conformism (adjustment). Very few chose death; conformism prevailed.³⁶

Under the conditions of the long-lasting Soviet occupation, the majority of the population had to deal with the institutions of the occupation power and work in them, fulfill their professional duties (teachers, doctors, workers, collective-farmers, etc.). Confrontation with the authorities in the totalitarian state meant to be a martyr, and only few were resolute enough to choose this way. The main Lithuanian collaborationists may be considered those who were authorized by the power to administer the population of Lithuania and were politically responsible for the execution of kremlin directives and who, by their actions, made harm to the whole Lithuania, Lithuanian nation and concrete persons. They were members of the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, the heads of politically important agencies – the KGB, the Glavlit, the Council of the Affairs of Religious Cults, the Prosecutor's Office, the Supreme Court – and some other officials.

2. The Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b)*

The Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VPK(b), a political body of the SSRS in Lithuania, was the highest institution of the Soviet occupation administration (1944-1947)**. It was established by the decision of the CK of the VKP(b) on 11 November 1944; the first sitting took place on 21 December the same year (doc.No. 2.1*). The position of the Chairman of the Bureau was taken by M.Suslov (1944-1946) and V.Shcherbakov (1946-1947). The main members were the Commissars of the State Security – the Commissioners of the

* **Literature and Sources page 46.**

****Note.** Extracts from the copies of the documents of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) translated into Lithuanian and included into the scientific article by the historian Henrikas Šadžius "The Activity of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) in Organizing the Suppression of the National Resistance" // *The Annals of the History of Lithuania in 1997*, Vilnius, 1988.

* **Doc. No. 2.1.** The 1st protocol of the meeting of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) of 21 December 1944. The Storage and Research Center of the Documents of the Newest History of Russia (further – SRCNHR). stk. 597. inv. 1. f. 1. p. 1-5.

* **Doc. No. 2.2.** An extract from the speech by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov at the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 30 December 1944. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 11. p. 194-195.

* **Doc. No. 2.3.** An extract from the speech by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov delivered at the meeting of the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) on 6 July 1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 79. p.

* **Doc. No. 2.4.** The list of the participants of the 8th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 6 December 1945. The Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) was represented by 11 persons. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 20. p. 1.

NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in the Lithuanian SSR Gen. I.Tkachenko and Gen. D.Radionov (responsible for the activity of the repressive bodies), as well as F.Kovaliov and V.Pisarev (responsible for economy). The Bureau had its own Secretariat and other bodies. A.Chernyshov, F.Budagovskij, V.Sukhinin, S.Ogurcov, E.Teterev, S.Kochetkov, V.Potapov, E.Belokrinkin, N.Kopitov, J.Brazul, I.Shvedov and others were responsible for specific activity areas. From local collaborationists, the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the LSSR M.Gedvilas, were included in the Bureau as permanent members. Through these persons, the Bureau could directly command and control the administration of the LSSR. Similar bureaus were established in Estonia, Latvia and Moldavia, that is, the countries which were occupied and annexed by the SSRS in 1940.

The main objectives of the Bureau were to Sovietize Lithuania as soon as possible, integrate it into the SSRS, establish the communist regime here, break down the resistance of the population of Lithuania to the occupation and implement the Stalinist policy of the cadre. On 30 December 1944, at the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) M.Suslov explained that such bureaus "were being established in all young Soviet republics – in the Central Asia, the Caucasus", and one of the most important aims of this policy was "to develop local national cadre". Since there were practically no cadre, according to M.Suslov, "the sending of a certain number of cadre from other Soviet republics is the demonstration of brotherly support for the young Soviet republic of Lithuania" (doc.No. 2.2.*).

The actual political power was concentrated in the hands of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b). Without its knowledge or preliminary approbation, not a single institution of the occupation administration in Lithuania could function independently. Members of the Bureau participated in the sittings of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) (doc.No. 2.3*), plenums of the CK of the LKP(b) (doc.No. 2.4*) and the Council of People's Commissars (the Council of Ministers) of the LSSR, where thoughts stated by them were, in fact, directives. The Bureau was subordinate and responsible only to the CK of the VKP(b). Actually, it had unlimited authority, interfered in all spheres of life, even in small day-by-day matters (e.g. in 1945, the Bureau suspended the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the LSSR on the distribution of salt to the population of Lithuania)¹, it could critically assess the work of the LKP(b) leaders. For instance, M.Suslov publicly demonstrated his power over A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas and J.Paleckis (doc.No. 2.5*). Particularly active was a typical Stalinist of that time Gen. I.Tkachenko, in whose opinion, Sovietization of Lithuania was too slow. Not only the underground, but also the passive and moderate behaviour of Lithuanian communists with "class enemies" hindered that. He continually demanded to reinforce political vigilance. Even the slightest kindred relations of Lithuanian officials with "hostile elements" or deviations from official regulations made him greatly suspicious. For instance, on 12 November 1945, he reported to A.Sniečkus on the politically improper speech delivered by the representative of the CK of the LKP(b) V.Girdžius in Biržai (doc.No. 2.6*). Examples of such activity by the Bureau abound.

The Chairman of the CK of the VKP(b) for Lithuania M.Suslov came here in December 1944. In fact, he became the administrator of the LSSR. Heads of the institutions of Soviet power addressed their letters on important issues not to A.Sniečkus, but to M.Suslov or V.Shcherbakov, or A.Sniečkus' name stood second on the documents.

Under the command of M.Suslov, the first post-war deportations, killings of partisans and defenceless people and other repression actions took place. Before each major political campaign or repression action organized by the Communist Party, apart from Bureau sittings, he would organize the so-called "conferences at the Chairman,s of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b)", thus emphasizing his leading role. As a politician, M.Suslov was insidious but cautious, acted consistently and resolutely. Nursing Bolshevik beliefs, he

* **Doc. No. 2.5.** An extract from the speech by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov at the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 24 August 1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv.8. f. 14. p. 185.

* **Doc. No. 2.6.** A letter of 12 November 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Lt. Gen. I. Tkachenko to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus in reference to the politically incorrect report by Maj. V. Girdžius. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 179. p. 135.

* **Doc. No. 2.7.** An extract from the materials of the August Plenum of 1945 of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 14. p. 58–59, 185.

fought with those thinking differently in all ways, was a supporter of violence and repression, did not acknowledge compromises. In public life, he was official, strict, but correct.

The Bureau was the main initiator in preparing political documents of that time, such as “Addressing the Lithuanian Nation” (10 February 1945), “We will Uproot Lithuanian-german Nationalists, the Most Vicious Enemies of the Lithuanian Nation” (25 May 1945) and others. M.Suslov himself edited the drafts of these documents and visaed them; their contents and forms of their presentation to the public used to be discussed at the sittings of the Bureau.

M.Suslov did not always trust local communists, even people loyal to the Soviet regime, organized cleansings of the Lithuanian cadre and was one of the most active initiators of Russianization of Lithuania. On 27 December 1944, at the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), he accused the authorities of the LKP(b) of their allegedly reasonable attitude towards “bourgeois” Lithuanian specialists (“The CK of the KP(b) of Lithuania has never discussed the behaviour of any employee that expressed bourgeois nationalistic views in his work...”)2. In 1944-1946, on the initiative of the Bureau, an intensive cleansing of the cadre was going on. M.Suslov, “the leader and educator”, to quote M.Šumauskas, and V.Shcherbakov treated Lithuanian communists like school children (doc. No. 2.7*). Due to M.Suslov and other radical communists, the Russianized LKP(b) soon became a Stalinist party organization. M.Suslov’s words about the increasing number of local cadre in power bodies turned into the opposite phenomenon. During the operation of the Bureau, Lithuanians in leading positions made up half or less than half of all the personnel in the administration institutions of the central power. In 1947, Lithuanians made up only 18 per cent of the LKP(b).

The most important task of the Bureau was to liquidate the resistance. M.Suslov regularly informed J.Stalin and L.Berija of the work performed by the repressive bodies in fighting against “Lithuanian-German nationalists”, the political situation and continuously suggested that repressions be expanded and the NKVD-NKGB bodies reinforced. Other members of the Bureau prepared various instructions or directives for the repressive, party or Soviet bodies of the LSSR. For instance, the instruction of 29 January 1945 by D.Radionov to the heads of county divisions of the NKVD and NKGB pointed out that destruction of partisans depends on the intelligence work and suitable employment of the Army.3

During the years of its operation, the Bureau adopted quite a few anti-partisan decisions that became important documents-directives in suppressing the resistance and organizing the first post-war deportations. On 24 May 1945, the Bureau adopted the famous decision “On the Intensification of the Activity of Bourgeois Nationalistic Bands and the Reinforcement of Fighting Against them”. The document orders “to disclose and liquidate the main nationalistic organizations in the shortest time possible”. For that purpose, it was necessary to send NKVD and NKGB personnel to Lithuania to fill the positions of the heads of rural district divisions, to increase the number of the NKVD troops, to deport 50-60 partisan families from each county, to organize open demonstrations of partisan trials, etc. (doc.No. 2.8*).

In the decision of 17 September 1945 “On the Part of the Decision of 15 August 1945 by the CK of the VKP(b) Regarding the Lithuanian-German Nationalistic Underground and the Liquidation of its Armed Bands” and in the decision of 15 October 1945 “On the Political Situation in the Republic”, the Bureau criticized party organizations and ordered them to annihilate partisans in the counties of Rokiškis, Utena, Kėdainiai, Ukmergė, Marijampolė, Raseiniai, švenčionys, Joniškis and Panevėžys, “resolutely get rid of complacency and kind-heartedness”, to arm party activists, etc. (doc.No. 2.9* and doc.No. 2.10*). On 17 October 1945, the Bureau forbade the county local authorities self-willed expropriation of the farms of partisan families. Plans were made to confiscate their property during the future mass deportations. I.Tkachenko specified

* **Doc. No. 2.8.** Extracts from the decision of 24 May 1945 by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) *On the Increasing Activities of Bourgeois-Nationalistic Bands and Strengthening of the Measures in Fighting against them.* SRCDNHR. stk. 597. inv. 1. f. 1. p. 100.

* **Doc. No. 2.9.** Extracts from the decision of 17 September 1945 by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) *On the Part of the Decision of 15 August 1945 by the CK of the VKP(b) Regarding the Liquidation of the Lithuanian-German Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands.* SRCDNHR. stk. 597. inv. 1. f. 1. p. 137-139.

* **Doc. No. 2.10.** Extracts from the decision of 15 October 1945 by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) *On the Political Situation in the Republic.* SRCDNHR. stk. 597. inv. 1. f. 1. p. 140.

* **Doc. No. 2.11.** An extract from the decision of 10 November 1945 by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) *On the Formation and Reinforcement of Additional Rural District Divisions of the NKVD and NKGB of the Lithuanian SSR.* SRCDNHR. stk. 597. inv. 1. f. 1. p. 142.

that he would allow the expropriation of these farms if all adult members of the families were arrested. In his report to Stalin in July 1945, M.Suslov wrote about the complete or partial confiscation of 39,899 farms.⁴

The Bureau constantly encouraged the expansion of the apparatus of repressive bodies. On 10 November 1945, the issue “On the Formation and reinforcement of Additional Rural District Divisions of the NKGB and NKVD of the Lithuanian SSR” was discussed. An entry in the decision requested the CK of the VKP(b) to establish NKVD divisions in all 320 rural districts, to send via the Personnel Directorate of the CK of the VKP(b) 470 best NKVD and NKGB operational personnel from the central and eastern regions of the SSRS in order to staff the aforementioned divisions and operational points of the NKVD (doc.No. 2.11*). During several years (1944-1945, till January 1946) the number of NKVD personnel in the LSSR grew from 2,184 to 9,957.⁵

M.Suslov tried to emphasize the necessity of the Bureau to Lithuania. On 20 June 1945, he sent a very exhaustive 36-page report to Stalin on the work performed by the Bureau in 1944-1945. M.Suslov underlined that it was during the operation of the Bureau that 22,554 persons were arrested, 6,514 partisans killed and partisan families started to be deported (doc.No. 2.12*). According to the most recent data by historians, in 1944-1946, the most active period of the operation of the Bureau, the troops of the NKVD (MVD) in Lithuania murdered or killed in action 14,4096 people during 25,488 military punitive operations (according to the data of the MGB of the LSSR, 14,356 people were killed and 39,235 were arrested) (doc. No. 4.2*) and deported 9,214 persons.⁷

The Bureau oversaw the work of courts. Seeking to intimidate the society, the Bureau insisted on organizing demonstration court trials of partisans (doc.No. 2.13* and doc.No. 2.14*). Reports on the verdicts pronounced by the military tribunals of the NKVD, the Supreme Court of the LSSR, the Extraordinary Conference of the NKVD to resistance fighters or killers of Jews were sent personally to M.Suslov and later to V.Shcherbakov. from 1944 till 1 June 1946, the military tribunals of the NKVD alone sentenced 8,268 persons for breaching Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the Soviet Socialist Republic of the Russian federation (doc. No. 4.5). In 1945, the Military Tribunal sentenced 468 persons to capital punishment, 1,157 – to penal servitude, etc.⁸ On 30 January 1946, in his last report to G.malenkov, M.Suslov wrote that he was not completely satisfied with the results. In his opinion, “taking into consideration the political situation, this punitive policy [...] cannot be regarded as strict, rather the opposite. [...] Taking into consideration the political situation in the republic, all the time it was necessary to take severe measures, including the extreme ones”.⁹ Judging by this letter, it is possible to make the conclusion that M.Suslov was well aware of the criminal role of the Bureau that tried to establish the Soviet power in Lithuania by compulsion and savage means.

When M.Suslov was recalled to Moscow, V.Shcherbakov became the Chairman of the Bureau. He was a pretentious and ambitious person, a typical representative of the Stalinist nomenclature of that time. Considering himself to be the most important vicegerent of Moscow in Lithuania, he often conducted himself like the ruler of the personal domain. Because of his autocratic tendencies and rough administration, he was unpopular even among local communists, ignored some decisions adopted by the CK of the LKP(b) and the government of the LSSR (doc.No. 2.15*). V.Shcherbakov was looking for “people’s enemies”, and “nationalists” everywhere, particularly belittled the Lithuanian intelligentsia and the national culture, was one of the most important initiators of Russianization and a great defender of Russian-speaking newcomers.

* **Doc. No. 2.12.** Extracts from the report of 20 June 1945 by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov to J.Stalin about the work performed by the Bureau in 1944–1945 (36 p.). SRCDNHR. stk. 597. inv. 1. f. 2. p. 18–21.

* **Doc. No. 4.2.** A note of December 1952 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kondakov *On the Results of the Work of the MGB Bodies of the Lithuanian SSR in Fighting against the Nationalistic Underground and its Bands from 15 July 1944 to 15 December 1952.* SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 407. p. 264-265.

* **Doc. No. 2.13.** The decision of 24 July 1945 by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) *On the Organization of Public Court Trials.* SRCDNHR. stk. 597. inv. 1. f. 1. p. 135–136.

* **Doc. No. 2.14.** An extract from the speech by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov made at the 6th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 28 July 1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 9. p. 291.

* **Doc. No. 2.15.** An extract from the speech by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V. Shcherbakov at the 10th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 9 July 1946. SLA. stk. 1771. inv.9. f. 13. p. 56.

In July 1946, at the Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), V.Shcherbakov and other members of the Presidium asked the First Secretary of the Party Committee of Kaunas city J.Grigalavičius why Russians had been excluded from the lists of the conference participants. J.Grigalavičius made excuses: “We have invited Russians (to the conference – V.T.). All our partorgs, with the exception of one, two or three, are Russians [...], but we used to accept Lithuanians because Russians do not know Lithuanian and, therefore, it is difficult for them to work with masses. I think I have made a gross political error“ (doc. No. 2.16*). However, in comparison to his predecessor M.Suslov, V.Shcherbakov’s influence on the political processes in Lithuania was much meagerer. He had no weighty support in Moscow, occasionally got into conflicts with the heads of repressive bodies who, because of their autonomous status, did not want to completely obey party bodies of Lithuania.

In May 1946, in a letter to the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) A.Zhdanov, V.Shcherbakov complained of “poor work of the MGB and the MVD”. He acknowledged the crimes committed by them: “the MVD and the MGB do not carry out offensive fighting, have no good intelligence network [...] Drinking, plundering, hooligan excesses, violations of the revolutionary law (unlawful arrests, beating of the arrested, etc.) [...] have become a norm [...] Inaction and fear are masked by unlawful arrests [...]”. V.Shcherbakov was concerned with the liquidation of the underground by the spring of 1946 and, seeing the failure of the plan, he accused the MGB and the MVD.¹⁰

He used to receive information regarding the criminal activity of State Security personnel and other representatives of the power from party organizations and his subordinates. For instance, on 4 march 1947, the member of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) F.Budagovskij reported to V.Shcherbakov on the increasing tendency of “violations of the socialist justice” in the spring of 1947 in Lithuania. “There are lots of facts of killings of innocent people, unlawful arrests, beatings and violence” (doc.No. 2.17*). The Special Lithuanian Archives hold a lot of documents which show that the heads of the occupation power bodies were indignant at the crimes committed by Soviet officials and then made public.

During the years of V.Shcherbakov’s command, further Sovietization of Lithuania, fighting against partisans, deportations and cleansing of the cadre continued (in 1946, 6,639 persons were dismissed from various institutions, 2,535 of them for political considerations).¹¹ The administration of the LSSR headed by V.Shcherbakov launched an extensive economic offensive campaign against the peasantry: taxes and norms for forced labour and product deliveries to the state were increased and the campaign of “the dispossession of the kulaks” continued. In 1947, the authorities of the LSSR, executing the directives by the Bureau, forbade small-scale private commerce and trade provided for by the Constitution of the LSSR (in July 1945, the part of the private capital in industry was 10 per cent and in trade – 31 per cent.).¹²

By the decision of the CK of the VKP(b) of 24 march 1947, the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) was disbanded. Most of its members left Lithuania. V.Shcherbakov became the First Secretary of the VKP(b) of kaliningrad region. V.Pisarev was nominated as the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR.¹³

The true reasons for disbanding the CK Bureaus of the VKP(b) in the Baltic Countries and Moldavia in 1947 are not known. It can be assumed that in 1944-1947 the Soviet political system was established and it was already functioning in these countries, therefore, these party bodies became unnecessary.

3. The Komsomol*

The Lenin Young Communist League of Lithuania (the LYCLL) was a constituent part of the LYCL of the Union, a political body of the SSRS, an aide to the Communist Party and its reserve. The LYCLL was established in 1919.

* **Doc. No. 2.17.** The note of 4 March 1947 by the member of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) F. Budagovskij to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V. Shcherbakov *On the Violations of Socialist Justice in the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 5. p. 26–36.

* **Literature and Sources page 52.**

In 1944 – 1953, the principal objectives of the LYCLL were to help the LKP(b) Sovietize the young people of Lithuania and fight against the underground as well as prepare a reserve of the future communists.

In the summer of 1944, alongside the Soviet troops, the Komsomol initiatory groups came and started reestablishing their political bodies. They were comprised mostly of the Komsomol functionaries who had returned from the SSRS, Soviet partisans, demobilized servicemen and Russian-speaking LYCLU cadre sent from Moscow who were appointed to executive positions in the apparatus of the LYCLL. By April 1945, they numbered 1,439.¹ Their responsibility was to guarantee the integration of the activity of LYCLL with the system of the LYCLU and have control over the Komsomol of Lithuania, preventing its deviation from the political course of the VKP(b).

On 5 October 1944, the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On the Work of the CK of the LYCL of Lithuania”, which encouraged faster expansion of Komsomol organisations.² In 1944, the CK of the LYCLL, the divisions of city and county committees corresponding to the key directions of the Komsomol activity, such as agitation and propaganda, personnel, peasantry youth, military-physical culture and schools, were reestablished. Komsorgs were assigned to places that had no Komsomol organizations (in 1945, in counties they numbered 235), Komsomol county committees were administratively set up. Later, during the forced collectivization, Komsomol organizations started to be established in kolkhozes, though without much success. In general, Komsomol organizations were being established artificially, following the decisions of the CK of the LKP(b) and the CK of the LYCLL and had no natural or direct connection with local young people.

The Komsomol of Lithuania duplicated many decisions of the CK of the LYCLU and the CK of the LKP(b), supported all political campaigns. For example, the January Plenum of the CK of the LYCLL in 1949 approved of the collectivization, urged to create Komsomol kolkhozes. The September Plenum of the CK of the LYCLL in 1952 discussed issues concerning the work with the cadre, “implementing the decisions of the 13th Plenum of the CK of the KP(b) of Lithuania”, etc.

Similarly to the LKP(b), during the first post-war years, the LYCL in Lithuania was an unpopular and not numerous organization (by 1 January 1945, it had 3,806 members). Young people of Lithuania condemned Komsomol members for their participation in the repressions and persecution of those thinking differently, for despising national values, and considered this organization alien to Lithuania. It was students and teachers that ignored it most: in 1944 – 1945, a single student joined the Komsomol, in 1946 – 46; in 1948, from 4,000 Komsomol-age teachers, only 180 were members of the LYCLU.³ The unwillingness of young people to join the Komsomol was one of the ways of the passive resistance against the Soviet regime.

Seeking to have a reliable reserve of the cadre in party and power bodies, the LKP(b) authorities demanded to increase the ranks of the LYCLL. At the same time, the LKP(b) tried to reinforce the political influence of the Komsomol on the young people of Lithuania. In February 1945, speaking at a meeting of the Komsomol activists, A.Sniečkus pointed out that the increase of the number of Komsomol members had to be the most important task of Komsomol organizations. At the November Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1946, the First Secretary of the CK of the LYCLL A.Raguotis reported that only 5,700 from 424,000 Komsomol-age young people of Lithuania “associated their life with the Komsomol”. At that time, in gymnasiums and junior gymnasiums only 1,400 from 13,500 pupils were members of the LYCLL, whereas at higher and special secondary schools their number scarcely reached 352, and even those were often non-Lithuanians. In 1947, at the University of Kaunas, only 13 from 2,000 students were members of the Komsomol.⁴

In order to increase the number of Komsomol members, the bodies of the Komsomol resorted to different illegal measures. For example, in 1948, the Komsomol organization of Kaunas county tried to enlarge its ranks by recruiting, using administrative measures and compulsion (doc. No. 3.2*). On 3 November 1951, the Mi-

* **Doc. No. 3.2.** An extract from the decision of 1 April 1948 by the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL *On Gross Violations in Admitting Members into the LYCLU in the Komsomol Organization of Kaunas County*. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 76. p. 158.

* **Doc. No. 3.3.** A report of 3 November 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus in regard to exerting pressure on the applicants for the Komsomol membership. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 135. p. 236–240.

nister of the MGB of the LSSR P.Kapralov sent a letter to A.Sniečkus providing numerous examples of how young people were compelled to join the Komsomol (doc. No. 3.3*). At the 6th Congress of LYCLL in 1951, it was demanded to increase the number of Komsomol members in the system of education. The Secretary of the CK of the LYCLU A.Shelepin (the future Chief of the KGB of the SSRS) ordered “to put an end to this abnormal and shameful to Lithuania matter”, expressed his indignation at the fact that as many as 349 schools did not have Komsomol organizations, and 630 schools had no pioneer organizations. He compared the number of students – members of the Komsomol in Armenia and Lithuania, the figures being 90 and 23 per cent respectively⁵. Under constant pressure of Moscow and the CK of the LKP(b), in 1953, the Komsomol organization of Lithuania increased the number of its members up to 100,000 (by 1 January 1953, it was 99,094). The LYCLL became a typical political body of the Soviet Union and a tool of Moscovs imperial policy in Lithuania.

The LYCLL was a semi-Russian organization. In 1946, Lithuanian Komsomol members constituted 51 per cent, in 1948 – 49 per cent of all its members. Beginning with 1950, due to the compulsive increase of the number of members of Komsomol organizations at schools, the number of Lithuanians increased, and in 1953 it reached 63 per cent.⁶ Some Komsomol organizations (in the county and city of Vilnius) did not have a single person who could speak Lithuanian. In 1947, Lithuanians belonging to the nomenclature of the CK of the LYCLL made up 41 per cent; the personnel of the CK of the LYCLL (the authorities) had 41 per cent of Lithuanians, whereas secretaries of city committees made up 13 per cent.⁷

The importance of developing respect for the Russian nation was constantly emphasized in the decisions of the CK of the LYCLU and the CK of the LYCLL. In the decision of 18 May 1945 by the CK Bureau of the LYCLU “On the Work of the CK of the LYCL of Lithuania”, Komsomol organizations were obligated to organize clubs for studying the Russian language, whereas Russians had to study Lithuanian.⁸ Almost none studied the, latter; therefore, it became compulsory to know Russian. The majority of Komsomol functions (plenums, congresses of activists) were in Russian; therefore, documents were also in the Russian language.

In 1945 – 1947, in the environment of total distrust, Lithuanian Komsomol employees were often blamed for their “nationalistic errors”, “loss of class vigilance”, were dismissed from their positions. In 1945 – 1946, by the decisions of the CK of the LYCLU and constant inspections, Moscow tried to intimidate the Lithuanian part of the authorities of the CK of the LYCLL to unconditionally follow all instructions, particularly those concerning the cadre of the Komsomol. The leading personnel of the Komsomol had to be loyal and obedient aides to the Communist Party. In the decision of the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLU of 18 May 1945 “On the Work of the CK of the LYCL of Lithuania”, accusations typical of that period were reiterated: “The fighting against the Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists is poor, the explanation to the young people that nationalists are the greatest enemies of the Lithuanian nation is not sufficient”, etc. (doc.No. 3.4*). All accusations were discussed at the republican conference of Komsomol activists on 26 August 1945. Its resolution stated that “Komsomol organizations do not educate the youth in the spirit of friendship of the SSRS nations and respect for the great Russian nation, do not instill the feeling of love to the Red Army, the liberator of the Lithuanian nation” (doc.No. 3.5*).

Because of the problems of Russianization, conflicts used to occur among the leading Lithuanian Komsomol personnel. For example, on 30 October 1945, the Head of the Sector of Registration and Statistics of the CK of the LYCLL J.Smilgevičius complained to the CK Bureau of the LYCLL that “the Deputy Head of the School Division comrade Velmontaitė [...] declared that “Russianization of the CK is going on”. I told her she was wrong and quoted an extract from a poem by Majakovskij: “I would learn the Russian language for

* **Doc. No. 3.4.** The extract from the decision of 18 May 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL *On the Work of the CK of the Lithuanian LYCL*. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 20. p. 41.

* **Doc. No. 3.5.** An extract from the meeting of the Republican Komsomol activists of the Lithuanian SSR on 26 August 1945. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 16. p. 70.

* **Doc. No. 3.11.** A complaint of 30 October 1945 by the Head of the Accounting and Statistics Sector of the CK of the LYCLL J. Smilgevičius to the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL in regard to the anti-Russian attitude of E. Velmontaitė. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 16. p. 124 a.

* **Doc. No. 3.12.** The decision of 31 October 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL *On Comrade E. J. Velmontaitė*. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 16. p. 119.

the sole reason that Lenin spoke it". Comrade Velmontaitė retorted: "You Russian sycophant". J.Smilgevičius requested to take "adequate measures" (doc.No. 3.11*). On 31 October, the CK Bureau of the LYCLL dismissed E.Velmontaitė from the position "for propagating outdated, local nationalistic attitudes" (doc.No. 3.12*).

At the end of the summer of 1945, inspections organized by the CK of the LYCLU began. On 30 August 1945, on the initiative of M.Suslov, the Second Secretary of the CK of the LYCLL M.Kenevičius was dismissed from his position (in 1959 he shot himself). His position was taken by the First Secretary of the Committee of the LYCLU of Arkhangelsk region N.Kulakov, a typical Stalinist of that time. He formed a group of informers in the apparatus of the CK and maintained close relations with D.Shupikov and V.Shcherbakov. Having gained their support, he started "the cleansing of the cadre" of the Komsomol (the greatest number of people were dismissed from their positions and even arrested in the Komsomol organization of Kaunas). Two factions were formed within the authorities of the CK of the LYCLL: N.Kulakov's and that of the First Secretary of the CK of the LYCLL Jonas Macevičius (a former Soviet partisan, later – an academician). At the 3rd Congress of the LYCLL on 18 May 1946, in the vote on the future members of the CK, 84 out of 430 delegates were against N.Kulakov.⁹

In the summer of 1946, together with the inspection group from the CK of the VKP(b) headed by V.Zhavronkov (to inspect the work of the CK of the LKP(b)), a group from the CK of the LYCLU headed by Aleksandrova came to Vilnius. The results of the inspection were discussed by the CK Bureau of the LYCLU on 26 August 1946 in Moscow, and the decision "On the Work of the CK Bureau of the LYCLL" was adopted which was later discussed in Vilnius by the 2nd Plenum of the LYCLL on 1 October 1946. The adopted decision stated the errors of the leaders of the LYCLL: they pursued incorrect policy of the cadre, did not educate the youth ideologically and, what was most important, "the CK Bureau of the LYCL of Lithuania did not take adequate measures to increase the activity of the Komsomol and young people in fighting against bourgeois nationalists – the enemies of our party, the enemies of the Soviet system". The Plenum dismissed J.Macevičius, E.Mieželaitis, M.Martinaitis, J.Buivydas from their positions and expelled them from the membership of the CK. N.Kulakov was warned, too, for "not timely informing the CK of the LYCLU about the incorrect working methods of comrade Macevičius" (doc.No. 3.6*). Antanas Raguotis, who had extremely radical views, was assigned the new First Secretary of the CK of the LYCLL (his motto was: "If the enemy does not surrender, he must be destroyed").

The new Secretary found many "enemies" in teaching institutions, accused education personnel of indifference to politics, copying the West, etc.¹⁰ For example, at the 15th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 27 November 1947, he castigated teachers, students and Rector M.Mickis of the Academy of Agriculture. According to him, the Academy was "contaminated with kulak and nationalistic elements", the issues of collectivization were circumvented at lectures, etc. Out of 800 students, only 8 were Komsomol members (doc.No. 3.1*). Following the new policy, allegedly because of inadequate fighting against nationalism and also of political errors, in 1947, he substituted quite a few Komsomol workers in counties and appointed mainly Russian-speaking newcomers as second secretaries of Komsomol committees. After this internal restructuring of the Komsomol organization of Lithuania, Moscow did not have major political demands to the leaders of the LYCLL (only reproved them for the slow increase in the number of Komsomol members).

At the 18th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1948, the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR D.Jefimov admitted that young people under the age of 25 constituted the bulk of the national underground.¹¹ Therefore, one of the most important tasks of the LYCLL was to intimidate the youth of Lithuania not to participate in the activity of the underground and even to involve part of it in the struggle against partisans.

* **Doc. No. 3.6.** The protocol of the 2nd Plenum of the CK of the LYCLL on 1 October 1946. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 27. p. 1-3.

* **Doc. No. 3.1.** An extract from the speech of 27 November 1947 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LYCLL A. Raguotis at the 15th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv.10. f. 36. p. 229-230.

* **Doc. No. 4.8.** The decision of 24 July 1944 by the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Formation of the Extermination Battalions of the NKVD in the Territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Liberated from the German Fascist Invaders.* SLA. stk.1771. inv. 7. f. 36. p. 1.

Alongside communists and the personnel of repressive bodies, Komsomol members became accomplices of many crimes. The Komsomol unconditionally carried out all instructions of the Communist Party and took part in all post-war compulsive economic and political campaigns, repressions and acts of terror. Komsomol members “distinguished themselves” in the operations of partisan extermination, they made up a considerable part of exterminators and party-Soviet activists, were among those who executed deportations of the population, helped the LKP(b) unmask “people’s enemies” in different institutions and organizations, were active pursuers of the policy of economic terror in the country and creators of the kolkhoz system.

In July 1944, the CK of the LKP(b) organized groups of exterminators (doc.No. 4.8*); in 1945, these repressive bodies numbered 1600,12 in July 1952 – 2,454 members of the Komsomol.¹³ The CK of the LKP(b) constantly insisted that Komsomol members be sent to the teaching institutions of the MGB and the MVD. On 24 July 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On the Reinforcing of the Battalions of Exterminators and the Improvement of the Material Conditions of their Fighters”. In the decision much attention was paid to the Komsomol. Clause 3 stated that the inclusion of Komsomol activists of rural districts into groups of exterminators had to be compulsory (doc.No. 3.7*).

The Komsomol organization of Lithuania carried out all decisions of the CK of the LKP(b) that were directed against the armed underground. Taking into consideration the decision of 12 December 1947 by the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) with regard to fighting against the national underground (more about that in the section “Suppression of the Resistance against the Soviet Occupation”), on 16 December 1947, the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL adopted the decision “On the Reinforcement of the Work of the Komsomol of Lithuania in Fighting against the Bourgeois Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands”(doc.No. 3.8*). This document, full of radicalism, obligated all Komsomol organizations “to actively join the fight”, “send Komsomol members to the groups of people’s defenders”, “instill hatred and contempt to people’s enemies into Komsomol members and young people”, etc. The decision “obligated Komsomol committees and primary Komsomol organizations of counties, cities and rural districts to render maximum assistance to the bodies of the MGB and party organizations in the liquidation of the bourgeois nationalistic underground and its armed bands in the shortest period possible”. Paragraph 2 of Clause 2 declared: “All Komsomol members who can bear a weapon must join armed groups”. The Bureau made a decision to send 100 Komsomol members to the MGB divisions of rural districts and 150 – to the republican school of the MGB (everyone had to know the Lithuanian language). Clause 9 of the decision also obligated “to be resolute in unmasking the anti-Soviet activity of certain students, pupils and teachers” and expel such persons from teaching institutions. In fact, members of Komsomol gained the right to persecute teachers and lecturers. Komsorgs were particularly ardent in this activity. Party committees were forced even to restrain some of them.

The fact that Komsomol members were compelled to join armed groups and participate in fighting against partisans can be estimated as criminal activity. The majority of Lithuanians were enlisted into the Komsomol under compulsion or applying moral or psychological pressure; therefore, quite a few of them got involved in the groups of exterminators or armed party-Soviet activists against their will. Thus, the CK of the LKP(b) and the CK of the LYCLL succeeded in inciting enmity among part of Lithuanian young people and entangling them into the fratricidal fight. Certainly, there were also Lithuanian Komsomol members who chose this organization for ideological considerations. Similarly to communists, they were convinced in the rightness of their activity while participating in committing Stalinist crimes. However, not all Komsomol members succumbed to the compulsion. There were cases when young people made attempts to evade this murderous obligation. For example, in 1945, having received his call-up papers from the Komsomol Committee of

* **Doc. No. 3.7.** The decision of 24 July 1945 by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Lithuanian SSR and the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Reinforcement of the Extermination Battalions and Improvement of the Material Conditions of their Fighters*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv..8. f. 83. p. 25–27.

* **Doc. No. 3.8.** The decision of 16 December 1947 by the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL *On the Reinforcement of the Work of the Lithuanian Komsomol in Fighting against the Bourgeois-Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands*. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1 f. 53. p. 240–244.

* **Doc. No. 3.13.** The decision of 17 October 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL *On the Approval of the Decisions by the Bureaus of the Committees of Counties and Cities of the Lithuanian LYCLL in Regard to the Expulsion from the LYCLL Membership*. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 16. p. 108–109.

Kaunas city to join a group of exterminators, the Komsomol member V. Aleksotskis tore them up and did not go anywhere. He was expelled from the Komsomol for that (doc.No. 3.13*). No doubt, such act had to damage his future life.

On 5 July 1949, on the basis of an anti-partisan decision of 6 June 1949 by the CK Bureau of the LKP(b), the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL adopted one more document intended for fighting against the underground, i.e. the decision “On the Participation of the Komsomol Organization of the Lithuanian SSR in Fighting against the Remaining Members of the Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands at the Period of Establishing Kolkhozes in the Republic” (doc.No. 3.9*). The great importance of the support of the Komsomol for party organizations and the MGB in fighting against partisans was pointed out. The decision obligated Komsomol bodies to continue rendering their support for the MGB and organizing armed groups in kolkhozes, Soviet farms, machine-and-tractor depots and administrations of parts of rural districts. A decision was made to enlarge all groups of exterminators by Komsomol members within a month after approving their candidacies at Komsomol committees of counties and those of political leaders – at party committees of counties.¹⁴

Members of the Komsomol participated in all compulsive economic and political campaigns organized by the Communist Party: “extortion” of peasants’ debts to the state, obtaining compulsory state loans (state bonds), establishing of kolkhozes, etc. During their raids on the countryside, alongside exterminators and other “activists”, they threatened people demanding that all instructions of the Soviet power be carried out.

People of the country took an active part in the resistance; therefore, the LKP(b) and the LYCLL made a lot of effort to expand the control over the peasantry youth. In June 1947, out of 21,034 members of the Komsomol, only 1,335 (6.5 per cent) were peasants. On 10 June 1947, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On the Work of Komsomol Organizations of Lithuania with the Peasantry Youth”, which was discussed by the Plenum of the CK of the LYCLL on 13–14 June (doc. No. 3.10*). On the basis of the principles of dividing the society into classes, the young people of the country were divided into three parts: the poor ones and the hired labourers, the layer of the middle peasantry and the kulaks. The aim of this division was to artificially incite enmity among the young people.

Ideologization of the spiritual life of the young people was based on the vulgarized materialistic philosophy and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The ideological activity of the Komsomol was associated with the mounting social and political tension in Lithuania. This not only facilitated the process of Sovietization, but also helped the Communist Party execute repressions. During different political campaigns (elections, signing of letters, movement of Stakhanov’s followers, etc.), Soviet holidays or after deportations, compulsory rallies to support the Soviet power used to be organized. There, ideological Komsomol members, blinded by their youthful maximalism, despised the aspirations for the national freedom and urged to take still stronger measures, particularly against clergymen, the so-called “kulaks”, nationally disposed teachers. Local Komsomol organizations used to hold meetings for the youth at which they explained “the advantages” of the political system of the SSRS, eulogized the communist system and the Communist Party. Pupils and students were forced to study the Constitution of the SSRS, the history of the VKP(b) and the LYCLU, the regulations of the Soviet elections, etc. Of particular concern to party and Komsomol organizations was the ideological indoctrination of the studying young people. Pupils and students became practically the most active members of the resistance to the occupation, therefore, schools were under particular surveillance.

* **Doc. No. 3.9.** An extract from the decision of 6 June 1949 by the Bureau of the CK of the LYCLL *On the Participation of the Komsomol Organization of the Lithuanian SSR in Fighting Against the Remaining Members of the Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands at the Period of Establishing Kolkhozes in the Republic*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 7. p. 29.

* **Doc. No. 3.10.** An extract from the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LYCLL on 13–14 June 1947 where the decision of the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Work of the Organizations of the Lithuanian Komsomol with the Peasant Youth* was discussed. SLA. stk. 4421. inv. 1. f. 44. p. 2–5.

4. The Suppression of the Resistance to the Soviet Occupation*

In 1944-1953, the Lithuanian nation bearing arms defended its freedom and the aspiration to restore the independent State. The Soviet Union suppressed this resistance by using military force. The fighting against the armed and unarmed underground was commanded by the CK of the VKP(b) and the repressive bodies of the SSRS. According to their directives, the suppression of the resistance was organized and activities of party, repressive and other bodies (of republican subordination) were coordinated locally. In 1944-1946, the CK of the VKP(b) adopted three decisions regarding the inadequate work of the LKP(b) in fighting against the armed underground.

According to the data by the KGB of the LSSR, in 1944-1954, “38,141 members of the armed underground were liquidated, 20,138 of them were killed, 18,003 were arrested and imprisoned”. 38,621 members of the armed underground were forced to be in hiding and later had to legalize themselves. According to the data by the State Security of the Lithuanian SSR, the total number of persons belonging to the armed underground in 1944-1954 was 76,762 (doc. No. 4.1*). Similar statistics regarding the armed underground are presented in other documents of the State Security (doc. No. 4.2*, doc. No. 4.3*). The note of December 1952 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P.Kondakov indicates that in 1944-1952 the total of 120,570 people that fought against the Soviet power or publicly disregarded it were killed, arrested or obtained legality (they did not belong to the category of the deported), 62,000 of them were arrested (among the arrested were 14,850 members of the unarmed underground), 20,093 were killed, 38,106 legalized themselves (doc. No. 4.2). According to the calculations by the historian A. Anušauskas the total number of people that were arrested (imprisoned, released from prison or died in it, killed by shooting) by the NKVD-MVD-MGB of the LSSR in 1944-1952 would amount to 186,000 (deportees excluded). This was one of the colossal crimes organized and executed by the Communist Party.

The statistics of the victims of the NKGB-MGB terror are not accurate. As has been revealed by the researches of Lithuanian historians, these data were doctored – increased or decreased, taking into consideration the political conjuncture of the period or the whims of Moscow authorities. For instance, unarmed killed men were often called “bandits (i.e. partisans) by the personnel of the repressive bodies. The exact number of repressed resistance fighters or peaceful civilian population will be determined in the future.

The names of the most important organizers and executors of the genocide were approved by the CK of the VKP(b). For instance, on 26 October 1946, the Minister of the MVD of the SSRS S.Kruglov wrote that he submitted the candidature of the deputy Head of the MVD Directorate of the LSSR for Lt. Col. B.Burilin to the Central Committee of the VKP(b) for approval. “On my suggestion, the CK of the VKP(b) approved you for the current position”, wrote S.Krylov. “You must justify the confidence shown to you” (doc. No. 4.4*).

Throughout the entire post-war period, the LKP(b) tried to portray the partisan war as class struggle, though party leaders themselves knew well that it was not so. The data on the social composition of the convicted resistance fighters submitted to V.Shcherbakov and A.Sniečkus on 28 May 1946 by the Chairman

* Literature and Sources

* **Doc. No. 4.1.** A note of 30 December 1954 by the Head of the 2nd Division of the 4th Directorate of the MVD of the LSSR Capt. L. Martavičius in regard to the killed and arrested members of the armed underground of Lithuania in 1944–1954. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 530. p. 38.

* **Doc. No. 4.2.** A note of December 1952 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kondakov *On the Results of the Work of the MGB Bodies of the Lithuanian SSR in Fighting against the Nationalistic Underground and its Bands from 15 July 1944 to 15 December 1952*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 407. p. 264-265.

* **Doc. No. 4.3.** A note of 25 October 1953 by the Head of the 4th Directorate of the MVD of the LSSR Maj. P. Raslanas *On the Results of the Work of the MVD Bodies of the Lithuanian SSR and Nationalistic Attacks from 15 June 1944 to 25 October 1953*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 441. p. 1–2.

* **Doc. No. 4.4.** A letter of 26 October 1946 by the Minister of the MVD of the SSRS Col. Gen. S. Kruglov to the Deputy Head of the Directorate of the MVD of the LSSR for Fighting against Banditism Lt. Col. B. Burylin. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 216. p. 1–2.

of the Military Tribunal of the MVD A.Khaliavin indicate that it was mostly middle class and poor peasants as well as the intelligentsia that participated in the activity of the underground in 1944-1946 (doc. No. 4.5*)

In 1944-1953, following the directives of the CK of the VKP(b) and the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP (b), the CK of the LKP(b) adopted quite a few political decisions, resolutions or directives of criminal and anti-humane nature. According to M.Suslov, the authorities of the VKP(b) demanded to accomplish “the most important of the most important tasks – to liquidate banditism as soon as possible” (1945).¹ Moscow ignored any possible political contacts with the underground that could at least slightly mitigate the military confrontation. Partisans, called “bandits” by the occupation authorities, had to be annihilated by armed force, without any compromises, whatever the cost in human lives on both sides. Those who supported partisans or were associated with them by kindred relations had to be repressed. The initiative for drafting anti-partisan documents would arise in repressive and communist party bodies. For instance, in November 1944, the Prosecutor of the LSSR M.Baliasnikov requested the Prosecutor of the SSRS K.Gorshenin to legalize deportations of the families of resistance fighters (doc. No. 4.6*). On 13 November 1944, the Acting Prosecutor of the LSSR F.Girko also requested to take repressive measures against partisan families (doc. No. 4.7*). These suggestions used to be included into the plenum decisions of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) or the CK of the LKP(b).

The CK of the LKP(b) constantly declared that politically it was necessary to shortly destroy the underground and started implementing that. The Lithuanian party organization operated in two directions: first, it helped organize the activity of the repressive bodies subordinate to Moscow throughout Lithuania and tried to command them; second, it established and strengthened armed units subordinate to it, that is, platoons of exterminators and armed groups of party – Soviet activists and other bodies (“the threes”, “the fours”, “the fives”).

On 24 July and 3 december 1944 and on 14 November 1947, the CK of the LKP(b) adopted decisions regarding the formation and reinforcement of the platoons of “the istrebiteli” (destroyers, exterminators, “people’s defenders”) (in 1945 there were 10,314 people in them, later the number decreased).² According to B.Kobulov, “the battalions of exterminators are the future combat nucleus of Lithuanian communists”.³ The CK Bureau of the LKP(b) demanded that partorgs and komsorgs (secretaries of Komsomol organizations) without fail be included into these battalions and the issues of their formation and staffing be considered at the divisions of city and county party committees and the NKVD. The battalion deputy commander for political affairs had to hold the position not lower than that of the head of the division of the county party committee. The Communist Party allocated material and social support to the exterminators (doc. No. 4.8*). In September 1945, the arming of the “party-Soviet activists” began (doc. No. 4.9*). In 1950, 7,245 persons were armed, but during deportations their number amounted to 12,000-14,000.⁴ “The activists” consisted of secretaries of all-level party committees, chairmen of the executive committees, partorgs, komsorgs, administration personnel from different institutions and organizations in the country, ordinary communists, Komsomol members, etc. Partisans killed 1,924 of them, but most of the 345 party activists that were captured or missing might as well be attributed to the killed ones.⁵ Sometimes, “the activists” that used to be approved by county party committees even surpassed exterminators by their brutal behaviour. Most of them were local Lithuanians. Alongside exterminators, they became the most important propaganda argument of the LKP(b) concerning the establishment of the communist power in the country. Later, on the grounds of

* **Doc. No. 4.5.** An explanatory letter of 28 May 1946 by the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD of the LSSR Lt. Col. A. Khaliavin to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V. Shcherbakov and the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the convicted resistance fighters of Lithuania. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 269. p. 73–75.

* **Doc. No. 4.6.** An additional report of November 1944 by the Prosecutor of the LSSR M. Baliasnikov to the Prosecutor of the SSRS K. Gorshenin in regard to the deportation of partisan families. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 7. f. 92. p. 43.

* **Doc. No. 4.7.** The letter of 13 November 1944 by the Acting Prosecutor of the LSSR F. Girko to the Prosecutor of the SSRS K. Gorshenin *On Fighting against Counterrevolutionary Crimes in the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 92. p. 35–42.

* **Doc. No. 4.8.** The decision of 24 July 1944 by the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Formation of the Extermination Battalions of the NKVD in the Territory of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic Liberated from the German Fascist Invaders*. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 7. f. 36. p. 1.

* **Doc. No. 4.9.** A telegram of 15 September 1945 by Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to all the Heads of the NKVD-NKGB Divisions of Ukmergė, Zarasai, Švenčionys and Utena on providing arms to the Soviet-party activists. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 18. f. 39. p. 168.

their participation, the myth that the Lithuanian nation itself defeated the “bourgeois nationalists and their armed bands” was created.

In order to make repression operations or actions of terror operational and secret, in 1945-1947, mostly in party committees of rural districts, “the threes” (troiki) and in those of counties – “the fives” (piatiorki) were being formed; these were top secret conferences of the heads of party-Soviet and repressive bodies whose activity is little known about today (more about it in the article by J.Starkauskas).⁶ The number of people – three, four, five – in the highest joint party-repressive county body, that directed fighting against the resistance, was determined by local circumstances. The CK of the LKP(b) and the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) most probably had interests in the activity of these special elements, though the historian J.Starkauskas did not succeed in finding any official information on their establishment. On 23 August 1945, at the Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), the First Secretary of the Party Committee of Trakai county M.Afonin claimed that “the threes” (troiki), which consisted of the rural district partorg or party secretary, the head of the county subdivision of the NKVD (MVD) and the commissioner of the rural district of the NKGB, had been founded by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b). At the aforementioned plenum, M.Suslov stated: “It is expedient that the First and Second Secretaries of party committees as well as heads of the NKVD and the NKGB meet every day or, in the worst case, every other day to briefly discuss the political situation in the counties and foresee operational measures for fighting against banditism”. For instance, on 27 August 1947, the Committee Bureau of Panevėžys county adopted the decision “On the Political Situation in Šeduva Rural District” (doc. No. 4.10).^{*} The document points out that the county party committee did not organize a conference of the troika after each partisan attack. County troiki did not write protocols of their conferences or decisions or they did not survive. Their activity is mentioned in the protocols of party committees. The Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the SSRS B.kobulov did not approve of the establishment of “the threes” or any special commissions, intended to direct fighting against the underground. In August of 1945, at the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), he urged the heads of the divisions of the local NKVD-NKGB and party committee secretaries to cooperate more closely.⁷

While forming the troiki, some party county committees, on their own initiative, supplemented them with a representative of the Army garrison or the leading personnel of some other institutions of the Soviet power. These conferences were unofficially called “the fours” (chetviorki). For instance, in August 1945, the Party Committee of Biržai county prepared a plan for the liquidation of partisans in the county of Biržai (doc. No. 4.26^{*}). The four officials, assigned to each rural district were responsible for the destruction of the underground. The second paragraph of the plan read: “To task the comrades named above to once more check and specify the persons belonging to the band, to warn them through their families to leave [the band]. Afterwards, to expropriate all their land, cattle, property, agricultural implements, crops and buildings”.

“The fives” were established by county party committees of the LKP(b). They were made up of the First and Second Secretaries of the county party committee, the heads of the NKVD and the NKGB divisions and the chairman of the executive committee. In secret conferences at the party committee, not less than once per month, these bodies used to discuss matters pertaining to the fighting against partisans and the repression policy. For instance, on 22 July 1946, a top secret conference of “the five” chaired by the First Secretary of Kėdainiai County party Committee of the LKP(b) J.Piligrimas, took place. The decision was adopted to task the head of the county MVD G.Chakhava to arrange an ambush for partisans on the night of 22 July. About 400 of MVD troops and forces of local party activists had to participate in the operation (doc. No.4.11).^{*} On 1 March 1947, “the five” (piatiorka) of Prienai County Committee of the LKP(b) considered the issues regarding the division of the property of the local MGB and MVD (doc. No. 4.27^{*}).

^{*} **Doc. No. 4.10.** The decision of 27 August 1947 by the Bureau of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Panevėžys county *On the Political Situation in the Rural District of Šeduva*. SLA. stk. 801. inv. 801-15. f. 1. p. 45-46.

^{*} **Doc. No. 4.26.** Plan No. 100 approved by the Committee of the LKP(b) of Biržai county in August 1945 *On the Liquidation of Kulak-Nationalistic Bands in the County of Biržai*. SLA. stk. 1093. inv. 1093-27. f. 1. p. 53-57.

^{*} **Doc. No. 4.11.** The protocol of 22 July 1946 of the conference of “the five” (piatiorka) under the command of the First Secretary of the Party Committee of the LKP(b) of Kėdainiai county J. Piligrimas *On the Political Situation in the County*. SLA. stk. 749. inv. 749-8. f. 1. p. 23.

^{*} **Doc. No. 4.27.** An extract from the sitting of “the five” (piatiorka) of Prienai County Committee of the LKP(b) on 1 March 1947. SLA. stk. 739. inv. 739-10. f. 2. p. 1.

The so-called troiki, chetviorki and piatiorki, being smaller and more specialized in their composition, could more effectively solve top-secret issues of fighting against the resistance than the bureaus of the county committees of the LKP(b). These party-repressive elements would also contribute to the reinforcement of communist terror against peaceful population (deportation of the population, confiscation of the property belonging to partisan families or their supporters, dismissal of “undesirable elements” from institutions and schools, etc.).

The main force suppressing the armed resistance was the military-repressive bodies of the NKVD-MGB, and not the armed platoons formed by the LKP(b). The NKVD-MGB troops would often act independently enough, without coordinating their military operations with lower party institutions. This caused certain contradictions; therefore, the authorities of the LKP(b) constantly declared that it was the Communist Party that had to direct fighting against partisans. During the post-war period, the CK of the LKP(b) adopted dozens of decisions on this issue obligating party and repressive bodies to take various measures against the underground, paying particular attention not to the employment of the armed force, but rather to criminal actions against defenceless people – partisans’ relatives and members of their families, who, as political hostages, were deported, imprisoned and killed. The spearhead of political repressions was directed not only to the hard-to-find partisans, but also to the members of their families or relatives – it meant their deportation from Lithuania, confiscation of their property and even loss of their lives. Partisans had to choose: to legalize themselves or risk their families.

The Soviet power declared more than one amnesty for the partisans in which, in the form of an ultimatum, the families of resistance fighters were threatened. For instance, the order of 15 February 1946 by the Commissar of the NKVD of the LSSR J.Bartašiūnas stated: “5. To arrest and deport families of participants of bandit and bourgeois-nationalistic organizations that have not given in to the institutions of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (bold print by the author). On 18 January 1947, J.Bartašiūnas pointed out that close relatives are considered to be the wife, father, mother, brother and sister of the partisan. Other relatives living together (mother-in-law, grandparents, aunts, etc.) had to be deported if they were supported by the partisan family. To prove that, a note from the executive committee of the rural district sufficed.⁹

This immoral repression policy (capturing hostages) in part justified itself and became one of the most important means to break the resistance. In July 1945, I.Tkachenko stated that “because of the displacement (deportation – V.T.), legalization of bandits and illegals has lately become more active”. He gave examples indicating that even parents made their sons legalize (doc. No. 5.4).^{*} In 1944-1945, 36,557 persons legalized themselves (doc. No. 4.2 and No. 4.3.).

Until the spring of 1947, the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) directly commanded the fighting against the partisan movement and underground organizations (more about it in the section “Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b)”). The LKP(b) performed only organizational functions, though frequently the CK of the VKP(b) or M.Suslov would lay all the blame for inactivity and failures in fighting against the underground on the CK of the LKP(b) and local party bodies. In 1944-1946, the most important directives on this issue were adopted by the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) in the sittings of which the LKP(b) authorities participated as well. Therefore, the responsibility for killings of partisans and defenceless people, mass arrests and imprisonments lies on both sides. During this period, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) carried out the decisions of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), by immediately sending them to its lower bodies. Political resolutions adopted at the plenums of the CK of the LKP(b) obligated all party and state institutions of the Lithuanian SSR to execute the decisions by the CK of the VKP(b) and the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b). During the period under the command of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), in letters sent to Moscow, in conjunction with the heads of the repressive bodies, A.Sniečkus requested to support the reinforcement of repressions and prepared special directives (instructions) that in their significance equaled the decisions adopted by the CK Bureau of the LKP(b).

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.4.** A report of 23 July 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Lt. Gen. I. Tkachenko in regard to the deportations in the operational sectors of Utena and Vilnius. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 22. p. 98–102.

On 28 December 1944, in the resolution of the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), one of the first political directives – to apply repressive sanctions against partisan families without the court verdict – was formulated: “The Plenum obligates party and Soviet bodies to promptly and resolutely carry out confiscation of land and property of the farms the members of which participate in bourgeois-nationalistic bands...” (doc. No. 4.12).* By 20 October 1945, 2,424 farms – 21,351 hectares – belonging to partisans and their supporters were confiscated (doc. No. 4.13).* This was an introduction into the beginning of repressions (deportations and imprisonments) in 1945 against partisan families, i.e. people most of whom aided partisans materially, supported them spiritually, but personally did not participate in the resistance, did not fight against the occupation power, thus formally did not commit any crimes against it.

On 4 June 1945, after conferences with M.Suslov and the authorities of the LKP(b), B.Kobulov, A.Apolonov and I.Tkachenko prepared the official report to L.Berija “On the reinforcement of Fighting Measures Against Banditism and the Anti-Soviet Underground in the Lithuanian SSR”, in which they suggested that 20,000 members of partisan families be deported from Lithuania.¹⁰ According to the directive of 16 June 1945 by the NKVD of the SSRS, 6,320 persons were deported.¹¹ On 20 September 1945, in their letter to L.Berija and V.Merkulov M.Suslov and A.Sniečkus reported that there still remained not deported families in the country and suggested their deportation. On 29 September, L.Berija addressed J.Stalin and pointed out that, on the grounds of the decisions adopted by the CK of the VKP(b) on 15 August 1945 and the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 24 August 1945, the property of the families of 300 partisan commanders had been confiscated and it was necessary to deport their owners: “The Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) comrade Suslov and the Secretary of the CK of the Lithuanian KP(b) comrade Sniečkus agree with this suggestion. We ask for your approval”. The approval was granted. In February 1946, 2,082 persons were deported.¹²

Communist authorities divided resistance fighters, deportees and members of their families into 5 groups: “bandits and nationalists”, “members of bandit and nationalistic families”, “bandit supporters”, “family members of the supporters”, “kulaks, nationalists and their families”. These people were kept at the sites of their deportation the longest (until the end of 1958). Their cases were reviewed formally and requests to release them from the deportation were rejected.

At the 11th Plenum of the LKP(b) on 23 November 1946, the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP (b) V. Shcherbakov pointed out that partisans had to be annihilated by February of 1947. A. Sniečkus and V. Shcherbakov admitted that partisan activity in Lithuania had intensified.¹³ On 7 December 1946, A. Sniečkus and the Commissioner of the MVD-MGB of the SSRS in Lithuania I. Tkachenko prepared a directive for the secretaries of the county committees of the LKP(b), the heads of the county divisions of the MVD and the MGB of the LSSR. Apart from immoral political instructions (recruitment of members of partisan families and priests), it provided for repressive measures: “The indispensable condition for the complete confiscation (of partisan farms – V. T.) is the arrest of all adult members of the family, particularly males, to prevent them from joining bands.[...] Specific action plans for the execution of this directive must be discussed at closed sittings of the bureaus of the county committees of the LKP(b) with the participation of the heads of county divisions of the MVD-MGB” (doc. No. 4.14, clause 10).*

When the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) was disbanded in March 1947, the functions of political organization of the suppression of the partisan resistance came directly under the CK of the LKP(b). On 14 April 1947, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On the Reinforcement of Fighting measures Against the bourgeois – nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands”. The document stated that in the second half of March most of partisan attacks occurred in the counties of Ukmergė, Rokiškis, Biržai,

* **Doc. No. 4.12.** An extract from the resolution of the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 30 December 1944. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 7. f. 9. p. 9.

* **Doc. No. 4.13.** A note of October 1945 by Maj. Jermakov of the NKGB of the LSSR in regard to the farms confiscated from partisans and their supporters by 20 October 1945. SLA. F.K-1. inv. 10. f. 21. p. 257.

* **Doc. No. 4.14.** The directive of 7 December 1946 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus and the Commissioner of the MVD-MGB of the SSRS in Lithuania I. Tkachenko to the Secretaries of the County Committees of the LKP(b) and the Heads of the County Divisions of the MVD and MGB of the SSRS *On Measures and Methods in Liquidating the Partisan Movement*. SLA. stk.1771. inv. 9. f. 241. p. 79–81.

Tauragė, lazdiškai, marijampolė, raseiniai and Panevėžys. In order to sooner break the resistance, the Bureau decided to apply “means of economic restriction of the kulaks”, to intensify “the work of splitting the Catholic clergy”, to form armed groups of party-Soviet activists, to reinforce the MGB with Lithuanians. The decision obligated the secretaries of the county party committees and heads of the MGB divisions to expose underground organizations in all rural districts and to liquidate them in April 1947 (doc. No. 4.15).*

The deadline came to an end, yet the partisan movement in Lithuania, though having suffered painful casualties, was not destroyed. On 12 December 1947, a new antipartisan document consisting of 27 clauses and signed by A.Sniečkus “On Intensifying the Fighting Against the Bourgeois – Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands” was adopted. The objective of the decision was similar to the previous ones, that is, to ensure that “the bourgeois-nationalistic underground is liquidated in the nearest future”. However, it differed from other documents because it revealed the aspirations of the LKP(b) authorities to portray the war of the MGB troops against the partisans as “the class struggle”, to create the semblance that Lithuanians themselves were fighting against partisans.¹⁴ For this purpose, party committees alongside county divisions and subdivisions of rural districts of the MGB and the MVD were obligated to organize armed groups from the pro-Soviet local population. These groups had to be headed by the secretaries of party committees or partorgs as well as the heads of the local divisions of the MGB. The Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Trofimov and the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR D.Jefimov were appointed commanders of all groups of “armed activists” in Lithuania. First secretaries of county and city party committees became personally responsible for the liquidation of the underground. In the decision, a request to Moscow was expressed to make the MGB apparatus at least partially Lithuanian and to allow the formation of Lithuanian units of the internal troops of the MGB. Clause 18 of the decision stated: “[...] in response to the committed terrorist acts, in December of 1947, to deport a maximum number of kulak families supporting bandits and their bands” (doc. No. 4.16).*

On 22 December 1947 and 28 March 1948, 3,938 persons were deported (doc. No. 5.1).* On the basis of the note of 25 October 1953 by the Head of the 4th Directorate of the MVD of the LSSR Maj. P.Raslanas, in 1944-1953, 12,29 partisan supporters were arrested and, “in response to the terrorist acts”, i.e. partisan attacks, 7,499 “nationalist” families were deported (doc. No. 4.3).* The only fault of all these people was that they were the closest relatives of the partisans.

Not all clauses of the decision were implemented (e.g. the permission to establish Lithuanian military units of the MGB was not granted); however, deportation and imprisonment, as a constituent part of communist terror, still remained one of the means in liquidating the armed underground. In 1945-1947 about 11,000 in 1948 – 41,136 and in 1949 – 33,500 people were deported. The number of people deported during the second phase of the armed resistance (1947-1949) totalled over 80,000, and 54,000 of Lithuanians were imprisoned in camps.¹⁵ All documents adopted by the CK of the LKP(b) in reference to the deportation emphasized the necessity to forcibly deport partisan families and their supporters “kulaks” from Lithuania as one of the main conditions in liquidating the armed resistance. A large part of the LKP(b) participated in these genocide actions, starting with the authorities that organized the deportation and finishing with ordinary members (more about it in the section “Deportations”). In January 1948, in his report to the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) A.Zhdanov, A.Sniečkus formulated the key directions in liquidating the armed underground: 1. intensifying communist propaganda in slandering partisans, despising the Catholic Church and justifying the deportation; 2. arming country “activists”, i.e. involving the local population into the armed

* **Doc. No. 4.15.** The decision of 14 April 1947 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Reinforcement of Measures in Fighting against the Bourgeois Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 5. p. 95–99.

* **Doc. No. 4.16.** The decision of 12 December 1947 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Intensifying of Fighting against the Bourgeois Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv.190. f. 5. p. 179–187.

* **Doc. No. 5.1.** A note of 12 May 1988 by the KGB of the LSSR to the CK of the LKP about the deported people of Lithuania in 1941–1952. SLA. stk. 3377. inv. 58. f. 916. p. 1-3.

* **Doc. No. 4.3.** A note of 25 October 1953 by the Head of the 4th Directorate of the MVD of the LSSR Maj. P. Raslanas *On the Results of the Work of the MVD Bodies of the Lithuanian SSR and Nationalistic Attacks from 15 June 1944 to 25 October 1953*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 441. p. 1–2.

struggle (the policy of inciting enmity in the society); 3. further deportating the population; 4. reinforcing the repressive apparatus (preferably by Lithuanians) (doc. No. 4.17).*

On 18 June 1948, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted one more antipartisan decision “On the Improvement of the Political Work with the Population and the Liquidation of the Remaining Members of Bourgeois – Nationalistic Bands”. The document stated that deportations had considerably undermined the “base” of the underground; however, “due to the condescension of the local MGB-MVD bodies, in some counties, bourgeois-nationalist elements keep killing the local population”. The blame should be shared by many party organizations, that “in spite of multiple directives by the CK of the LKP(b) have not yet realized that success in fighting against the banditism depends on how efficiently the operational measures taken by the personnel of the Extraordinary Committees are coordinated with everyday political work with the population”. Clause 11 obligated county party committees and bodies of the MGB to employ armed groups of activists in fighting against partisans and “establish them in kolkhozes, sovkhoses and machine and tractor depots” (doc. No. 4.18).*

To check how the decisions of the Bureau were executed, brigades or representatives of the CK of the LKP(b) were sent to counties and rural districts. For instance, in July 1948, as soon as the aforementioned decision was adopted, a brigade of inspectors stated that in Varėna county “political work with the population was neglected and the performance of the personnel of the Extraordinary Committee of the MGB and the MVD bodies was poor...” Some exterminators were criticized for immoral behaviour and disregard of Soviet laws (deputy commander of the exterminators in the rural district of Rudnia Ignatenko threatened the population and abused alcohol), whereas the secretaries of the party committees in the rural districts of merkinė and Varėna were criticized for the persecution of legalized partisans, etc. (doc. No. 4.19).*

In 1948-1949, the efforts of the LKP(b) to liquidate the armed underground ended in failure (mass deportations, operations by the personnel of the Extraordinary Committee and forced collectivization were of no avail). On 1 June 1949, a conference of the most important heads of party and repressive agencies took place (24 persons participated), where measures for the liquidation of the resistance were discussed. For instance, P.Vetrov proposed to augment military units (doc. No. 4.20).* After this conference, on 6 June 1949, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted one more antipartisan decision “On the Reinforcement of Fighting Against Banditism and the Remaining members of the Bourgeois-Nationalistic Underground in Regard to the Establishment of Collective Farms in the republic” (doc. No. 4.21).* It again urged the MGB to sooner annihilate partisans, strengthen passport control, form armed groups of “activists” in all kolkhozes, sovkhoses, parts of rural districts and machine and tractor depots, consider each partisan attack at the sittings of the bureau of the county party committee, “reinforce” the MGB with Lithuanians, etc. Following Clause 16 of this decision, a conference of all First Secretaries of the county party committees of the LKP(b) and heads of the county divisions of the MGB-MVD had to be held on 9 July 1949 (documents about this conference have not been found – V.T.).

Apart from general decisions covering party bodies of all counties, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) discussed the work of the party committees of specific counties in fighting against the underground. In fact, during the period of 1944-1953, party committees of all counties were discussed, and some of them even several times (depending on the activity of partisans). For instance, on 14 May 1946, the Bureau analyzed the work of Panevėžys County Committee of the LKP(b) and stated that heads of party and repressive bodies

* **Doc. No. 4.17.** An extract from the report of January 1948 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus to the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) A. Zhdanov. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 215. p. 9–17.

* **Doc. No. 4.18.** The decision of 18 June 1948 by the Bureau of CK of the LKP(b) *On the Reinforcement of Political Work with the Population and the Liquidation of the Remaining Members of the Bourgeois Nationalistic Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 6. p. 64–68.

* **Doc. No. 4.19.** The note of July 1948 by the inspection brigade (Urazov, Butnevičius and Stasiūnas) of the CK of the LKP(b) to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov *On the Work of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Varėna County in Executing the Decision of 18 June 1948 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) On the Reinforcement of Political Work with the Population and the Liquidation of the Remaining Members of the Bourgeois Nationalistic Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 6. p. 127–130.

* **Doc. No. 4.20.** An extract from the conference of the heads of party and repressive bodies on 1 June 1949 *On Measures in Liquidation the Remaining Members of the Nationalistic Underground and its Bands during the Collectivization*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 7. p. 39–46.

* **Doc. No. 4.21.** The decision of 6 June 1949 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Intensifying of Fighting against Banditism and the Remaining Members of the Bourgeois Nationalistic Underground in Reference to the Formation of Kolkhozes in the Republic*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 7. p. 22–28.

“allowed the attitudes of criminal carelessness and complacency to emerge”. The Bureau obligated them to liquidate the armed underground in the shortest time possible (doc. No. 4.22).*

Special inspectors of the CK of the LKP(b) constantly informed the Bureau of the CK about the activity of local communists in fighting against partisans. The reports used to describe the political situation in counties and rural districts critically enough. Later, the CK of LKP(b) criticized local communists, mostly for political passiveness, bad organization of work in liquidating the underground, “violations of the revolutionary law” (crimes) and immoral conduct. For instance, on 8 May 1946, A.Sniečkus was informed that in 1946, the party committee of lazdišiai county only once considered the issue of fighting against partisans (“banditism”) and once the “violations of the revolutionary law”; moreover, “no means of fighting against this evil were planned” (doc. No. 4.23).*

With the deportation and imprisonment of the most active supporters of partisans, the social base and material support of the underground became weaker. From 1950, the number of fighters considerably decreased. Therefore, the CK of the LKP(b) intentionally no longer prepared anti-partisan decisions of general nature and focused their attention on specific counties where resistance fighters were most active. Besides, it was no longer convenient for the LKP(b) that the troops of the MGB demonstrated force in the countryside. Taking this into consideration, on 31 August 1951, P.Kapralov obligated his subordinates to conceal their actions during military operations as much as possible, and not to demonstrate them publicly as, for example, members of Daugai punitive battalion of the MGB did. P.Kapralov pointed out that this “gives rise to various rumours and unhealthy attitudes” (doc. No 4.24).*

The last decision of the antipartisan nature adopted on 31 December 1953 and called “On the Reinforcement of Measures in Fighting Against the Nationalistic Underground and Remaining Members of Bands in the republic” did not have any special political significance (doc. No. 4.25).*

5. Deportations*

One of the most important crimes of the Communist Party was deportations, that is, forced and mass displacement of Lithuanian people from their permanent places of living to the farthest northern and eastern regions of the SSRS. The purpose of the deportations was to remove the most active and rational opposition groups of the population and entire social layers, deprive them of their property and seize it, intimidate the Lithuanian nation and suppress any resistance to the occupation regime.¹

Until the Revival of Lithuania that began in 1988, the authorities of the LKP(b) and the KGB closely guarded all secrets associated with the deportations. The CK of the LKP even tried to dissociate themselves from the participation in Stalinist repressions, though they more than once publicly admitted that “the liquidation of the kulaks as a class and temporary displacement from the republic of the families of the members of the armed underground” were “the extraordinary measures” of the Soviet power which “positively affected the political and economic activity of the working peasantry”.²

All deportations of the Lithuanian population were cruel, executed promptly and insidiously. According to the data of the MGB-KGB of the LSSR, in 1945 – 1953, 106,000 – 108,000 of people or 29,230 families

* **Doc. No. 4.22.** The decision of 14 May 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Decision of 15 August 1945 by the CK of the VKP(b) On Fighting against the Bourgeois Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands and on the Execution of the Decision of 26 October 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) on this Issue in the County of Panevėžys.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 42–44.

* **Doc. No. 4.23.** A note of 8 May 1946 by an inspector of the CK of the LKP(b) to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus *On the Political Situation in the County of Lazdišiai.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 58. **Doc. No. 4.24.** An order of 31 August 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the Heads of the MGB Directorates of Vilnius, Kaunas, Šiauliai, Klaipėda counties and to the Heads of the Divisions of the MGB Districts of the LSSR about the concealment of military operations from the local population. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 390. p. 25.

* **Doc. No. 4.24.** An order of 31 August 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the Heads of the MGB Directorates of Vilnius, Kaunas, Šiauliai, Klaipėda counties and to the Heads of the Divisions of the MGB Districts of the LSSR about the concealment of military operations from the local population. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 390. p. 25.

* **Doc. No. 4.25.** An extract from the LKP decision of 31 December 1953 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Intensifying of Measures in Fighting against the Nationalistic Underground and the Remaining Members of Bands in the Republic.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 9. p. 36-41.

* **Literature and Sources**

were “displaced” (doc. No. 5.1*, doc. No. 5.2*, doc. No. 5.3*, doc. No. 4.2*, doc. No. 4.3*). According to the estimations of Lithuanian historians, these data are not accurate, but the documents of the State Security clearly testify to the crime committed by the Soviet power. Major or minor deportations of the Lithuanian population to the depths of the SSRS in 1945 – 1953 total 34.3 The accurate number of the deported people will be determined after the name lists of the deportees are announced.

In 1945 – 1953, deportations in Lithuania were organized by party, governmental and repressive bodies of the Soviet Union. Post-war deportations were executed on the basis of the directives and decisions of the CK of the VKP(b), the Council of People’s Commissars (the Council of Ministers) of the SSRS and the NKVD-MGB of the SSRS. They instructed what groups of people had to be deported, indicated the numbers of the deportees, deportation and forced employment sites. In 1945 – 1948, people were deported on the basis of the directives by the NKVD of the SSRS and the MGB of the SSRS. Starting with 1948, appropriate decisions in reference to the deportation were taken by the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the LSSR in compliance with the directives by the Government of the SSRS and the repressive bodies of the SSRS. Thus, a republican procedure for confirming Moscow directives emerged and the first body to approve them was the CK Bureau of the LKP(b).

It was not only the authorities of the CK of the LKP(b) alongside the NKVD (MGB) that organized the deportations and were personally responsible for them, but all secretaries of party committees in cities, counties and rural districts of Lithuania. For instance, in 1950, the Secretary of the LKP(b) committee of Ignalina district signed the list of the deported people (doc. No. 5.13).^{*} Officials of the NKVD and the MGB of the SSRS were sent to Lithuania to organize and execute deportations. For instance, on 23 July 1945, the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Gen. I.Tkachenko reported to L.Berija, V.Merkulov, B.Kobulov, M.Suslov and A.Sniečkus that in the operational sectors of Utena and Vilnius (7 counties), the deportation of the population on 17 July 1947 was well organized, unexpected and secret (doc. No. 5.4).^{*} Deportations were executed by the internal, border and convoy military units, local exterminators and the militia. All bodies of the Lithuanian Communist Party and power institutions subordinated to them actively participated and showed much initiative. On the eve of the deportations, the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars (the Council of Ministers) of the LSSR would adopt special top secret decisions and instructions on taking over the property of the deported people. For instance, on 18 May 1948, the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the LSSR adopted the decision “On Measures in Displacing Kulak Families – Supporters of Bandits and their Bands” (doc. No. 5.5).^{*}

The most important deportation documents prepared in Lithuania used to be signed by the best-known leaders of the LKP(b): the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR M.Gedvilas and the temporarily substituting him Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR K.Preikšas. This is typical historical evidence of collaborationism and ingratiation with Moscow. However, perhaps the most ardent in this was A.Sniečkus. At various party meetings, trying to raise the fighting spirit of his associates, he openly and boldly spoke about resolute measures to be applied in

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.1.** A note of 12 May 1988 by the KGB of the LSSR to the CK of the LKP about the deported people of Lithuania in 1941–1952. SLA. stk. 3377. inv. 58. f. 916. p. 1-3.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.2.** A note of 13 May 1958 by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR K. Preikšas to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP A. Sniečkus about the deported people. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 11. p. 122–130.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.3.** The note of 14 April 1953 by the Head of the 8th Division of the 1st Central Directorate of the MVD of the SSRS Lt. Gen. Zhukov *On the Contingent of the Displaced People from the Lithuanian SSR in 1945–1953*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 439. p. 247–249.

^{*} **Doc. No. 4.2.** A note of December 1952 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kondakov *On the Results of the Work of the MGB Bodies of the Lithuanian SSR in Fighting against the Nationalistic Underground and its Bands from 15 July 1944 to 15 December 1952*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 407. p. 264-265.

^{*} **Doc. No. 4.3.** A note of 25 October 1953 by the Head of the 4th Directorate of the MVD of the LSSR Maj. P. Raslanas *On the Results of the Work of the MVD Bodies of the Lithuanian SSR and Nationalistic Attacks from 15 June 1944 to 25 October 1953*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 441. p. 1–2.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.13.** A list of Kulak families deported from Ignalina district of Vilnius county signed by the Secretary of the LKP(b) Committee of Ignalina Beliakov in 1950 // The stocks of the Museum of the Genocide Victims. Vilnius.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.4.** A report of 23 July 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Lt. Gen. I. Tkachenko in regard to the deportations in the operational sectors of Utena and Vilnius. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 22. p. 98–102.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.5.** The decision of 18 May 1948 by the Council of Ministers of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP(b) *On Measures in Displacing Kulak Families, Supporters of Bandits and their Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 6. p. 36–37.

reference to the underground and “class enemies”. At the 6th Congress of the LKP(b) in 1949, A.Sniečkus emphasized that in 1948 “the displacement of kulaks performed a positive role”.⁴ At the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1949, having in mind the deportations of 1949, A.Sniečkus reminded communists that “the success of fighting against bourgeois-nationalists has always depended and now depends on the coordination of all forms of struggle – political, administrative, repressive, etc”.⁵ On 25 May 1948, he sent the CK of the VKP(b), the Minister of the MGB of the SSRS V.Abakumov and his deputy S.Ogoltsov the decision of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) which stated that the MGB correctly selected and in an organized manner deported 12,000 families (doc.No. 5.6).^{*} On 29 March 1949, A.Sniečkus expressed his gratitude to the MGB of the SSRS for “great assistance” in carrying out this job (doc. No. 5.7).^{*} On 28 September 1951, he signed the decision of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) which ordered the MGB of the LSSR to deport 4,000 “kulaks and their families” (doc. No. 5.8).^{*} A.Sniečkus also requested the Kremlin to deport families of resistance fighters (see the section “Suppression of the Resistance to the Soviet Occupation”).

Special authorized persons approved by the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars (the Council of Ministers) of the LSSR were assigned to each county from which people had to be deported (doc. No. 5.9).^{*} Usually, they were officials holding high positions at the Central Committee of the LKP(b) and People’s Commissariats. For instance, the Minister of Justice J.Blieka was assigned to Joniškis county (doc. No. 5.10),^{*} the Managing Secretary of the Party College at the CK of the LKP(b) V.Petraitis to Pasvalys county (doc. No. 5.11),^{*} the Chairman of the Supreme Court K.Didžiulis to Biržai county (doc. No. 5.12),^{*} the Minister of Health Care B.Penkauskas (Penkovskij) to Tauragė county, the Minister of Finances A.Drobnys to Telšiai county, the Minister of Fishing Industry V.Mickevičius to Trakai county, etc. (about 50 persons have been identified – V.T.). Together with secretaries of county party committees and chairmen of executive committees they were personally responsible for the participation of party activists in deportations and confiscation of property, helped with the preparation of lists of the people to be deported, organized making the inventory of the property left behind by the deportees and the appropriation (confiscation). These authorized people alongside representatives of local repressive bodies briefed local party-Soviet activists on how to operate during deportations. The authorized people were responsible for the appropriation and distribution of the property of the deported people.

In 1948, a group of authorized people from four or five counties was headed by the highest-ranking administration officials of the LSSR: the Personnel Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) D.Shupikov supervised the authorized people in Kėdainiai, Prienai, Kaišiadorys and Kaunas counties, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR M.Šumauskas – Alytus, Lazdijai, Marijampolė, Vilkaviškis, Šakiai counties, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of LSSR P.Oleka – Telšiai, Klaipėda, Kretinga, Plungė, Mažeikiai counties, etc. (doc.No. 5.9).^{*} Other Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR E.Ozarskis, A.Sokolov, K.Liaudis and K.Preikšas also belonged to this commanding group. Most of them were also members of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b). With the change in

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.6.** A decision of 25 May 1948 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) in reference to the deportation of 12,000 families. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 6. p. 60.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.7.** A decision of 29 March 1949 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) in regard to the results of the deportation of people from Lithuania on 25–28 March 1949. LSA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 7. p. 21.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.8.** The decision of 28 September 1951 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Displacement of Kulaks and their Families*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 8. p. 139.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.9.** Lists of 1948 of authorized people for the deportation in counties under the highest-ranking officials of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 6. p. 53–54. 1 copy.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.10.** An account of 5 June 1948 by the Minister of Justice of the LSSR, an official authorized by the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the LSSR J. Blieka to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the results of the deportations in the county of Joniškis. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 257. p. 58.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.11.** Political information of 6 January 1948 by the representative of the CK of the LKP(b) V. Petraitis and the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) M. Mikalauskas to the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Displacement of Bandit Families and their Supporters from our County*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 237. p. 14-15.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.12.** An account of 19 July 1945 by the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the LSSR, an official authorized by the Council of People’s Commissars of the LSSR and the CK of the LKP(b) K. Didžiulis to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the deportation of people from Trakai county. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 194. p. 81.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.14.** An account for 1945 by the instructor of the Division of Sovkhozos of the CK of the LKP(b) V. Sakalauskas to the CK of the LKP(b) about the deportations in the county of Raseiniai. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 194. p. 80.

the administrative division of Lithuania in 1950, the four First Secretaries of regional committees of the LKP(b) became responsible for deportations: D.Shupikov, F.Bieliauskas in Vilnius region, E.Ozarskis in Kaunas region, M.Šumauskas in Šiauliai region and K.Liaudis in Klaipėda region.

During deportations, these authorized people would temporarily become the highest local administrative power in the counties assigned to them. Not only the first secretaries and chairmen of executive committees, but also heads of the divisions of the NKVD-NKGB (MGB) were responsible to them. In 1945, in his report to the CK of the LKP(b), the instructor of the Sovkhozes Division of the CK of the LKP(b) V.Sakalauskas requested an authorized person to be sent to Raseiniai county in order to restrain troops of the NKVD from plundering the property of deportees (doc. No. 5.14).^{*} However, it was not only State Security personnel that participated in thefts, but also communists, Komsomol members, exterminators, etc. (doc. No. 5.15).^{*} Such documents abound.

The so-called party-Soviet armed activists in cities and in the country enjoyed a special status in these anti-humane acts. For instance, on 8 January 1948, the First Secretary of Kupiškis County Party Committee of the LKP(b) P.Grigėnas informed A.Sniečkus that on 29 December 1947, the Party Committee and the executives of the MGB-MVD held a closed meeting of heads of rural districts, activists and MGB-MVD personnel. The same day, a group of 135 activists was armed and sent to rural districts to deport people (doc. No. 5.16).^{*} The First Secretary of Kėdainiai County Party Committee of the LKP(b) J.Piligrimas informed A.Sniečkus that on 21 May 1948, conferences of party-Soviet activists were held in the city and all counties. 162 activists participated in the operation (doc. No. 5.17).^{*} Being better familiar with local conditions and the population, they helped execute deportations and afterwards take inventory of the confiscated property. City “activists” also used to be sent to the country. For instance, on 8 May 1948, the Party Committee of Klaipėda city sent 330 activists (doc. No. 5.18).^{*}

Deportation plans and details of their organization were kept in utmost secrecy. Only the top command of the LKP(b) knew them. Ordinary party members and activists used to be informed about the beginning of the operation at the last moment. In 1945, the person authorized by the CK J.Stimburys informed the CK of the LKP(b) that party activists in Šiauliai county were not informed of the deportation (doc. No. 5.19).^{*} On 27 May 1948, the First Secretary of Joniškis County Party Committee P.Kunčinas wrote to A.Sniečkus that in order to prevent peasants from suspecting that deportations would take place, party activists sent to the counties were obligated to settle issues pertaining to the acceleration of cattle-raising produce deliveries to the State.⁶ A.Sniečkus demanded that his subordinates send name lists of people that were not deported (were not at home at the time or had run away) to the CK of the LKP(b). Attempts were made to specifically ascertain what people had not been repressed. For instance, on 28 May 1948, the First Secretary of Kaunas city of the LKP(b) K.Gabdank sent A.Sniečkus a list of 57 such people (doc.No. 5.20).^{*}

After deportations, “an extensive explanatory work” was carried out in each rural district: people driven to meetings by force would listen to speeches made by the authorized people and representatives of local power about the necessity of deportations and the “fair” policy of the Communist Party and the Government. Later, in their reports, the authorized people or secretaries of county party committees would cynically lie that “the main mass of the population” approved of the deportations and would also supply examples of how the local population rejoiced at “the displacement of kulak and bandit families”. For instance, in July 1945, the Deputy

^{*} **Doc. Nr. 5.15.** An account of 24 June 1948 by the Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Radviliškis county Goriunov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus about the deportations in the county of Radviliškis. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 257. p. 64.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.16.** An account of 8 January 1948 by the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Kupiškis county P. Grigėnas to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the deportations in the county of Kupiškis. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 236. p. 102–104.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.17.** An account of 21 May 1948 by the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Kėdainiai county J. Piligrimas to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the deportations in the county of Kėdainiai. SLA. stk. 749. inv. 749-8. f. 1. p. 111–112.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.18.** The information of 8 May 1948 by the Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Klaipėda city A. Smirnov to the CK of the LKP(b) about the participation of party-Soviet activists in the deportations. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 235. p. 21–22.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.19.** An account of 30 July 1945 by an official authorized by the CK of the LKP(b) J. Stimburys about the deportations in the county of Šiauliai. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 194. p. 92.

^{*} **Doc. No. 5.20.** A report of 28 May 1948 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) of Kaunas city K. Gabdank to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the people who were not deported. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 235. p. 7–9.

Chief of the Sovkhozes Division of the CK of the LKP(b) V.Poliakus wrote that after the deportations in Mažeikiai county, “the overall mood of the peasantry was good” (doc.No. 5.21).*

The frightened people, apparently wanting to seem obedient and loyal to the Soviet system, tried to follow all the instructions of the authorities. On 28 May 1948, the First Secretary of Kėdainiai County Committee of the LKP(b) J.Piligrimas boasted to A.Sniečkus that right after the deportations, mandatory deliveries of agricultural produce to the State grew 3 – 5 times and reception points could not cope with their work (doc. No. 5.17).* On 5 June 1948, the Minister of Justice J.Blieka informed A.Sniečkus that “the desire to join collective farms is observed in the county” and that this opportunity had to be taken advantage of (doc. No. 5.10).*

To prevent close relatives of party and Soviet functionaries from being included in the lists of deportees, on 5 March 1949, A.Sniečkus and the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR N.Gorlinskij signed a decree which pointed out that, when close relatives of important Soviet, scientific and other distinguished employees got onto the lists of the deportees, “each individual case must be considered separately and submitted to the CK of the KP(b) of Lithuania to be sanctioned”.⁷ Relatives of well-known executors of the genocide K.Didžiulis, D.Rocius, etc. made use of this decree.

The list of partially identified top-level officials of the LSSR administration (the Council of Ministers of the LSSR and persons in counties authorized by the CK of the LKP(b) who organized and executed deportations in 1948 (doc.No. 5.9).

Aleknavičius Stasys – ?

Augustinaitis Vladas – the Minister of Cattle-Raising of the LSSR in 1946 – 1950; the Minister of Agriculture in 1950 – 1956, a member of the CK of the LKP(b)

Bakhmetjev P. – the Managing Organizer of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947

Bilevičius Elijas – the Minister of Fishing Industry of the LSSR in 1950 – 1953

Bylinskij V. – the Managing Organizer of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947

Baranauskas Boleslovas – the Chairman of the Republican Council of the Trade Unions of the LSSR in 1945 – 1958

Blieka Jurgis – the Minister of Justice of the LSSR in 1946 – 1951

Didžiulis (Grosmanas) Karolis – the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the LSSR in 1947 – 1958, a member of the CK of the LKP(b)

Drobnys Aleksandras – the Minister of Finance of the LSSR in 1944 – 1957

Gailevičius Alfonsas – the Commissioner of the Council of Religious Cults at the Council of Ministers of the SSRS in the Lithuanian SSR in 1944 – 1948, the Deputy Minister of the MGB of the LSSR in 1948 – 1953

Kulygin – the Secretary of Vilnius City Committee of the LKP(b) in 1947 (?)

Karaliūnas Povilas – the Deputy Minister of Sovkhozes of the LSSR in 1946 – 1953

Junčas-Kučinskas Mykolas – the Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR in 1947 – 1959

Kurys Povilas – the Minister of Local Industry of the LSSR in 1947 – 1949; the Minister of Forestry and Paper Industry in 1949 – 1951; the Minister of Forestry and Paper Industry in 1951 – 1957

Liaudis Kazimieras – the Minister of Agriculture of the LSSR and the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR in 1947 – 1950, the First Secretary of Klaipėda County Committee of the LKP(b) in 1950 – 1953

Liubimtsev Nikolaj – the Minister of Building Materials Industry of the LSSR in 1946 – 1953

* **Doc. No. 5.21.** A report of 31 July 1945 by the Deputy Head of the Division of Sovkhozes of the CK of the LKP(b) V. Poliakus to the CK of the LKP(b) about the deportations in the county of Mažeikiai. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 194. p. 26.

* **Doc. No. 5.17.** An account of 21 May 1948 by the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Kėdainiai county J. Piligrimas to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the deportations in the county of Kėdainiai. SLA. stk. 749. inv. 749-8. f. 1. p. 111–112.

* **Doc. No. 5.10.** An account of 5 June 1948 by the Minister of Justice of the LSSR, an official authorized by the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the LSSR J. Blieka to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the results of the deportations in the county of Joniškis. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 257. p. 58.

Macijauskas Jonas – the Head of the Political Division of the Republican Military Commissariat of Lithuania in 1946 – 1950; the Military Commissar of the LSSR in 1950 – 1962

Mickevičius Vaclovas – the Minister of Fishing Industry of the LSSR in 1949 – 1951

Moskvinov Anatolij – the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1950 – 1952; the Second Secretary of Vilnius Region Committee of the LKP(b) in 1952 – 1953

Murauskas Petras – the First Secretary of Tauragė County Committee of the LKP(b) in 1944 – 1947; the Chairman of the Bureau for the Organization of Agricultural Cooperation in 1947 – 1949; the Deputy Chairman of Šiauliai County Executive Committee in 1950 – 1951; the Deputy Minister of Meat and Dairy Industry of the LSSR in 1951 – 1953

Načas Eduardas – a Representative of the Directorate of Cultural and Educational Institutions in 1947

Niunka Vladas – the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR in 1944 – 1948; the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1948 – 1961; a member of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) in 1944 – 1961

Olekas Pranas – the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR in 1947 – 1950

Ozarskis Eduardas – the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1946 – 1950; the First Secretary of Kaunas County Committee of the LKP(b) in 1950 – 1953

Penkauskas, Penkovskij, Bronislavas – the Minister of Health Care of the LSSR in 1947 – 1957

Petraitis Vladislovas – the Managing Secretary of the Party College at the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947 – 1953

Poliakus V. – the Deputy Chief of the Division of Sovkhozes of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945

Ponomariov Aleksandr – the Minister of Forestry Industry of the LSSR in 1946 – 1948; the Minister of Forestry and Paper Industry in 1948 – 1949

Preikšas Kazys – the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1940 – 1948; the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR in 1948 – 1960; a member of the CK Bureau of the LKP in 1940 – 1954

Savchenko S. – the Managing Organizer of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947

Sichkarchuk P. – the Deputy Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947

Skardis Antanas – the Director of the Republican Party School at the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945 – 1954

Sokolov Aleksandr – the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR in 1946 – 1954

Sorokin M. – the Second Secretary of Panevėžys County Committee of the LKP(b) in 1947

Svischov Jakov – the Minister of Communal Economy of the LSSR in 1946 – 1957

Stimburys Juozas – the Minister of Social Security of the LSSR in 1946 – 1960

Šumauskas Motiejus – the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR in 1946 – 1950; the First Secretary of Šiauliai Region Committee of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1950 – 1953

Shupikov Danijil – the Personnel Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947 – 1950; the Secretary of Vilnius Region Committee of the LKP(b) in 1950 – 1952

Terioshin Fiodor – the Minister of Light Industry of the LSSR in 1946 – 1953

Tirkunov A. – the Deputy Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947

Volf – ?

A supplementary list of the authorized people of the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of Ministers of the LSSR

Artemjev P. – ?, the authorized person of Kelmė county in April 1949

Bražūnis Leonardas – the Head of the Personnel Division of the Directorate of the Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, the authorized person of Lazdijai county in December 1947

Dubinins P. – the People's Deputy Commissar of the Agriculture of the LSSR, the authorized person of Alytus county in February 1946

Girdvainis Juozas – the Assistant to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR M.Gedvilas, the authorized person of Kretinga county in December 1947

Gorokhov Timofej – the Deputy Minister of Trade of the LSSR, the authorized person of Panevėžys county in December 1947

Malygin Aleksandr – the Head of the Central Directorate on Literature and Publishing Houses at the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, the authorized person of Radviliškis county in December 1947

Petryla Danielius – the Deputy Manager of the Affairs of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, the authorized person of Plungė county in January 1948

Rimšelis P. - ?, the authorized person of Biržai county in July 1945

Sakalauskas V. – the Instructor of the Sovkhozes Division of the CK of the LKP(b), the authorized person of Lazdijai county in February 1946

Senkevičius T. - ?, the authorized person of Plungė county in April 1949

Solovjov P. - ?, the authorized person of Jurbarkas county in June 1948

6. Forced Elections*

The Communist Party paid special attention to the “legitimacy” of the Soviet power in Lithuania, to its ostensible “legality”, particularly during the preparation for the first post-war elections. In order to form an impression that the state power was represented by “the working people” or “people’s masses”, forced elections to the highest state organs of the SSRS and the LSSR as well as to local power bodies were arranged almost every year. Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR and “the Soviets of working people’s deputies” in cities, counties, towns, rural districts and parts of rural districts were a constituent part of the policy of Sovietization of Lithuania. By them, the Communist Party tried to emphasize the “democratic” character of the political system of the SSRS, whereas the ostensibly active participation of the Lithuanian nation in the elections had to demonstrate the approval of the Soviet system and the “voluntary” existence of Lithuania in the SSRS. Elections were of practical importance, too: in this way, the Communist Party officially included its members and supporters in power bodies of the state.

All elections to different levels of Soviets, organized by the Communist Party, were anti-democratic, forced, fictitious, discriminatory and criminal in their character. People agitating to vote against or not voting for communists at all were regarded as enemies of the Soviet system. They sustained or could sustain repressions or became the targets of the persecution by State Security personnel – “shadowed by them” – (“vziat v razrabotku” – Russ.). For example, on 17 December 1945, the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR D.Jefimov informed the authorities of the NKGB of the SSRS about the discontent of certain Lithuanian people with the organization of the election to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS. One of them, a solo singer of Kaunas Opera Theater Romanas Marijošius speaking with his friends made an uncautious remark that “before the elections the Bolsheviks promise non-existing wealth to workers and peasantry of the Soviet Union”. For such talks, R.Marijošius found himself under the observation of the State Security (doc.No. 6.1. p.63).*

According to Clause 113 of the Constitution of the LSSR, in the preparation for the elections, the Communist Party was given a monopolistic role: only “communist party” and other public organizations – “trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, cultural societies”, which were also under the control of the Communist Party, were given the right to announce candidacies. For propaganda reasons, a well-known person in Lithuania could be appointed the Chairman of the Central Election Commission. On 11 October 1946, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) nominated the famous writer Petras Cvirka for this post; however, in fact, the Secretary of this commission E.Ozarskis was in charge of all affairs. He was the Personnel Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b), whose responsibilities included the issues of political reliability of the personnel, i.e. of all

* Literature and Sources

* **Doc. No. 6.1.** Extracts from a note of 17 December 1945 by the Acting Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. D. Jefimov to the Commissar of the NKGB of the SSRS V. Merkulov, the Head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the SSRS Lt. Gen. Fedotov, the Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the SSRS S. Ogoltsov in regard to the anti-Soviet activities and intelligence-operational measures in preparing for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 23. p. 55, 62–64.

deputies (doc.No. 6.3).^{*} The party regulated the percentage proportions of party and non-party deputies (non-party deputies had to make up not less than 20 – 25 per cent) as well as the number of men and women (women had to make up not less than 30 per cent) (doc.No. 6.4).^{*}

Not a single citizen of the SSRS could become a deputy without the assent of party committees. All elections were held without nominating any alternative candidacies. The rights of citizens were brutally violated. Not all people were equal by law; certain categories of people were intentionally not included in the lists of voters, though Clause 2 of the Regulations of the Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS stated that “all citizens of the USSR who are 18 years old, regardless of their race or nationality, sex, religion, educational qualification, permanent place of residence, social origin, property status or previous activity, shall be ensured the right to participate in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS”.¹

On 11 November 1945, the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) discussed the issue of not including certain groups of the population of the Lithuanian SSR in the lists of voters and made a decision to exclude all the registered families of partisans, killed and arrested people, persons who had worked in political bodies during the Nazi occupation as well as their family members, well-off peasants (“the kulaks”), those dispossessed of all their land or part of it (as a result of the Soviet “land reform”), people of the German nationality and their families, also the families of those who had signed to repatriate to Poland. The number of people debarred from the election amounted to approximately 300,000.² On 12 November 1945, M.Suslov and A.Sniečkus asked G.Malenkov to approve their decision (doc.No. 6.5).^{*} After the decision, prepared by M.Suslov, was approved by the CK of the VKP(b), at conferences of the CK of the VKP(b), A.Sniečkus and the Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the LSSR S.Pupeikis ordered not to include persons with anti-Soviet attitudes in the lists of voters.³ Everything was kept in the utmost secrecy. At the 8th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) held on 6 – 7 December 1945 “On the Tasks of Party Organizations with Regard to the Election to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS”, the fact that certain groups of people were not included in the lists of voters was not even mentioned.

Preparation for the elections used to be performed under anti-democratic conditions and rough pressure. According to the information of the First Secretary of Zarasai County Committee of the LKP(b) E.Kasnauskaitė, an agitator of Zarasai town, teacher P. explained to her electors: “What kind of election is this? Everything is done for the sake of appearance. People are forced to vote for the nominated candidate by weapon”. Speaking with village people, the agitator of Kadagikiai village of Imbradas rural district A.Novikov instructed them that “during the voting, you can go into the booth and cross out the names of the deputies nominated by the Soviet power”. According to E.Kasnauskaitė, these people spread “anti-Soviet attitudes”.⁴ In the information to the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) K.Preikšas, it was reported that a teacher of Kamajai rural district of Rokiškis county spoke at a meeting devoted to the election: “Elect communists, leave non-party people be”. The peasant K.Bačiulis from the rural district of Kamajai said: “Russians occupied us, let Russians command”.⁵

Each time, problems of the organization of elections used to be dealt with at the plenums of the CK of the LKP(b). Political directives to city and county party authorities were given at them. For example, at the 15th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947, having read the report on the preparation for the election to the local Soviets, K.Preikšas pointed out that “the work of party organizations in the election will be estimated by the number of voters who will come to the polls, by the results of the election”.⁶ It was a serious warning and a clear instruction to seek better results.

Falsification of election results was the main attribute of the communist elections. Nobody controlled them because there were no political opponents or public observers. The members of the election commissions

^{*} **Doc. No. 6.3.** A decision of 15 October 1946 by the Bureau of CK of the LKP(b) in regard to the nomination of P. Cvirka as the Chairman and E. Ozarskij as the Secretary of the Central Election Commission of the LSSR in preparing for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 118.

^{*} **Doc. No. 6.4.** A decision of 14 November 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) in regard to the candidates for the deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 122.

^{*} **Doc. No. 6.5.** The letter of 12 November 1945 by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov and the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus to the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) G. Malenkov *On the Exclusion of some Groups of the Population of the LSSR from the Lists of the Electors*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 3. p. 128–129.

were assigned by party committees themselves, therefore, at the end of the election day, the ballots that had not been used would quite often be put into the ballot boxes. Thus, the desired result would be achieved, which often reached almost 99 – 100 per cent. For example, in 1947, during the election to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR, in the county of Zarasai, 99.9 per cent of voters “came” to vote and “supported” the candidates. Most probably the most “unsuccessful” election to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR was in 1946. By the official data of the CK of the LKP(b), 91.78 per cent of voters “participated” in the election and 95.4 per cent “voted” for the communist candidates (doc. No. 6.6)*.

Judging by the final results, falsification of elections was made in election districts and the Central Committee of the LKP(b) which would doctor the primary data. For example, according to the data of the CK, in the county of Marijampolė, 75.5 per cent of voters went to the polls, whereas according to the summary tables of the staff of the NKVD troops, whose people not only guarded election constituencies, but also participated in the counting of ballots, 54 per cent of those included in the electoral lists voted in the election; in Alytus county, 83.7 per cent and 32 per cent, and in Lazdijai county 84.5 per cent and 38 per cent respectively.⁷ (doc. No. 6.7)*. At the 9th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), I.Tkachenko explained that people did not go to the polls because they were afraid of partisans’ revenge, therefore, in the counties of Alytus, Lazdijai and Marijampolė only 20-30 per cent of electors had given their vote by 6 p.m. 90 vehicles were allocated to take election commissions to people’s homes. Due to this, the number of voters could be increased by 60-75 per cent (doc. No. 6.2)*. J.Paleckis demagogically claimed that once again, as in the elections of 1940 and 1941, the Lithuanian nation expressed its resolution to go the Soviet way”.⁸ In general, all these figures are not reliable, but the manipulation of them was an indication that for the first time the Soviet power faced an open boycott of the elections by quite a considerable part of the society.

Having failed to conceal the facts of falsification of the election in the county of Alytus, on 5 March 1946, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) penalized the heads of the election commission J.Matačinskas and K.Lydys, giving them “a reprimand” and “a severe reprimand to be recorded into the personal records file” respectively. K.Lydys was also dismissed from the position of the secretary of the propaganda committee (doc. No. 6.8)*. Now, it is not clear what for the penalty was – perhaps communists of Alytus were too conscientious and did not act as party committees of Vilnius, Joniškis and Klaipėda counties or Vilnius, Ukmergė, Švenčionys and Rokiškis cities that “achieved” 100 per cent electors “to participate” in the elections. In 1947, in the election to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR such excesses or misunderstandings did not occur any more. Party committees became well aware of how to vote; later, 98-99 per cent of electors “participated” and “voted”.

In preparing for the elections, an important function was performed by agitators who had to visit electors at home and ensure the arrival of those voters who were assigned to them. Although it was declared that the ballot was secret, it was but a rare person who would go to the equipped voting booths in election constituencies. At the 8th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR J.Paleckis directed county authorities that electors should avoid using these booths: “A person having no doubts at all will take the ballot and go straight to the ballot box, and only the one who wants to cross out will go to the booth.”⁹ Nevertheless, according to official data, in the election of 1946, those persons who dared to cross out “candidates” made up more than 54,000.¹⁰

Individual farms prevailed in Lithuanian country. Country people avoided such elections; therefore, members of election commissions themselves, escorted by exterminators and State Security personnel, used to go to individual farmsteads carrying ballot boxes. Therefore, under such conditions, to refuse to vote or cross out the candidate was impossible.

* **Doc. No. 6.6.** An extract from the account by the CK of the LKP(b) for 1947 to the CK of the VKP(b) in regard to the implementation of the decision of 5 October 1946 by the CK of the VKP(b) *On the Work of the CK of the Lithuanian KP(b)*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 242. p. 47.

* **Doc. No. 6.7.** A report of 10 February 1946 by the Chief Military Commander of the NKVD troops of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Vetrov and the Head of the Operational Staff Pankin to the Commissar of the NKVD of the LSSR Maj. Gen. J. Bartašiūnas about the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 104. p. 53–54.

* **Doc. No. 6.2.** An extract from the speech of 4 April 1946 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Lt. Gen. I. Tkachenko at the 9th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv.9. f. 5. p. 65.

* **Doc. No. 6.8.** The decision of 5 March 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Violations of the Election Regulations to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS in the County of Alytus*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 29.

To the very end of the armed resistance, not a single event organized by communists was so strongly opposed as elections. Everyone was well aware of the political significance of this action. In 1946, a partisan document said: "Since these elections do not follow the principles of democracy and are a mockery of human rights, our task is to harm and hinder the election campaign as much as possible".¹¹ By different means, partisans urged not to vote, used to attack election constituencies or fire upon them, destroy election lists, etc. During the election campaign of 1946 alone, 667 partisans were killed. Taking this into consideration, the LKP(b) organized military protection of these constituencies. Units of the NKVD-MGB exterminators and party-Soviet activists were responsible for this. The election was under the control of the operational staff of the troops of the NKVD-MGB of the LSSR. It was in charge of up to 20,000 military personnel who, divided into groups of 8 to 12, guarded all election constituencies.¹²

"In preparing for the election, military units are of fairly good assistance to us", stated the First Secretary of Party Committee of Tauragė County P. Murauskas. However, he expressed concern that in selecting the members of the election commission – communists – it turned out that the majority of them were the personnel of the NKVD and the NKGB.¹³ Making preparations for later elections, the number of military personnel was being cut down. In 1951, during the election to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR, "the cover" was provided by 13,064 military personnel (doc. No. 6.9)*.

All post-war elections were going on under the conditions of armed struggle, political pressure and terror. Ordinary people of Lithuania faced threats by the communist power, demonstration of the Soviet military force and acts by repressive bodies. On the other hand, they were constantly urged by partisans to boycott the elections. No result of elections organized under such conditions, could be true.

For the authorities of the VKP(b), the elections (to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS in 1946, to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR in 1947 and to the local Soviets in 1948) were important in two political aspects. First, the stage of Sovietization of Lithuania was formally completed. Second, Moscow now could demonstrate to the world that after the war Lithuanians themselves chose "the guardianship" of the Soviet Union as well as its political system. During later years, re-elections to these Soviets lost their political significance, and the Communist Party gradually stopped employing special political means and physical pressure. Having been intimidated by the red terror, people openly did not object to and participated in forced elections.

7. Russianization*

In its post-war activity, the VKP(b) followed not only the so-called ideology of Marxism-Leninism, but also the Russian super-state chauvinism. Under a veil of communist ideas, home and foreign policy of the Bolsheviks was based on the old imperial tradition of Russia. The model of the state pursued by Stalin was a powerful communist state where all nations were allegedly equal yet guided by the "great Russian nation". As early as 1 December 1937, the Politburo of the CK of the VKP(b) adopted several decisions: "On National Schools", "On the Liquidation of National District and Country Soviets" and "On the Publishing of Russian Newspapers in the Ukraine" that limited the rights of national minorities (doc. No. 7.1).^{*} On 13 March 1938, the CK of the VKP(b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the SSRS adopted the decision "On mandatory learning of the Russian language in National Republics and Regions." One of the clauses of the decision stated that from 1 September 1938, mandatory teaching of the Russian language starting with the second and third forms was introduced in all schools of the Soviet Union (doc. No. 7.2).^{*} After the war, this requirement was transferred to the education system of Lithuania.

* **Doc. No. 6.9.** A note of 16 February 1951 by the Head of the 2nd Division of the 2nd Directorate of the MGB of the LSSR G. Chakhava about the deployment of military forces in Lithuania in preparing for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 387. p. 103.

* **Literature and Sources**

* **Doc. No. 7.1.** The decisions of 1 December 1937 by the Politburo of the CK of the VKP(b) *On National Schools, On the Liquidation of National District and Rural Councils and On the Publishing of Russian Newspapers in the Ukraine.* SRCDNHR. stk. 17. inv. 3. f. 983, 994, 1004.

* **Doc. No. 7.2.** An extract from the decision of 13 March 1938 by the CK of the VKP(b) and the Council of People's Commissars *On the Mandatory Studying of the Russian Language in National Republics and Regions.* SRCDNHR. stk. 17. inv. 3. f. 998.

On 1 January 1944, Stalin approved the new anthem of the SSRS, the words of which “The union of free republics has forever been firmly conjoined by the great Russian nation” became the symbol of the Soviet imperial power and Russianization. On 7 January 1944, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) approved the text of the Lithuanian translation of this anthem by the poet A.Venclova, and it became the official anthem of the Lithuanian SSR (doc. No. 7.3).*

The post-war Stalinist policy of the VKP(b) guaranteed a privileged position of Russians and Russian-speaking people throughout the Soviet Union. For the Lithuanian public, Russia used to be portrayed as one of the principal sources of the European civilization, claiming that it had constantly experienced attacks by hostile neighbouring nations, though it had always assisted them in developing culture and education and in liberating them from the yoke of oppressors.

Russianization of Lithuania was conducted according to the plan and in several directions: through the policy of the cadre, the system of science and education (young people had to compulsorily study Russian since childhood), cultural institutions (theatres, cinemas, libraries, etc.) and by calling men up to the Soviet Army. The most important sources of Russianization in Lithuania were the apparatus of the CK of the LKP(b) (particularly the Division of Agitation and Propaganda), the Glavlit, repressive bodies, Republican Military Commissariat, and also agencies, enterprises and organizations subordinated to the Union.

Russianization became a constituent part of “the socialist cultural revolution”, though it was not legitimized by any documents or decisions. The Communist Party designated Russianization as “proletarian internationalism”: all the nations of the SSRS were equal, but “the most equal” of all was the Russian nation, “the elder brother”, rendering altruistic assistance to the others. The Russian language forced its way into the public life of Lithuania not only as the office language, but also as the common, second “native” language.

It was strictly forbidden to critically assess the Russianization policy, the more so, to oppose it. Because of that, people, even the leading Lithuanian communists, were accused of “bourgeois nationalism” and that could become an additional accusation. For instance, in 1951, the MGB of the LSSR were gathering evidence against the former Minister of Education of the LSSR (1943-1948) communist J.Žiugžda under whose alleged instructions during the first post-war years in Lithuania “much less time was allotted to teaching Russian than in other republics of the Union” (doc. No. 1.52). In 1951, the Director of the Republican Pedagogical Office A.Iešmanta was arrested and accused of “nationalism”, disregard for the assistance of the Russian nation to Lithuania, etc. (doc. No. 1.49).

During the post-war years, the Russian language established itself in all higher power institutions of Lithuania very fast. Having come to Lithuania, party functionaries explained to Lithuanians that the Russian nation was the leading force of the Soviet Union. In the opinion of A.Fedotov, the editor of the newspaper “Sovietskaja Litva” (the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945), the intelligentsia of Lithuania did not understand the historical mission of the Russian nation: “Among all the nations of our country, the Russian nation, as the leading force of the Soviet Union, has earned universal acknowledgement.[...] This acknowledgement has been won by the Russian nation due to the incessant assistance which it rendered to all other nations [...]. As the elder brother in the family of Soviet nations, it helped its brothers to create new life and develop culture” (doc. No. 7.4).* A.Fedotov regretted that the memory for the Russian military commanders M.Kutuzov, A.Suvorov and the poet A. Pushkin was not perpetuated.

Soon after this speech, not only the street named after Suvorov, Kutuzov Square, and a memorial for Pushkin at the foot of Gediminas hill appeared, but the names of other officials of Russian culture were also perpetuated. This process was taken care of throughout Lithuania. The CK Bureau of the LKP(b) would annually consider plans and programs for the mandatory celebration of birth and death anniversaries of famous Russian and Lithuanian functionaries. For instance, a decision was made to arrange republican-level celebrations to the writer I.Krylov in 1944, to M.Kutuzov in 1945, twice to V.Lenin, and also to the pedagogue K.Ushinskij, the Lithuanian party functionary V.Kapsukas and the writer Žemaitė. Tribute was also paid to the Soviet General I.Cherniakhovskij. On 6 June 1951, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) decided to

* **Doc. No. 7.3.** An excerpt from the decision of 7 January 1944 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Translation of the Anthem of the Soviet Union into the Lithuanian Language*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 20. p. 1–10.

* **Doc. No. 7.4.** An extract from the speech by the Editor-in-Chief of the “*Sovietskaya Litva*” newspaper A. Fedotov delivered at 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 23 August 1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 14. p.69–71.

perpetuate the memory of the writer M.Gorkij in Lithuania: to erect a monument in Vilnius, to name streets in Vilnius and Kaunas, and Šiauliai Teachers' Institute after him (doc. No. 7.5).*

With the formation of the atmosphere pervaded by suspicion, the leading personnel in education and culture were afraid that Russian-speaking people would discern manifestations of nationalism in the traditions of the Lithuanian nation and culture or that historical facts would cause negative associations. The Glavlit forbade to publish satires and "The National Hymn" by V.Kudirka, whereas the division of the Polish-Lithuanian State and the annexation of Lithuania to Russia became positive historical phenomena for historians (J.Jurginis, J.Žiugžda). At the 7th Congress of the LKP(b) in 1952, J.Žiugžda emphasized that "the analysis of historical facts demonstrates [...] how the culture of the Lithuanian nation developed under the influence of the much higher culture of the Russian nation. [...] The annexation of Lithuania to Russia, notwithstanding the cruel yoke of czarism, made all prerequisites [...] for the consolidation of the Lithuanian nation, for the formation of the national Lithuanian language" (doc. No. 7.6).*

It was aimed at making Russian the second native language. Mandatory teaching of Russian was introduced into gymnasiums: in the academic year of 1944/1945 it was allotted the same number of hours as the Lithuanian language – 1,176. The corresponding number of hours had to be allotted to teaching Lithuanian at Russian schools (doc. No. 7.7*); however, Russian-speaking people never learnt Lithuanian. Teaching of Russian was introduced even in primary schools, though there were no teachers of Russian at that time. In 1947-1948, the number of weekly lessons for teaching Russian in these schools (starting with the second form) was 16, and for the native Lithuanian language – 38.1

During the post-war years, about 13,000 people, mostly Russian-speaking, arrived in Lithuania from the SSRS.² The Russianization policy was particularly actively executed in the multinational southeastern region of Lithuania, where it was extremely difficult to establish Lithuanian schools, and in Vilnius and Klaipėda cities. From 1950, the Russian language came to be taught in Polish comprehensive schools. For the Lithuanian population, particularly the intelligentsia, the speedy Russianization of Lithuania was a painful experience, yet, terrified by the policy of state terror and repressions, they had no strength to oppose this process. At secret party sittings or meetings, the high-ranking officials of the administration of the LSSR J.Paleckis and M.Gedvilas admitted that Lithuania was being Russianized. At the CK Plenum of the LKP in 1953, M.Gedvilas said, "In nearly all institutions in the capital, county and even, in some cases, rural district center that he (a Lithuanian – V.T.) had to apply to, officials would reply not in Lithuanian".³ J.Paleckis and M.Gedvilas put this question to the authorities of the LKP(b), but were accused of Lithuanian nationalism and silenced (doc. No. 1.36).* At the 5th Plenum of the CK of the LKP in 1953 (during the period of the political influence of L.Berija), A. Sniečkus was forced to admit that "we often ignored the Lithuanian language in the political mass work".⁴

Moscow sent its own people to these posts, mostly Russians or Russian-speaking personnel that were often hostile to Lithuania. By 1 April 1945, 6,116 employees came to Lithuania with the "routing passes" of the CK of the VKP(b) (doc. No. 7.8)*, and by the autumn of 1947, 12,258 persons from different areas were sent by institutions and agencies of the SSRS.⁵ The newcomers would take leading positions and would also become deputies of Lithuanian leaders. Their instructions were mandatory and beyond discussion. Such special "internationalism" of the leading personnel created conditions to better control local executives, increase distrust among them and carry out Russianization of the occupation administration of the entire Lithuania.

Due to this policy of the cadre, state institutions in which Lithuanians made up about half of the employees became greatly Russianized (more about it in the section "party Nomenclature and the Cadre"). However, this ratio was not the same: of 1951 in district power institutions Lithuanians made up 59.3 per cent, in city

* **Doc. No. 7.5.** The decision of 6 June 1951 by the LKP(b) Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On Measures to Commemorate the 15th Death Anniversary of the Great Proletariat Writer M. Gorkij*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 112. f. 75. p. 43–44.

* **Doc. No. 7.6.** An extract from the speech of 22 September 1952 by the Vice-President of the Academy of Sciences of the LSSR J. Žiugžda at the 7th Congress of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131. f. 1. p. 497.

* **Doc. No. 7.7.** The curricula of Lithuanian and Russian gymnasiums for the academic year 1944/1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 46. p. 47, 49.

* **Doc. No. 7.8.** A note by the Personnel Department of the CK of the LKP(b) about the employees who came to Lithuania from the SSRS from 1944 to 1 April 1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 272. p. 1.

institutions – 45.8 per cent, and in the republican highest power institutions 40.8 per cent of all the leading personnel working there.⁶ Among republican power institutions, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR was the most Lithuanian because not only the Chairman J.Paleckis, but both his deputies and the secretary were Lithuanians; however, this institution had almost no say in official matters. At the beginning of the 60's, even 3 out of 5 deputies of M.Gedvilas were Russians. In 1952, out of 54 leaders of the highest power institutions only 30 were Lithuanians, and out of 132 deputies – only 52. Russians were appointed not only as deputies, but as ministers, chairmen of state-level directorates and committees. For instance, the people's Commissar of Local Industry was F.Terioshin (1944-1945), S.Shkodin (1945-1947), N.Kalugin (1949-1951); the Minister of Forestry was A.Ponamoriiov (1945-1948), of Fish Industry – A.Zasytkin (1945-1949), of Building materials – N.Liubimtsev (1946-1953) of Building – P.Sheremetjev (1946-1948), V.Kotov (1948-1950), of Communal Economy – J.Svischiov (1945-1957), etc.

However, the greatest number of Russians worked in repressive bodies; only Russians were appointed as their heads. At the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), the Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the SSRS B.Kobulov explained: "The republic of Lithuania does not have suitable cadre and Lithuanians cannot direct county divisions" (those of the State Security – V.T).⁷ In 1945, with the dismissal of the People's Commissar of the State Security A.Guzevičius, till 1953, this post was taken by the Russian Generals: D.Jefimov (1945-1949), N.Gorlinskij (1949), P.Kapralov (1949-1952), and P.Kondakov (1952-1953). In the apparatus of the MGB of the LSSR, out of 676 State Security personnel 70 were Lithuanians, and out of 1,505 MVD employees – 216.⁸ The position of the LSSR Prosecutor was taken by M.Baliasnikov (1944-1946), D.Salin (1947-1948), G.Bakharov (1948-1957).

The cadre sent from Moscow had particularly strong positions in party power institutions. In 1944, out of 76 functionaries of the CK apparatus of the LKP(b) 62 per cent were Lithuanians, whereas in 1952, – 40 per cent out of 109. However, only 20 per cent of them knew the Lithuanian language.⁹

On 26 April 1944 and 19 October 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted decisions about studying the Lithuanian language (doc. No. 7.9* and doc. No. 7.10*). They pointed out that newcomers had to learn Lithuanian, however, nobody followed these decisions. On 10 September 1946, the Deputy Chief of the Schools Division of the CK of the LKP(b) V.Uogintas informed A.Sniečkus that city and county party committees "did not fight for the implementation of this decision", and 81 persons within the CK apparatus did not know the Lithuanian language (doc. No. 7.11).*

During later years (till 1953), the issue of studying Lithuanian was not made urgent any more. Russian-speaking personnel did not study it, and Lithuanian communists either ingratiating themselves or being afraid to be accused of nationalism, did not raise this issue at all. Private requirement of the CK apparatus of the LKP(b) to render respect to those speaking Russian soon became a custom in all central administration institutions of the LSSR. The demise of Stalin interrupted the speedy process of Russianization in Lithuania, and the new policy of the CK of the VKP(b) (that of L.Berija) began to be carried out in the summer of 1953. The results of the 10-year Russianization were obvious. The major part of young people and middle-aged population could speak and write Russian fluently or nearly fluently; the Russian language also established itself in most power institutions of republican subordination (in Vilnius and Klaipėda in almost all institutions); in cities and certain other places, information announcements or headings of advertisements were most often in Russian, central city streets were renamed after Russian public men, monuments were erected in their honour, etc. At first glance, Lithuania could seem for a newcomer an inseparable part of Russia.

* **Doc. No. 7.9.** An excerpt from the decision of 26 April 1944 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Studying of the Lithuanian Language by Employees of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 28. p. 16.

* **Doc. No. 7.10.** The decision of 19 October 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Studying of the Lithuanian Language by Communists*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 118. p. 28.

* **Doc. No. 7.11.** The note of 10 September 1946 by the Deputy Head of the School Division of the CK of the LKP(b) V. Uogintas to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus *On the Execution of the Decision of 19 October 1945 by the CK of the LKP(b) On the Studying of the Communists who do not Know the Lithuanian Language*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 243. p. 68.

8. Anti-Semitism*

After WWII, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union implemented the state policy of anti-Semitism. At the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s, the CK of the VKP(b) instigated political and ideological anti-Semitic campaigns, resorted to repressions. Anti-Semitism, officially designated as struggle against “Zionism”, “cosmopolitanism” and “Masonry”, began in 1949, though its beginning goes back to 1939 (rapprochement of the SSRS with the fascist Germany).

In pre-war Lithuania, some Jews objected to this and therefore were expelled from the Communist Party (doc. No. 8.1.p.2).^{*} As early as the first post-war years, the political line of the CK of the VKP(b) began to materialize – to limit or altogether deny Jews the possibility to work in party and Soviet power bodies. The Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), who later became the Secretary of the CK of the SSRS for ideological issues, M. Suslov always followed Stalinist and anti-Jewish attitudes.¹ The accusation of the CK Secretary of the VKP(b) A. Zhdanov in 1946-1948 against the intelligentsia for “grovelling to the West” was one of the signals to start an anti-Semitic campaign. On 21 November 1948, the Anti-fascist Committee of Jews was disbanded in Moscow. Jews were incriminated with non-existent crimes, prevented from taking leading posts, dismissed from work, tried or imprisoned and some even killed. However, it was not a racist policy of exterminating the Jewish nation. The authorities of the VKP(b) tried to exclude them from governing the State and active public life. Persecution of Jews and their repression went on throughout the Soviet Union and in communist countries of Eastern Europe.

After the war, because of the Holocaust and other reasons, few Jews remained in Lithuania (at the beginning of 1946, about 10,000). They worked in various party, Soviet, repressive, economic, cultural and other institutions and organizations. Part of them had high positions in the administration of the LSSR (they knew the Lithuanian language): G. Zimanas, E. Bilevičius, M. Bordonaitė, Ch. Aizenas, L. Šausas, S. Gutmanas and some others. A group of local and sent Jews worked in repressive bodies and the Glavlit. The best-known of them were A. Slavin, N. Dushanskij, D. Todesas, M. Jofė, etc. In 1945, there were 238 communist Jews (6.7 per cent) in 1953 – 2,055 (5.6 per cent).² As party members participating in repression actions against Lithuanians, people of other nationalities and even Jews themselves, they were the functionaries of the Soviet power apparatus, but not Jewish functionaries. Actually, these Soviet officials did not participate in the life of Jews and did not represent them.³

In Lithuania, the anti-Semitic policy of the VKP(b) was executed by the CK of the LKP(b) and the MGB of the LSSR. The latter had its separate field of activity and specialized in the persecution of Jews and the formation of their intelligence network (doc. No. 8.2).^{*} From 15 August 1945 till 15 August 1946, 111 persons were arrested for “Zionist activity”⁴, in 1946-1948 – 188 persons (doc. No. 8.3).^{*} They were charged with underground activity, relations with the West, attempts to illegally escape from the SSRS and organization of such escapes. After WWII, Jews, like all Lithuanian people, found themselves behind “the iron curtain”. Having survived the Holocaust, the atrocities of war, and having experienced the violence of the communist regime, quite a few of them tried to escape from the SSRS. For instance, in January 1946, at the border of the SSRS and Poland, the MGB of the LSSR detained 96 Jews. In 1947-1948, for the attempt to get to Poland with forged documents, the MGB of the LSSR arrested 39 Jews. On 24 December 1948, the MGB arrested the famous functionaries of the Lithuanian Jewish community Finkelštein and A. Štukarevičius. In Moscow, they met with the personnel of the Israeli Embassy and asked for the assistance to leave the SSRS, telling them about the difficult state of Jews (doc. No. 8.3. p. 82, 84-85).^{*} In February

* Literature and Sources

* **Doc. No. 8.1.** The decision of 24 February 1950 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Lecturer on the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism of Vilnius State University B. Kh. Fridmanas B. Kh.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 90. f. 45. p. 190. Extracts from B. Fridmanas's case. *ibid.* p. 195, 197.

* **Doc. No. 8.2.** An order of 13 October 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania I. Tkachenko to all the Heads of the Operational Sectors to provide operational data on the Jewish agents of the NKGB in 3 days. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 18. f. 40. p. 118.

* **Doc. No. 8.3.** An account of 26 January 1949 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. D. Jefimov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the underground activities of the Lithuanian Jews based on the data of the agents of the MGB of the LSSR. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 62. p. 79-89.

1951, the deputy Minister of the MGB of the LSSR A. Leonov informed Moscow about the underground organization dealing in illegal “transfer” of Jews to Palestine and America through Poland (doc. No. 8.4).^{*} During anti-Semitic campaigns, the editorial staff of the newspaper “Sovietskaja Litva” was particularly ardent in keeping to the party political course.

The persecution of Lithuanian Jews and those who came to Lithuania from the SSRS increased in 1949-1950. It was mostly those Jews who had participated in the activity of legal public organizations of that time in the independent Lithuania, used to go abroad, studied, had relatives or friends there, developed their own business, as well as former military personnel who had fought for the independence of Lithuania, etc., that fell under the observation of the MGB. Their previous activity, like that of Lithuanians, would become the object of political repression. In February 1950, P. Kapralov was against Leizer Davidzon’s filling in the position of the Deputy Manager of the Republican Cinema Rent Office of Lithuania, because before the war he had a cinema firm in Kaunas that circulated American films (doc. No. 8.5).^{*} In June 1950, the Head of the Planning Division of the plant “Laima” Leon Joffe was arrested because in 1921-1940 he wrote anti-Soviet articles and belonged to the Union of Jewish Warriors, etc. (doc. No. 8.6).^{*}

In July 1950, compromising material was collected about the Deputy Minister of Forest Industry of the LSSR Chaim Alperavčius (a former “member of the Zionist organization”, protected Jewish cadre within the Ministry apparatus), the heads of divisions Samuil Levin (son of a major merchant), Solomon Kliatskin (suspected of sabotage), Deputy Director of the ELTA (Lithuanian Telegram Agency) Leiba Šausas (a former member of the Zionist organization; his cousin Robinzon Šausas was arrested in 1950) as well as about the leading Jewish officials – Simonas Gutmanas, Solomon Mil’, David Štarkas, Bendion Brudinas, Vladimir Šverlingas (doc. No. 1.48).^{*}

The MGB of the LSSR arrested and imprisoned the poets H. Ošerovičius and J. Lacmanas, the Director of the reinforced concrete produce factory of Vilnius Š. Liubeckis, even the former Soviet partisan, the Chief of the Union of Jewish Warriors of the independent Lithuania Peres Padison (doc. No. 8.7. p. 246).^{*} His brothers in arms V. Šneideris, N. Endlinas, M. Rubinsonas, S. Galbergas, the Commander of the Soviet partisan platoon “Death to Invaders” Rodionov, the Commissar Parfionov and others tried to intercede for him, but to no avail. P. Padison was imprisoned. In 1951, certain Jews were dismissed from the Radio Information Committee of the LSSR (doc. No. 8.8)^{*} and from various institutions in Kaunas (doc. No. 8.9)^{*} in 1952, in Panevėžys (doc. No. 8.10)^{*} and elsewhere. As a former member of the “fascist Jewish party”, the doctor of the Tuberculosis Institute communist Rubinshtein was arrested (doc. No. 8.11).^{*}

State Security personnel came to suspect and persecute even communists Jews, faithful supporters of the Soviet power. Thus, the MGB tried to prove that Jews were politically unreliable and that the LKP(b) had to take measures against them in order to base the necessity of the political repression against Jews. In January

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.4.** A special report of 9 February 1951 by the Deputy Minister of the MGB of the LSSR A. Leonov to the Head of the 5th Directorate of the MGB of the SSRS Col. A. Volkov in regard to reopening agent case No. 973 “*The Companions*”. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 102. p. 61.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.5.** A special report of February 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in regard to L. Davidzon. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 102. p. 61.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.6** A special report of 12 July 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in regard to L. Joffe. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 102. p. 236–237.

^{*} **Doc. No. 1.48.** The special report of 28 July 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov *On the Contamination of the Commanding Personnel of the Ministries and the Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 62. p. 99–115.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.7.** An extract from the speech of 4 April 1953 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus at the Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131. f. 172. p. 246.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.8.** A special report of 30 March 1951 by the Acting Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Col. A. Leonov to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov in regard to the contamination of the Radio Information Committee at the Council of Ministers of the LSSR with socially alien and politically unreliable persons. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 134. p. 104–106.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.9.** A report of 4 June 1951 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov in regard to the arrest of a group of “the Jewish bourgeois nationalists” in Kaunas city. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 134. p. 287–288.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.10.** The note of 31 December 1952 by the Deputy Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Col. L. Martavičius to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus *On the Activities of the Jewish Clergymen and Zionists in Panevėžys*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 152. p. 102–106.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.11.** An extract from the speech by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus at the 7th Congress of the CK of the LKP(b) on 25 September 1952. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131. f. 1. p. 541.

1949, the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR D.Jefimov explained to A.Sniečkus that “the Zionist underground particularly values well disguised nationalists bearing party tickets...” In 1947, 5 members of the VKP(b) and 4 members of the LYCLU were arrested for illegal “nationalistic activity”, among them the Deputy Chief Accountant of Vilnius city State Bank communist Moisej Epshtein and the secretary of the Military Division of the CK of the LKP(b), a member of the Komsomol Chaja Kurickaitė (doc. No. 8.3. p. 86).^{*} In February 1950, the MGB disclosed that the Secretary of Vilnius city Lenin district Committee of the LKP(b) Tuvija Gefenas was a member of the Zionist organization in 1925-1940 (doc. No. 8.12).^{*} On 17 April 1952, the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P.Kapralov informed A.Sniečkus about the Division Chief of the newspaper “Raudonoji žvaigždė” communist Mauša Liubeckis as an unreliable employee (doc. No. 8.13).^{*} On 24 February 1950, at the sitting of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b), the teacher of Vilnius University, the partorg of the Economics Department B.Fridmanas was dismissed and expelled from the members of the VKP(b) for “the jewish bourgeois nationalism” (doc. No. 8.1).^{*}

The leaders of the LKP(b) reasoned that some Jews consciously sabotaged and hindered the establishment of socialism. Though constantly communicating with Jews, A.Sniečkus had developed a sense of respect for them, even started fervently searching for “Zionists-Masons” or “Jewish nationalists”. In 1952, at the June Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), A.Sniečkus said that Jewish and Lithuanian nationalists, having penetrated into the leading posts used to surround themselves with suitable people, steal state property and finance anti-Soviet groups.⁶ On 4 April 1953, at the Plenum of the CK of the LKP, he stated that “Zionists have always been and are the most vicious people’s enemies, agents of imperialism, spies of the Americans” (doc. No. 8.17. p. 242).^{*}

Mass deportations of Lithuanians had an impact on Jews too. On 4 January 1950, at the sitting of the CK Bureau of the LKP, A.Sniečkus criticized those communists jews that were dissatisfied with the deportation of jews, “descendants of the bourgeoisie”, from Vilnius and Kaunas (doc. No. 8.1. p. 197).^{*}

In the post-war Lithuania, Jews were forbidden from having their own schools and press, their religion was persecuted, synagogues were closed, streets named after Jews were renamed and cemeteries were destroyed. In 1949, the Museum of Jews was liquidated. On 26 January 1949, in his letter to A.Sniečkus, the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P.Kapralov explained that the monument erected at the site of the massacre of Jews in Paneriai in 1948 was of purely religious style “and nothing Soviet is reflected in it” (doc. No. 8.3. p. 89).^{*} In 1952, this monument was pulled down, and the victims of the Holocaust were everywhere officially considered as killed Soviet citizens. In response to the anti-Semitic policy of the VKP(b), the MGB of the LSSR tried to make this issue politically urgent in Lithuania. The MGB of the LSSR sent A.Sniečkus and the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) V.Aronov much information about the discontent of “the Soviet people” with “the sabotage activity of Jews”. It was mostly extracts from the letters confiscated by the State Security and anti-Semitic conversations of the population recorded by Security agents. The case of “killer doctors” (most of the doctors were Jews), that started in Moscow at the beginning of 1953, soon found repercussions in Lithuania. The authorities of the MGB of the LSSR, seeking to attach still more significance to this case and exaggerate the issue of anti-Semitism again, sent A.Sniečkus and V.Aronov excerpts from secretly censored letters. The excerpts, tendentiously presented by State Security personnel, supposedly demonstrated that the population of Lithuania hated Jews and approved of the anti-Jewish campaign of the Kremlin. The letter of 21 January 1953 informed V.Aronov about the mood of the population after the TASS (The Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union) press release on the arrest of a group of “doctors saboteurs” in Moscow: “If I could, I would hang all Jews”; “If I had the right, I would murder these doctors saboteurs in

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.12.** A special report of 16 February 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in regard to T. Gefenas. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 102. p. 59–60.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.13.** The note of 17 April 1953 by the Minister of the MVD of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kondakov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus *On the Member of the SSKP Liubeckis M.K.* SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 151. p. 181–183.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.1.** The decision of 24 February 1950 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Lecturer on the Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism of Vilnius State University B. Kh. Fridmanas B.Kh.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 90. f. 45. p. 190. Extracts from B. Fridmanas’s case. *ibid.* p. 195, 197.

^{*} **Doc. No. 8.17.** An extract from the speech of 4 April 1953 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus at the Plenum of CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131. f. 172. p. 242.

the most inhumane way”; “Do not expect any good from Jews. It was not without purpose that Germans exterminated them, Russians will also kill them” (doc. No. 8.14).*

On 27 February 1953, A.Sniečkus received a special note about foodstuffs and medications that had allegedly been poisoned by Jews: “They say that Jews poisoned foodstuffs with the germs of tuberculosis and cancer. In Vilnius, everybody curses Jews and says that Germans shot them, Lithuanians assisted and Russians will finish them off”; “All Jews living in the Soviet Union are engaged in subversive activity”; “In Antakalnis pharmacy in Vilnius, female Jews work, and all medicines were poisoned. A lot of people died. At the barber’s, next to the department store in Naujoji Vilnia, a female Jew worked and she would make a cut while shaving and afterwards would put a coat of cream infected with bacteria”; “A lot of saboteurs have been found in food industry, all products, particularly fat, were poisoned. At present, there is nothing in the shops...” (doc. No. 8.15).*

The note “On the Intelligence-Operational Work at Medical Institutions of the Lithuanian SSR” signed by the Deputy Minister of the MVD of the LSSR L.Martavičius on 17 March 1953, pointed out that 10,178 medical employees worked in this system, and the MGB of the LSSR had compromising material on more than 1,000 of them and that 84 persons were actively spied upon (doc. No. 8.16).* The document also pointed out that the doctor Leon Mošel Koganas (a former member of the pro-Soviet government, the Minister of Health Care from June till July 1940) was arrested in February 1953. He was charged with maintaining relations with the famous medical professors Pletniov and Shereshevskij, who were arrested in Moscow, giving priority to the science of the West, rendering poor medical care to party and Soviet officials. Viktoras Micelmacheris was accused of relations with the West and anti-Soviet speeches and was dismissed from the position of the Deputy Minister of Health Care in February 1953. Similar charges were pressed against other doctors Jews Kazimir Liuksemburg, Ježi Ivanter, Abraomas Aršas, Chaja Dvoreckaitė-Vidzbergienė and Lithuanians: the Deputy Minister of Health Care of the LSSR F.Lazutka, the former People’s Commissar of Health Care of the LSSR V.Girdzijauskas (1940-1945), etc (S. Janavičius, L. Klumbys, E. Doktoraitis, J. Gaivenis). The doctor Konstantin Lopatto, Karaite by nationality, was suspected of killing children (causing their deaths), “because in 1949-1952, the percentage of death rate was high”. L.Martavičius pointed out that “there were grounds to suspect other medical employees of subversive activity”. On the basis of intelligence data, he suspected doctors of having contributed to the early death of the writer P.Cvirka in 1947 (State Security personnel associated the demise of P.Cvirka with the unexpected death of A.Zhdanov in 1948 – V.T.) and charged them with high mortality rate of children in Kaunas Republican Hospital.

L.Martavičius pointed out that only 38 security agents worked at Lithuanian medical institutions, and that their number was not sufficient to organize intelligence work. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of work performed by State Security personnel in disclosing adverse elements among medical people, a qualified intelligence apparatus would be established in medical institutions in the months of March-May, and that the cleansing of anti-Soviet elements had to be organized by party bodies.

The case of “doctors saboteurs” caused great moral and psychological damage to Lithuanian Jews. However, the phenomena of anti-Semitism in the post-war Lithuania did not acquire the scope of those in Moscow and Leningrad. In 1953, the new authorities of the SSRS, initially L.Berija and later N.Khrushchiov, put an end to the state policy of the persecution of Jews initiated by Stalin as well as to the restriction of their activity. But even later, with the knowledge of the Communist Party, the experience of the post-war anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist campaigns that manifested themselves in dismissing Jews from leading posts, transferring them to lower positions, preventing them from making a career and, in general, limiting their influence on the Soviet administrative apparatus was recalled over and over again.

* **Doc. No. 8.14.** A special report of 21 January 1953 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kondakov to the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Aronov about the attitude of the Lithuanian population in regard to the case of “the doctors saboteurs”. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 152. p. 135–139.

* **Doc. No. 8.15.** A special report of 27 February 1953 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kondakov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in regard to “the Jews poisoning the population with food products and medicines”. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 152. p. 262–268.

* **Doc. No. 8.16.** The note of 17 March 1953 by the Deputy Minister of the MVD of the LSSR Col. L. Martavičius to the Deputy Head of the 5th Directorate of the MVD of the SSRS Col. S. Kholejev *On the Intelligence-Operational Work in Medical Institutions of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 149. p. 187–207.

9. Soviet Law and Order*

Law in the Soviet Union nearly always defended the interests of the Communist State, but not of the citizen. Any criticism of the Communist Party of the Soviet power was forbidden. It incurred severe punishments which were inflicted by courts, and the Prosecutor's Office controlled by the Communist Party. All judges and prosecutors belonged to the party nomenclature, their work was discussed at the sittings of Communist Party committees.

The Soviet system of law and order that operated in the post-war Lithuania had two key functions: to suppress resistance to the Soviet occupation and reinforce the communist regime (the totalitarian state). For these purposes and on the basis of the Stalinist Constitution (Article 77 of the Constitution of 1940 of the LTSR), in 1944-1953, functioned two categories of courts in Lithuania: special and common.

Special courts were the repressive bodies of the SSRS: the Extraordinary Conference at the NKVD (MVD) of the SSRS, the Military Tribunals of the NKVD(MVD) troops of the LSSR and the Regular Army of the SSRS, the Transport Courts of the SSRS – the Military Tribunal of Lithuanian railways in Vilnius and the Tribunal of the Nemunas Water Basin in Kaunas. In 1946, the transport courts were reorganized into the Linear Court of Lithuanian Railways, conducting standing sessions in Vilnius, Šiauliai and Kaliningrad, and the Nemunas Linear Court. In the administrative order, these judicial-repressive institutions were directly subordinated to Moscow, heard mostly political cases and tried members of armed and unarmed resistance of Lithuania, clergymen, etc. The transport courts tried employees from the institutions of fishing harbours and the railway system – “state criminals”, persons of “anti-Soviet” disposition that would be arrested and interrogated by special officials from the divisions of the Lithuanian Water Basin of the NKGB-MGB of the SSRS and the Lithuanian Railway Transport of the NKGB-MGB of the SSRS.¹

Such structure of the courts of the SSRS and the LSSR was established on the basis of the decision of 10 July 1934 by the Politburo of the CK of the VKP(b) “On the Work of Courts and the Prosecutor's Office”.² The document pointed out that cases referring to “state crimes and crimes against the power” were within the competence of the Supreme Courts of the republics; cases dealing with “treason of the Motherland, espionage, terror, explosions, arson, sabotage” – within that of the Military Tribunals; all crimes committed in the transport system were tried in the Transport Courts. All other cases belonged to common courts of the republics. Verdicts of capital punishment by the Supreme Court of the LSSR were approved by the Political Commission of the CK of the VKP(b). According to the classification of courts and their belonging to local or central bodies in Moscow, the limits of the subordination of courts to local administrative bodies were determined.

In 1944-1947, the most important and ruthless punitive institution was the Military Tribunal of the troops of the NKVD(MVD) of the LSSR. Due to the specific character of the organization and execution of the punitive policy of the SSRS as well as to the end of the war, this tribunal gradually ousted other military tribunals. In 1944, it covered 30 per cent of all passed and executed capital punishments in Vilnius and in 1947 – 100 per cent.³ The CK apparatus of the LKP(b) maintained very close relations with special courts of the SSRS, the leading officials of which belonged to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b) (doc. No. 1.18. p.34). They sent A.Sniečkus information reports (quarterly accounts) on the convicted resistance fighters, arranged demonstration trials of partisans, etc. For instance, on 21 July 1946, the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD troops of the LSSR A.Khaliavin stated that 37 trials were held during the 1st quarter, though only 7 of them with the participation of civilian population, whereas the others – in military units (doc. No. 9.2).^{*} The authorities of the LKP(b) had no great reproaches for the work of these courts (archival evidence that the CK of the LKP(b) criticized or urged them to make punishments much severer has not been found). On the contrary, when addressing the CK of the LKP(b), these courts, particularly the

* Literature and Sources

* **Doc. No. 9.2.** An excerpt of 21 July 1946 from the report by the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD troops of the LSSR Lt. Col. A. Khaliavin *On the Work of the Military Tribunal of the Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian SSR during the 1st Quarter of 1946*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 269. p. 68.

Military Tribunal, encouraged still stronger reinforcement of repression policy, criticized the Ministry of Justice of the LSSR and courts subordinated to it for apolitical attitudes, distortion of “the class line”, occurrences of impartiality, their “contamination” with politically unreliable personnel, etc. In June 1946, A.Khaliavin complained to V.Shcherbakov and A.Sniečkus about the inadequate work of courts of the LSSR in confiscating the property of resistance fighters and their families sentenced by this tribunal. In 1945, courts passed verdicts to expropriate the property of 5,410 persons out of 7,092 convicted people for “counter-revolutionary” crimes; in the first half of 1946, the property of only 69 resistance fighters out of 1,958 convicted persons was confiscated (doc. No. 9.3).^{*} In general, among the heads of repressive bodies, Lt. Col. Khaliavin, one of the most active officials of the LSSR administration, was not shy in criticizing and publicly teaching others, for example, Gen. J.Bartašiūnas, who was one of the key initiators of repressions (doc. No. 9.3. p. 112), interfering in the work of other institutions (the Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministries of Finance and Internal Affairs), urging them to make repressions more severe and unconditionally execute verdicts of the Military Tribunal. One thing that the CK of the LKP(b) was displeased with was the fact that these courts arranged few open-court trials of partisans.

On 31 May 1946, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On the Open-Court Trials of the Members of the Lithuanian-German Nationalistic Underground and its Armed bands” (doc. No. 9.4).^{*} The decision emphasized that county party committees, the MVD of the LSSR, court bodies of the MGB-MVD of the LSSR and the Prosecutor’s Office did not appraise the significance of these trials. These bodies were obligated to increase the number of such court trials, particularly in Alytus, Marijampolė, tauragė, lazdijai, Šiauliai, kėdainiai and raseiniai counties, and to organize them in the centers of those rural districts where “crimes had been committed”. There were almost no Lithuanians in the above-mentioned military tribunals; therefore, Clause 3 of this decision instructed the Personnel Department of the CK of the LKP(b) to find a Lithuanian communist and appoint him “a member of the Tribunal of the MVD troops” (J.Rugienis was nominated). Clause 4 “obligated county party committees to control open-court trials and ensure mass participation of the working people”. The CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted more of such decisions, e.g., on 28 September 1951 (doc. No. 9.5).^{*} After court trials, A.Sniečkus would account to Moscow for the performed work. For instance, in December 1951, he informed G.Malenkov about the trial of 9 partisans that was arranged by the Military Tribunal, where they were sentenced to death by hanging. “The sentences were executed”, stated A.Sniečkus. [...] The court trials were well prepared and were conducted smoothly” (doc. No. 9.6).^{*}

However, repressive bodies did not always take interest in these courts because they sometimes discredited the repression policy of the Soviet power and disclosed crimes committed by it. On 19 November 1946, in Leipalingis, Lazdijai county, the trial of the resistance fighter A.Vaškevičius, who had shot the partorg Benediktov, took place. Local people and 7-8-form pupils driven by force participated in it. A.Sniečkus was informed that the trial “essentially turned into an anti-Soviet demonstration. The defendant behaved particularly impudently, defiantly, made attacks against the Soviet power throughout the trial, and the Chairman, comrade Rugienis, did not manage to bridle him”.⁴

Because of such failures, special courts critically assessed the propaganda work of the LKP(b), its inability to win over “poor and middle-class peasants”, who constituted the greatest part of resistance fighters. On 28 May 1946, in his letter to V.Shcherbakov and A.Sniečkus, A.Khaliavin pointed out that only 7.5 per cent of the convicted people were kulaks, landowners and clergymen. “I request you to issue a directive to reinforce educational work with working people in order to protect poor and middle-class

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.3.** A report of June 1946 by the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD troops of the LSSR Lt. Col. A. Khaliavin to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V. Shcherbakov and the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus on the inadequate work of the courts of the LSSR. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 269. p. 110–112.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.4.** The decision of 31 May 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Open-Court Trials of the Lithuanian-German Nationalistic Underground and Members of its Armed Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 62–63.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.5.** The decision of 28 September 1951 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Preparation of Material for Open-Court Trials*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 8. p. 142.

^{*} **Doc. No.9.6.** The note of 10 December 1951 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus to the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) G. Malenkov *On the Execution of Civil Open-Court Trials of Bandits*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 1771-108. f. 2. p. 86–87.

peasants, people with home trades, intellectuals and pupils from the influence of kulaks, landowners and clergymen” (doc. No. 4.5).*

In the letters by the chairmen of some military tribunals, the CK of the LKP(b) would acknowledge mass character of the crimes committed by repressive bodies against peaceful people, would make attempts to analyze the cases of this phenomenon and submit suggestions. For instance, on 24 March 1947, the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD troops of the Lithuanian border region Lt. Col. Tulskej emphasized that “violations of Soviet law and order” committed by “our bodies and the army” in regard to their significance equal fighting against partisans. In 1945, this military tribunal convicted 328 and, in the first quarter of 1946, 137 servicemen for “unlawful executions by shooting, killings, violence and plundering”. Lt. Col. Tulskej attempted to clarify the causes of the committed crimes: 1. Some soldiers fail to endure the atrocities of the war against partisans, suffer a nervous breakdown and go out of their minds; 2. Others, “morally degraded ones”, try to conceal their inactiveness by arresting local people and executing them by shooting for career purposes; 3. The third type try to get rich by plundering the population. He proposed to check the cadre, particularly the exterminators, to dismiss drunkards, drones and selfish people (“bezdėl’nikov i škurnikov”) (doc.No. 9.1*).

In 1944-1954, on the basis of the note of 22 May 1954 by the Deputy Head of the Registration-Archival Division of the KGB of the LSSR A.mylnikov, the Extraordinary Conference of the NKVD-MGB convicted 11,932 people (11,901 and 31), and military tribunals – 22,080 persons (17,383 and 4,697) for “counter-revolutionary crimes”. The total number of the repressed Lithuanian people was 34,012 (doc. No. 9.7).* According to the data by the historian A.Anušauskas, the Extraordinary Conference convicted 15,887 and military tribunals – 29,052, the total of 44,939 people.⁵

Common courts – “people’s courts” of cities, their districts and counties – and the Supreme Court of the LSSR were directly responsible to the CK of the LKP(b) as well as to local city and county party committees and the Ministry of Justice. These courts mostly tried administrative and criminal cases that had to reinforce the communist regime. The Supreme Court of the LSSR was an exception, because it was entrusted with a relatively small number of political cases: in 1944-1954, it convicted 2,385 persons for “crimes against the State” (doc. No. 9.7).

During cadre cleansing campaigns, the CK of the LKP(b), particularly county party committees, accused court officials of being apolitical and judges of being politically unreliable and ingratiating themselves with “the kulaks” For example, in July 1946, at the 10th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), the First Secretary of Zarasai Party Committee of the LKP(b) E.Kasnauskaitė was indignant at the decisions of the Supreme Court. To quote her, the Supreme Court acquitted “the kulaks” convicted by Zarasai County Court. Having listened to this, V.Shcherbakov decided to charge the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) to conduct the hearing of the work account of the Supreme Court in the nearest future (doc. No. 9.8).* Inspectors of the CK of the LKP(b) were also displeased with the work of judges. For instance, in May 1946, in his report to the CK of the LKP(b) on the political situation in Lazdijai county, the instructor of the CK of the LKP(b) Kozlov pointed out that “judicial and interrogation bodies have not convicted a single saboteur of milk deliveries to the State, i.e. a kulak” (doc. No. 9.9).* At the beginning of 1946, the CK of the LKP(b) began to check the results of the work of courts.

* **Doc. No. 4.5.** An explanatory letter of 28 May 1946 by the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD of the LSSR Lt. Col. A. Khaliavin to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V. Shcherbakov and the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus about the convicted resistance fighters of Lithuania. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 269. p. 73–75.

* **Doc. No. 9.1.** Extracts from the report of 24 March 1947 by the Chairman of the Military Tribunal of the MVD troops of the Lithuanian border region Lt. Col. Tulskej to the CK of the LKP(b) *On Violations of Soviet Law and Order in the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv.10. f.293. p.11-23.

* **Doc. No. 9.7.** The note of 22 May 1954 by the Deputy Head of the Accounting-Archival Division of the KGB of the LSSR Lt. Col. A. Mylnikov to the Chairman of the KGB Committee of the LSSR K. Liaudis *On the Number of Cases against Persons Arrested by the MGB-MVD of the Lithuanian SSR and Convicted of Counterrevolutionary Crimes in 1944–1954*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 6. f. 229. p. 18.

* **Doc. No. 9.8.** An extract from the speech by the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Zarasai county E. Kasnauskaitė at the 10th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 9 July 1946. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 13. p. 122–123.

* **Doc. No. 9.9.** The report of 28 May 1946 by the instructor of the CK of the LKP(b) P. Kozlov to the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Political Situation in the County of Lazdijai*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 4. p. 59–61.

On 22 February 1946, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On Distortions of Party Policy in the Work of the Civil Cases College of the Supreme Court of the Lithuanian SSR” (doc. No. 9.10).^{*} It was stated that “in the second half of 1945, this college revoked or mitigated almost all charges brought against kulaks by people’s courts of the republic. By its politically erroneous assessments [...], the College disorientated people’s courts of the republic and weakened the fighting against bourgeois elements sabotaging the execution of state orders”. The Deputy Chairman of the Court Medžys was dismissed from the position, the Minister of Education J.Žiugžda was obligated to expel Medžys from the Dean’s position at Vilnius University, too. The Personnel Department of the CK of the LKP(b) was instructed to select three new members for the Supreme Court of the LSSR.

On 31 August 1946, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) discussed the issue “On Reinforcement of People’s Courts of the Republic” and obligated the Minister of Justice of the LSSR K.Domaševičius to submit the lists of people’s judges for the approval by the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) by 1 December 1946. The decision emphasized that “in those cases when working people’s judges do not conform to professional and political qualities, new candidates should be chosen, having previously discussed them at the bureau sittings of county and city party committees” (doc. No. 9.11).^{*} The newly appointed judges had to be of communist views and loyal to the Soviet power.

In the agrarian policy of the Communist Party, particularly in preparing for collectivization, special attention was paid to fighting against “the kulaks” and those avoiding to pay taxes. As early as 1945, courts punished farmers, possessing over 20 hectares, of land for lagging behind the schedule with forced labour and product deliveries to the state with two years in prison and confiscation of their property. Overall, the policy of economic terror, carried out by the LKP(b), had to economically break down the peasantry that was the social and material backbone of the resistance.

On 12 November 1946, having discussed financial issues, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) obligated the Prosecutor of the LSSR M.Baliasnikov and the Minister of Justice of the LSSR K.Domaševičius, in conjunction with the Prosecutor’s Office and courts, to urgently start analyzing the cases of those “persistently avoiding to pay taxes” (doc. No. 9.12).^{*} K.Domaševičius was repeatedly criticized for the “contamination” of the courts of the LSSR. In 1947, he was dismissed from the Minister’s position. The Chairman of the Supreme Court of the LSSR J.Blieka was appointed instead of K.Domaševičius, and Blieka’s post was taken by K.Didžiulis, an experienced organizer of the deportations of partisan families in counties. In 1948, the Minister of Justice J.Blieka was in charge of the deportations of the population in Joniškis county (doc. No. 5.10).

However, J.Blieka did not meet the expectations. In September 1950, the heads of the key institutions of law and order (Bylinskij, G.Bakharov, S.Grimovich, K.Didžiulis) addressed A.Sniečkus, accusing the authorities of the Ministry of Justice of political errors and interpersonal disagreements (doc. No. 9.13).^{*} On 7 September 1951, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) dismissed J.Blieka from his position (doc. No. 9.14).^{*} Besides, as early as 9 January 1951, the authorities of the MGB of the LSSR expressed political distrust in him (doc. No. 1.48).

The CK of the LKP(b) required courts to observe “the class line”. On 12 July 1947, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On Improving the Work of People’s Courts of the Lithuanian SSR”, which

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.10.** The decision of 22 February 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Distortions in the Party Policy in the Work of the Civil Case College of the Supreme Court of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 36. p. 55–56.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.11.** The decision of 31 August 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Reinforcement of People’s Courts in the Republic*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 144. p. 92.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.12.** The decision of 12 November 1946 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Work of the Ministry of Finance of the LSSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 1771. p. 31–34.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.13.** An extract from the letter of 15 September 1951 by the Head of the Administrative Division of the CK of the LKP(b) Bylinskij, the Prosecutor of the LSSR G. Bakharov, the Military Prosecutor of the border troops of the MVD of the LSSR S. Grimovich and the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the LSSR K. Didžiulis to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in regard to the inadequate work of the authorities of the Ministry of Justice and Courts of the LSSR. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 112. f. 101. p. 69–80.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.14.** An extract from the decision of 7 September 1951 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Work of the Ministry of Justice of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 112. f. 101. p. 60–61.

criticized courts for distorting the class policy of the party (doc. No. 9.15).^{*} The degree of the punishment (e.g. for not paying taxes) had to depend on the social origin or status of the defendant.

The economic terror of the LKP(b) led to the state when peasants did not manage to pay annually growing taxes or deliver produce. Indebted farms were inventoried, and the debtors were tried. For instance, from 25 June 1946 to 20 September, 923 cases were instigated, and 569 persons arrested (doc. No. 9.16).^{*} In 1948-1950, for monetary tax debts alone (1/3 of county reports are missing), 103, 000 farms were inventoried, and 45,000 of their owners were taken to court.⁶ In 1953, at the 5th Plenum of CK of the LKP, the Minister of State Control of the LSSR A.Jefremov pointed out that during the post-war years, 107, 876 people were punished for not paying agricultural taxes and 33,019 persons for not carrying out forced labour and produce deliveries to the state (doc. No. 9.17).^{*} Because of this harsh judicial treatment of peasants, common courts also became repressive bodies of the economic terror policy, carried out by the Communist Party against the country of Lithuania.

Trials were conducted in Russian not only at special courts, but frequently also at the courts directly responsible to the administration of the LSSR. In 1953, J.Paleckis wrote in his notes: "Interrogation is often conducted by non-Lithuanians [interrogators – V.T.] and not in Lithuanian. The article of the Constitution referring to the conducting of trials in the Lithuanian language is not observed".⁷

Seeking to render a semblance of democracy to courts, the Communist Party organized forced elections of judges and assessors. According to official data, on 9-16 January 1949, at the elections without alternative candidacies, 99.58 per cent of electors participated, and 99.72 per cent "voted" for the judges nominated by the party. There were no major difficulties, however, Kaunas County Committee of the LKP(b) made an error – two candidates were nominated for one place in Constituency 40 (doc. No. 9.18).^{*}

The Communist Party controlled the work of the Prosecutor's Office. On 17 November 1938, the CK of the VKP(b) and the Council of people's Commissars decided that, under the proposal of "national Communist Parties" and prosecutors of the SSRS, the CK of the VKP(b) had the right to approve all prosecutors overseeing interrogations executed by the NKVD.⁸ All prosecutors belonged to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b) (doc. No. 1.18. p. 34). Similarly to courts, two categories of prosecutor's offices operated in Lithuania: 1. The Prosecutor's Office of the LSSR directly subordinated to the Division of Administrative Bodies of the CK of the LKP(b) and the Prosecutor of the SSRS; 2. The Military Prosecutor's Office of the NKVD-MVD troops of the LSSR and the Prosecutor's Office of the Railways of the Western Region directly accountable to central agencies in Moscow.

The Military Prosecutor's Office of the NKVD-MVD troops sanctioned arrests of resistance fighters, organized and oversaw their interrogations, during which people were physically tortured. The authorities of the LKP(b) used to be informed of this. In his report of 5 March 1951 to A.Sniečkus, the Military Prosecutor of the MVD troops of the LSSR Col. S.Grimovich pointed out that "much of the evidence of those confessing [...] was obtained by using measures of physical pressure" (doc. No. 9.19).^{*} On 8 August 1953, Col. S.Grimovich informed A.Sniečkus: "As it is known in the CK of the LKP, special instructions were given in the former Ministry of State Security of the SSRS, on the basis of which, in certain cases, it was permissible to use measures of physical pressure while interrogating people arrested for crimes against the State". S.Grimovich explained that this was also applied in Lithuania.⁹

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.15.** An extract from the decision of 12 July 1947 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Improvement of the Work of People's Courts in the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 10. f. 139. p. 19.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.16.** The note of September 1946 (not prior) by the Head of the Militia Directorate of the Division for Fighting Against the Stealing of the Socialist Property (DFSSP – OBCHSS) of the MVD of the LSSR Maj. V. Motinov *On People Arrested by the Militia and the Initiation of Legal Proceedings against them for Sabotage of Agricultural Product Deliveries to the State in the Lithuanian SSR from 25 July 1946 to 20 September 1946*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 3. f. 103. p. 136.

^{*} **Doc. No.9.17.** An extract from the speech by the Minister of the State Control A. Jefremov at the June Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1953. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131, f. 179. p. 181.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.18.** An extract from the note of 19 December 1948 by the Head of the Division of Party, Trade Union and Komsomol Bodies of the CK of the LKP(b) S. Filipavičius to the Division of Party, Trade Union and Komsomol Bodies of the CK of the VKP(b) *On the Preparation for the Elections of People's Courts of Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 215. p. 40–48.

^{*} **Doc. No. 9.19.** Extracts from the account of 8 March 1951 by the Military Prosecutor of the MVD troops of the Lithuanian Region S. Grimovich to the 1st Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus *On the Investigation of Cases Related to Counterrevolutionary Crimes in the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 108. f. 21. p. 192–206.

The Prosecutor's Office of the LSSR incited repressions of the Lithuanian population, urged the authorities of the LKP(b) to take political actions in organizing deportations of the families of partisans and their supporters (doc. No. 4.6 and No. 4.7). However, due to the great scope of repressions, thousands of people, who had nothing in common (at least formally) with the underground or even persons loyal to the Soviet power, found themselves in prisons. People's endless complaints about obvious crimes, committed by representatives of all Soviet power bodies, made the LKP(b) and the heads of the Prosecutor's Office review some cases. In 1947-1950, 10,885 people were released from prisons (doc. No. 9.20).^{*} Actually, the communist power privately admitted that even from the point of view of the Soviet law, actions and violence used against these people were illegal.

About half the personnel of the Prosecutor's Office were Russian-speaking people sent from the SSRS. F.Girko (1944), M.Baliasnikov (1944-1946), D.Salin (1947-1948), G.Bakharov (1948-1957) worked as prosecutors of the LSSR. They all, with the consent of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b), sanctioned repression actions of the Lithuanian population. In November 1944, F.Girko requested the Prosecutor of the SSRS K.Gorshenin and A.Sniečkus to staff the apparatus of the Prosecutor's Office with officials sent from the eastern areas of the SSRS (doc. No. 4.7. p.42). In 1948-1950, Lithuanians, who belonged to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b), made up not less than half of the leading personnel of the Prosecutor's Office.

10. Spiritual Pressure*

The Soviet Union controlled cultural and spiritual life of the society and, using drastical measures, persecuted those thinking differently through the apparatus of its power, particularly through party bodies. Alien communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism and mandatory materialistic view of the world were imposed on the Lithuanian population. The intelligentsia of Lithuania were forced to follow communist ideology and demonstrate advantages of the Soviet system, the exclusiveness of the Russian nation, its extraordinary mission in the world and Lithuania. The communist ideology defended the imperial policy of the SSRS and treated national culture as an alien phenomenon for the interests of socialism. It was declared that culture must be "national in its form, but socialist in its contents". It had to reinforce the Soviet regime. The policy of the VKP(b), directed against the fostering of the traditions of the Lithuanian nation and the cognition of world culture, was called "the cultural revolution". Its objectives were to Sovietize, Russianize and ideologize spiritual life of the population, suppress national and religious consciousness and instill Bolshevik attitude of intolerance of common values of humanity. For this purpose, the universal education program of young people and illiterate adults was made use of and promptly implemented. The Communist Party treated the Lithuanian nation as culturally backward, religious and superstitious. On 24 November 1944, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) decided to propagate the materialistic world outlook among the population and raise the "cultural level" of the Lithuanian population (doc.No. 10.1).^{*}

The apparatus of the CK of the LKP(b) with the help of state institutions supervising a certain area of culture controlled and strictly administered all areas of culture and education in Lithuania. The Directorate of Art Affairs supervised writers, artists, composers and theatre personnel; the Committee of Culture and Education Institutions supervised libraries, museums and culture centers; the Ministry of Education – schools; and the Division of Culture and Science and the Division of Agitation and Propaganda of the CK of the LKP(b) supervised them all. Local communists – the personnel of the CK apparatus of the LKP(b) – K.Preikšas, V.Niunka, G.Zimanas, J.Žiugžda, A.Venclova had great influence on cultural and scientific activity.

^{*} **DOC. No. 9.20.** Extracts from the note of 2 June 1951 by the Prosecutor of the LSSR G. Bakharov to the instructor of the CK of the VKP(b) Kulikov *On Fighting against Groundless Arrests of Citizens and Taking them to the Courts of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 108. f. 21. p. 6–14.

^{*} **Literature and Sources**

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.1.** The decision of 24 November 1944 by the CK of the LKP(b) *On Organisation of the Scientific-Educational Propaganda among the Population of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f 61. p. 37.

The Lithuanian intelligentsia, counter to what had been expected (the most active part of the intelligentsia retreated to the West), did not urge the Lithuanian people to openly oppose the Soviet occupation, took almost no part (with the exception of teachers) in illegal underground activity, though most of them did not glorify or support the communist power and adopted the attitude of “the silent ones”. Such a position of the intelligentsia caused discontent of Moscow and Lithuanian communists of radical views.

Many functionaries sent from Moscow did not trust “the bourgeois” Lithuanian intelligentsia and wanted to get rid of all of it. However, the official Communist Party were of the opinion (A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas and also M.Suslov supported it) that “it was necessary to reform the old intelligentsia and exploit them in building socialism”. It was necessary that famous people in their public statements or ordinary teachers at classes support the Soviet power. Plenums of the CK of the LKP(b), various congresses and conferences of the intelligentsia were devoted to discussing “the education” of the nation. On 21 March 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) decided to convene conferences of the leading functionaries from different areas: 1. writers and journalists; 2. actors, directors and musicians; 3. artists; 4. education personnel. Their main objective was to make the intelligentsia condemn the resistance of the nation and support the policy of the Communist Party (doc.No. 10.2).*

The Congress of the Lithuanian Intelligentsia convened on 10–14 July 1945 demonstrated that the Communist Party would not tolerate the passiveness of the intellectuals and critical assessment of the authorities expressed by some of them. On 13 July 1945, the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR A.Guzevičius sent a special report to M.Suslov about the discrepant attitudes of the delegates in reference to the Soviet power in Lithuania. According to A.Guzevičius, the professor of Vilnius university Dagys, “a nationalist”, who was spied upon in compliance with the intelligence case “Waste”, started speaking quite openly about the intellectuals deported in 1941 who had to be returned to Lithuania. The participants of the Congress (540 delegates and 250 guests) assented to him, applauded fervently and only few disagreed (doc.No. 10.3).* In another letter to Moscow, A.Guzevičius (on 28 July) revealed the contribution of State Security personnel in disclosing anti-Soviet attitudes of the delegates. He wrote that representatives of the NKVD-NKGB of the LSSR did not participate at the congress officially, however, there were 64 secret agents clad in civilian clothes: “As the intelligence personnel informed, the delegates got the impression that a complete freedom of actions and presentations was possible, and part of them were pleasantly surprised for they had been afraid that they would not only be forbidden to speak freely, but be threatened with imprisonment or Siberia”. 27 persons “with anti-Soviet attitudes” were detected during the Congress, two of whom were arrested (doc.No. 10.4).*

“The silent ones”, who did not glorify the party and the Soviet regime, who did not want to arrive at a compromise with their conscience, were scolded, intimidated and punished. The Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) and its Chairman V.Shcherbakov, the Division of Agitation and Propaganda of the CK of the LKP(b) and its chief K.Preikšas were particularly ardent in this respect. At the meeting of Lithuanian writers that took place in Vilnius on 1–2 October 1946 and was devoted to the discussion of the instructional speech of the Secretary of the CK of the VKP(b) A.Zhdanov, K.Preikšas demanded “to cleanse themselves of non-principled rubbish”.¹ J.Graičiūnas, E.Matuzevičius, A.Miškinis, J.Paukštelis, P.Vaičiūnas, B.Sruoga and other writers were accused of passiveness and apolitical attitudes. In 1946, at the November Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), K.Preikšas again attacked the writer B.Sruoga, the poets E.Mieželaitis and A.Miškinis, the painter J.Vienožinskis, the fine arts researcher H.Kairiūkštytė, the historians A.Janulaitis and I.Jonynas. At this plenum, A.Sniečkus stated that “the majority of the Lithuanian intelligentsia haven’t yet found their place under the conditions of the on-going class struggle, hesitate and stand at crossroads. Some Lithuanian

* **Doc. No. 10.2.** The decision of 21 March 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On Convening a Congress of the Intelligentsia of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 50. p. 18.

* **Doc. No. 10.3.** A special report of 13 July 1945 by the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. A.Guzevičius to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov about the attitude of the delegates of the Congress of the Lithuanian Intelligentsia. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 12. p. 149–154.

* **Doc. No. 10.4.** Extracts from the note of 28 July 1945 by the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. A.Guzevičius and the Head of the 2nd Division of the NKGB of the LSSR Lt. Col. Izotov to the Head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the SSRS Lt. Gen. P. Fedotov *On the 1st Congress of the Intelligentsia of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 22. p. 125–135.

intellectuals tolerate bourgeois nationalists or follow the policy hostile to the Soviet power themselves” (doc.No. 10.5).^{*} Later, his political standpoint became stricter and simpler. At the conference of Lithuanian communists and heads of repressive bodies that took place in June 1949, A.Sniečkus emphasized: “You must demolish the wall of being silent and drive away all who are not with us [...]. You must create conditions for the intelligentsia to split up in order to see who is with us and who is against us” (doc.No. 4.20. p. 46).^{*} Later, at plenums of the CK of the LKP(b), congresses and other party conferences, names of people of art would be frequently mentioned and their works condemned for their keeping silent and other “sins”. According to the calculations of the man of letters A.Martinkus, 91 men of letters were arrested, deported, killed or otherwise punished;² according to other data – 82.3 For instance, in 1951, the writers Kazys Jankauskas, Eduardas Viskanta and the journalist Pranas Budvytis were arrested for their creative activity during the years of the independent Lithuania and for keeping the literature of that time in their homes (doc.No. 10.6).^{*} The writers K.Inčiūra, K.Boruta, A.Miškinis, P.Juodelis, V.Drazdauskas, P.Genys and others found themselves in the Gulags. Many facts indicate that the poet Kazys Jakubėnas was killed by State Security personnel.⁴ The publication of “Dievų miškas” (“The Forest of Gods”) by Balys Sruoga was forbidden.

In executing the decision of 1948 by the CK of the VKP(b) “On the Repertoire of Drama Theatres and Measures for its Improvement”, the censorship of theatre repertoires was made much stricter: it was mostly plays by Russian classical writers and Soviet authors that were staged at that time. The composers J.Bendorius, A.Kačanauskas, E.Laumenskienė, J.Nabažas were criticized for “keeping silent”; J.Gruodis and S.Vainiūnas were proclaimed as formalists. The creation of M.K.Čiurlionis was called decadent; attempts were made to erase his name from the memory of the nation and the history of culture. In 1948, the singer A.Kučingis was deported for his relations with the underground. People working in the creative area had to be very vigilant not to be suspected of anti-Soviet activity by the LKP(b) or the MGB. For instance, in 1951, the famous pre-war cinema chronicler Stepas Uzdonas was arrested and imprisoned for “filming badly” (doc.No. 10.7).^{*} The MGB of the LSSR was interested in the past of people of art, their views, relatives and friends. For instance, in 1950, the director and actor of the State Drama Theatre Juozas Siparis got into the sight of State Security personnel (doc.No. 10.8).^{*}

Because of the ideological and political terror, many artists became conformists; they lived and created according to the political conjuncture. Particularly active supporters of communism and the SSRS were the men of letters J.Baltušis, P.Cvirka, L.Gira, K.Korsakas, T.Tilvitis, A.Venclova, etc. The authorities of the LKP(b) encouraged people of art to contribute to the propagation of the communist ideology. For instance, at the 15th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1947, A.Sniečkus praised the cantatas by the composers A.Račiūnas and J.Tallat Kelpša dedicated to Stalin, etc.⁵ The picture painted by V.Dilka in 1950 “The Constituent Assembly of the Collective Farm” had to become an example for all artists.

In 1948, an organized attack on Lithuanian scientists began. It was headed by the Chief of the Division of Science and Higher Schools of the CK of the LKP(b) S.Lazutka (doc.No. 10.9)^{*} and by the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) V.Niunka (doc.No. 10.10).^{*} The poorly educated Commissioner of the CARC B.Pušinis demonstrated his personal initiative in condemning intellectuals. The Ministry of State Security of the LSSR assisted the authorities of the CK of the LKP(b). At the query of A.Sniečkus, the MGB of the LSSR could

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.5.** An extract from the report of 22 November 1946 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus at the 11th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 21. p. 26.

^{*} **Doc. No. 4.20.** An extract from the conference of the heads of party and repressive bodies on 1 June 1949 *On Measures in Liquidation the Remaining Members of the Nationalistic Underground and its Bands during the Collectivization*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 7. p. 39–46.

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.6.** A note of 17 November 1951 by the Head of the 5th Division of the MGB of the LSSR Lt. Col. P. Odintsov related to the arrests of K. Jankauskas, E. Viskanta and P. Budvytis. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 154. p. 23–25.

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.7.** A special report of 21 March 1951 by the Acting Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Col. A. Leonov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in regard to the arrest of the cameraman S. Uzdonas. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 134. p. 59–60.

^{*} **Doc. No.10.8.** A note of January 1950 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov in reference to the Honoured Artist of the Lithuanian SSR J. Siparis. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 102. p. 22–23.

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.9.** An extract from the speech by the Head of the Science and Higher School Division of the CK of the LKP(b) S. Lazutka at the 7th Congress of the LKP(b) on 22–25 September 1952. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 131. f. 1. p. 291,297.

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.10.** An extract from the speech by the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) V. Niunka at the 4th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 14 July 1949. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 51. f. 261. p. 189–190.

promptly collect compromising information about each citizen of Lithuania. If State Security personnel searched for the relations of well-known Lithuanian people and their relatives with foreign countries or the underground, the authorities of the LKP(b) would resort to political and ideological blackmail. The scientists J.Balčikonis, K.Daukšas, A.Janulaitis, P.Pakarklis, J.Lebedys, A.Purėnas, V.Girdzijauskas, T.Ivanauskas, V.Lašas, V.Kairiūkštis and V.Ruokis were accused of “slavish grovelling to the rotting science of the West”, “ignoring the role of the advanced Russian and Soviet science”, “bourgeois objectivism”, giving in to “the theory of the uniform trend” and other sins. In September 1952, the MGB of the LSSR collected “compromising material” on the professor of Vilnius University Ignas Jonynas, who was a diplomat before the war and represented the State of Lithuania abroad, and dismissed him from the position of the Chief of the Department for anti-Marxist teaching of history (doc.No. 10.11)*, but apparently that did not suffice to concoct a criminal case against him under the approval of the CK of the LKP(b).

When fighting against “the followers of the obscurantists Mendel-Morgan” began, J.Dagys, M.Natkevičaitė-Ivanauskienė, P.Šivickas and other biologists suffered. Genetics and cybernetics were forbidden. The philosophers L.Karsavinas and V.Sezemanas, the economist D.Cesevičius, the architect S.Stulginskis, the agronomist J.Aleksa and others were deported. The Dean of Vilnius Pedagogical Institute, editor of the journal “Tarybinė mokykla” (“The Soviet School”) communist Petras Mikutaitis was arrested for “sabotage activity in the system of the Ministry of Education”. He was charged with propagation of alien ideology, “publication of subversive and apolitical works” (doc.No. 10.12).* According to the requirements of political conjuncture, teaching programs were reviewed. For instance, on 28 October 1949, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On Gross Political Errors in the Geography Program of Secondary Schools”. It was stated that due to the lack of political vigilance, “the fascist-Gestapo regime of Tito’s clique” in Yugoslavia was not politically appraised in the geography teaching program of Form 9 approved by the Ministry of Education (doc.No. 10.13).*

Around 1949–1950, State Security personnel took the initiative to search for “politically unreliable” famous people of Lithuania, concocted political cases in which they tried to produce the impression that underground organizations of intellectuals working in state institutions function in Lithuania. Their initiative was stopped only after the demise of Stalin. In 1949, the cases of the Editor-in-Chief of the State Fiction Publishing House V.Drazdauskas, the Editor-in-Chief of the Science Literature Publishing House B.Vaitekūnas and the editor J.Lazauskas, etc. that were arrested and imprisoned rang through Lithuania. They were all accused of belonging to the anti-Soviet Masonic organization. In June–September 1949, the MGB of the LSSR arrested 18 people (B.Vaitekūnas, S.Stulginskis, J.Glemža, B.Valušytė, G.Znamerovskij, S.Vaitkus, V.Sipaitis, etc.), who had allegedly established an anti-Soviet mystic underground organization of Nikolaj Rerikh. In his special report to A.Sniečkus and A.Trofimov, P.Kapralov pointed out that the organization was not completely liquidated because in 1936, when Rerikh’s association was being established in Lithuania, it had about 50 persons “close to the associates of Smetona’s government” (doc.No. 10.14).* J.Paleckis was among those who signed for the establishment of this association. It was not by chance that, with the beginning of the condemnation campaign against J.Paleckis, he was also accused of having participated in the activity of this association (doc.No. 1.13).*⁶ Besides, during this period political persecution of the intellectuals of social-democratic orientation – the former members of the Lithuanian Social-Democrat and People’s parties (doc. No. 1.48, 1.49, 1.52, 1.56, 1.57).

* **Doc. No.10.11.** The note of 4 September 1952 by the Head of the 5th Division of the MGB of the LSSR Col. J. Shpilevoj *On the Materials Compromising Professor Ignas Jonynas*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 154. p. 85.

* **Doc. No.10.12.** The special report of 27 February 1952 by the Minister of the MGB of the LSSR P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in reference to P. Mikutaitis’ “sabotage” activity within the system of the Ministry of Education. SLA. stk. K-1. inv.10. f. 154. p. 35–37.

* **Doc. No. 10.13.** The decision of 28 October 1949 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Gross Political Error in the Geography Programme of Secondary Schools*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 51. f. 430. p. 181.

* **Doc. No. 10.14.** Extracts from the special report of 19 September 1949 by the Acting Minister of the MGB of the LSSR Maj. Gen. P. Kapralov to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus and the Second Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Trofimov *On the Disclosure and Partial Liquidation of the Anti-Soviet Mystical Organisation*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 155. p. 4–11.

* **Doc. No. 1.13.** The decision of the CK of the LKP(b) of 5 January 1951 condemning the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR J. Paleckis, the Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR S. Pupeikis and others for relations with “the anti-Soviet masonic organisation”. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f.. 8. p. 84.

In 1944 – 1953 repressive bodies arrested 1,651 intellectuals. There were quite a few representatives of creative and scientific intellectuals among them (6,267 office employees are not included into this number) (doc.No. 1.33).* The authorities of the LKP(b) continually accounted to the CK of the VKP(b) for “the education” of Lithuanian scientists or other personnel from the area of culture.

J.Paleckis was the only one from the authorities of the LKP(b) who tried to defend certain intellectuals, aspects of the history of Lithuania, manifestations of the national culture and the use of the Lithuanian language. He had to suffer much criticism for that, and in 1952, he had to repent in front of the CK members of the LKP(b) and admit that he had committed an error. The society knew almost nothing about it.

The Communist Party directly controlled each published word. In the autumn of 1944, the “cleansing” of libraries began. On 26 October 1944, A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas, A.Guzevičius and J.Bartašiūnas ordered all secretaries of county party committees, chairmen of executive committees and heads of the NKGB-NKVD divisions to immediately collect “fascist” and other “anti-Soviet” books from schools, institutions and the population. Those who concealed “hostile” literature had to be strictly punished (doc.No. 10.15).* The Central Directorate on Literature and Publishing Houses (the Glavlit) took care of the cleansing of libraries, destruction and censorship of books. This service did not adopt a single more significant decision without getting the approval of the LKP(b). The report of the 4th quarter of 1945 reads: “The Glavlit coordinates all most important political issues with the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) for propaganda and agitation or with his deputies; sometimes it consults the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b). Individual issues are also discussed with the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b), who often takes personal interest in censorship matters [...]. The Glavlit also maintains relations with the NKGB and the NKVD” (doc.No. 10.16. p. 22).*

On 16 February 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) assessed the work of the Glavlit as unsatisfactory (dismissed M.Jofė from the position of the head and appointed A.Malygin) and demanded to finish the withdrawal of literature published during the war from the circulation (3,669,000 books), i.e. to destroy it, to establish special book storage stocks in Vilnius and Kaunas, to staff the apparatus of censors, etc. (doc.No. 10.17).* In August 1945, at the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), A.Sniečkus urged to cleanse libraries, i.e. to destroy books of “nationalistic contents” (doc.No. 10.18).* Literature published during the years of the independent Lithuania was withdrawn from libraries according to the lists prepared by the Glavlit and approved by the CK of the LKP(b) (doc.No. 10.19).* In 1944 – 1945, 545,000 books were treated this way.⁷ The number of books withdrawn from libraries in 1944 – 1951 totalled over 600,000. Only some of them were transferred to the special stocks; all the others were destroyed.⁸

The CK of the LKP(b), assisted by the Glavlit, controlled all cultural institutions from the republican radio to museums. The society could know only information that was approved by the Communist Party (doc.No. 10.20).*

Those who came from the SSRS and local communists were indignant at the monuments built during the times of the independent Lithuania, at the monuments that existed in almost every center of the county or

* **Doc. No. 1.33.** A note of 7 May 1953 by the Acting Chief of the 1st Special Division of the MVD of the LSSR Lt. Col. M. Jefimov and the Head of the 2nd Subdivision Maj. M. Vasev on the arrested intelligentsia and office employees in 1944–1953. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 6. f. 161. p. 59.

* **Doc. No. 10.15.** A directive of 26 October 1944 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars M. Gedvilas, the Minister of the NKGB of the LSSR A. Guzevičius and the Minister of the NKVD of the LSSR J. Bartašiūnas to the Secretaries of the County Committees and Chairmen of the Executive Committees of the LKP(b) and the Heads of the NKGB and the NKVD Divisions in reference to the confiscation of fascist and anti-Soviet literature from the people of Lithuania. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 7. f. 81. p. 35.

* **Doc. No. 10.16.** Extracts from the report of 10 January 1946 by the Head of the Glavlit of the LSSR at the Council of People’s Commissars A. Malygin to the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) K. Preikšas. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 278. p. 11, 21–23.

* **Doc. No. 10.17.** The decision of 16 February 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Work of the Glavlit of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 40. p. 75–76.

* **Doc. No. 10.18.** An extract from the speech of 24 August 1945 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus at the 7th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b). SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 14. p. 178.

* **Doc. No. 10.19.** Extracts from the report of 29 January 1947 by the Head of the Glavlit of the LSSR A. Malygin to the Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) K. Preikšas for the 4th quarter of 1946. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 278. p. 1, 9–10.

* **Doc. No. 10.20.** The decision of 1 November 1950 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On Measures to Eliminate the Facts of Disclosing State Secrets in Museums*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 90. f. 121. p. 5–6.

rural district. At the aforementioned plenum, A.Sniečkus also urged to pull them down. He pointed out that the Division of Agitation and Propaganda of the CK had to prepare a specific plan of the destruction of the monuments in the nearest future (doc.No.10.18). (The search for the plan was unsuccessful. – V.T.) In 1946, at the November Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V.Shcherbakov also reproached for the monuments from the years of the independence that stood in townlets and to which Lithuanians rendered respect during national holidays (doc.No. 10.21).^{*} In 1948, a mass destruction of monuments started. In 1950, in Kaunas, the Statue of Liberty, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and other sculptures in the square of the War Museum were destroyed. In 1950, the sculptures of the saints were pulled down from Vilnius Cathedral. In 1952, the monument of the Three Crosses was barbarically exploded. At the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s, almost all historic monuments, particularly those related to fighting for the independence, were pulled down. The total of 526 monuments, sculptures and works of fine architecture were destroyed, desecrated or devastated during the Soviet times, mostly during the Stalinist years.⁹ At the sites of the destroyed monuments, new ones, perpetuating the memory of the outstanding representatives of the Russian nation and leaders of the Soviet State, were erected.

The Lithuanian education system created during the years of independence was completely liquidated, comprehensive schools were turned into hotbeds of propagation of communist ideology. The subject of religion was eliminated from gymnasiums, which were given the name of secondary schools in 1949, and mandatory teaching of the Constitution of the SSRS and the Russian language was introduced. Teachers suspected of “nationalistic or anti-Soviet” activity used to be dismissed from work. There were cases when their fate could be decided even by school Komsomol organizations.

The CK of the LKP(b) and the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) tried to prevent the occurrence of persons hostile to the regime among the future intellectuals. Candidates to higher schools were selected by special Admissions Boards controlled by local party committees. The boards would check the social origin of the candidates and grant priority to the young people whose parents supported the Soviet power and were hired labourers, poor peasants and workers. Consequently, many talented young people had no access to higher educational institutions. On 6 July 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars adopted the decision “On the Admittance of Students to Higher Educational Institutions in the Academic Year of 1945/1946” and approved a special questionnaire. It required to answer such questions that were asked when joining the Communist Party or the Komsomol; for example: What did your parents do before 1941?, What farm did they have?, Have they been abroad?, Where did they work before 1940?, Were they party members? and so on. Having supplied untruthful data, one could be expelled from the higher school or even sued. The decision obligated to form admissions boards in each higher education institution including a partorg and a representative of the Komsomol (doc.No. 10.22).^{*} On 6 July, A.Guzevičius suggested that the selection criteria be made still stricter by adding these points to the questionnaire: In what organizations did you participate before 1940?, Do you have relatives abroad and what kind of relations do you maintain with them?, etc. (doc.No. 10.23).^{*}

By the decisions of the LKP(b) and the Government of the LSSR, cultural centers of national associations that had long been functioning in Vilnius were closed. The museums of Belorussians, Jews and Karaites were liquidated in 1946, 1949 and 1951 respectively. The devastation of the culture of national associations greatly damaged their national self-awareness.

The Lithuanians suffered the greatest moral damage when the old anthem of Lithuania “The National Hymn” by V.Kudirka was abolished. On 28 September 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the decision “On the State Anthem of the Lithuanian SSR” and made up a seven-member commission (K.Preikšas as the

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.21.** An extract from the speech by the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) V. Shcherbakov at the 11th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) on 22 November 1946. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 19. p. 228.

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.22.** The decision of 6 July 1945 by the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars of the LSSR *On Admission of Students to Higher Schools in the Academic Year of 1945/1946*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 79. p. 70, 75–76.

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.23.** A letter of 6 July 1945 by the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR A. Guzevičius to the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in reference to the filling in of the questionnaire for those seeking admission to higher schools. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 79. p. 73.

Chairman, J.Paleckis, J.Banaitis, J.Žiugžda, prof. J.Gruodis, K.Korsakas and V.Niunka as members) in order to create a new anthem of the LSSR (doc.No. 10.24).^{*} J.Paleckis suggested leaving the music (melody) of the old anthem, but other members of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) opposed that.¹⁰ To quote A.Sniečkus, the old anthem “propagated such ideas that we draw our might from the past. You see”, he said in 1952, at the September Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b), “what anthem it was: not leading forward but turning back”.¹¹

The new Soviet anthem of the LSSR was approved at the sitting of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) on 29 March 1950 (doc.No. 10.25).^{*} Here sounded the words: “Lenin has lit the way to freedom for us, The great Russian nation helped in the fight. Stalin leads us to the freedom and might...” The CK Bureau of the LKP(b) did not adopt a special decision in regard to the banning of the anthem of Lithuania (the search for such document failed – V.T.), however, singing of “The National Hymn” become politically intolerant, one could be sued for that (accused of “counter-revolutionary agitation”).

11. The Forced Campaign for Signing the Letter to J.Stalin in 1945*

With the approach of the fifth year of the existence of “the Soviet Lithuania” (21 July 1940 was the official day when the Soviet power was proclaimed in Lithuania), on 22 June 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) decided to solemnly commemorate this anniversary and on behalf of the Lithuanian nation send a letter of gratitude to Stalin (doc. No. 11.1).^{*} A governmental commission was formed: V.Niunka (the Chairman), M.Chodosaitė, Khriunova, V.Banaitis, J.Jurginis and K.Korsakas. Moscow had to be interested in this political action: on 17 July 1945, the beginning of the Potsdam Conference had been planned, where, if needed, Stalin could demonstrate the Lithuanians’ “approval” of the Soviet power. The underground and the majority of Lithuanian people were of completely opposite opinion, thinking that the signing of the letter could lessen the possibilities to regain independence even more. Therefore, a boycott of this political campaign started immediately, acquiring an obvious form of civil disobedience to the Soviet occupation. Measures of violence were taken to make at least the majority of people of Lithuania sign the letter.

In preparing for this campaign, at all levels of LKP(b) committees plans for collecting signatures were made, places and time for people’s meetings were planned. To carry out the action in rural areas, groups of party-Soviet activists were formed with the military personnel of the NKVD and exterminators attached to them; in cities, communists, Komsomol members, activists of trade unions were assigned to major enterprises or institutions. For example, in Kaunas, 700 Komsomol and trade union activists were mobilized.¹

From the very beginning, the signature collecting campaign suffered a complete failure. Often, people openly ignored those coming to collect signatures. At the 6th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in July 1945, the First Secretary of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Raseiniai county T.Mončiunskas regretted that in one of the meetings, out of 60 peasants who participated, not a single one signed, but demonstratively left the meeting (doc. No. 11.2).^{*} With the help of the NKVD and exterminators, groups of 4-5 “activists” were formed that “every day did rounds in 3 or 4 parts of rural districts, held meetings there, read letters and afterwards individually visited all farmsteads”. Since psychological pressure and physical violence were being exerted on people, quite a few of them agreed to sign. According to official data, in Raseiniai county

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.24.** The decision of 28 September 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the State Anthem of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 109. p. 127.

^{*} **Doc. No. 10.25.** The decision of 29 March 1950 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Approval of the Draft Text of the Anthem of the Lithuanian SSR*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 90. f. 53. p. 76–77, 83, 85.

*** Literature and Sources**

^{*} **Doc. No. 11.1.** The decision of 22 June 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Preparation and Organization of the Celebration of the 5th Anniversary of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic on 21 July 1945*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 77. p. 34–37.

^{*} **Doc. No.11.2.** An extract from the report by the First Secretary of the Party Committee of Raseiniai county T. Mončiunskas at the July Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1945. SLA. stk. 1771. inv.8. f. 137. p. 137–138.

21,000 people from 40,000 adult population signed the letter. It was estimated as a failure by CK of the LKP(b).

In July 1945, the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR A.Guzevičius informed M.Suslov, A.Sniečkus and B.Kulakov that before putting their signatures, students of Vilnius University said that if the letter was sent to Stalin, “the world will understand that the Lithuanian nation is for the Soviet power and then hopes to regain the independence of Lithuania will be ruined”. In this report A.Guzevičius pointed out that 184 people refused to sign in the part of the rural district of Bobiai of Žilialai rural district in Vilkaviškis county, in Daugailiai rural district of Utena county nearly everyone left the meeting, in Utena butter plant out of 15 workers only the director signed (doc. No. 11.3)*. A lot of similar facts were observed throughout Lithuania.

On 7 July 1945, Kaunas State Security personnel reported to the Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the SSRS B.Kobulov that most employees of enterprises and institutions in Kaunas refused to sign the letter. For example, in Vilijampolė, the meeting was attended by almost only women and none of them signed. “Measures” were taken, therefore, “since 6 July, the number of those who signed has considerably increased due to the so-called individual “processing” (“individual’noj obrabotki” – Russ.), wrote NKGB employees. On July 6, by 8 p.m., 13,000 signatures of inhabitants of Kaunas were collected. The State Security directed their agents to disclose “anti-Soviet elements” hindering the signing of the letter. The most active “nationalists” were ordered to be arrested (doc. No. 11.4)*.

Being aware that the action was destined to fail, on 11 July 1945, the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania I.Tkachenko sent a letter personally to A.Sniečkus and M.Suslov noting that “the way the system of organization of such an important political event as it is used now in many places is an insult to the honourable name of our party and the leader of nations”. He provided a lot of examples which indicated that people avoided to approve of the state power. For example, in the rural district of Ramygala, from 8,000 adults only 250 signed, in Tauragė “Maistas” plant, from 200 workers only 7, etc. I.Tkachenko indicated that “anti-Soviet elements and bandits” considered this action as a secret plebiscite organized by the Soviet power seeking the prove to America and England that the Lithuanian nation had a favourable attitude towards the Soviet power. The NKGB of the LSSR ordered its operational sectors to arrest people who would obstruct the signing of the letter to “comrade Stalin”. I.Tkachenko directed all heads of operational sectors and county divisions of the NKVD-NKGB “to arrest all persons frustrating the discussion of the letter to comrade Stalin or arranging any other excesses” (doc. No. 11.5)*. The number of people arrested has not been established.

On 11 July 1945, I.Tkachenko, B.Kobulov and A.Apolonov sent a letter of a similar content to L.Berija who passed it on to Stalin the same day: “I am sending you a worth-attention report by comrades Kobulov, Apolonov and Tkachenko about how people of the Lithuanian SSR sign the letter to comrade Stalin on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the Soviet power in the republic”. Judging by the document, it is evident that the heads of State Security bodies wanted to lay the blame for the failure of the campaign on the CK of the LKP(b) and lower organizations of the party (the poorly organized “political-mass” and agitation work). The failure of the campaign of signing the letter must have had a personal impact on Stalin. On 12-13 July, L.Berija received Stalin’s authorization to start the first major deportations of partisan families in Lithuania.2

* **Doc. No. 11.3.** The special report of July 1945 by the Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR A. Guzevičius to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov, the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus and the Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the SSRS B. Kobulov in reference to the refusal of people to sign the letter to Stalin. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 22. p. 1–2.

* **Doc. No.11.4.** A special report of 7 July 1945 by the Head of Kaunas Operational Sector of the NKVD-NKGB Col. I. Veselov and the Head of Kaunas Division of the NKGB of the LSSR Lt. Col. V.Vorontsov to the Deputy Commissar of the NKGB of the LSSR B. Kobulov *On Negative Occurrences in Collecting Signatures from the Population of Kaunas City on the Address to Comrade Stalin in Preparing for the Celebration of the 5th Anniversary of the Soviet Power in Lithuania*. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 10. f. 23. p. 285–288.

* **Doc. No. 11.5.** A report of 11 July 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania I. Tkachenko to the Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) M. Suslov and the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in reference to the inadequate work of the apparatus of the CK of the LKP(b) in organizing the campaign of signing the letter to J. Stalin. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 179. p. 110–112.

A.Sniečkus and all authorities of the CK of the LKP(b) quickly reacted to the situation. On 18 July 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) had a special discussion on the work of the Committee of the LKP(b) of Utena county and adopted the decision “On the Irresponsible Attitude towards the Organization of Political-Mass Work in the County of Utena in Preparing the Letter to Comrade Stalin”. The document stated that communists and other activists in Utena county resorted to measures of violence”. For example, in the town of Vyžuonos, at a meeting of the population, the party commissioner of the county Kaminskij barricaded the door with a table and demanded to sign the letter. This decision of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) was sent to all party committees of counties and cities (doc. No. 11.6)*.

According to the Soviet official data, out of nearly 1.5 million of Lithuanian population who had the right to vote, 640,875 people signed the letter to Stalin under psychological, moral and physical pressure (arrests) (the data has not been verified – V.T.). In order not to openly conflict with the state power, quite a few people were forced to sign.

12. Repressive Policy against the Lithuanian Catholic Church*

One of the most important forces of the spiritual opposition of the Lithuanian nation was the Catholic Church. Due to its centralized organization structure and significant support of believers, it had quite a great impact on the life of the Lithuanian society. Catholic clergymen had always tried to maintain the national dignity of Lithuanians, urged not to ignore Catholic traditions and oppose denationalization; they morally supported the national resistance and some of them participated in the underground activity. The communist power resorted to rough violence against the clergy and believers. During the post-war period, it aimed at the elimination of the Church from public life and did not acknowledge any initiative by the Vatican concerning the issues of ruling the Church and its hierarchy.

During the last decade of Stalin’s rule, after the Russian Orthodox Church became subjected to the interests of the VKP(b), the objectives of propagating atheism in the society of the Soviet Union were principally implemented and were no longer of great urgency. At that time, the CK of the VKP(b) did not adopt a single decision urging to more actively fight against “religious prejudices”.¹ The situation in Lithuania was different. The Communist Party did not control the Catholic Church; therefore, Moscow granted communists of Lithuania almost complete freedom of action which later, due to the excessive assiduity of the LKP(b) in making repressions against the Church, was named in Moscow as “the leftist deviation”. The most important issues of the activity of the Catholic Church were discussed at the meetings of the Bureau or divisions of the CK of the LKP(b) and the Commissioner of the Council of the Affairs of Religious Cult (CARC); ways and means detrimental to the Church, permission for priests to hold high clerical positions and other issues were discussed at them. This practice was in operation throughout the entire period of the occupation.

The LKP(b) interfered in the internal affairs of religious communities and controlled them; with the assistance of agency network of the State Security, it secretly collected information about the plans of ordinary clergymen and the authorities of the Church as well as about their political moods. In July 1945, I.Tkachenko admitted that the Church in Lithuania had authority, though that was denied by the leaders of the LKP(b) in every possible way (doc. No. 12.1)*. With the help of the institution of the Commissioner of the CARC and the NKGB-MGB of the LSSR, the CK of the LKP(b) adopted several political documents directed against the Church, on the basis of which conditions were provided for the above-mentioned bodies to carry out the policy of intimidation, blackmail, physical violence and repressions against the clergy. The communist power was afraid of the authority of the church, therefore, security services were obligated to

* **Doc. No. 11.6.** The decision of 18 July 1945 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Irresponsible Attitude Towards the Organisation of the Political-Mass Work in the County of Utena in Preparing the Letter to Comrade Stalin*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 8. f. 83. p. 4–5.

* **Literature and Sources**

* **Doc. No. 12.1.** A report of July 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD –NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Lt. Gen. I. Tkachenko to the Heads of the Operational Sectors of the NKVD-NKGB of the LSSR. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 18. f. 39. p. 140.

infiltrate into clergy layers and, by using available means, demoralize the Church from the inside and compromise it in the society.

The main initiators and organizers of the repression of the Church were A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas, K.Preikšas, the Commissioners of the CARC A.Gailevičius (1944-1948) and B.Pušinis (1948-1957) as well as the heads of the NKGB-MGB of the LSSR.

In the post-war years, the Lithuanian Catholic Church suffered much greater pressure from local communists than it was demanded by Moscow. The authorities of the LKP(b) were criticized for that, but they never admitted their “fault”. On 3 December 1960, at the meeting of the CK Bureau of the LKP, A.Sniečkus said: “We did not make concessions to the Catholic Church. On the contrary, we closed down a lot of churches and monasteries. At some time, we were blamed for “the leftist deviation”; I was called to the Secretariat of the CK of the SSKP, where I had to explain myself in regard to this issue” (doc. No. 12.2)*. The Commissioner of the CARC B.Pušinis had a similar, though much more radical standpoint. On 22 March 1950, at the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) he was even criticized for self-willed actions (doc. No. 12.3. p.80)*.

At first, the communist power pursued dual, hypocritical policy in respect of the Church. In 1945, with the intensification of the resistance of the armed underground, militant heads of the LKP(b) and the NKVD-NKGB insisted on increasing the pressure on the Church as “the inspirer of the nationalistic struggle”. However, M.Gedvilas and A.Gailevičius were of the opinion that it was essential “to employ the Catholic Church in fighting against bandit formations on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR”². In the summer of 1945, they managed to force or persuade the prelate of Kaunas metropolitan diocese S.Jakūbauskas to make an appeal to clergymen, believers, resistance fighters and those in hiding urging to cease the resistance and legalize themselves. However, the majority of the clergy did not support this form of cooperation between the power and the Church. There are more examples of such delusive and hypocritical activity of the leaders of the LKP(b). For example, on 2 December 1946, Moscow approved of the proposition made by A.Gailevičius to prohibit catechization of children in church buildings, but this kind of measure was of no political use at that time; therefore, A.Sniečkus and M.Gedvilas ordered A.Gailevičius to postpone this decision for a few months (until the election to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR, i.e. until February 1947).³

Having failed to make clergymen submit to the Soviet power, the LKP(b) together with repressive bodies toughened the policy of discriminating believers, compromising and repressing the clergy, attempted to turn the Church into a national one separated from the Vatican and controlled by the communist power.⁴ The CK of the LKP(b) and the NKGB of the LSSR carried out brutal repressions directed against clergymen: in 1944-1946, 103 priests were arrested⁵, the property of the Church was nationalized, it was forbidden to teach religion at schools and catechize groups of children. In rural areas, this required more effort. On 24 September 1946, the Minister of Education of the LSSR J.Žiugžda addressed M.Gedvilas and A.Sniečkus “to give directives to the corresponding bodies to liquidate the sources of religious cults at children’s homes and evict clergymen” (doc. No. 12.4)*. The CK of the LKP(b) could not completely prohibit public celebration of religious holidays, but it tried to restrict their scale by different means. Anti-Soviet demonstrations of believers and clergymen and other actions hostile to the power during these holidays caused great fear. On 13 October 1945, Gen. I.Tkachenko ordered his subordinates to keep the troops and other repressive bodies in combat readiness and on stand-by in the barracks on the days of All Saints and All Souls. Persons trying to use the holidays for anti-Soviet purposes had to be put under immediate arrest (doc. No 12.5)*.

* **Doc. No.12.2.** An extract from the stenographed record of the sitting of the Bureau of the CK of the LKP on 3 December 1960. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 12. p. 110–111.

* **Doc. No. 12.3.** Extracts from the decision of 22 March 1950 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Decision of the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) On the Execution of the Tasks of Party Organizations in Revealing Hostile Activities of the Reactionary Catholic Clergy*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 7. p. 78, 80, 83.

* **Doc. No. 12.4.** The letter of 24 September 1946 by the Minister of Education of the LSSR J. Žiugžda to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR M. Gedvilas and the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A. Sniečkus in reference to the eviction of the Catholic clergy. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 9. f. 278. p. 139.

* **Doc. No. 12.5.** A report of 13 October 1945 by the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Lt. Gen. I. Tkachenko to the People’s Commissars of the NKVD-NKGB of the LSSR and the Heads of Operational Sectors, County and City Divisions of the NKVD-NKGB of the LSSR in reference to commemorating the Day of the Dead in Lithuania. SLA. stk. K-1. inv. 18. f. 40. p. 121.

In 1946, a compulsory registration of all religious communities and priests began. It was only the Vatican that could change the order of the Church; therefore, Lithuanian bishops rejected this requirement and prohibited the Church from taking part in political life. Until 1948, the Lithuanian Catholic Church used different means to boycott the registration of parish committees and priests; as a result, repressions against it were made more severe. In 1946, the bishop T. Matulionis was deported, the bishop V. Borisevičius was arrested and shot dead, the archbishop M. Reinys was imprisoned (he died in Vladimir prison in 1953), in 1947, the bishop P. Ramanauskas was deported. From 1947, administrative penalties were imposed on unregistered priests. The clergy were accused of cooperation with the armed underground, therefore, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) never forgot the Catholic Church in their anti-partisan decisions and obligated repressive bodies “to put an end to the hostile activity”. For example, Clause 22 of the decision of 12 December 1947 by the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) stated: “To obligate party organizations and MGB bodies of the Republic to extend the unmasking of the reactionary Catholic clergy and put an end to its hostile activity and, at the same time, exploit loyally disposed priests who in their sermons to the believers would unmask banditism and some reactionary clergymen assisting bands (doc.No. 4.16).*

On 9 July 1948, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted the famous decision “On Tasks of Party Organizations in Unmasking the Hostile Activity of the Reactionary Catholic Clergy” (doc.No. 12.6).* The document obligated party committees and bodies of the State Security to take repressive measures to make all priests register themselves and stop their underground or anti-Soviet activities. Clause 2 of the decision ordered to close down unregistered churches; Clause 3 allowed religious communities rent from the State all nationalized property of the Catholic Church, provided the priest would be loyal to the Soviet power; Clause 4 forbade priests to teach children religion by no means. Legal proceedings were taken against those priests who did not act in accordance with the decision. Clause 5 obligated the MGB to disclose “religious-nationalistic underground organizations”, whereas Clause 9 directed the Komsomol of Lithuania to actively “unmask the activity of the reactionary clergy directed against the people”.

This decision of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) was discussed by almost all city and county committees of the LKP(b) (with the exception of party committees of Ukmergė and Radviliškis counties which were later criticized for that). For example, on 10 August 1948, Zarasai County Committee of the LKP(b) ordered the Executive Committee of the county not later than by 15 August to register churches and priests (Clause 2): “Priests, who obstruct the registration of Catholic communities and avoid to register themselves, will be forbidden to carry out their duties at churches and believers’ homes; those, who persistently ignore and avoid to register, will face prosecution; unregistered churches will be closed down (sealed) and not open until priests serving at them submit a note about the registration of the religious community and the employee of the cult from the Commissioner of the CARC“. Clause 3 of the decision obligated the chairmen of the Soviets of rural districts to nationalize all church buildings and other property of the rural district by 20 August. The rest of the clauses of the decision duplicated the decision of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) (doc.No. 12.7).*

The campaign of closing churches or the forced registration began. B. Pušinis showed the greatest initiative in this activity. Because of his excessive assiduity, he got more than one warning from Moscow. The authorities of the CARC of the SSRS (the Commissioner I. Polianskij) were concerned not so much about the order of closing churches or the campaign itself, but rather about the self-willed or too independent decisions taken by B. Pušinis. In all cases, Moscow’s agreement was necessary, and the leaders of Lithuanian communists did not always obey this. On 13 October 1948, after a church in Kaunas (Aukštieji Šančiai) was closed, in his letter to Moscow, B. Pušinis explained that this had been done intentionally, seeking to break down the opposition of Kaunas priests to the registration. He emphasized that “this decision was strongly supported by the CK of the LKP(b) that sanctioned the act”.⁶ On 6 October 1949, on the initiative of the authorities of the

* **Doc. No. 4.16.** The decision of 12 December 1947 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Intensifying of Fighting against the Bourgeois Nationalistic Underground and its Armed Bands*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv.190. f. 5. p. 179–187.

* **Doc. No. 12.6.** The decision of 9 July 1948 by the Bureau of the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Tasks of Party Organisations in Revealing Hostile Activities of the Reactionary Catholic Clergy*. SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 11. f. 111. p. 9–13.

* **Doc. No. 12.7.** The decision of 10 August 1948 by the Bureau of Zarasai County Committee of the LKP(b) *On the Tasks of Party Organisations in Revealing Hostile Activities of the Reactionary Catholic Clergy*. SLA. stk. 913. inv. 913-3. f. 2. p. 155-158.

CK of the LKP(b) and formally by the decision of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, Vilnius Cathedral was closed down.

B.Pušinis was supported by A.Sniečkus, who openly demonstrated his contempt and fanatical hatred for the Catholic Church. At party conferences, he kept repeating that by no means could the fighting against priests and religion be made less intensive. At the 18th Plenum of the CK of the LKP(b) in 1948, he said: “We compelled churches to register, nationalized their property, achieved considerable results in stopping to teach religion at schools, closed down several dozens of churches. However, not everything went smoothly, people are not content with the future use of churches. [...] Of course, closing of one or another church still remains on the schedule. But we must do it carefully, use these premises for cultural needs, for example, for clubs, cinemas”.⁷

In July 1949, the Vatican announced the decree of St. Ophithia, which separated communists and Catholics supporting them from the Church. It is not yet clear what influence it had, but around 1950, the campaign of closing churches in Lithuania slowed down. Seeking to preserve the Church, priests submitted to the demands of the power and started to register themselves.

On 22 March 1950, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted a decision which summed up the two-year-long repression policy of the Church organized by the Communist Party. The note said that “42 monasteries liquidated themselves” (Catholic), the number of places of worship decreased by 12 per cent, theological seminary students – by 64 per cent, employees of the managing apparatus of dioceses – by 50 per cent, and “Lourdes of Plungė liquidated itself” (doc.No. 12.8*).

In 1944–1953, during the implementation of the discriminatory and criminal policy of the Communist Party and repressive bodies, 362 priests and 4 bishops were arrested, imprisoned or deported (two of the bishops perished), 130 churches and all monasteries were closed down (14,000 monks were dismissed), all property of churches and monasteries was nationalized, only one theological seminary was left, teaching of religion was banned, etc. (doc.No. 12.9).*

Due to the repressions, political and ideological persecution, the clergy changed the tactics of their activity. They started looking for compromises, some priests began behaving in such a way as to prove their loyalty to the Soviet power. On 16 January 1950, in his circular to priests of Lithuania, the Head of Kaunas archdiocese, Kaišiadorys and Vilkaviškis dioceses J.Stankevičius recommended them “to positively contribute to the creative work by clearly advising people, both publicly and privately, to join the common constructive socialist work”.⁸ Nevertheless, most clergy, supported by believers, remained an opposing force to the communist regime until the very end of the Soviet occupation. The Communist Party never managed to subject the Church to its will.

* **Doc. No. 12.8.** Extracts from the note of March 1950 by the CK of the LKP(b) *On the Execution of the Decision of 9 July 1948 by the Bureau of CK of the LKP(b) On the Tasks of Party Organisations in Revealing Hostile Activities of the Reactionary Catholic Clergy.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 7. p. 85, 87–88.

* **Doc. No. 12.9.** An extract from the note of 7 December 1960 by the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP A. Sniečkus to the CK of the SSKP *On the Construction of a Catholic Church in Klaipėda.* SLA. stk. 1771. inv. 190. f. 12. p. 101–102.

Conclusions

In 1944, with the beginning of the second Soviet occupation (reoccupation), the communist regime was established in Lithuania. The Communist Party of the Union (the Bolsheviks) again became the most important and the only official body and the pillar of the political regime in Lithuania. Its constituent part – the Communist Party of Lithuania (the Bolsheviks) – was a territorial organization of the VKP(b) and performed the main administrative functions of the occupation power.

During the post-war years, apart from the LKP(b), some other political bodies of the SSRS functioned here: the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) and the Lenin Young Communist League of Lithuania (the Komsomol). These organizations actively contributed to the Sovietization, fought against the resistance, participated in repressions and acts of genocide.

1. The Communist Party of Lithuania (the Bolsheviks)

1. The Communist Party of Lithuania (the Bolsheviks) was the most important political body in the implementation of the criminal Stalinist policy in Lithuania in 1944–1953. It was considered by the Lithuanian society as an organization alien and hostile to the Lithuanian nation, having no authority and political capability to maintain power without the support of the military and repressive bodies of the SSRS. The name of the communist was largely associated with the betrayal of the aspirations of the Lithuanian nation; therefore, communists used to be shot dead on the spot when captured by partisans. Many members of the LKP(b) had poor education. Disregard of the general Christian norms and moral values of the society and even contempt for them had an impact on the immoral behaviour of communists and led to their senseless cruelty.

2. Lithuanians were the minority in the LKP(b) (in 1947, they made up 18 per cent, in 1953–38 per cent). The Russian language was used in clerical work and the greatest part of party literature was in Russian, too. The LKP(b) was the core of Russianization of Lithuania.

3. The main function of the LKP(b) was the unconditional implementation of the directives of the CK of the VKP(b), the CK Politburo of the VKP(b) and J.Stalin. Suggestions by the LKP(b) were taken into account only in those cases when they coincided with the interests of the Kremlin: seeking to deport partisan families, sending specialists from the SSRS, etc. The key tasks and objectives of the LKP(b) were Sovietization of Lithuania and establishment of the communist regime in all spheres of public life, organization of fighting against the national underground and its liquidation, execution of the Stalinist cadre policy.

4. The chief task of party bodies was the day-to-day search for “people’s or class enemies” and the organization of their repression. People or social groups who became the victims of the repressive policy of the VKP(b)–LKP(b) can be classified into the four categories: 1. partisans and members of underground organizations and their supporters (“bourgeois nationalists”); 2. farmers (“the kulaks”); 3. office workers, teachers, the intelligentsia, former politicians, employees, military personnel and other officials of the independent Lithuania (“politically and socially unreliable, counter-revolutionary elements”); 4. Catholic clergymen (“the reactionary Catholic clergy”). All these people were arrested, imprisoned, deported or killed. This was the largest and the most important part of the criminal activity of the LKP(b). In other spheres (e.g. organizing forced elections, pursuing the policy of Russianization, spiritual pressure, militant atheism, persecution of believers and the Church, tendentious justice, anti-Semitism, etc.), the activity of the LKP(b) manifested the features of political discrimination of people that was also criminal in its character.

5. The whole policy of the Communist Party in establishing the Soviet regime in Lithuania was pursued in total secrecy. Not only the planned repressions or acts of terror, but also elementary everyday issues were kept secret from the society. Both public and private life of the individual was under surveillance.

6. Supported by the repressive bodies, the LKP(b) established itself in the centers of Lithuania within a short period of time (1944–1945). It took some effort to expand its power network in the country. Partorgs who were sent here became the highest local political power. They were the initiators and organizers of local repressions, demonstrated brutal behaviour, anti-humane actions and immoral way of life. In 1948, they were substituted by secretaries of party organizations.

7. In the first post-war years, Moscow demanded that the LKP(b) speed up Sovietization and make the repression policy stricter. In order to intimidate communists of Lithuania, especially Lithuanians, in 1944–1946, the CK of the VKP(b) adopted three decisions in which it severely criticized the LKP(b) for inadequate actions in Sovietizing Lithuania. In 1944–1953, they developed into decisions and resolutions of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) and plenums of the CK of the LKP(b), which abounded in gross violations of human rights.

8. In order to control the implementation of the decisions of the CK of the VKP(b), different commissions and inspection brigades were sent to Lithuania that were merciless to communists themselves: because of ineffective work and lack of diligence, people were dismissed or demoted. This helped the CK of the VKP(b) totally control the authorities of the LKP(b) and direct them the way they wanted. Communists of Lithuania made all possible efforts to justify the expectations of Moscow. Therefore, virtually no repressive measures were taken against the leading Lithuanian communists.

9. In order to strengthen the implementation control of the decisions of the CK of the VKP(b), beginning with the end of 1944, non-Lithuanians were appointed as second secretaries of party committees practically at all levels of the LKP(b) (in 1952, 2 per cent of Lithuanians held these positions). They supervised the work of the Lithuanian first secretaries, observed the general political situation over the territory under their control, shaped the policy of the cadre. The institution of second secretaries was one of the major distinct features of the political control and supervision of local communists by the CK of the VKP(b) in the post-war Lithuania.

10. Alongside the whole Soviet political system, the Stalinist policy of the cadre was established in Lithuania. It was the practice of the formation of the party nomenclature that in a short period of time helped the Communist Party expand and reinforce its control over all state, economic, cultural and other institutions. People belonging to the nomenclature, the leading personnel and specialists of party and Soviet administrative institutions of the LSSR, constituted a privileged layer of the functionaries of Lithuania, the composition of which was unopenly regulated by the CK of the VKP(b) and the CK of the LKP(b). In 1946 the formed party nomenclature alongside the repressive bodies became the main pillar of the Soviet regime in Lithuania.

In 1952, nomenclature positions in Lithuania totalled 42,000. Half of those holding nomenclature positions were non-Lithuanians, mainly people of different nationalities of the SSRS, who had acquired Russian attitudes and who had been sent by the CK of the VKP(b).

The policy of the cadre based on the reliability of “political and professional” qualities of employees was anti-democratic, anti-national, discriminatory and criminal (in case employees were imprisoned because of political unreliability). Those belonging to the nomenclature in party committees used to be assigned to the positions or dismissed from them in secret, the society being unaware of that. Having acquired a nomenclature post, a person was forced to carry out all party instructions. 11. The process of the formation of the nomenclature was followed by gross violations of human rights. The CK of the VKP(b) and the CK of the LKP(b) organized mass campaigns of dismissing people, mainly Lithuanians, from work for political considerations. They were dismissed from their positions, intentionally prevented from getting employment elsewhere, arrested, interrogated and, fairly often, imprisoned. In 1945, 7,128 employees were dismissed from different institutions, including 4,000 for political considerations; in 1946, 6,639 and 2,535 people were dismissed respectively. According to the data of the repressive bodies, during the entire post-war period (1944–1953), 6,267 employees were arrested, though the greatest number were arrested during the period of the cleansing of the cadre: 5,190 persons within the period of 1945–1947.

At court, it was impossible to defend one’s work rights or oneself from political persecution, because judges were also on the nomenclature lists and executed the will of the local party committee.

12. The key body of the apparatus of the CK of the LKP(b) was the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) that dealt not only with repressive issues (e.g. how to annihilate the resistance or deport people), but also made decisions on many economic, social and other problems of the administration of the LSSR. At the Bureau, there were quite a few Lithuanian communists with Stalinist views: A.Sniečkus, V.Niunka. K.Preikšas, G.Zimanas, J.Bartašiūnas. J.Paleckis and M.Gedvilas were slightly more moderate in their views. Members of the Bureau were particularly intolerant towards those thinking differently. Especially radical in their views were newcomers from the SSRS: second secretaries of the CK of the LKP(b), ministers of State Security, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the LSSR V.Pisarev, who held this post for many years, etc.

Though political decisions were taken in Moscow, the entire political responsibility for the consequences of the Soviet occupation in the post-war Lithuania rested on their executors, i.e. members of the Bureau.

13. The First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) Antanas Sniečkus was the creator of the Soviet system, the main Lithuanian collaborationist, a loyal vicegerent of Moscow in Lithuania. Having firm belief in the ideals of communism and being a person brought up by the Bolshevik Party, throughout his whole life he remained faithful to the traditions of Marxist dogmatism, obedience, intolerance of the opposite opinion. In 1944–1953, his name was associated with the forced Sovietization and Russianization of Lithuania, organization of fighting against the national underground, mass deportations and imprisonments of innocent people, persecution of the Catholic Church and those thinking differently, and destruction of the national culture. His reports at party conferences and his personal signatures sanctioning the implementation of the repressive policy testify to that. For his obedience and consistent execution of the political course of the CK of the VKP(b) in the post-war period he was awarded six orders. After the demise of Stalin, taking into account the political conjuncture, A. Sniečkus tended to change; he even started to consider, to some extent, the interests of Lithuania, though he always remained faithful to the ideas of Bolshevism.

14. One of the main pillars of the communist regime in the SSRS was the repressive bodies (the NKVD-MVD, the NKGB-MGB, the Prosecutor's Office, special courts). In the post-war Lithuania, while performing the mission of the CK of the VKP(b) and central repressive agencies of the SSRS, these bodies gained a significant political influence, because, in fact, the existence of the Soviet power and the Communist Party in particular depended on their activity, i.e. on the day-to-day fighting against the resistance of the Lithuanian nation.

Similarly to the entire Stalinist SSRS, where the repressive bodies were formally subordinated to the party, i.e. the VKP(b), in Lithuania, the LKP(b) actually did not command these institutions administratively. The CK of the LKP(b) had no political power to subject the whole repressive apparatus to itself, although it was striving for that throughout the entire post-war period. All these bodies were under the direct command of central agencies of the SSRS. There were practically no Lithuanians, because they were not trusted. The authorities of the LKP(b) made a lot of effort to extend their influence and include more Lithuanians in these institutions, to form Lithuanian military-repressive units; however, Moscow tried to solve the problem of the armed resistance by its military-repressive power alone, leaving the obedient Lithuanians the mere function of institutionalizing the communist regime. Although the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted many anti-partisan decisions, the LKP(b) command over the repressive bodies was largely party-ideological in its character.

15. The decisions of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) and the Plenums of the CK obligated the repressive bodies to pursue the common policy of the reinforcement of the Soviet regime and state terror. However, throughout the entire post-war period, there was constant polemics between the LKP(b) and State Security personnel in regard to means and methods of faster Sovietization of Lithuania and breaking down of the resistance. The two institutions used to exchange criticizing letters in which party members and State Security personnel accused the opposite side of different “violations”, concessions to “people's enemies”, drinking, looting, murdering, etc. Heads of the repressive bodies often almost openly ignored party committees, not always shared operational information about the underground or planned repressive actions with communists and behaved insolently. Talks spread among State Security personnel that one of the reasons of the prolonged fighting against the underground was the fact that the authorities of the VKP(b) were too tolerant towards “the nationalists”, and some Lithuanian communists were themselves nationalistically disposed (e.g. J.Paleckis, employees of the Presidium apparatus of the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR). On the other hand, the leaders of the LKP(b) used to out the blame for all failures in suppressing the resistance on the repressive bodies, accused them of gross violations of “the socialist justice” (arrests of defenceless innocent people, killings, plundering, drinking, etc.) and keeping aloof from active fighting against partisans. The disobedience of State Security personnel to the party caused the greatest indignation.

In fact, in initiating and executing repressions in Lithuania there existed political competition between the LKP(b) and the State Security.

Nevertheless, disagreements between the LKP(b) and the repressive bodies were insignificant. All institutions of the occupation administration were directed from Moscow and performed the same work that was di-

sastrous to the Lithuanian nation. Besides, disagreements also used to occur over the superiority of power or personal ambitions (the relations between A. Sniečkus and D.Jefimov, P.Kapralov, I.Tkachenko were poor).

16. The communist regime was immoral, because not only ordinary citizens, but also high-ranking officials of the state – ideological communists, collaborationists – used to be shadowed. Compromising materials on them were secretly collected and cases were forged. The largest campaign of political distrust was in 1950–1953.

17. In 1944, the leading positions in control and local power institutions of the occupation administration of the LSSR were assigned not to the invaders, but to the former citizens of Lithuania, mainly communists, who, because of their ideological beliefs, career or self-seeking interests, supported the Soviet Union. They voluntarily cooperated with the invaders and had the administrative mandate of the authorities to compel their countrymen to obey Moscow's instructions. At that time, Lithuanian communists were against the independent Lithuania and for the unified and indivisible Soviet Union. A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas, J.Paleckis, A.Guzevičius, V.Niunka, K.Preikšas and many other famous communists became the most important executors of Moscow's political and ideological directives and organizers of repressions. They did not defend the interests of Lithuania but those of the SSRS, i.e. the invaders; therefore, their activity is estimated as criminal cooperation, assistance and collaborationism.

2. The Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b)

1. The Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) (11 November 1944–24 March 1947) was a political body of the SSRS in Lithuania, the highest institution of the Soviet occupation administration, in the hands of which real political power was concentrated during the first post-war years. It had unlimited authority and was accountable only to the CK of the VKP(b). The Chairmen of the Bureau M.Suslov and V.Shcherbakov, the First Secretary of the CK of the LKP(b) A.Sniečkus and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the LSSR M.Gedvilas were included as permanent members of the Bureau on the side of the Lithuanian administration. With the help of these Lithuanian collaborationists, the Bureau could directly command and control the administration of the LSSR.

2. Throughout the period of its activity, the Bureau, as a structural sub-division of the CK of the VKP(b), sought to Sovietize Lithuania as soon as possible. Most important documents of that time that regulated the life of Lithuania were initially prepared and approved by the Bureau. All the main issues were coordinated with M.Suslov and other members of the Bureau; therefore, the entire political responsibility for all actions associated with political repressions, killings of innocent people and other genocide acts, fully lies on the Bureau as well as on the CK of the LKP(b).

3. One of the most fundamental tasks of the Bureau was to break down the resistance of the Lithuanian nation, to erase the aspiration for freedom and independence from the conscience of the Lithuanian population. It was during the years of the Bureau command that on average the greatest number of people were arrested, imprisoned and killed per year in the post-war Lithuania. In 1944–1946, the troops of the NKVD (MVD) murdered or killed in action 14,409, arrested 39,235 and deported 9,214 Lithuanian people (mass deportations were carried out later).

4. The Bureau was the political-ideological organizer of repressions and continually encouraged the expansion of the apparatus of the repressive bodies, incited public partisan court trials, organized by the Military Tribunal, and the cleansing of the cadre, sanctioned the first post-war deportations, supervised forced elections to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR as well as forced mobilization of men to the Red Army, and was the initiator of Russianization of Lithuania. The Bureau demanded that heads of party and repressive bodies fight severely and mercilessly against the armed underground.

5. The Bureau failed to suppress the national resistance; nevertheless, in 1947, the Soviet political system, supported by armed force, was already functioning in Lithuania. The process of Sovietization was continuing.

3. The Komsomol

1. The Lenin Young Communist League of Lithuania (LYCLL), a constituent part of the LYCLU, was a political body of the SSRS, an aide to the Communist Party and its reserve. In 1944–1953, the principal directives of the LYCLL had to help the LKP(b) Sovietize the young people of Lithuania, fight against the underground and train a reserve of the future Lithuanian communists.
2. Lithuanian youth condemned Komsomol members for their participation in repressions, for the persecution of people thinking differently, for the contempt to national values, and considered this organization alien to Lithuania. It was students and teachers that ignored the Komsomol the most. Reluctance of the youth to join the Komsomol was one of the forms of passive resistance to the Soviet regime.
3. Moscow and the authorities of the LKP(b) demanded that the ranks of the LYCLL be augmented. Komsomol organizations resorted to various unlawful means (recruitment, administration, blackmail, violence) in order to increase the number of Komsomol members. In 1953, the number of Komsomol members amounted to 100,000. Certainly, there were Komsomol members who joined this organization for ideological considerations.
4. The LYCLL was a half-Russian organization. In 1946, Lithuanians made up 51 per cent, in 1948 – 49 per cent, in 1953 – 63 per cent of the members. Most Komsomol functions were conducted in Russian, nearly all documents and clerical work in offices were also done in Russian.
5. The Komsomol unconditionally carried out all directives of the LKP(b) and participated in all post-war forced economic and political campaigns, repressions and acts of terror. Komsomol members took part in partisan extermination operations, constituted quite a large part of exterminators and party-Soviet activists, were in the ranks of those who carried out deportations of the population, spied upon and reported to party organizations on “people’s enemies” in institutions and organizations, were active executors of economic terror against the peasantry and creators of the system of kolkhozes. Alongside exterminators and other representatives of the “activists”, they organized raids on the country and, making threats, demanded that people carry out all directives of the Soviet power.
6. In its decisions, the CK of the LKP(b) made all male Komsomol members participate in the armed fighting against the underground. The compulsion of Komsomol members to join armed groups and participate in fighting against partisans might be considered as criminal activity. Most Lithuanians were enrolled in the Komsomol by force or by applying moral and psychological pressure; therefore, quite a few of them were involved in the groups of exterminators or armed party-Soviet activists against their will. Thus, the CK of the LKP(b) and the CK of the LYCLL succeeded in spreading enmity among part of Lithuanian young people and involving them in the fratricidal war.
7. Moscow did not always trust the authorities of the LYCLL. In 1945–1947, Lithuanian Komsomol officials were accused of “nationalistic errors”, “loss of class vigilance”, etc. Moscow sought to intimidate the Lithuanian part of the CK of the LYCLL by the decisions of the CK of the LYCLU and continual inspections in order to make it unconditionally carry out all directives. In 1946, the Head of the Lithuanian Komsomol J. Macevičius and his closest associates were dismissed from their positions. A. Raguotis, a person of radical views, became the new First Secretary of the CK of the LYCLL.

4. Suppression of the Resistance to Soviet Occupation

1. Suppression of the armed resistance in the post-war Lithuania was headed by the CK of the VKP(b) and repressive bodies of the SSRS in Moscow according to the directive documents of which military operations and intelligence work was organized, the activity of party, repressive and other bodies (of republican subordination) was coordinated locally. The communist authorities of the SSRS did not acknowledge any political concessions or compromises. The resistance had to be overcome by the military force of the SSRS. From the point of view of the Soviet authorities, partisans could only capitulate, i.e. legalize themselves. According to the data of the State Security of the LSSR, in 1944-1953, 62,000 resistance fighters were arrested and imprisoned, 20,000 were killed and 38,000 legalized themselves. Overall, 120,000

people that publicly disapproved of the Soviet power or fought against it suffered violence or repression. According to the calculations by the historian A. Anušauskas the total number of people arrested by the NKVD-MVD-MGB of the LSSR in 1944-1952 was about 186,000 (deportees excluded). This was one of the colossal crimes organized and executed by the Communist Party.

2. From 1944 to the spring of 1947, the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b) directly commanded fighting against the underground. The LKP(b) performed organizational and partially executive functions. From 1947 to 1953, the functions of the political organization of the suppression of partisan resistance came directly under the CK of the LKP(b). In 1947-1949 and in 1953, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted top secret anti-partisan documents applied to the whole of Lithuania, which obligated all party and repressive bodies to suppress the resistance to the Soviet power by all means: repressive (military operations and deportations), economic (a growing burden of taxes for peasants, forced collectivization), ideological (slandering Lithuanian resistance fighters and the Catholic Church by employing mass media). Trying to lead the fighting against the underground, the CK of the LKP(b) organized conferences of the heads of party and repressive bodies. In order to fight against partisans, special top secret party-repressive bodies were established: "the threes" in rural districts and "the fives" in counties.

3. In fighting against the underground, the LKP(b) made great efforts to cause enmity among the Lithuanian nation. The LKP(b) established special Lithuanian party and armed bodies and commanded them – exterminator platoons ("people's defenders"), armed groups of party-Soviet activists.

4. The most important method of the LKP(b) in fighting against the underground was not armed force (it belonged to the repressive bodies subordinated to Moscow), but anti-humane measures: political blackmail and the organization of deportations and imprisonment (kidnapping hostages) of the members of partisan families and relatives that did not commit any crimes against the occupation authorities as well as confiscation of their property. These people (representatives of all social layers of Lithuania) made up a separate political category of persons to be deported. This contradicted the theory of class struggle declared by communists. According to the data of the MGB of the LSSR, in 1944-1953, 12,259 of these persons were arrested, and 7,499 families were deported.

5. From 1950 (except 1953), the CK of the LKP(b) did not prepare anti-partisan decisions to be applied to the whole of Lithuania, but paid special attention to specific districts where resistance fighters were the most active.

5. Deportations

1. One of the most important crimes of the Communist Party was deportations, that is, forced and mass displacement of people from their permanent places of residence to the farthest northern and eastern regions of the SSRS. The purpose of deportations was to remove the most active, rational opposition groups of the population and entire social layers, to appropriate and take possession of their property, to intimidate the Lithuanian nation and to suppress any resistance to the occupation regime. By mass deportations of the population, the Communist Party sought dual purposes: to annihilate the social base of the supporters of resistance fighters and to liquidate strong farmers, called the kulaks, that were independent of the Soviet power, and thus prepare the Lithuanian country for forced collectivization.

According to the data of the MGB-KGB of the LSSR, in 1945-1953, 108,000 people or 29,230 families were deported from Lithuania. The accurate number of the deported people will be determined after the name lists of the deportees are announced.

2. Deportations in Lithuania were executed on the basis of the directives and instructions of the highest party and State bodies of the SSRS (the CK of the VKP(b), the Council of Ministers of the SSRS, the NKVD-MGB of the SSRS and the Extraordinary Conference of the NKVD-MGB of the SSRS). These administrative bodies of the LSSR were appointed to organize and carry out deportations: the CK of the LKP(b), the Council of Ministers of the LSSR, the NKVD-NKGB-MGB of the LSSR and their local sub-units. In 1945-1948, deportations were carried out under direct instructions from Moscow, but from 1949 till 1953, a republican procedure for the approval of the directives came into being. This procedure had to be first approved by the CK of the LKP(b). On the eve of deportations, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) would adopt

special top secret decisions and instructions on the organization of deportations and appropriation of the property of the deported people.

3. The most important deportation documents prepared in Lithuania were signed by the best-known leaders of the LKP(b): A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas and K.Preikšas, who was temporarily substituting him. At various party meetings, seeking to raise the fighting spirit of his associates, A.Sniečkus tried to justify deportations by the necessity of “the class struggle” and urged to make repressions in fighting with “the class enemies” still stricter.

4. The CK Bureau of the LKP(b) assigned each county a special commissioner of the CK of the LKP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars (the Council of Ministers) for the execution of deportations. Officials of the administration of the LSSR holding the highest nomenclature posts headed a group of commissioners from 4-5 counties. These commissioners (over 50 persons have been identified) would become the highest local power during deportations, and heads of local State Security bodies had to obey them. The commissioners were assisted by local party bodies, Komsomol organizations, exterminators and armed groups of party-Soviet activists.

5. After each deportation, at propagandistic meetings of the population driven there by force, the CK of the LKP(b) and local party leaders, while trying to conceal their criminal activity, attempted to prove that deportations were necessary. In their reports to higher authorities they openly lied that the population supported deportations.

6. The general order of deportations was not applied to close relatives of managing officials of the Soviet power.

6. Forced Elections

1. All elections to all levels of Soviets organized by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union were forced, anti-democratic, fictitious, discriminatory and criminal. Forced elections to the Supreme Soviet of the SSRS in 1946, to the Supreme Soviet of the LSSR in 1947 and to local Soviets in 1948 formally completed the stage of Sovietization of Lithuania.

2. Elections could be arranged only by the Communist Party. People who agitated to vote against communists or those who did not vote at all were considered enemies of the Soviet system. They suffered or could suffer repressions and used to become targets of the persecution by State Security personnel.

3. The Communist Party was concerned with the issues of political reliability of deputies; not a single citizen could become a deputy without the consent of the party committee.

4. Not all people were equal according to the Soviet laws, certain categories of people were in advance not included into the lists of voters. In 1945, 300,000 people were debarred from voting.

5. The main attribute of the communist elections was falsification of election results. Nobody controlled them because there were no political opponents or public observers. The authorities of LKP(b) assessed the work of party organizations according to election results. At the end of the election day, the remaining ballots would be put into the ballot boxes. Thus, the desired result reaching 99-100 per cent used to be achieved.

6. All post-war elections were held under conditions of armed struggle, political pressure and terror. Ordinary people of Lithuania faced threats of the communist power, demonstration of Soviet military force and actions of repressive bodies. On the other hand, they were constantly urged by partisans to boycott elections. No results of elections held under such conditions could be true.

7. Russianization

1. Throughout the period of its activity, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the RKP(b), the VKP(b), the SSKP) followed the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and Russian super-state chauvinism. Nations living within the SSRS had to be gradually assimilated. In 1938, learning of the Russian language became mandatory throughout the SSRS. After the war, this requirement was transferred to the education system of Lithuania. The Communist party designated Russianization as “the proletarian internationalism”: all nations

in the SSRS are equal, but the “most equal” of all is the Russian nation, rendering altruistic assistance to the others.

2. Russianization became a constituent part of “the socialist cultural revolution”, though it was not made legitimate by any documents or decisions. Russianization in Lithuania was conducted according to a plan and in several directions: through the policy of the cadre, by employing educational, scientific and cultural institutions and the Soviet Army. The most important hotbeds of Russianization in Lithuania were the CK apparatus of the LKP(b) (particularly the Division of Agitation and Propaganda), the Glavlit, the repressive bodies, the Republican Military Commissariat, agencies, enterprises and organizations of Union subordination.

3. The most active policy of Russianization was carried out in the area of the cadre. Lithuanians were replaced by Russian-speaking personnel (during the post-war years, about 130,000 persons came to Lithuania) on the basis of inadequate qualification of employees or accusing them of nationalism. The newcomers used to hold leading positions and would also become deputies of Lithuanian leaders. In 1951, out of 2,500 leading personnel of the LSSR, 54 per cent were Lithuanians. Lithuanians made up about 60 per cent in district power institutions and 41 per cent in cities. The LKP(b) and repressive bodies, including the Prosecutor’s Office, were Russianized the most.

4. In 1944 and 1945, the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) adopted several decisions regarding the Lithuanian language, which was a must for the newcomers. However, these decisions were formal. Those speaking Russian did not study the language, and Lithuanian communists, with the exception of several, did not raise this problem until the demise of Stalin either toadying or fearing to be accused of nationalism. The authorities of the LKP(b) officially approved of and favourably estimated all decisions of the Kremlin in reference to the establishment of the Russian language in Lithuania.

5. The results of the ten-year-long Russianization were obvious. Russian encroached upon the public life of Lithuania not only as the clerical language, but also as the common and the second “native” language. Most young and middle-aged people could speak Russian fluently or nearly fluently and could write in it. Russian established itself in most power institutions of republican subordination (in Vilnius and Klaipėda in almost all institutions); information notices and advertisements in cities and in some other places were most often only in Russian, central streets in many cities were renamed after Russian functionaries, monuments were erected in their honour, etc.

8. Anti-Semitism

1. After WWII, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union implemented the state policy of anti-Semitism. As early as the first post-war years, the political line of the CK of the VKP(b) started to be discernible: to restrict the possibility for Jews to work in party or Soviet power bodies or eliminate this possibility altogether. The Chairman of the Lithuanian Bureau of the CK of the VKP(b), later the Secretary of the CK of the SSKP for ideological issues M.Suslov always followed Stalinist and anti-Jewish attitudes. At the end of the 50s, the VKP(b) began to instigate political and ideological anti-Semitic campaigns and resorted to repressions. Anti-Semitism was officially designated as fighting against “Zionism”, “cosmopolitanism” and “Masonry”. Jews were incriminated with non-existent crimes, not allowed to hold leading posts, dismissed from work, tried and imprisoned, and some of them even killed. However, it was not the racist policy of the extermination of Jews. The authorities of the VKP(b) tried to oust them from state governing institutions and active public life. Persecution and repression of Jews went on throughout the SSRS and in communist countries of Eastern Europe. In the post-war Lithuania, Jews were forbidden to have their schools, press, they were persecuted for their religion, synagogues were closed, cemeteries were destroyed, etc. In 1949, the Museum of Jews was liquidated. In 1952, the monument to the victims of the Holocaust in Paneriai was pulled down, and the issue of the Holocaust was being ignored altogether.

2. After the war, due to the Holocaust and other reasons, few Jews remained in Lithuania. Their community was supplemented by Jews coming from the SSRS (in 1946, about 10,000 Jews lived in Lithuania). They worked in various institutions, some of them held high positions in the administration institutions of the LSSR and repressive bodies. The latter, as party members participating in repressions against Lithuanians,

people of other nationalities and even Jews themselves, were functionaries of the Soviet Lithuania, but not of Jews. In fact, these Soviet officials did not participate in the life of Jews and did not represent them.

3. In Lithuania, the anti-Semitic policy was carried out by the CK of the LKP(b) and the MGB of the LSSR. LKP leaders tried to prove that some Jews consciously committed acts of sabotage, that is, hindered the establishment of socialism. At CK plenums and other party meetings, party apparatus laid political grounds for anti-Semitism. However, it did not resort to large-scale political repressions. It was the MGB of the LSSR that tried to make this issue urgent. State Security personnel, trying to exaggerate the issue of anti-Semitism and make it more urgent, used to inform the authorities of the LKP(b) of the discontent of “the Soviet people” with the “sabotage activity of Jews”. It was mostly extracts from the letters confiscated by the MGB as well as anti-Semitic conversations of the population recorded by intelligence agents. State Security personnel began to suspect and persecute even Jewish communists, loyal supporters of the Soviet power. Thus, the MGB tried to prove that Jews were politically unreliable and the LKP(b) had to take measures against them justifying the political necessity to repress Jews.

4. The greatest political repercussions were caused by the “killer doctors” case in 1953. The authorities of the MGB of the LSSR, following in Moscow’s footsteps, also tried to prove that the health care system was “contaminated with hostile elements”, mostly Jews. The case of “killer doctors” caused great moral and spiritual damage to Lithuanian Jews.

5. In the post-war Lithuania, anti-Semitic phenomena did not acquire the scope of those in Moscow and Leningrad. The moderate attitudes of the Lithuanian leaders of the LKP(b), particularly that of A.Sniečkus, to the issue of anti-Semitism had a great influence on that. In 1953, the new authorities of the SSRS put an end to the open persecution of Jews, though even later there were cases of discrimination of Jews.

9. Soviet Law and Order

1. The Law in the Soviet Union nearly always defended the interests of the Communist State but not those of the citizen. Any criticism of the Communist Party or the Soviet power (the communist regime) was forbidden. The party controlled courts and the Prosecutor’s Office. All judges and prosecutors belonged to the party nomenclature, their work was discussed at the sittings of party committees.

2. In the post-war Lithuania, the system of law and order had two key functions: it assisted in suppressing the resistance to the Soviet occupation and reinforced the communist regime (the totalitarian state). Taking this into consideration, in 1944-1953, two categories of courts functioned in Lithuania: special and common.

3. Special courts were the repressive bodies of the SSRS in Lithuania, that is, the Extraordinary Conference at the NKVD(MVD) of the SSRS, the Military Tribunal of the NKVD(MVD) troops of the LSSR and the Transport Courts of the SSRS. Administratively, they were directly subordinated to Moscow, heard mostly political cases, tried Lithuanian resistance fighters, clergymen, adopted decisions on the deportation of the population, etc., and in fact were among the most important tools for suppressing resistance. According to the data of 1954 by the KGB of the LSSR, in 1944-1954, these courts convicted 34,012 persons (according to the calculations of Lithuanian historians – about 45,000) for “counter-revolutionary crimes”. All other cases were heard and judged by common courts, the so-called “people’s courts” of counties, cities and their districts, and to their higher institution, that is, the Supreme Court of the LSSR.

4. The CK apparatus of the LKP(b) maintained very close relations with special courts, the leading officials of which belonged to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b) (there were almost no Lithuanians in these courts). They sent A.Sniečkus information reports about convicted resistance fighters, arranged demonstration trials of partisans. The authorities of the LKP(b) had no major reproaches for the work of these courts; in fact, they approved of all suggestions submitted by them and only urged them to arrange more open trials. Repressive bodies did not take great interest in these courts, because they quite often discredited the repression policy of the Soviet power and disclosed crimes committed by it. Because of such failures, heads of special courts critically assessed the propaganda work of the LKP(b), its inability to win over “poor and middle-class” peasants, who constituted the greatest part of resistance fighters. These courts, particularly the Military Tribunal, encouraged still stronger reinforcement of repressions, criticized the

Ministry of Justice of the LSSR and the work of courts subordinated to it for apolitical attitudes, distortion of “the class line”, occurrences of impartiality in the work of courts, their “contamination” with politically unreliable personnel, etc.

5. Common courts, that is, “people’s” courts of cities, their districts and counties, and the Supreme Court of the LSSR were directly subordinated to the CK of the LKP(b) and local city and county party committees as well as to the Ministry of Justice of the LSSR. These courts mostly heard administrative and criminal cases that had to reinforce the communist regime. The Supreme Court of the LSSR that was entrusted with a relatively small number of political cases was an exception. In 1944-1954, this court convicted 2,385 persons for “crimes against the State”. During cadre cleansing campaigns, the CK of the LKP(b), particularly county party committees, accused court employees of being apolitical and judges of being politically unreliable and ingratiating themselves with “the kulaks”. The newly appointed judges had to be of communist views and merciless to class enemies, particularly to well-off peasants (“the kulaks”).

6. Common courts became repressive bodies of the economic terror policy executed by the Communist Party against the country of Lithuania. In 1944-1953, 107,876 persons were punished for not paying land taxes and 33,019 people—for not carrying out forced labour and produce deliveries to the state. The CK of the LKP(b) demanded that courts follow “the class line”; therefore, the severity of the punishment had to depend on the social origin and the status of the person under the trial.

7. The Communist Party controlled the work of the Prosecutor’s Office. All prosecutors belonged to the nomenclature of the CK of the LKP(b). Two categories of prosecutor’s offices operated in the post-war Lithuania: 1. the Prosecutor’s Office of the LSSR directly responsible to the CK of the LKP(b) and the Prosecutor’s Office of the SSRS; 2. the Military Prosecutor’s Office of the NKVD(MVD) troops of the LSSR and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Railways of the Western Region directly accountable to central agencies in Moscow. All these prosecutor’s offices, as repressive institutions, sanctioned genocide actions and political repressions of the Lithuanian population.

10. Spiritual Pressure

1. Through the apparatus of its power, particularly through party bodies, the Soviet Union controlled culture and the spiritual life of the Lithuanian society and persecuted those thinking differently using drastic measures. The alien communist ideology of Marxism-Leninism and mandatory materialistic view of the world were imposed on the population of Lithuania. The intelligentsia of Lithuania were forced to follow the communist ideology, praise the advantages of the Soviet system, the exclusiveness of the Russian nation, its extraordinary mission in the world and Lithuania. The communist ideology defended the imperial policy of the SSRS and treated the national culture as an alien phenomenon for the interests of socialism. It was declared that culture must be “national in its form but socialist in its contents”. It had to reinforce the Soviet regime.

2. In 1944-1953, the achievements of Lithuanian spiritual culture and historic heritage were being destroyed or transformed into the system of cultural values of the totalitarian state and communist society. Creators of Lithuanian professional culture were forced to obey the Soviet regime and the ideological dictate; therefore, their creations did not reflect the spiritual life of the Lithuanian nation or the tragic fate of the post-war people. Creative work was turned into an appendage of the policy of the Communist Party, an implement of the ideological brainwashing of the society. Administrative and instructive methods of the command of the LKP(b), dissociation from the achievements of culture and science of the world as well as from the national origins impeded the development of the national culture and science in Lithuania, eliminated the possibility of attaching the meaning to universal human values.

3. The policy of the VKP(b), directed against the fostering of Lithuanian national traditions and knowledge of the culture of the world, was called “the cultural revolution”. Its objective was to Sovietize, Russianize and ideologize spiritual life of people, subdue national and religious awareness and instill the Bolshevik ideology of intolerance of universal values of the mankind. The Communist Party considered the Lithuanian nation culturally backward, religious and superstitious.

4. All areas of culture and education in Lithuania were controlled and strictly administered by the apparatus of the CK the LKP(b), which was assisted by state institutions managing certain spheres of culture. The Directorate of Art Affairs was in charge of writers, artists, composers and theatre personnel, the Committee of Cultural and Educational Institutions was responsible for libraries, museums and culture centers, the Ministry of Education supervised schools, whereas they all were under the control of the Division of Culture and Science and the Division of Agitation and Propaganda of the CK of the LKP(b). The local communists of the CK apparatus of the LKP(b) K.Preikšas, V.Niunka, G.Zimanas, J.Žiugžda, A.Venclova had a great influence on the activity of these divisions.

5. Most Lithuanian intellectuals did not urge to openly oppose the Soviet occupation, almost did not participate in the illegal underground activity (with the exception of teachers), though they did not glorify or support the communist power, either. Therefore, many officials who were sent from Moscow did not trust the intelligentsia and wanted to get rid of them all. However, the official attitude of the Communist Party (A.Sniečkus, M.Suslov, M.Gedvilas) was that “the old intelligentsia must be reformed and employed in establishing socialism”. It was necessary that famous people approve of the Soviet power by making public statements and ordinary teachers express this approval during their lessons.

6. In order to discuss “the education” of the Lithuanian nation, the LKP(b) used to organize different congresses and conferences of intellectuals, seeking to secretly (with the help of State Security personnel) find out their political attitudes. Later, in special plenums of the CK of the LKP(b), famous Lithuanian people used to be condemned.

7. The reformation of the intelligentsia, which was organized by the LKP(b), was carried out together with the repressions executed by the NKVD-MGB of the LSSR. In 1944-1953, 1,651 representatives of creative and scientific intelligentsia were arrested, most of them were deported or imprisoned; there were also persons who were killed or otherwise punished. Among men of letters alone, 91 were repressed (in 1940-1953). In many cases, the CK of the LKP(b) approved of the imprisonment of intellectuals. J.Paleckis made attempts to save some intellectuals and defend certain aspects of Lithuanian history and manifestations of national culture as well as the use of the Lithuanian language.

8. The Communist Party controlled each printed word. Assisted by the Glavlit, the CK of the LKP(b) organized “the cleansing” of all libraries of Lithuania. Library stocks related to the time of the independent Lithuania and the achievements of the national culture were being destroyed. Those who concealed the literature to be confiscated were charged with severe accusations. In 1944-1951, more than 600,000 books were withdrawn from libraries; few of them were transferred to special stocks, while the rest were destroyed. Literature published in the years of the German occupation (3,7 mln books) was destroyed too.

9. The CK of the LKP(b) organized campaigns for destroying monuments erected during the years of independence. In total, during the Soviet period, mainly in the Stalinist years, 526 monuments, sculptures and fine architecture works were destroyed, desecrated or devastated. The monument of the Three Crosses, the frontal sculptures of Vilnius Cathedral, etc. were barbarously demolished. In the places of the torn down monuments or in other sites, memorials to the most famous representatives of the Russian nation or distinguished Soviet statesmen or leaders were erected.

10. The education system of Lithuania created during the period of independence was completely destroyed, and comprehensive schools were turned into hotbeds of propagation of the communist ideology. To prevent the occurrence of persons opposing the regime among future intellectuals, candidates to higher schools were selected by special admissions boards which were under the control of local party committees.

11. Lithuanians suffered great moral harm when the CK of the LKP(b) banned the old Lithuanian anthem “the National Hymn” by V.Kudirka. Singing of it became politically intolerable, legal charges could be brought against people for that (accusing them of counter-revolutionary agitation”). In 1950, the CK of the LKP(b) approved a new anthem of the LSSR. Words glorifying the Russian nation, V.Lenin and J.Stalin sounded in it.

11. The Forced Campaign for Signing the Letter to J.Stalin in 1945

1. In the summer of 1945, Lithuania boycotted the campaign for signing the letter of gratitude of the Lithuanian nation to J.Stalin, which was organized by the CK of the LKP(b). The Communist Party, assisted by exterminators, members of the Komsomol and party activists, resorted to forcible measures to make at least the majority of the population sign the letter. People avoided that.
2. On 11 July 1945, being aware of the political failure of Lithuanian communists, the Commissioner of the NKVD-NKGB of the SSRS in Lithuania Gen. I.Tkachenko ordered his subordinates to arrest everyone who would hinder signing the letter. The number of people who suffered for that is not known, but later, collecting of signatures was more successful.
3. In the course of this action, disagreements between the repressive bodies and the authorities of the LKP(b) came to light. In their address to Stalin, I.Tkachenko and others accused the CK of the LKP(b) and lower party bodies for their inactivity. Taking this into consideration, in conjunction with the repressive apparatus, the CK of the LKP(b) took various measures to increase the number of those who would sign.
4. According to the official data of the Soviet power, out of almost 1.5 mln of the Lithuanian population having the right to vote, 640,875 people signed the letter to Stalin (the data have not been verified) by exerting psychological, moral and physical pressure (arrests).

12. Repressive Policy against the Lithuanian Catholic Church

1. One of the main spiritual opposition forces of the Lithuanian nation resisting Sovietization was the Lithuanian Catholic Church. The communist power resorted to brutal violence against clergymen and believers. During the post-war years, the authorities tried to eliminate the Church from public life, interfered in the internal affairs of religious communities and controlled them. The communist power did not acknowledge any prerogative of the Vatican with regard to the issues of the ruling and hierarchy of the Lithuanian Catholic Church. The most important matters of the Church used to be discussed at the meetings of the CK Bureau of the LKP(b) or its divisions as well as at the Commissioner's of the CARC, where ways of damaging the Church or permission to priests to take different clerical positions were discussed.
2. With the help of the institution of the Commissioner of the CARC and repressive bodies, the CK of the LKP(b) adopted several political decisions directed against the Church, which later enabled the above-mentioned institutions to pursue the policy of intimidation, blackmail, physical violence and repressions against the clergy. The property of the Church was nationalized, teaching of religion at schools and catechization of groups of children were banned, mass celebration of religious holidays was made minimal. In 1946, a forced registration of religious communities and priests started. The clergy were accused of cooperation with the underground; therefore, in its anti-partisan decisions, the CK of the LKP(b) obligated repressive bodies "to put an end to their hostile activity". In 1944–1953, 362 priests and 4 bishops were imprisoned (two of the bishops perished). About 130 churches and all monasteries were closed down (approximately 14,000 monks were dismissed) and only Kaunas Theological Seminary was left, which was constantly persecuted.
3. During the post-war years, the Catholic Church sustained considerably greater pressure of the Lithuanian communists than it was required by Moscow. Due to the excessive assiduity of the LKP(b), its activity was later called "the leftist deviation". A.Sniečkus and other communists were criticized for that in Moscow, but they never admitted their crimes (the so-called "errors").
4. The main initiators and organizers of the repression against the Church in Lithuania were the communists A.Sniečkus, M.Gedvilas, K.Preikšas, B.Pušinis and all the heads of the NKVD-NKGB-MGB of the LSSR.

General conclusions

The crimes of the communist regime in Lithuania in 1944-1953 were predetermined by the totalitarian nature of the communist State of the Soviet Union and the anti-Lithuanian policy of the Soviet occupation executed by Moscow as well as its consequences. Seeking to retain Lithuania within the Soviet Union by force, the communist regime prohibited the freedom of the world view, continually grossly violated elementary human rights and freedoms, executed criminal policy of state terror, war crimes, repressions, and the extermination of the Lithuanian nation that was, in fact, equal to genocide.

All most important political judgements in reference to the extermination of the Lithuanian people and repression used to be made by the authorities of the Communist Party in Moscow. In Lithuania, all occupation bodies of the administration power approved of them and would adopt corresponding decisions. The Lithuanian Communist Party (the authorities and the structural parts of the party: the Central Committee of the LKP(b), county, city and rural district committees of the LKP(b), secretaries and partorgs of party committees and party organizations) became the inspirer, organizer and executioner of criminal activity, involved functionaries of the Soviet apparatus and quite a few young people, that had been forced to join the Komsomol, into the criminal activity.

All activity of the Communist Party was based on the Stalinist theory of the intensifying class struggle. At ideological communist functions, one social group of the population would be opposed to another, attempts would be made to prove that the poorest part of the population was the most progressive social layer, national discord was instigated by artificially extolling the Russian nation. The LKP(b) ideologically based, justified and even encouraged extermination of part of the Lithuanian nation or people thinking differently in regard to politics. Communist terror and political repressions affected about half a million of Lithuanian people.

In 1944-1953, the LKP(b) and its territorial sub-unit – the Communist Party of Lithuania (the Bolsheviks) were, in fact, an organization of political criminals, that, secretly from the society, planned and executed crimes against humanity, the Lithuanian nation and the statehood. The Communist Party (the LKP) never publicly assessed its past or admitted the committed crimes.